On the structure and internal mechanisms of business incubators: A comparative case study by Ahmad, Ali
On the Structure and Internal 
Mechanisms of Business Incubators: 














Dr. Sarah Ingle  
 
 
DCU Business School 






I hereby certify that this material, which I now submit for assessment on the 
programme of study leading to the award of PhD is entirely my own work, and 
that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and 
does not to the best of my knowledge breach any law of copyright, and has 
not been taken from the work of others save and to the extent that such work 




Signed:    
ID No.  57127913  
Date   January 10, 2012 
 3 
Acknowledgement & Dedication 
 
The transliteration of the above Arabic calligraphic text is: Bismillah ir-Rahman 
ir-Rahim. It is translated as: "In the name of Allah, the most Gracious, the 
most Compassionate". This axiom opens every chapter (bar one) of the 
glorious Quran – the book of revelations by Allah (God) to Prophet 
Mohammad (sallallahu alaihi wasallam – lit. peace be upon him). Bismillah ir-
Rahman ir-Rahim adorns every human act with a meaning and purpose. It 
conveys the grand majesty of Allah and is a call to His essence. Bismillah ir-
Rahman ir-Rahim is, therefore, the most appropriate foreword for this thesis 
because it is true that without Allah’s supreme, loving kindness I would not 
have had the capability, capacity, motivation, resources, desire and all 
necessary pre-requisites and requirements to pursue and complete this piece 
of research. Hence, this work is most humbly dedicated to Him –  the First 
and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden, the Architect and the ex-nihilio 
Creator, the lone Master of the universe and the All-Knower of everything.  He 
willed it so and it was. 
 
 
Innama qawluna lishayin itha aradnahu an naqoola lahu kun fayakoon 
 
And Our word unto a thing, when We intend it, is only that We say unto it: Be! and it is  




On the Structure and Internal Mechanisms of 







It is an established economic development paradigm that entrepreneurship 
promotes innovation and encourages the creation of high quality jobs. In order 
to enhance entrepreneurial activity, the focus in Ireland to date has been on 
public-sector venture creation programmes. Of such programmes, business 
incubators, over the years, politically and in terms of public funding, have 
received perhaps the highest level of attention. Thus, incubators in Ireland 
have become important policy instruments for promoting early stage 
entrepreneurship.  
 
The research project outlined in this thesis to investigate this important 
phenomenon began with an extensive review of the incubator-incubation 
literature. This review showed that given the importance attributed to 
incubators, surprisingly little is known about how they function, or, the internal 
process of incubation. In other words, what is not understood completely are 
the dynamics of an incubator’s internal processes, normative environment and 
structural properties which enable human activity. Researching these aspects 
is important due to their important link with incubation “success”. A more 
sophisticated understanding of how incubators incubate will allow us to 
exercise more control over the quality of incubation programs, thereby, 
influencing the likelihood of incubated firms surviving after the incubation 
period.  
 
In order to investigate the incubation process and incubators’ normative 
environment and structural properties, a qualitative, multi-site case study 
approach was utilised. A pragmatist-interpretivist philosophy and the social 
mechanisms literature informed the research’s meta-theoretical lens. Data 
was collected during 2009-2010 at two different types of incubation facilities in 
Dublin; a ‘community enterprise centre’ and a ‘university campus-based high-
tech incubator’.  
 
The research’s most significant finding is that incubation is primarily relational 
in nature, and the process is co-produced by both the incubator manager (IM) 
and a specific client in independent dyads. A number of factors influence the 
development of IM-Client, Client-Client, Client-IM-Client and Client-Third Party 
relationships, chief of which are the leadership style of the IM, the physical 




It was also determined that the scale, scope, intensity, frequency and thus the 
quality of incubation is dependent on, what has been termed, an incubation 
click. This is a bond based on the understanding that incubation assistance 
can be competently provided, and that such mentoring, coaching or 
developmental assistance is also proactively sought. Incubation is triggered in 
a sophisticated normative environment under the prevalence of ground rules, 
subtle signals, the interplay of personal histories, hidden agendas, 
perceptions of value and human biases.  
 
As a result of this research our knowledge of various aspects of incubators’ 
structure and their status as complex hybrid organisations has also increased. 
Incubators’ structural attributes such as de-coupling, mis-alignment of 
managerial incentives and sources of internal coordination and control 
uncertainty suggest why it continues to be difficult to evaluate their 
performance and socio-economic impact.  
 
Overall, the research has raised the profile of incubation research in the 
incubator-incubation discourse.  Although modelling the incubation process is 
difficult due to high levels of randomness inherent in the internal incubator 
environment, the increased understanding of process variables, normative 
patterns and structural properties developed as a result of this research will 
allow the introduction of efficiencies to improve the chances of incubation 
“success”.  
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Background| Significance | Focus | Structure 
 
 
In this chapter, background details of the research are presented along with 
its objective, the research questions, the approach to theory development and 
the structure of the thesis. 
 
Since the 1970s, when the contribution of small new ventures to economic 
development began to be increasingly recognised, a more sophisticated 
understanding of the mechanisms to promote their creation and growth has 
been struggling to emerge. Researchers and policy makers have constantly 
engaged with the issue of how programmes can be structured to facilitate the 
new venture creation process and to increase success rates. As a result, 
there is growing awareness that new venture creation is a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon. A whole host of variables relating to the entrepreneur, the new 
firm and the environment interact in complex ways within the dynamic system 
of new enterprise development (Gartner, 1985; Lichtenstein et al, 2006; 
Davidsson & Gordon, 2010; Shepherd, 2011) 
 
Out of a myriad of new venture creation mechanisms such as business, 
science and technology parks, grant assistance schemes, educational 
initiatives, mentoring programmes, it is business incubation that most 
comprehensively resolves the issues surrounding the new venture creation 
process.  Incubators create, within a physical boundary, the ideal conditions to 
bring together the expertise and resources necessary for promoting the 
development and growth of new ventures. The venture creation process 
ongoing inside an incubator is controllable, brings providers and consumers 
within close proximity and allows easy and timely access to resources for a 
particularly turbulent phase in new venture survival.  
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The focus of much of the research on incubators to-date has been on 
understanding their social and fiscal contributions to various facets of 
government policy and vice versa (Hannon & Chaplin, 2003; Hackett & Dilts, 
2004a; Phan et al, 2005; Hackett & Dilts, 2008; Patton et al, 2009; Warren et 
al, 2009). Such assessments are usually restricted to a particular country or 
region and employ quantitative approaches to analyse data on a variety of 
indicators related to incubator performance. While such research has 
produced very useful insights, it is limited in the understanding that it provides 
about the context and process of new venture creation going on inside an 
incubator. Therefore, there is a role for additional research on (a) the 
relationships between the various facets of the internal process and their 
inter-relationships; (b) the impact of the internal normative environment; and 
(c) the contributions of the unique structural properties of incubators to new 
venture ‘success’. Investigating incubators’ internal mechanisms, norms and 
structure are essential for understanding the entrepreneurial process or life-
cycle (Russell & Russell, 1992). Researching these three inter-related aspects 
will help in developing new theory to explain the variation in incubation 
outcomes across models and regions as well as differences in incubator 
performance in a cross-national context.  
 
Following on from the above, the main objective of the research presented in 
this thesis is: to investigate the normative environment, internal mechanisms 
and structural properties of incubator organisations for the purpose of 
identifying key elements that positively influence the development of new 
enterprises.  
 
In order to progress this objective, a number of questions will be addressed in 
this thesis: 
 
1. How are the various stages of incubation organised? 
 
2. What are the various strategies of dyadic co-production? 
 
3. How do the structural properties of incubators impact on the organisation 
and orchestration of the incubation process? 
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4. How does the internal normative environment impact on the organisation 
and orchestration of the incubation process? 
 
5. What is the nature of the relationship between the incubator organisation 
and client firm? 
 
6. In what ways does the incubator manager’s leadership style impact on co-
production efficacy? 
 
7. How is incubation triggered in a dyadic setting? 
 
8. How does Client-Client interaction within the incubator organisation take 
place?  
 
9. How are new firms inducted for incubation?  
 
The research questions above are derived from a systematic examination and 
review of the incubation process literature. In this review, an analysis of 23 
previously published studies relevant to this research is undertaken. Details of 
the methodology employed for developing a pool of relevant studies, as well 
as the criteria used to select the most applicable of these is provided later. 
The selected studies were categorised into one of six conceptualisations 
which describe the predominant theoretical view on incubation held by 
previous researchers. These conceptualisations are: (1) incubation as a 
mechanism for new venture creation; (2) incubation as a mechanism for 
resource allocation; (3) incubation as a socio-political game; (4) incubation as 
a co-product of incubator-incubatee dyads; (5) incubation as an outcome of 
network behaviour; and (6) incubatee selection as a predictable and 
controllable process. The literature review assisted in identifying knowledge 
gaps and areas for further research, which facilitated the development of the 
research’s objective and associated questions.  
 
The research questions acted as useful starting points and guides for the 
research process, and were in no way used to limit / ring-fence the scope of 
enquiry as is usually the case in positivist or hypothetico-deductive 
approaches. In order to deploy a hypothetico-deductive approach, a 
conceptual framework linked to hypotheses to be tested, proved or disproved 
would have been required. It was not possible to develop such a framework 
(linked to hypotheses) due to the paucity of relevant research on the 
 12 
incubation process. There were very few studies that made their exclusive 
focus (either separately or together) incubators’ internal mechanisms, 
normative environment and structural properties. As a result, a holistic picture 
is missing of what occurs inside an incubator that introduces positive changes 
in client firms1, thereby promoting their growth and development after the 
incubation period. In the absence of a high level of background understanding 
of the incubation process’s dynamics, major impacting variables and their 
causal relationships, an exploratory strategy based in an inductive, qualitative 
and interpretive approach was ideal.  
 
A systematic and two-tracked approach is used to address the research 
questions. First, theoretical frameworks from the social sciences were 
scrutinised to assess compatibility with the research’s objective, in other 
words, the lens through which to analyse data and build new theory. As a 
result, the social mechanisms literature was identified as it provides the 
concepts and language not only to understand the nature of the questions 
being posed, but to make sense of observations about the internal processes, 
norms and structural properties of incubators. Second, actual examples of 
processes, norms and structural properties were scrutinised in order to see 
how these positively (and negatively) influence the internal incubation 
environment and the development of new enterprises. This analysis was 
carried out at two Irish business incubation facilities (a community enterprise 
centre and a high-technology university campus incubator).  
 
The first track focuses on theory and the second on practice. The 
development of knowledge involves a complicated interplay between the two; 
neither alone is sufficient. Yet this interplay does not occur in a smooth or 
linear fashion. Trying to describe the path of this kind of research as well as 
the substance of the argument presents challenges for the researcher. 
 
The final structure of the thesis is a function of the systemic nature of what 
was being investigated and the way the subject is being approached. 
                                                 
1 Enhancements or improvements introduced as a result of incubation intervention which positively contribute to 
the post incubation survivability of new ventures. 
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Although the theoretical lens is presented first, followed by the empirical 
research, it should be emphasised that both tracks were pursued 
simultaneously during the course of the empirical research and in the 
development of the conclusions. The presentation of the research is 
organised as it is for ease of exposition. To facilitate the journey through the 
thesis, a brief outline is now presented: 
 
In the next chapter (Chapter 2), background literature on incubators-
incubation is presented to set the geographical context for this research, and 
to outline the research problem and its significance. This sets the stage for 
Chapter 3 which deals with the internal process of incubation. In this chapter a 
systematic review of published literature on the incubation process is 
presented. As already outlined, 23 studies were selected, categorised and 
reviewed which helped in identifying gaps in knowledge along with avenues to 
advance research in the area. The main conclusion arising from this review 
was that the present functionalist research agenda being pursued in the 
incubator-incubation area has resulted in ‘black-box’ models that place little 
emphasis on processes and normative and structural variables.  
 
The theoretical framework used to guide the research is presented in Chapter 
4. The feasibility of extant frameworks from social theory in the study of 
processes or mechanisms is explored, resulting in the identification of the 
Social Mechanisms literature. The two broad approaches for studying social 
mechanisms – the rational choice and the body of work that goes under the 
rubric of practice-action theory – are scrutinised. It is shown that both rational 
choice and the practice-action tradition have weaknesses, and that 
considering the spirit and objective of this research, Gross’s (2009) new 
pragmatist theory of social mechanisms is the ideal way forward. In this 
chapter, when Gross’s (2009) base theory is applied to incubation, it results in 
a completely new mechanisms–based conceptualisation of the incubation 
process.  
 
The philosophical worldview and theoretical lens adopted for the research 
inevitably has an impact on methodology and method, and this impact is 
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scrutinised in the development of the research methodology in Chapter 5. In 
this chapter the usefulness of the inductive multi-site comparative case study 
methodology is discussed as the most appropriate approach for studying 
incubation as a social mechanism. A detailed case study protocol is also 
presented.  
 
The next five chapters (Chapters 6-10) present an analysis of the empirical 
case data. The first of these is non-analytical and provides background details 
on the two case organisations. The remaining four chapters are analytical and 
present the themes and patterns emerging from the case data analysis work. 
These chapters and their accompanying themes have been organised on the 
basis of the research’s envisaged main output i.e. new theory of incubators’ 
internal mechanisms, normative environment and structural properties.  
 
In Chapter 11 - Discussion & Conclusion, the major contributions of the 
research are presented. The research questions are revisited and it is 
demonstrated how these have been ‘answered’. A number of conceptual 
frameworks are presented to capture the research’s contributions to theory. 
Two questions are posed and discussed: was the choice of social 
mechanisms as a theoretical framework an adequate one and to what extent 
are the findings from this research generalisable to the wider incubator-
incubation phenomenon? The thesis ends with a reflection on the research’s 
limitations, its impact on professional practice and recommendations for 
further research.  
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In this chapter background literature on the incubator-incubation phenomenon 
is examined and the resulting analysis is used to define the research problem 
being identified in the thesis. This is done by, first, placing previous literature 
within a relevant geographic and policy context and extracting the reasons for 
the wide scale adoption of the incubator model as a new venture creation 
mechanism. Arguments developed highlight that in the flurry of political 
lobbying during the 1990s-2000s that led to the rapid expansion of incubators-
incubation across the European Union (EU), policy makers, practitioners and 
researchers alike failed to focus on what is key to understanding incubators’ 
true impact – internal incubation processes. Second, a review of incubators’ 
development and impact at EU member state-level is presented which allows 
for a clearer context-bound sense of the state-of-art in incubator-incubation 
research to emerge. In turn it becomes possible to clearly highlight the 
direction of this research project in a stalemate between two opposing camps 
– one which has produced evidence to suggest that incubators make a 
significant difference in reducing start-up risk and the other camp which 
believes incubators do not give tax payers value-for-money. Structured in this 
way, the chapter is able to draw attention to the essential ‘missing ingredient’ 
in previous research which is key to understanding incubators’ impact, define 
the research problem and setup a context for the following literature review 
chapter.   
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2.1 Incubation Policy and Landscape at the European Union Level 
 
The support for incubators-incubation at the EU level comes from a number of 
broad policies to bolster the growth in the number of SMEs. EU policy aimed 
at supporting SMEs can be found in the ‘European Charter for Small 
Enterprises’ (ECSE) which was instituted in the mid-1990s2. This Charter 
replaced the paradigm that emphasised the importance of large corporations 
as engines of economic progress and job creation. Instead, during the 1990s, 
EU policy and politics were re-focused to support the growth and development 
of small business. This focus remains, to-date, on top of the policy agenda.  
 
Under the ECSE’s mandate two initiatives were launched in 1997, the 
‘Business Environment Simplification Task Force’ and the ‘Action Plan to 
Promote Entrepreneurship and Competitiveness’. These initiatives brought 
together representatives from the business community and public authorities 
in EU Member States to prepare independent reports on ways of improving 
legislation and removing unnecessary hindrances to the development of 
European businesses, particularly SMEs.  
 
Progress Reports from EU member states on the implementation of the ECSE 
have been reviewed and discussed at annual conferences and meetings from 
2001 organised by the European Commission (EC). Since the 2004 
Conference on the ECSE held in Dublin, parties to the Charter have 
increasingly focused on ‘Innovation and Technology Transfer’ (EC-Enterprise 
Directorate General, 2004). This can be termed as the beginning of the new 
policy focus towards supporting innovative new SMEs and stemmed from 
research that suggested that from the total population of European SMEs, 
only a fraction (2%) were responsible for the majority of competitive 
innovations and thus jobs created (EURO INFO, 2000).   
 
                                                 
2 From the website of the European Commission - 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise_policy/charter/charter2001.htm (accessed Sept. 2009). 
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In 2006, the above broad-based agreement on the importance of innovation to 
European SME growth and competitiveness turned into official policy through 
the EC’s adoption of the communication on innovation ‘Putting knowledge into 
practice: A broad-based innovation strategy for the EU’. This communication 
was augmented in 2007 with the EC’s adoption of  "Lead Market Initiative for 
Europe". In the same year, the EC launched the ‘Competitiveness and 
Innovation Framework Programme (2007-2013)’ which aims to encourage the 
competitiveness of European enterprises by supporting innovation activities, 
provide better access to finance and deliver business support services in the 
regions3. The purpose of these policy frameworks and programmes is to call 
upon EU Member States “to make the structural reforms necessary to deliver 
the results required…[and]…to enable Member States to develop new 
measures in favour of the support of innovation, taking into account the 
identified market failures of Europe in this domain”4. 
 
The main argument for the correction of the alleged market failures suggested 
by the EC Innovation Policy, is the curbing of SME failure, especially in the 
start-up phase. Empirical data on firm dynamics in the OECD suggests 30 to 
40 per cent of entering firms do not survive the first two years and although 
failure rates decline with duration, only about 40 to 50 per cent of entering 
firms in a given year are still in business seven years later (Scarpetta et al, 
2002). Thus, for reducing entrepreneurial risk and to improve new firm 
survival rates, the EC Innovation Policy recommends the provision of 
business support services to new innovative start-ups for reducing the risk of 
business failure (Commission of the European Committees, 2005).  
 
Evidence in support of business support services such as incubators-
incubation is found across a spectrum of policy documents and reports. For 
example, a 2002 EC-funded study ‘Benchmarking European Incubators’ found 
that the survival rate of incubator clients was significantly higher (80–90% still 
exist after 5 years), than the business success rate amongst the wider SME 
                                                 
3 From the website of the European Commission - http://ec.europa.eu/cip/index_en.htm  (accessed Sept. 2009) 
4 From the website of the EC – Enterprise & Industry Policy Areas – Innovation Policy - 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/innovation/index_en.htm (accessed Sept. 2009). 
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community (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2002).  A 2003 EU-
wide green paper on entrepreneurship suggests incubators are important for 
start-ups during the initial difficult period and the wider availability of 
mentoring is useful to support entrepreneurs when they develop their firms 
(EU-Commission of the European Communities, 2003).  Finally, a 2009 
European BIC (Business Incubation Centre) Network (an EU/EC funded body) 
study states the increase in start-ups marks a four year upward trend, which 
demonstrates that BICs continue to make an ever more important impact on 
enterprise creation in Europe and beyond (EBN, 2009). 
 
An exact count of business incubators in the EU does not exist. The CORDIS 
incubator database (CID) managed by the EC suggests a figure of 7005. 
However, the veracity of CID’s claims have been challenged: for instance, 
Aerts, Matthyssens, & Vandenbempt (2007, pp. 258) suggest that the 
“CORDIS database is not subjected to any ‘quality control’... [upon 
examining]…the database more closely, it appeared that not all organisations 
in the database were real incubators”. Further, an EC-funded and supported 
study of 2006 highlighted that CORDIS significantly underestimates the 
availability of incubation facilities in Europe. There are several reasons for 
these discrepancies, for instance that entries into the CID are voluntary, are 
not validated, or kept up to date - this limits the value of this database for 
analysis (Goddard & Chouk, 2006). Another estimate comes from a 2006 
survey and study supported by the EC and conducted by researchers at the 
Paris Dauphine University’s ‘Economics of Business Incubation (Incunomics) 
Project’. This report presents an estimate of 936 (Goddard and Chouk, 2006). 
 
A number of explanations can be presented for the unavailability of precise 
figures on the number of incubators in EU member states: (a) ‘definitional 
ambiguity’ – the problem of defining or ascertaining what facility or 
programme can qualify as an incubator or incubation support (Hackett & Dilts, 
2004a); (b) the blurring of distinction between science parks, business 
incubators, research parks, technology parks and so on (Aerts et al, 2007); 
                                                 
5 From the website of CORDIS on the European Commission - http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/bi/ (accessed Sept., 
2009). 
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and (c) the unavailability of an EU-wide system of centralised accreditation 
and record keeping (Tamásy, 2007). Thus, a valid and rigorous explanation of 
the growth of the business incubator phenomenon in Europe on a 
representative and theoretically grounded bases still needs to be developed.   
 
In terms of the EU’s incubator best practice recommendations to member 
states – a 2002 EU incubator benchmarking study presents a general ‘model 
of incubation’ based on EU-wide survey data. The model uses benchmarks 
that depict incubator efficiency and performance in terms of using inputs, 
developing and orchestrating processes and ensuring a steady supply of 
quality outputs (see Figure 1 below). This model is widely quoted in the policy 
literature on incubators and has been a benchmark for EU states.  
 
Figure 1 – Business Incubation Model 





Although the above model is a useful attempt, it has serious limitations such 
as: (1) the model is divorced from the national and regional environment and 
the macro-politics of institutional change which determine the real aims and 
objectives of state-level incubation systems (Aernoudt, 2004); (2) the total 
absence of the role and influence of the incubatee firm - an important party in 
the co-production dynamic of the incubation process (Rice, 2002); and (3) the 
model is fundamentally inward looking because it is presenting a ‘black-box’ 
view of the process of incubation (Hackett & Dilts, 2008). According to the 
model, a number of independent ‘services’ feed into ‘incubation’ which in turn 
feed into the ‘process’ black-box. There is no sense of what services come 
first and why, their relationships to stages of growth of incubating firms and 
causal mechanisms. Without due attention to the process of incubation, the 
internal normative environment and incubators’ special structural properties a 
holistic understanding of ‘what incubators really do’ and ‘how they do what 
they do’ cannot emerge.  
 
In conclusion, business incubation these days enjoys heightened political 
support since evidence suggests that potential investors, in times of economic 
crises and downturn, are hesitant and reluctant to invest in uncertain and risky 
high-tech projects (Sauner-Leroy, 2004). For politicians and bureaucrats, 
business incubation offers the ideal venture creation vehicle, in that it is a 
concrete and verifiable investment in an empirically verified idea which works 
around the world, supports local communities and helps to promote small-
scale hi-tech entrepreneurship in both times of economic prosperity and 
downturn (Costa-David et al, 2002). In the foreseeable future, incubators will 
continue to grow and remain popular because, firstly, it is inherently difficult to 
evaluate incubation outcomes and to link these to programmatic objectives 
due to the special methodological challenges that such research presents 
(Sherman & Chappell, 1998).  Secondly, since the academic community is 
fairly divided over the contentious issue of real incubator impact, no truly 
scientific challenge has been presented to suggest that incubators don’t work 
(Tamásy, 2007). Therefore, incubators are here to stay and there is little to be 
gained by challenging their existence through more impact assessment / 
evaluation-type research. For politicians, bureaucrats, practitioners and 
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researchers then, the way forward is to study the ‘impact’ of incubators more 
closely by focusing on incubation’s processes and investigating which 
processes contribute to new venture creation ‘success’, how, why and under 
what conditions. Such a way forward will allow us to develop a more 
sophisticated and nuanced understanding of a phenomenon that has become 
an important institutionalised component of the EU’s and its member states’ 
national innovation systems.   
 
In the following sections, details on the incubation environments of Germany 
and Italy are presented to highlight differences in (a) national policy objectives, 
(b) prevalent models, and (c) results of incubator impact evaluations. The 
purpose here is to scrutinise previous incubator-incubation background 
literature in appropriate categories and to highlight the predominant research 
trend or focus. There are several rationales for the inclusion of these two 
exemplar EU states; first, the included states represent the Latin and 
Germanic approaches to incubation in the EU and as such are considerably 
different so as to allow an effective comparison (Aernoudt, 2004). Second, of 
late, in comparison to other EU states, a significant volume of incubator-
incubation research has emerged from Germany and Italy. The conclusions of 
such research are arguably more sensitive than the diffused results of studies 
that look at whole regions or continents. Other settings like Sweden, France 
and the UK were considered, however, the number of available studies was 
quite low which did not make a state-level analysis feasible. Finally, in terms 
of sheer numbers, history and state-of-development, Germany and Italy 
represent the EU forerunners in the incubator-incubation area. It is argued 
that geographic contextualisation makes the following review of background 
incubator-incubation literature not only more relevant, but also helps in 
comparing and contrasting the outputs of previous research in a meaningful 
manner. The notion of comparison reveals the fringes of what is known about 
the phenomenon which in turn allows for the identification of new vistas to 
take knowledge further and in defining the problem being identified in this 
thesis. It is shown how following the existing research agenda is not going to 
result in positive advances in knowledge. To further research in the area, a 




A hindrance was faced by the researcher in developing an overview of 
incubation in Germany. This related to the problem of a lack of studies 
published in the English language. However, due to the commentary on and 
analysis of previous industry-level research undertaken by public bodies or 
academicians by two German researchers Christine Tamásy & Michael 
Schwartz who have published in English, a number of valid and interesting 
aspects about the structure and workings of the German incubation industry 
come to the fore: 
 
First, Germany has a relatively long incubation tradition and a very dense 
incubator population. Major growth occurred following the reunification in 
1990. Due to restructuring of the region’s economy, large non-competitive 
industrial plants ceased operations and were replaced by a combination of 
new local businesses and inward investment. Thus, incubators served to 
boost regional competitiveness (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, 
2002). The first incubator, BIG (German Business & Innovation Centre), was 
set up in Berlin in 1983. Since the establishment of Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
Deutscher Technologiezentren or The German Association of Innovation, 
Technology and Business Incubation Centres (ADT) in 1988, incubators 
increased in prominence and this is evidenced by the increase in the total 
number of incubators to presently over 400 (Schwartz & Hornych, 2008), one 
the highest in the EU (see Figure 2 below). ADT now boasts a membership of 
nearly 400 representing 154 Incubators and other Associated and Affiliated 
Members.  
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Figure 2 – Innovation Centres in Germany 




ADT’s membership of over 400 represents only one of the two major 
categories of business incubators in Germany. These broad categories are 
the ‘Gewerbezentrum’ or business incubator (BI) and “Technologie- und 
Gründerzentrum” or technology and founder Centre (TC). BIs are explicitly 
concerned with the successful start-up of new firms where client selection is 
not based on either technological competence or innovativeness. TCs, on the 
other hand, focus on the growth and development of innovative SMEs (not 
necessarily start-ups). Tenant selection criteria here is captured by the 
German umbrella concept of or “Technology & Founder Centre”, thus 
selection is a combination of both constructs – innovativeness and founder 
characteristics (Schwartz & Hornych, 2008). There is a third category also, 
“Gründerzentrum” or “Technology orientated incubators” - – where between 
50% and 74% of client firms are classified as technology-based firms (Centre 
for Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2002).  
 
Second, according to Sternberg et al (1997), in their survey of German 
incubators, the three over-arching goals that German incubators attributed to 
themselves, in order of importance, included (a) the support of start-ups, (b) 
the creation of qualified jobs and (c) the intensification of knowledge and 
technology transfer (Sternberg et al, 1997). The ADT adds a further two more 
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objectives: “Promoting Regional Economic Development” and “Creating 
Financial Self-Sustainability” (ADT-Friedrichsdorf, 2008).  
 
Third, German incubators rely considerably on state support for survival. ADT 
reports that a high number of local/regional, State, Federal, EU-Support 
Programmes are available to incubators in addition to High-Tech 
Gründerfonds operating since April 2006 (ADT-Friedrichsdorf, 2008). Coupled 
with the lack of financing from Private Equity particularly in the seed phase, 
the state dependence syndrome, as witnessed with incubation facilities in 
other countries around the world (Phan et al, 2005), is also prevalent in 
Germany. 
 
Fourth, incubators in Germany offer three levels of support to nascent firms: 
(1) provision of spatially concentrated and flexible rental space at below 
market price (office and manufacturing space, laboratories, etc.); (2) a number 
of shared facilities and services  such as conference rooms, secretarial 
support, IT and presentation infrastructure, etc.), charged through allowance 
or a moderate user fee; and (3) a variety of managerial services and business 
assistance in the areas of marketing, accounting, human resources or legal 
matters; and (4) the incubator takes the position of an intermediary, helping 
the clients to establish formal or informal contacts and to gain access to 
resources and knowledge (Tamásy, 2001; Tamásy, 2002).  
 
Fifth, unlike incubators in the UK and Ireland (McAdam & McAdam, 2008; 
McAdam & McAdam, 2006; Karatas-Ozkan et al, 2005; Westhead, 1997), 
Finland and Ukraine (Abetti & Rancourt, 2006) or Sweden (Löfsten & Lindelöf, 
2002), only a minority of the German BIs and technology Centres maintain 
formal linkages with higher education institutions (Schwartz & Hornych, 2008). 
Although, as Schwartz (2008) reports, there are exceptions (e.g. the 
technology Centres in the cities of Dresden or Dortmund), however, in most 
cases these linkages are missing or rather loose, especially in rural areas 
(Tamásy, 2002). One could imagine that a lack of strong university linkages 
would lead to a more generic incubator population in Germany. This in fact is 
not the case. Interestingly, the share of new German specialist business 
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incubators (those that specialise in incubating clients focused on a particular 
industry, such as Media) among the total number of BIs opened has risen 
considerably in recent years. Schwartz (2008) reports that since 1999, nearly 
one-third of all new BIs or technology centres in Germany specialised in one 
or a few complementary sectors (Schwartz & Hornych, 2008). 
 
Finally, in Germany, the culture of evaluation is quite strong - the ADT, for 
instance, encourages its members to self-evaluate their performance on the 
aforementioned four specific goals or quality standards. In order to arrive at 
quantitative metrics, ADT has devised a scoring system based on some 75 
criteria sub-divided into four groups which represent the four major goals of 
technology centres / incubators. Incubators are asked to evaluate themselves 
against each of the criterion on the basis of a ten-point scale. The scores are 
then aggregated to give an overall score. Apart from its use for self-evaluation, 
this classification is also used by German authorities to determine eligibility for 
grants and other forms of government assistance (Centre for Strategy & 
Evaluation Services, 2002).  
 
Predictably, results of self-evaluation are always quite positive; to this affect 
Schwartz (2008)6 stresses that results are communicated to the public by the 
incubator management, policy makers or local authorities (e.g., local 
development agencies) not only to demonstrate the success or effectiveness 
of those publicity funded policy initiatives, but also to vindicate the financial 
support granted by cities, municipalities or other stakeholders. 
 
Academicians, however, in their evaluations of the German incubation 
industry produce results which paint an altogether different picture. To 
illustrate, two different evaluations have been conducted in the past by 
German academicians. The first focuses on the overall impact of the 
incubation industry where the “success” of incubation has been analysed in 
terms of the main goals of incubators, as seen by their respective 
managements (Sternberg et al, 1997). Whilst the second aimed to test 
                                                 
6 Also see Schwartz’s (2008) commentary on ADT’s assessment of post-graduation survival rates 
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incubation impact by studying the graduation dynamics and survival rates of 
client firms (Schwartz, 2008). The major findings of these two evaluation 
exercises are discussed below:  
 
Tamásy (2007) reports the results of a comprehensive evaluation of 
technology-oriented business incubators in Germany which was undertaken 
by Sternberg et al (1997). Sternberg et al’s (1997) investigation included 
1,021 businesses and 108 technology-oriented business incubators and 
reports on a number of aspects of German incubators. According to Tamásy 
(2007), the study’s findings suggest that business incubators have not been 
instrumental in promoting hi-tech start-ups, which in turn, brings into question 
the sustainability of the entire incubation industry. For instance, in Germany: 
(a) at least one-third of the firms in business incubators are active in low-value 
service sectors or commerce which negates the primary ethos of incubation 
activity i.e. promotion of innovative and hi-tech new ventures; (b) almost 20% 
of the firms that entered incubation programmes where more than 2 years old; 
(c) the motivation effect of business incubators has been quite low so far - 
only 3% of firm founders would not have started their businesses without the 
existence of incubators where a majority of firm founders took the support as 
an additional bonus. 
 
Schwartz (2008) studied the survival or exit dynamics of German firms after 
leaving incubator facilities by examining the survival of 352 firms from five 
German BIs after their graduation (Schwartz, 2008). The findings of this study, 
somewhat, complement Sternberg et al’s (1997) assertion that business 
incubators in Germany are not effective when it comes to ensuring the long 
term survival of new ventures. Schwartz (2008) concludes that in Germany, 
although, post-graduation survival rate amounts to 61.4%, however, nearly 
30% of all firms graduating from incubators do not survive long-term beyond 
the supportive and protective environment that is provided by incubation 
programmes. This is in stark contrast to the findings of ADT, where official 
data puts the closure rate of firms to less than 10%, which seems quite 
satisfactory bearing in mind the failure rates of innovative start-ups in general 
(Glaser, 2005).  
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The most interesting aspect of Schwartz’s (2008) analysis reveals the 
presence of a high-risk period that confronts graduates within the first years 
after their graduation from the BI. This high-risk period for graduate firms 
starts with incubator exit and lasts approximately until the third year post exit. 
About 20% of graduated firms do not survive this period and more than half of 
post-graduation closures occur within this time. Therefore, a generally 
applicable policy prescription is made, that since firms that graduate from BIs 
are confronted with a variety of severe problems that might have a negative 
impact on subsequent firm development - incubator management should 
prepare the leaving graduated firms for the process of graduation.  
 
A final study by Schwartz & Göthner (2009) sheds some light on the question 
of how to identify the most effective incubator within a specific BI population. 
For this purpose, they use the “Preference Ranking Organisation Method for 
Enrichment Evaluation” (PROMETHEE) to compare five technology-oriented 
BIs in Germany. Schwartz & Göthner (2009) argue that there is no generally 
accepted set of incubator evaluation criteria which can deem incubation 
‘success’, therefore, for inter-incubator comparisons, multiple criteria must be 
included along with incubatee-level indicators. Although Schwartz & Göthner 
(2009) do produce a ranking based on their criteria, they admit that there are 
weaknesses regarding the method as well as the criteria used in this analysis. 
This occurred primary due to the vague knowledge in incubation research 
concerning the most appropriate evaluation criteria. 
 
In conclusion, it is evident that there is a lack of studies that explore the 
internal incubation process in the German milieu. Schwartz (2008) suggests, 
in the context of evaluation, that it is necessary to determine the decisive 
incubator-specific support components (e.g., networking opportunities, 
managerial support) that contribute to the long-term survival of incubatees – in 
other words, processes. Therefore, studying the internal process of incubation 
is also necessary for effective evaluation research. 
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2.3 Italy  
 
Just like in the case of Germany, a lack of studies available in the English 
language created some hindrance in developing an outlook of incubators-
incubation in Italy. However, with the recent publication by vonZedtwitz & 
Grimaldi (2006), reviews of all significant past research by public and 
academic bodies on the incubation environment of Italy becomes readily 
available. These studies (listed in the vonZedtwitz & Grimaldi’s bibliography) 
along with a number of UN and other Italian local agency reports in the 
English language remedy the issue of the reliability and validity of the outlook 
thus presented.  
 
Italy is a very interesting case when it comes to entrepreneurship and SME 
policy. On the one hand, propensity towards entrepreneurship is especially 
high in Italy (Blanchflower & Oswald, 1999) and small firms account for a very 
high share of total employment, approximately 73% (Kozak, 2007); on the 
other hand, Italy exhibits poor performance in the hi-tech domain and the birth 
of new SMEs is heavily concentrated in low-tech and mature sectors 
(Colombo & Delmastro, 2002). According to Colombo & Delmastro (2002) 
Italian high-tech entrepreneurs, in general, are less educated and have less 
prior sector-specific working experience than their other European 
counterparts.  
 
Furthermore, Italy’s SII7 score, which is below the EU27, and it’s ranking of 24 
in the EU Innovation Scoreboard (UNU-MERIT & European Commission, 
2007), makes it a moderate innovator, whilst UK, France and Germany 
remain Innovation Leaders.  Thus, according to the EU Innovation Scoreboard, 
Italy’s performance relative to the EU 25 has been somewhat discouraging. 
For instance, Business R&D Expenditure remains ‘low’ and Public R&D 
Expenditure is ‘average’.  
 
                                                 
7 Summary Innovation Index – see http://www.proinno-europe.eu/page/summary-innovation-index-0 - accessed 
Aug, 2011. 
 29 
From the Italian Innovation Outlook (see Figure 3 below) it can be inferred 
that Italy has relative strengths in the Knowledge Creation and Intellectual 
Property dimensions of innovation where it is close to the EU average. 
However, EU analysts suggest that although Italy has a high efficiency in 
transforming innovation inputs into Intellectual Property outputs, it has, overall, 
a lower efficiency in transforming such inputs into Applications Outputs (PRO 
INNO Europe, 2011). Thus, the role of policy initiatives for SME development, 
such as business incubators, becomes more pronounced in the case of Italy, 
which is characterised by a rather inefficient national innovation system in 
comparison to other technologically more advanced European countries 
(Malerba, 1993). This could be, in part, due the fact that when compared to 
other European countries, SME promotion in Italy has only recently been 
considered a significant government policy objective (Centre for Strategy & 
Evaluation Services, 2002; Watanabe & Fukuda, 2006). Previously, due to the 
already strong presence of SMEs in the Italian economy, albeit in the 
traditional sectors, government policy focused on the development and 
evolution of large-scale enterprise instead. This is also evident from the 
relatively late development of Italy’s incubation network.  
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Figure 3  – Italian Innovation Outlook (relative to EU27) 




Business incubators in Italy were initially concentrated in steel closure areas 
and in economically lagging areas of the south. The first Italian incubator, the 
BIC Liguria was set up as a regional economic development catalyst in 1990 
against a backdrop of industrial decline in the region of Genova (Grimaldi & 
Grandi, 2005). The incubator is situated in Genova’s industrial zone, an area 
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that has undergone profound structural decline over the past 30 years. Since 
2000, however, incubation has gained significant prominence at the level of 
government policy and is now seen as a useful tool for encouraging SME 
innovation and growth (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2002; 
vonZedtwitz & Grimaldi, 2006). All Italian BICs are members of EBN, the 
European network for the promotion of the incubation8.   
 
Prior to 2002, Sviluppo Italia, the Italian national agency for economic 
development and entrepreneurship promotion over saw the Italian incubation 
network. Since April 2002, the role of Sviluppo Italia has been taken over by 
BIC Italia Net. This agency is the association of Italian BICs and companies 
within their gambit and is as such the central coordinating body for business 
incubation in Italy now9. The Association reports 44 members as at Jan. 2010 
on its website, a significant increase from 17 reported in 200210. However, this 
figure of 44 Italian BICs ought to be treated with caution, since an earlier 2006 
study reports a figure of 50 (vonZedtwitz & Grimaldi, 2006). This discrepancy 
may perhaps be due to “definitional ambiguity” (Hackett & Dilts, 2004a, pp. 
59).  
 
Grimaldi & Grandi (2005) and Grimaldi & vonZedtwitz (2006) have carried out 
empirical investigations in Italy to describe the pre-dominant local models of 
incubation. Grimaldi & Grandi (2005) identify four major incubator archetypes 
generally and then apply these archetypes or models using a number of 
characterising variables (such as institutional mission, industrial sector, 
location, market, incubation period, sources of revenue, services offered and 
so on) to a number Italian incubators to test the models’ validity. Their four 
models include: Business Innovation Centres (BICs), University Business 
Incubators (UBIs), Independent Private Incubators (IPIs), and Corporate 
Private Incubators (CPIs). They collapse their four incubator classifications 
                                                 
8 From the website of BIC Italia Net - http://www.bic-italia.net/documento.asp?lingua=eng (accessed July 2010). 
9 From the website of the Italian Network for Innovation & Technology Transfer to SMEs  which operates under the 
Italian Ministry of Economic Development and managed by the Italian Institute for Industrial Promotion - 
http://www.riditt.it/page.asp?page=networks_national (accessed July 2009). 
10 From the website of BIC Italia Net - http://www.bic-italia.net/documento.asp?lingua=eng (accessed July 2009). 
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into two major models, which they argue, are driven and shaped by the 
evolution of client company requirements and needs (see Figure 4 below). 
 
Figure 4  - The Two Incubating Models  
(Grimaldi & Grandi, 2005) 
 
 
Their empirical work in Italy supports the hypothesis of two major incubator 
models i.e. not-for-profit government-owned and financed incubators at the 
one end whilst privately owned and commercial incubators on the other. Both 
these models, Grimaldi & Grandi (2005) argue, are differentiated on their 
ability to target different types of client firms. Such firms, each with its own 
objectives and requirements, fundamentally shape the structure of incubator 
models. In other words, a certain category of firms with associated attributes 
are suited more to a particular incubator model. Thus, BICs, with their 
capacity to reduce start-up costs, target small entrepreneurial initiatives which 
focus on local markets anchored to the old economy. Whilst, CPIs and IPIs, 
with their ability to accelerate the start-up process through the provision of 
high-value services attract highly promising hi-tech and knowledge-intensive 
entrepreneurial initiatives that promise aggressive growth in size and 
investment (Grimaldi & Grandi, 2005).  
 
In subsequent work Grimaldi & vonZedtwitz (2006), extending the work of 
Grimaldi & Grandi (2005), focus on the relationships of incubator structure 
and incubator management practices in Italy. They conclude, commenting on 
the quality of service delivery of Italian for-profit and not-for-profit incubators, 
that the management teams of independent (or for-profit) incubators were 
generally more experienced, in comparison to government-owned or 
sponsored incubators, and were able to transfer competencies and 
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knowledge directly to their incubatees. Further, most team members of 
publicly-funded incubators do not possess the management and financial 
skills required to run new businesses. That said, however, Italian BICs 
generally have a very agile organisation, with a small number of employees 
(vonZedtwitz & Grimaldi, 2006).  
 
Colombo & Delmastro (2002) argue that the differentiating aspect of 
incubation in Italy is how incubators provide incubation-related services to 
client firms. The provision of such services is through both self-administration 
and outsourcing, where there is greater recourse towards the latter. 
Therefore, a great deal of management effort is devoted to the coordination of 
activities and services performed by third parties rather than self-
administration. Clegg (1990) suggests that this aspect of the organisation of 
firm activity is witnessed in other sectors in Italy also, such as fashion, where 
Benetton is thought of less as an organisation per se and rather more as 
organised network of market relations premised on complex forms of 
contracting made possible by advances in IT. Italy in this respect is unique 
where the Weberian bureaucracy is replaced by ‘systemation’ – the new trend 
towards merging all activities: managerial and productive, white and blue 
collar, design and marketing, economic and technical into one single 
interactive system (Clegg, 1990).  
 
Perhaps the most comprehensive study of incubators-incubation in Italy was 
undertaken by Colombo & Delmastro (2002). The researchers, who claim that 
their research was the first-of-its-kind, evaluated Italian incubators in terms of 
their impact on fostering the establishment and growth of new technology-
based firms (NTBFs). For this purpose, they compared a sample of 45 Italian 
independent NTBFs that were located in a technology incubator with a 
matched sample of 45 similar off-incubator firms. This comparison was done 
in terms of age, sector of activity and geographical location. The results are 
very interesting; overall, firms in incubators showed higher growth rates than 
their off-incubator counterparts. Firms located in incubators perform better in 
terms of exploiting sophisticated technologies, show an aptitude towards 
engaging with international R&D programmes and are eager to develop 
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collaborative arrangements, especially with universities. Most importantly, on-
site firms find it easier to get access to public subsidy. With these findings 
Colombo & Delmastro (2002) conclude that incubators are in fact an important 
element of the Italian national innovation system and contribute to the survival 
and growth of NTBFs.  
 
The success of Italian incubators in contrast to evidence from Germany11 
could be attributed to the fact that since Italy’s hi-tech sector is under-
developed when compared to other competing EU economies, due to market 
failures in the provision of essential inputs to new hi-tech firms, the presence 
of bridging institutions such as incubators may be relatively more beneficial 
(Colombo & Delmastro, 2002; Grimaldi & vonZedtwitz, 2006). However, 
another, more simpler, explanation could easily be that incubators in Italy are 
somewhat better at incubating than their German counterparts. Unfortunately, 
there is presently no research available to either confirm this argument or to 
shed further light on how Italian incubators’ venture creation processes work. 
Clearly, through further research on the incubation process, there is immense 
opportunity in developing cross-national best practice models to encourage 
learning and adoption.  
 
2.4 Comparing & Contrasting Germany & Italy 
 
Internationally, incubators are set up and operated in a variety of dynamic 
environmental and institutional contexts (Aernoudt, 2004; Aerts et al, 2007; 
Carayannis & von Zedtwitz, 2005; Grimaldi & Grandi, 2005). As it has been 
shown in the cases of Germany and Italy, due to variance in national-level 
technology policy, the aims and objectives as well as the institutional make-up 
of incubator fields varies widely. Along with national policies, initiatives and 
policy linked to incubators-incubation have also been launched at the EU-level 
which influence the member-states’ technology policies and innovation 
systems in different ways. Thus, in Europe, the focus and agenda for 
incubation is for the most part set by government policy (Aernoudt, 2004).  
                                                 
11 ibid. See previous section.  
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It is quite tempting to construct a comparative matrix of the major 
differentiators that distinguish incubators-incubation in Germany and Italy. 
This exercise, however, is not easy since it remains unclear as to what ought 
to be compared and contrasted. Is it aspects such as incubation policy 
frameworks, incubation models or typologies, incubator characteristics, the 
nature and structure of the internal incubation process, incubator impact and 
performance, or a combination of these? By simply comparing and contrasting 
incubation policy or the organisation of the incubation process, the more 
fundamental questions of ‘why’ country-specific differences exist, or why one 
country’s incubator-incubation environment using similar evaluation criteria, 
outperforms another, will remain only partially answered. The above aspects 
exist as distinct strands of research not an intermeshed analysis. Arguably, a 
research exercise which integrates these strands within a national context has 
the potential to unveil the existence of unique ‘national systems of incubation’.  
 
In recent times, several comparative studies have been published [see for 
instance Autio & Kloftsen (1998); Tamásy (2001); and Abetti & Rancourt 
(2006)], however, to-date there is a lack of agreement and also systematic 
evidence on the presence of such a ‘nationally-embedded system of business 
incubation’ in tune of a ‘national legal system’ or ‘innovation system’. Thus, a 
question arises, what can or ought to be compared when conducting a holistic 
cross-country analysis of incubators-incubation, beyond general 
characteristics? Further, in what ways will our understanding of incubators-
incubation improve when them through the national systems approach?  
 
Since the analysis of the above paradox is beyond the scope of this review, 
Table 1 below presents a broad-based comparative overview of incubators-
incubation in the two reviewed EU member states - Germany & Italy: 
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Table 1 – Broad-based Comparison of Incubators-Incubation in Germany & Italy 
 
 Germany Italy 
Historical Underpinnings A relatively long incubation tradition. Major growth 
occurred following the reunification in 1990. Due to 
restructuring of the region’s economy, large non-
competitive industrial plants ceased operations and 
were replaced by a combination of new local businesses 
and inward investment. Incubators served to boost 
regional competitiveness.  
Initially concentrated in steel closure areas and in 
economically lagging areas of the south. The first incubator 
was set up in 1990 but it was a decade later that incubation 
gained significant prominence at the level of government 
policy with high levels of political and financial support. Now 
incubation is seen as a useful tool for encouraging SME 






Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Technologiezentren or 
The German Association of Innovation, Technology and 
Business Incubation Centres (ADT) – established 1988 
BIC Italia Net – established 2002. All Italian BICs are 
members of the EBN  
Models / Typologies 1. ‘Gewerbezentrum’ or business incubator (BI)  
2. “Technologie- und Gründerzentrum” or technology 
and founder centre (TC) 
3. ‘Gründerzentrum’ or Technology orientated 
incubators 
Researchers in Italy have shown a lot of interest in incubator 
models. Grimaldi & Grandi (2005) and Grimaldi and 
vonZedtwitz (2006) have carried out empirical investigations 
to describe the pre-dominant local models of incubation. 
They argue that the models are driven and shaped by the 
evolution of client company requirements and needs. Five 
pre-dominant models emerge: 
 
Not-for-Profit 
1. Business Innovation Centres 
2. University Business Incubators  
 
For-Profit 
3. Independent Private Incubators  
4. Corporate Private Incubators 





Incubation Process There is a lack of studies that explore the internal 
incubation process in the German milieu. Research 
results do not point beyond incubation objectives and 
incubator services. German scholars recognise this 
discrepancy and point out, especially in the context of 
evaluation research, that it is necessary to determine 
the decisive incubator-specific support components (i.e. 
the incubation process) that contribute to the long-term 
survival of the incubates. 
 
Although no studies make the study of the internal 
incubation process their major focus, nevertheless, an 
interesting aspect of incubation in Italy is the culture of 
outsourcing the provision of incubation-related services to 
third-parties.  
Results of Evaluation Incubator evaluation research has attracted most 
attention in Germany. Like in the case of the UK, 
evaluation results, those that impact incubation policy, 
are compiled by incubator managements, policy makers 
or local authorities to demonstrate incubation success.  
 
Two comprehensive evaluations have been undertaken 
by academicians - Sternberg et al. (1997) and Schwartz 
(2008). The studies conclude: incubators have not been 
instrumental in promoting hi-tech start-ups nor are they 
effective when it comes to ensuring the long term 
survival of new ventures.  
Colombo & Delmastro (2002) compare a sample of 45 
Italian independent NTBFs that were located on a 
technology incubator with a matched sample of 45 similar 
off-incubator firms. Overall, on-incubator firms show higher 
growth rates and perform better in terms of exploiting 
technology, R&D, building linkages with universities and find 
it easier to get public subsidy.  





The purpose in this chapter was to scrutinise background literature on the incubator-
incubation phenomenon and to use this analysis to define the research problem being 
identified in this thesis. Towards this end, studies from various streams of incubator-
incubation research were placed in a relevant geographic context and reviewed in the 
previous sections. This review has shown that there is a great deal of researcher 
emphasis on incubator evaluation-type research; most published literature emanating 
from these states focuses on this area. The problem with such research is that the 
‘real’ and ‘true’ impact of incubators, as it has been suggested by some past 
researchers, can not be gauged in any simplistic manner (Roper, 1999; Sherman, 
1999; Tamásy, 2001; Rudy, 2004; Sofouli & Vonortas, 2007; Tamásy, 2007). 
Incubators are very useful ‘packaged programmes’ for the curbing of entrepreneurial 
risk and the promotion of new ventures (Hongyi et al, 2007; Hughes et al, 2007; 
Benson, 2008; Cooper & Park, 2008; Ndabeni, 2008), however, they are also highly 
sophisticated when it comes to management, service delivery and evaluation 
(Sherman & Chappell, 1998).  
 
Hackett & Dilts (2004a, pp. 56) in their systematic literature review of published 
incubator-incubation research suggest that: “it is clear that the economic development 
perspective has influenced the field of published business incubation studies”. This 
overemphasis has been recognised as an issue by scholars who acknowledge that 
the development of knowledge in the area has followed a somewhat skewed 
trajectory. Some streams have received an inordinate amount of attention whilst there 
has been little or no development in other areas. This has led to a discursive and 
heavily compartmentalised knowledge body with weak inter-stream linkages (Hackett 
& Dilts, 2004a, Phan et al, 2005).  
 
To illustrate the above point, Hannon & Chaplin (2003, pp. 862), commenting on the 
state-of-research in the incubator-incubation area, suggest that “the focus is now 
shifting away from incubators towards incubation (italics added) through an enhanced 
understanding that the underlying processes of incubation may be far more critical for 
achieving accelerated firm growth than incubator infrastructure”. Hackett & Dilts 
(2004a, pp. 73) frustrated with a lack of focus on the part of incubator-incubation 
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researchers take Hannon & Chaplin’s (2003) suggestion a step further and 
recommend that “to facilitate a focus on incubation process studies, a moratorium on 
incubator facility configuration studies should probably be imposed”.  
 
The urgent need to progress knowledge on the incubation process has led to the 
development of the present research project. The research presented in this thesis 
goes a few steps further by including the study of incubators’ normative environment 
and structural properties – two dimensions entrepreneurship researchers Russell & 
Russell (1992) highlight as essential dimensions for understanding the 
entrepreneurial process or life-cycle. Taken together, the three facets of processes, 
norms and structure complete the triad organisation theorists recommend as 
important to developing an understanding of organisational functioning (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1978).  
 
Developing a rich knowledge-base on the internal processes, norms and structure of 
incubation is important for a number of reasons: first, in explaining the variation in 
incubation outcomes – previous research shows that there is no universal formula for 
incubation “success”. The problems associated with determining incubation “success” 
are: (a) some incubators (of a certain type) in particular regions are simply more 
successful on a certain set of criteria than their counterparts in other regions – it 
cannot be explained why; and (b) definitions of “success” and “criteria for success” 
also vary widely depending on the aims and objectives of the evaluating agency. 
Hackett & Dilts (2004a; 2008) simplify this problem by suggesting that by any 
definition incubation “success” must mean the production of a sustainable new 
enterprise at the end of the incubation period; and logically this basic criterion ought 
to be linked to “how incubators incubate”12. The logic here is quite simple: the better 
incubators are at incubating the more likely it is for their clients to be “successful”. 
Therefore, if there is an understanding around them impact of the various 
                                                 
12 It is acknowledged that production of a sustainable new enterprise at the end of the incubation period is not the only criteria 
for incubation “success”. We know from the literature that incubator programmes have other goals which are weighed in 
equally important terms such as internal incubator network formation (Lichtenstein, 1992), incubator-industry network and 
incubator support services network density (Nowak & Grantham, 2000; Hansen et al, 2000), incubator manager and 
incubatee relationships (Rice, 2002; Sherman, 1999; Udell, 1990; Autio & Kloftsen, 1998), incubator effectiveness (Sherman 
& Chappell, 1998) and incubatee selection process (Kuratko & LaFollette, 1987; Merrifield ,1987). Hackett & Dilts’ (2004a; 
2008) definition, however, is all en-compassing, for in the post incubation sustainability of any new firm, all the 
aforementioned criteria / variables are likely play an important role. 
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combinations of the incubation process’s base components on client firms it is likely 
that our grasp on incubating “successfully” would increase.  
 
Second, in explaining the variation in performance across incubator types in a 
national and cross-national context – past research has shown that incubation 
performance varies considerably when compared at a number of levels including (a) 
between different types / models of incubator organisations in a national / regional 
context; (b) between models prevalent across national / regional boundaries; and (c) 
even across similar models prevalent in a national / regional context. There is a lack 
of a theoretically grounded basis for explaining this variation in incubator 
performance. This dearth in theory can be attributed to a lack of (a) knowledge on the 
incubation process in general since logically one of the most important contributing 
factors to the variation in incubator performance has to be incubation practices; and 
(b) studies with a comparative design to compare and contrast incubation practices to 
identify which practices at what types of incubator organisations contribute to 
performance variation. Thus, it is foreseeable that research that investigates and 
contrasts the incubation process across different incubator models will make a useful 
contribution and help in answering the questions “why incubation practices differ 
widely across (and also in between) models” and “why / which certain practices seem 
to make a greater impact than others”. 
 
Third, in developing new theory – focusing on the processes, norms and structural 
properties of incubators will draw attention to the underlying causes and best 
practices of new venture creation in an incubator environment. This, in turn, should 
lead towards new theories of business incubation. In developing new theory multiple 
research methods will be required and it would be important to draw from frameworks 
prevalent in other domains; such as those used to explain phenomenon associated 
with new venture formation and development and organisation theory. 
 
And the fourth significant factor is relevance to policy and practice - despite the fact 
that bodies such as the NBIA13 and UKBI14 have noted on many occasions that the 
incubation process is much more important than the incubator facility (UKBI, 2004; 
                                                 
13 National Business Incubation Association, based in the USA, is the largest representative body of business incubators in 
the world. 
14 UK Business Incubation is NBIA’s counter-part in the UK. 
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NBIA, 2008), the extent of what is known about the incubator-incubation phenomenon 
is limited almost exclusively to the incubator facility (Hackett & Dilts, 2004a; 2008). 
Hackett & Dilts (2004a; 2008) argue that as interest in entrepreneurship continues to 
grow, so is increasing an interest in methods for increasing the likelihood of 
entrepreneurial success and preventing entrepreneurial failure. Accordingly, the 
development of models of the incubation process represents an opportunity to 
conduct incubator-incubation research that is likely to be of interest to a much 
broader spectrum of researchers and practitioners. 
 
Thus, developing a more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the incubation 
process is imperative for inter-linking various streams within the area and also to 
progress knowledge in an apparent stalemate where researchers seemed to be 
locked in cyclical debates15 and some of the more fundamental questions are not 
receiving due attention. In this research, an attempt has been made to address these 
problems. 
 
In the next chapter previous incubation process-related literature is critically analysed 
to identify knowledge gaps and areas for further research. Selected studies are 
placed in a number of conceptualisations and critically reviewed which helps in 
highlighting theoretical and methodological weaknesses. A new approach is also 




                                                 
15  Ccompare for instance the conflicting results of Colombo & Delmastro (2002) and Tamásy (2007) using similar 
methodologies investigating the impact of incubators in Italy and Germany respectively. 




The Business Incubation Process:  





In the previous chapter, the problem being investigated in this research was 
identified: that there is a need to progress knowledge on the channels of interaction 
internal to the incubator including its processes, normative environment and structural 
properties that impact upon both incubatee survival, and “success” upon graduation. 
In other words, it is important to develop a deeper understanding of what is actually 
taking place inside the alleged “black-box” of the incubator that adds value to clients 
and other stakeholders.  Following on from this, the objective in this chapter is to 
critically analyse previous incubation process-related literature for identifying 
knowledge gaps and to propose directions for further research. This objective is 
achieved through a systematic approach where a selection criteria is used to classify 
and critically review 23 relevant studies. These studies are categorised into six major 
conceptualisations that describe the predominant views on incubation held by 
previous researchers. The conceptualizations include (1) incubation as a mechanism 
for new venture creation; (2) incubation as a mechanism for resource allocation; (3) 
incubation as a socio-political game; (4) incubation as a co-product of incubator-
incubatee dyads; (5) incubation as an outcome of network behaviour; and (6) 
incubatee selection as a predictable and controllable process. The review highlights 
challenges within extant research, suggests areas previous researchers have ignored 
and identifies avenues for future research. The chapter ends with a critical reflection 
on the meta-theoretical foundations of previous research, highlights the reasons why 
our knowledge on the incubation process is under-developed and lays the foundation 
for developing a new theory around a mechanisms-based conceptualisation of the 
incubation process.  
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3.1 Introduction  
 
Researchers and practitioner groups have presented numerous definitions and 
descriptions of the incubation process over the last number of years16. It is, however, 
generally agreed that incubation encompasses the provision of management 
guidance, technical assistance, technology support services, assistance in obtaining 
financing and consulting tailored to young growing companies in incubator 
organisations17 . A mix of all, or a combination of, these services, at times with 
differing terminology, is advertised by incubator organisations in a ‘menu’ of facilities 
provided to client firms. 
 
In addition, as a necessary component, incubation also includes access to 
appropriate rental space, flexible leases and business support facilities such as 
common areas, cafeteria, conferencing, reception desk, photocopying, internet, 
courier and other services. Therefore, critical to the incubation process, alongside 
mentoring or developmental assistance is the provision of the above ‘infrastructural 
facilities’. When both of these are provided together, they comprise the system that 
Hackett & Dilts (2004a) refer to when describing what incubators do. This ‘system’ in 
total, is the incubator’s ‘technology’. The incubator’s technology-processes are 
developed and carried out by the incubator management, and offered both in the 
incubator premises and through a network of outside contacts (Merrifield, 1987).  
 
In the literature, at a theoretical level researchers conceptualise incubation in different 
ways. For instance, incubation is often described as, or assumed to be, a process of 
mentoring designed to nurture young entrepreneurial firms to grow rapidly in a 
controlled environment, grooming them to acquire skills to reduce prospects of failure 
once they cease to be incubatees (Campbell et al, 1985; Sherman, 1999; Rice, 2002; 
Hackett & Dilts, 2008). Alternatively it has been defined as a process of brokering in 
which the incubator is a node in a wider network of stakeholders and institutions, 
enabling the flow of resources to and from young firms to outside and unconnected 
sub-groups, thereby, fostering mutual trust, awarding credibility to the new firms and 
                                                 
16 For a comprehensive listing of definitions see Hackett & Dilts (2004a) 
17 Compiled from the definitions presented by the UKBI and NBIA-USA. 
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building legitimacy in transactions (Smilor, 1987; Markley & McNamara, 1995; 
Hansen et al, 2000; Lendner & Dowling, 2003; McAdam & McAdam, 2006).  
 
Arguably, differences in incubator models, from an incubation process standpoint, 
ought to result in different forms of incubating or differences in the combinations, 
intensity and proportions of services offered by incubator organisations. It is being 
suggested in this thesis that inter-model differences diminish when it comes to their 
internal processes since in order to qualify as an incubator, any model must capture 
the original ethos of business incubation in its incubation delivery mechanisms. To 
illustrate, the goal of Campus Incubators is “to support the creation and growth of its 
client firms during the start-up years through value-added contributions - the 
incubation process” (Mian, 1997, pp. 257). This definition, in essence, of what 
incubators do (incubate), is the same when university campus-based incubators are 
compared with community enterprise centres, not-for-profit hi-tech incubators or 
corporate incubators. Furthermore, an analysis of descriptions of incubators set up in 
different countries around the world such as the UK and Ireland (McAdam & 
McAdam, 2008), Finland and Ukraine (Abetti & Rancourt, 2006), Sweden (Löfsten & 
Lindelöf, 2002) and Germany (Schwartz & Hornych, 2008) do not reveal any major 
differences in terms of what they are meant to do and achieve.  
 
When examining the literature chronologically, six conceptualisations of the 
incubation process become evident through a number of means; first, via the 
theoretical lens researchers use for data analysis, for instance, social network theory, 
dyadic theory or the resource based view; second, via the conceptual constructs 
linked to specific bodies of literature (such as the new venture creation literature) to 
develop definitions and / or models; and, third, via the philosophical implications of 
new theoretical conclusions such as the line of argument a game or rational choice 
theorist would use.  These conceptualisations are as follows: 
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1. Incubation as a mechanism for new venture creation - a step-by-step / staged 
process that awards legitimacy, opens network access and heightens community 
support for entrepreneurs.  
 
2. Incubation as a mechanism for resource allocation - a mechanism of awarding a 
stock of tangible and in-tangible resources to client firms that results in, in addition 
to other benefits, client firm growth.  
 
3. Incubation as a socio-political game - a socio-political mechanism of creating an 
environment and perception of reduced risk and security within a boundaried 
physical space. 
 
4. Incubation as a co-product of incubator-incubatee dyads - a process of co-
producing developmental assistance in independent incubator-client dyads. 
 
5. Incubation as an outcome of network behaviour - a system of increasing client 
firms’ network density. 
 
6. Incubatee selection as a predictable and controllable process - a process of 
selecting “weak but promising” firms for incubator induction. 
 
These different conceptualisations reflect the variety of philosophical and theoretical 
viewpoints that exist within the incubator-incubation research community. While these 
conceptualisations are not necessarily mutually independent, they are employed as 
classifications of convenience in order to facilitate a more insightful discussion of the 
literature. 
 
The major aim in this chapter is to identify knowledge gaps, major trends in the 
literature and researcher attitudes towards the topic. This is done via a systematic 
literature review. In conducting this review, the study selection criteria, the review’s 
methodology and style of organisation has been adopted from Hackett & Dilts’s 
(2004a) seminal systematic review of incubator-incubation literature. Replicating 
Hackett & Dilts’s (2004a) robust approach adds a degree of rigour to the present 
review.  
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The chapter is organised as follows: first, the methodology employed in identifying 
and selecting articles for review along with the selection criteria is presented. Second, 
the selected articles are reviewed along the six conceptualisations described above. 
Third, several challenges are identified in extant literature and a new way forward is 
suggested to progress this research. Specifically, it is noted that a large majority of 
researchers have not made the study of the business incubation process their 
exclusive priority and the meta-theoretical lenses previously employed are not ideally 
suited to the study of social ‘processes’. The chapter concludes by emphasising that 
there is a lack of a business incubation process model that unpacks the process’s 
variables and its relationship with incubators’ internal normative environment and 
structural properties.  
 
3.2 Methodology for Identifying Articles, Selection Criteria & Exclusions 
 
Initially, the type of material to be included in the review was kept very broad which 
included articles from scholarly journals, books and book chapters, dissertations, 
government publications, policy reports and conference papers. Online academic 
databases hosted by the University’s Library Services were extensively used for 
searching and accessing soft copies of the above categories of base material. 
Business Source Premier, SAGE Journals Online, ScienceDirect, SpringerLink and 
Web of Science were key resources. Google Scholar proved to be highly effective 
also, especially when tracing very specific material. Save for a few old publications, 
all material was readily available in softcopy format. Using these databases, articles 
and other publications, were (a) exported to an online bibliography management 
software, RefWorks -; (2) downloaded, mostly in a ‘pdf’ format; (3) downloaded files 
were renamed for easy recall; (4) the material was read; and, finally (5) saved in 
relevant folders according to classification in relevant conceptualisation. This virtual 
‘filing cabinet’ along with the RefWorks software became the primary means of 
organising and tracking base material. A number of conference papers and articles 
pre-dating the 1990s had to be accessed via the University library in hardcopy form. 
These were filed separately.   
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Reading and writing remained a simultaneous exercise where new leads from the 
accumulated literature were explored, such as via citations in text and bibliography 
reviews. The journals which published the most prominent articles were further 
searched using a number of key words for more relevant material. A number of 
special reviews, especially the ones published by the Journal of Business Venturing, 
were very helpful. When reasonably confident that all extant articles on the incubation 
process had been identified and retrieved, their listing was checked against the 
bibliography of Hackett & Dilts (2004a) and a bibliography created by the National 
Business Incubation Association (NBIA) in 200718 that lists all (peer-reviewed, non-
peer reviewed and popular press) articles related to incubation in order to ensure as 
far as possible that the entire population of articles on the incubation process had 
been collected.  
 
The articles considered for review appear in the following journals: Policy Studies 
Review, Technovation, Journal of Business Venturing, Economic Development 
Review, International Entrepreneurship Management Journal, Journal of Technology 
Transfer, Long Range Planning, American Journal of Small Business, International 
Small Business Journal, IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, Research 
Management and Academy of Entrepreneurship Journal.   
 
The review has been limited in several ways. First, the coverage of literature is 
confined primarily to the incubation process. Although the locus of the incubation 
concept is the nexus of forces involving new venture formation and development, new 
product conceptualisation and development and business assistance, each of which 
has an established body of research, to expand the scope of the review beyond 
research explicitly focused on incubation would make it impossible to complete given 
the constraints of this research. Second, although practitioner literature has 
influenced academic research, the review is centered on academic literature, except 
in cases where practitioner literature has proven especially influential and has some 
intrinsic academic validity. Third, an effort is made to include studies with an empirical 
component and those that employ a rigorous research methodology. Finally, only 
those studies have been included which have been published in recognised peer-
reviewed journals.  
                                                 
18 Available from: http://www.nbia.org/resource_library/bibliography/ - accessed in March, 2009. 
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Selecting the most relevant studies out of the available pool was done via a process 
of elimination which qualified or disqualified articles based on the above criteria. The 
first criterion was especially very strictly adhered to: studies’ relevance and overall 
focus on the incubation process (as opposed to other areas in incubator-incubation 
research). To explain this point, Sarfaraz A. Mian – who is a prolific incubator-
incubation researcher - his work on University Campus Incubators (Mian, 1994a; 
1994b; 1996, 1997) was not included. Overall, the focus of Mian’s research is on 
assessing the effectiveness of Campus Incubators on the growth of technology-
oriented client firms. He has also looked at the role of the university in nurturing 
technology clients in Campus Incubators. The research is indeed pioneering for its 
time, however, is not as relevant to this review since the internal process of 
incubation at Campus Incubators is not investigated19. Other studies are prescriptive 
pieces directed at policy makers for promoting the concept of business incubation in 
developing countries20. Some studies which did seem relevant were reviewed21, but 
were ultimately not included since they were not published in a peer-reviewed journal.  
 
Another work, Greg A. Lichtenstein’s unpublished doctoral thesis titled “The 
significance of relationships in entrepreneurship: A case study of the ecology of 
enterprise in two business incubators” (Lichtenstein, 1992), was also quite relevant 
and impossible to ignore; however, it too is not being included in this chapter. This is 
                                                 
19  In Mian (1997) for instance, building on his earlier case study-based work on university campus incubators; three 
categories of variables are proposed that could be used to assess the effectiveness of campus incubators: (a) performance 
outcomes, (b) management policies and their effectiveness, and (c) services and their value-added. Of these, the category 
‘management policies and their effectiveness’ is presumably most closely related to the internal process of incubation. Mian 
uses four variables including (1) goals, structure, and governance: (2) operational policies; (3) financing and capitalisation; 
and (4) target markets to assess the effectiveness of incubator management policies. As per the definition of incubation 
proposed, if we look at the two aspects Mian gauged which come closest to what incubation truly is (under ‘goals, structure, 
and governance’) “the quality of management support received by the tenant firms in helping to solve their problems” and “the 
extent of incubator service usage” it becomes clear that not much light shed on what went on inside campus incubators. 
Although the research is pioneering for its time, but Mian admits that “the framework did not fully account for the micro-level 
internal NTBF creation processes” (Mian, 1997, pp. 280).   
20 For instance, Lalkaka (2002) and Abetti & Rancourt (2006) present a number of case studies each which are country-
specific situation analyses of campus incubators and attempt to gauge their impact on technology transfer and regional 
economic development. Both these studies seem to be directed at policy makers promoting the concept of business 
incubation; there is no discussion on how incubators incubate. Lendner and Dowling (2007) have also perused an evaluatory 
agenda where they use an exploratory survey to assess the impact of university campus incubators’ main goals, 
organisational structure and business strategies on the development of tenant firms. Karatas-Ozkan, Murphy, & Rae (2005) 
aimed to improve the understanding of the formation and effective management of incubators in the UK. They interviewed 
incubator managers at four campus incubators to highlight contextual constraints and opportunities which work to shape and 
re-shape incubator programs. They were not really interested in understanding the nature of the internal process of 
incubation for which they would certainly have had to take into account the views of client firms.   
21 For instance, Rustam, L. & Ping, H. 1987. Nurturing Micro Enterprises and Technological Innovation through the Business 
Incubation Process. Paper presented at Guangzhou Seminar on Small and Medium Enterprises: Technology Policy Issues 
and Options, November 1987. New York: United Nations Centre for Science and Technology for Development. 
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due to two major reasons: first, the material is unpublished and Dr. Lichtenstein 
confirmed in email correspondence that he did not publish journal papers from his 
doctoral work instead producing a number of practitioner focused books; second, 
critically reviewing an entire doctoral thesis in this chapter, given its constraints, was 
not practical and reviewing just portions of it did not seem rigorous, therefore, his 
research will be drawn upon and reviewed in the relevant analysis section instead as 
part of the reflective literature review process. 
 
Arguably, theoretical work on social networks and new venture creation is relevant to 
the study of the incubation process, however, it is excluded from this review since a 
number of articles included draw extensively on the Network and Social Capital 
theories [e.g. Bøllingtoft & Ulhøi (2004); Tötterman & Sten (2005) and Hughes et al 
(2007)] and the new venture creation literature [Campbell et all (1985); Smilor (1987); 
Hisrich (1988); and Peters et al (2004)]. Through a critical examination of these 
studies, a discussion around the usefulness of the network and venture creation 
literature to the study of the incubation process becomes possible. This discussion 
appears in the sections on ‘incubation as an outcome of network behaviour’ and 
‘incubation as a mechanism for new venture creation’.  
 
Thus, 23 articles (3 non-empirical and 20 empirical) were selected. It was felt that 23 
articles was a sufficient-enough number considering that Hackett & Dilts (2004a) in 
their systematic review of the entire incubator-incubation area with five different 
research orientations (where process studies were merged with ‘incubatee 
development’ studies) had a total of 35. Appendix - A presents a chronological listing 
of all the reviewed articles and Table 2 below highlights the conceptualisation of 
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Table 2 – Selected Articles’ Selection Rationale & Context 
 
No. Article & Conceptualisation Selection Rationale Research Context 
Incubation as a mechanism for new venture creation 
1 Campbell et al (1985) 
 
 
One of the earliest articles on incubators; 
describes the business incubation process 
and presents a model of the incubator. 
1. Practitioner Study Quantitative with survey 
2. Incubation as a business development process consisting of four 
mutually exclusive components: (1) diagnosis of needs; (2) selection 
and monitoring; (3) capital investment; and (4) access to expert 
networks. 
3. Emphasis on the problem of locating potential entrepreneurs suitable 
for incubation. 
2 Brooks (1986) 
 
 
An important early article which presents a 
staged conceptualisation of the incubation 
process. The process is seen as 
transcending the walls of the physical 
incubator facility. 
1. Practitioner Study 
2. Incubation is the process of heightening community support for the 
entrepreneur; hence, it is a process that ought to transcend the walls 
of an incubator to include all incubators within a community working 
communally to incubate nascent firms. 
3. The primary components of the incubation process include the 
incubator support network, the pooled support services and a 
university linkage.  
4. Incubation as a two-stage process where at the first stage start-ups 
enter an ‘‘economic growth incubator’’ in order to gain access to 
primary support components. At the second stage, with greater 
maturity, they can move into a ‘‘real estate incubator’’ which provides 
office space and shared services. 
3 Merrifield (1987) 
 
 
First published study that focuses on an 
important component of the incubation 
process: client selection. 
1. Practitioner study. 
2. Only those firms that are “weak but promising” should be admitted 
whilst the firms that cannot be helped through business incubation and 
those that do not need incubation, should be screened.  
4 Smilor (1987) 
 
 
One of the first published studies to have a 
strong empirical component; highlights the 
impact of incubator ownership on the 
incubation process. 
1. Practitioner Study  Triangulation with data from national survey, 
interviews, analysis of case studies, and observation 
2. Incubation as a process of opening new network access while 
controlling a set of assistive resources: ‘‘secretarial support, 
administrative support, facilities support, and business assistance’’. 
5 Hisrich (1988) 
 
 
Verifies Brooks (1986) – see no. 2 – 
conceptualisation of an incubator without 
walls and the incubation process as 
spatially dispersed across various 
‘incubating’ institutions. 
1. Case study with triangulation. 
2. Incubation is seen as one component of an integrated strategy to 
promote intrapreneurship. Others being venture capital exchange, 
intrapreneurship center, innovation center, small business 
development center, student / education / entrepreneurship 
development center. 
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6 Weinberg et al (1991) 
 
 
Prolific incubation researchers; this is a 
seminal publication building on and collating 
the results from a number of previous 
studies by David Allen – one of the study’s 
co-authors; also first to bring a human 
relations perspective to incubation research.  
1. Triangulation with secondary data from multiple practitioner-oriented 
case studies (incubator programme evaluations) 
2. Their model views incubation as a cooperative process between the 
incubator, its clients and field-level partners. Incubation occurs within 
the internal and external interorganisational fields that connect these 
entities in a network that channels the flow of resources to and from 
incubating firms to entities in the environment. 
7 Peters et al (2004) 
 
 
Useful article since it draws on new venture 
creation literature and discuss the 
entrepreneurial process inside incubators. 
1. Mixed methods research design with secondary data analysis using 
published statistics and face-to-face interviews 
2. Focus on the impact of the services offered by incubators, namely 
infrastructure, coaching and networks, on the graduation rates of the 
respective incubators’ clients. 
3. They suggest that if a deeper understanding of the entrepreneurial 
process, incubation strategies and approaches can then be designed 
to facilitate the entrepreneur at critical junctures with tangible 
resources and other forms of support. 
Incubation as a mechanism for resource allocation 
8 McAdam & McAdam (2008) 
 
 
Useful article which uses the Resource-
Based View (RBV) to study the relationship 
between stages of growth of new ventures 
inside incubators and incubator resource 
consumption. 
1. Exploratory and longitudinal multiple case study with primary data from 
interviewing, non-participant observations and informal discussion  
2. Incubation is not a static process or simply a menu of services. The 
nature of incubation changes according to (a) the varying resource 
needs of the client firm over the duration of the incubation period; and 
more importantly (b) as it becomes clear from the comparative nature 
of their research, the client firm’s industrial affiliation drives aspects of 
resource needs. 
3. There are a number of stages in the growth of the entrepreneurial hi-
tech firm where each successive stage represents increasing levels of 
(a) complexity in firm coordination, control and strategy and; and (b) 
the need for additional resources.  
4. High-tech firms’ propensity to make use of the incubator resources 
and support increases as the lifecycle stage of the firm increases. 
 
9 Patton et al (2009) 
 
 
A unique study in that it looks specifically at 
a number of aspects that strengthen the 
incubation process at hi-tech university 
incubators. 
1. Case study of a high tech university incubator. 
2. Incubation is seen as a process by which business assistance is 
deployed. The timing of such deployment is derived from a tacit 
understanding of the founder and associated business proposal that 
the incubator director develops. 
3. The emphasis is on the importance of the incubator manager and 
client relationship. 
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10 Todorovic & Moenter (2010) 
 
 
Latest article that studies an important 
aspect of the incubation process; using the 
Resource-Based View the article looks at 
what incubator resources are most valued 
by client firms. 
1. Qualitative study based on 30 in-depth interviews. 
2. The incubator must provide a resource that the client firm cannot find 
elsewhere. Once the incubator client firm relationship reaches a point 
where the only resource it is providing is the subsidy of physical 
space, then the incubator space can be better utilised by another client 
firm.  
3. No evidence was found to suggest that certain industry sectors have 
one emphasis as opposed to the other.  
Incubation as a socio-political game 
11 McAdam & Marlow (2007) 
 
 
Study is based in an Irish empirical setting; 
the internal dynamic of a business incubator 
(linked to a university) is explored to 
suggest dis-advantages that may arise as a 
result of incubator placement.  
1. Longitudinal in-depth case study using qualitative data. collected via 
interviewing, participant observation and informal discussion 
2. Critical of the incubator’s role in the establishment of management 
teams and awarding credibility to client businesses. 
3. Mental notions of credibility change as the firm matures with incubator 
placement as initially being perceived as a valuable mechanism of 
achieving greater levels of market integrity. However, in later years, 
residing in an incubator premises was, according to entrepreneurs, 
perceived as amateurish, vulnerable and inexperienced. 
12 Evald & Bager (2008) 
 
 
A unique piece of research since it looks at 
venture team activity inside ‘corporate 
incubators’ – which remain quite under-
studied; the study focuses on political 
rivalries within venture teams. 
1. Longitudinal research design with triangulation. Both qualitative 
(interviews) and quantitative (questionnaires) data collected in two 
rounds spread over two years. 
2. Due to competing priorities and objectives between high-tech venture 
teams, incubator managers and corporate managers, is open to 
discreet political games. These political games tend to become 
institutionalised patterns of rivalry and power struggle, trapping leaders 
of venture teams.  
Incubation as a co-product of incubator-incubatee dyads 
13 Rice (2002) 
 
 
A significant study which for the first time 
describes incubation as occurring within 
independent co-production dyads.  
1. Triangulation with multiple case studies where data was collected via 
both a structured questionnaire and in-depth interviews 
2. The readiness of the entrepreneur to engage in co-production of 
business assistance impacts the incubation process outputs  
3. Rice overturns the implicit assumption in previous research which 
assumes the incubator to be the initiator and orchestrator of incubation 
whilst the incubatee as the passive recipient. Instead, according to 
Rice, incubation occurs in an inter-dependent ‘co-production dyad’ 
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14 Warren et al (2009) 
 
 
Study looks at the knowledge acquisition 
processes of client firms in the incubation 
process. 
1. Case study of a hi-tech university incubator. 
2. Describe incubation as a process of knowledge acquisition by client 
firms. The process is seen as two-staged: (a) knowledge gained 
through the incubator director; and (b) knowledge gained via external 
networks.  
3. A tipping point occurs when clients begin to wean themselves away 
from the Director and start to leverage social capital themselves. 
Incubation as an outcome of network behaviour 
15 Bøllingtoft & Ulhøi (2005) 
 
 
Only article found which uses ethnography 
to investigate the functioning of a new 
‘networked incubator’ model. 
1. Qualitative with ethnography.  
2. Focused on the mechanisms connected to individuals and their 
relations with each other and (ii) mechanisms related to the 
construction of the incubator. 
16 Tötterman & Sten (2005) 
 
 
The article uses Social Capital Theory to 
focus on how business incubators can 
support entrepreneurs.  
1. Triangulation with multiple case studies where data was collected via 
both a structured questionnaire and in-depth interviews. 
2. Incubators facilitate the creation of entrepreneurial networks and the 
higher the firm network density in an incubator the greater the level of 
client satisfaction with incubator services.  
3. Business incubators should carefully consider what kind of tenant mix 
and industry focus would most effectively stimulate the existence of 
synergies and commitment among tenants. 
17 McAdam & McAdam (2006) 
 
 
Useful qualitative study that looks at 
entrepreneurial networking within a 
technology incubator in Ireland. 
1. In-depth longitudinal study using semi-structured interviews. 
2. Incubator placement enhances the development of entrepreneurial 
networks which provide support during the vital stages of firm 
foundation.  
3. Networks have a key role in facilitating the design and implementation 
of firm growth strategies. 
18 Hughes et al (2007) 
 
 
Relevant study which looks at an important 
aspect of incubation process - client 
networking behaviour inside incubator 
organisations. 
1. Quantitative with survey 
2. Physical space and the company mix of an incubator play an important 
role in increasing the network dynamic of an incubator. 
3. Incubation outcomes can be classified and predicted based on the 
network behaviour of client firms. 
Incubatee selection as a predictable and controllable process 
19 Lumpkin & Ireland (1988) 
 
 
Builds on Merrifield’s (1987) – see no. 3 – 
work that new firms or incubatees can be 
rationally selected from a pool of available 
options. Very rigorous methodology and 
analytical process employed. 
1. Quantitative with Survey 
2. Screening practices and emphasis differs between different groups of 
incubators. 
3. Specific characteristics of incubator archetypes influence the way they 
select and incubate nascent firms. 
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20 Hackett & Dilts (2004b) 
 
 
Very relevant article; for building new theory 
on the incubation process, the article 
assess the appropriateness and fit of 
numerous theoretical frameworks; explicit 
theorisation on client selection using the 
Real Option lens. 
1. Theoretical paper. 
2. Real Options theoretical reasoning is used to map the incubation 
process. They suggest that incubatee selection is the creation of an 
option whilst subsequent resource infusions and monitoring and 
assistance are option exercises. 
3. The performance of any incubation programme is a function of and 
positively related to (1) incubatee selection performance, (2) 
monitoring and business assistance intensity, and (3) resource 
munificence. 
21 Aerts et al (2007) 
 
 
Important study that looks at the client 
selection processes of European business 
incubators using a wide ranging survey. 
4. Quantitative with Survey 
5. Incubators can be categorised according to their screening profiles: (1) 
financial screener, (2) team screener, (3) market screener, and (4) 
balanced screener. 
6. Incubator screening practices vary across European nations and 
Europe’s screening emphasis as a whole differs considerably from the 
US. Whereas, in the US, financial criteria dominates screening, in 
Europe the more ‘soft’ criteria to evaluate the management team and 
market fit are employed. 
22 Bergek & Norrman (2008) 
 
 
Study looks at an important component of 
the incubation process - client selection. 
1. Quantitative with secondary data from incubator application forms.  
2. Any incubator selection strategy would use criteria to assess either the 
‘business idea’ or the ‘entrepreneur / management team’. 
3. What really differentiates any incubator selection strategy is either the 
flexibility or strictness in the application of assessment criteria. 
23 Hackett & Dilts (2008) 
 
 
Important article which operationalises the 
Real Options framework proposed in 
Hackett & Dilts (2004b) to investigate the 
client selection process. 
1. Quantitative with Survey. 
2. Real Options theoretical reasoning is used to map the incubation 
process. They suggest that incubatee selection is the creation of an 
option whilst subsequent resource infusions and monitoring and 
assistance are option exercises. 
3. The performance of any incubation programme is a function of and 
positively related to (1) incubatee selection performance, (2) 
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Presented next is a review of the above 23 articles placed in six different 
conceptualizations. Organising the review along conceptualizations makes it possible 
to extract overall findings and major lines of argument which in-turn helps in 
identifying knowledge gaps and, in a number of cases, the meta-theoretical 
implications for the development of new theory in the area.  
 
3.3 Thematic Review of Selected Studies  
 
3.3.1 Incubation as Mechanism for New Venture Creation 
 
Campbell et al (1985); Smilor (1987); Brooks (1986); Hisrich (1988); Weinberg et al 
(1991) and Peters et al (2004) – studies included in this conceptualisation - draw on 
the new venture creation and entrepreneurial process literature and make advances 
in three areas. First, a number of attributes are ascribed to the idea of incubation 
including: (i) a process of awarding credibility and legitimacy to new firms; (ii) a 
process of opening new network access while controlling a set of assistive resources; 
(iii) a process of heightening community support for the entrepreneur; (iv) a 
cooperative process between the incubator, its clients and field-level partners. 
Second, they describe a number of mutually exclusive components or stages of the 
incubation process such as: (i) diagnosis of needs; (ii) selection and monitoring; (iii) 
capital investment; and (iv) access to expert networks. Finally, typologies or models 
are proposed such as: (i) not-for-profit; (ii) university-based; (iii) corporate; (iv) high-
tech, and these are compared and contrasted on the basis of a number of 
characteristics ascribed to the model’s particular method, or style of incubation. 
 
In the first of the above three advances, while it is useful to propose incubation’s 
attributes for definitional purposes, these do not on their own help us understand how 
the process unfolds to either award credibility, open network access or heighten 
community support. The other two advances pose problems of their own; first, in 
conceptualising incubation as a step-by-step / staged process – this is usually an 
instrumentalist description of ‘what incubators ought to do’ which does not show ‘how 
incubators function’, since in the latter, theoretical models must present a picture of 
internal management practice and the normative and structural milieu that allows 
incubator organisations to perform its functions. These aspects of incubation are 
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undoubtedly impacted by both the micro-level context of human relations, and the 
wider macro-context of regional economy, public policy, entrepreneurship culture and 
other environmental drivers. 
 








Second, research which highlights incubator archetypes and associated attributes of 
incubation practice, is divorced from contextual variables and by many researchers’ 
own admission, not really applicable to any one incubator organisation. Arguably, any 
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particular style of incubation is dependant on a myriad of subjective, dynamic and 
context-bound attributes and behaviours of incubator managements, as well as a 
particular client-mix. Thus, using this logic, no two corporate, university-based, high-
tech incubators or any other incubator archetype could possibly have anything in 
common.  
 
It seems as though previous researchers have ignored what Gartner (1985) has 
identified as key to understanding the new venture creation process. Gartner (1985) 
suggests that any new venture is a gestalt of variables from four dimensions: (a) 
individual(s)-the person(s) involved in starting a new organisation; (b) organisation – 
the kind of firm that is started; (c) environment – the situation surrounding and 
influencing the new organisation; and (d) new venture process – the actions 
undertaken by the individuals) to start the venture. Therefore, no new venture 
creation can be comprehensively described, nor can its complexity be adequately 
accounted for, unless all of its four dimensions are investigated and an attempt is 
made to discover how variables from each dimension interact with variables from 
other dimensions.  
 
The uni-dimensionality of previous researchers becomes quite clear with Peters et 
al’s (2004) – the latest study in the theme – conclusion who attempted to test a model 
of incubation on three different types of incubators, for-profit, non-profit, university-
based incubators. Based on findings, they concluded that their model is ineffective, in 
the sense that it could not fully explain the incubator’s role in facilitating the new 
venture creation process. This failure can only be ascribed to an inappropriate 
understanding of the new venture creation ‘gestalt’. Latest research on new venture 
creation (Lichtenstein et al, 2006; Davidsson & Gordon, 2010; Shepherd, 2011) re-
affirms Gartner’s (1985) view, therefore, further research needs more sophisticated 
research designs that trace the dynamics of incubators’ internal venture creation 
processes in time, taking into account the impact of associated variables such as the 
role of the entrepreneur, the incubator manager, the client cohort, the internal 
normative environment, the external context and the structural properties of the 
incubator organisation. 
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3.3.2 Incubation as a Mechanism for Resource Allocation 
 
Researchers in this stream (McAdam & McAdam, 2008; Patton et al, 2009; Todorovic 
& Moenter, 2010) theorise using the Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm 
(Penrose, 1959). The incubator is seen as a mechanism of awarding a stock of 
resources to client firms without incurring substantial cost. Resources here are not 
just tangible resources, but other intangibles including proximity to markets, sources 
of knowledge (universities) and clustering effects similar to that of a Community of 
Practice. The impact of these resources on the client firm, it is argued, results in 
access to new knowledge, expertise and networks, ultimately leading to growth.  
 





This is a very appropriate conceptualisation of incubation, after all, what is the real 
point of incubation but a system to make resources available in a cost effective and 
timely manner, to new firms. However, on deeper scrutiny, a number of problems 
emerge, especially regarding the classical assumptions behind the RBV. These 
assumptions, emerging from neo-classical economic theory, underline the real 
applicability of the RBV. For instance, on the issue of exchanges between the firm 
and its environment, the RBV places primary emphasis on economic as opposed to 
social or political exchanges. Further, it assumes rationality and views organisational 
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actors as rational beings assessing choices and making decisions which maximise 
their self-interests (Fahy, 2000). These assumptions have not only been challenged 
by behavioural economists in the past but also researchers in the discipline of 
entrepreneurship and small business (Bernheim & Stark, 1988; Karra et al, 2006).  
 
Furthermore, the basic logic behind the RBV is for the firm to develop a sustainable 
competitive advantage (SCA) allowing the earning of economic rents or above-
average returns. RBV suggests that to achieve SCA, firms must come into the 
possession of certain key resources, that is, resources having the characteristics of a 
“value, barrier” to duplication and appropriability. To achieve SCA firms must 
effectively deploy these resources. This then is an issue of strategic choice i.e. the 
firm's management identifying, developing and deploying key resources to maximise 
returns.  
 
The RBV would dictate a three-tired (and interlinked) role of incubators: ‘how’ to help 
client firms develop SCA and superior performance; ‘what’ are the characteristics and 
types of advantage-generating resources; and ‘influencers’ of strategic choices by 
client firm managements. It is suggested that the role of incubators lies in the second 
tier only i.e. in identifying firm resource needs and aiding in resource deployment. 
Here a problem is encountered; McAdam & McAdam (2008) found that the most 
crucial factor determining the ability of firms to use incubator resources is an ‘effective 
management team’. Thus, is an incubator organisation designed to infuse resources 
to build effective entrepreneurial teams? As McAdam & McAdam show through their 
review of past literature, effective team building is mostly dependant on personal 
capabilities and personality traits – aspects seemingly beyond the scope of incubator 
organisations to practically / tangibly influence. This problem brings into question the 
appropriateness of the RBV for studying incubation simply as mechanism for 
resource allocation.  
 
For developing an understanding of the client firm’s capacity and willingness to 
absorb resources and varying resource needs it would be important to consider 
variables of the internal environment and the external context, such as markets 
served or the nature of the relationship with the incubator manager. Arguably, in a 
scenario where relationships are strained, irrespective of absorptive capacity, 
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resource availability or requirement, consumption would ultimately be effected (Patton 
et al, 2009). For incubation researchers, therefore, it is important to delve into the 
context of a particular incubation environment, and to unearth micro processes and 
institutionalised patterns governing the rules of incubator-client firm interaction.  
 
3.3.3 Incubation as a Socio-Political Game 
 
Incubation in this stream is conceptualised in game theoretic terms. Researchers pick 
up a number of themes previously ignored in the incubation discourse, including 
those that deal with the disadvantages of incubation (McAdam & Marlow, 2007) and 
political rivalries (Evald & Bager, 2006). Investigations based on rich qualitative 
approaches reveal the presence of power struggles, shifting coalitions, self-interest, 
secrecy, lying and entrepreneurs trying to hide the fact that their businesses are 
based in incubators. The role of incubators is then to create a collaborative culture by 
reducing political rivalries and self-interest. Researchers in this stream suggest or 
imply a certain inevitability when it comes to disharmony and political tension in an 
incubation setting. This is due to close physical proximity of firms with comparable 
attributes involved in similar lines of business. Another important contributor is 
alleged to be the multi-tiered structure of incubators with competing stakeholders 
leading to shifting organisational objectives and priorities.  
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Research in this stream is exploratory in nature where findings come from a single 
unit of analysis – the client firm. Arguably, when scrutinising the negative aspects of 
incubators, the views and experiences of the incubator management ought to be 
analysed alongside client views. Therefore, since the voice of the incubator 
management is entirely missing, the relevance and generalisability of the research’s 
results becomes slightly problematic.  
 
Nonetheless, this stream showcases interesting research from a policy standpoint 
and further extends our own theoretical underpinnings that incubation is primarily a 
socio-political mechanism of awarding legitimacy and perceptions of reduced risk and 
security within a boundaried physical space. By way of further research, it would be 
interesting to study the mechanisms which may reduce levels of self-interest and 
entrepreneurial conflict. Another area would be to see if a higher level of 
entrepreneurial conflict is inherent to either (a) certain client-types such as ICT firms 
or bio-technology firms or (b) certain types of incubators such as specialist incubators 
where the mix of firms is focussed on a particular industry or sector.  
 
3.3.4 Incubation as a Co-Product of Incubator-Incubatee Dyads 
 
Not many studies fall into this category (Rice 2002; Warren, et al, 2009), but from the 
standpoint of the research presented in this thesis, this particular approach to 
studying incubation, though faced with a number of difficult methodological 
challenges, is the most fruitful and ‘closer-to-ground’. It is argued that incubators and 
entrepreneurs operate in an inter-dependent ‘co-production dyad’ where business 
assistance is co-produced between the incubator manager as the regular producer 
and the incubator company as the consumer producer [(Rice, 2002) - see Figure 9]. 
This is a very intuitive approach, to argue that the readiness of the entrepreneur to 
engage in co-production of business assistance impacts the incubation process 
outputs. Such mutual co-production of incubation assistance is primarily driven by the 
nature of the relationship between the incubator manager and the entrepreneur.  
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Figure 9 - A model of co-production in business incubators 




Researchers in this theme argue that by customising co-production to fit the 
readiness profiles of entrepreneurs, incubator managers can enhance the aggregate 
impact of co-production on their portfolios of incubator companies. This is the aspect 
most ignored in previous research on mapping the incubation process and business 
incubator performance evaluation. Previously, the focus of incubator evaluation has 
been on measuring the effectiveness of services delivered to client firms or to match 
incubator missions or goals with targeted outputs (Allen & McCluskey, 1990; Markley 
& McNamara, 1995; Sherman & Chappell, 1998; Colombo & Delmastro, 2002; 
Bhabra-Remedios & Cornelius, 2003; Wynarczyk & Raine, 2005; Lendner & Dowling, 
2007). However, such an approach neglects a fundamental constituent of the 
incubation process, the clients and their valuation of the usefulness of incubation to 
firm development and growth. What Rice’s work has done is that it laid the foundation 
for future more client-centric incubator assessments (Abduh et al, 2007; Hughes et al, 
2007) .   
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This conceptualisation of incubation overturns an important assumption in previous 
research; that the incubator is the initiator and orchestrator of incubation, whilst the 
incubatee is a passive recipient. Instead this approach views incubation as occurring 
in an inter-dependent ‘co-production dyad’ between the incubator manager and the 
incubating firm. Thus, the ideal level or unit of analysis to investigate the incubation 
process ought to be the incubator manager-firm (or entrepreneur) dyad.  
 
Arguably, the quality, quantity, frequency, intensity, scale, scope and ultimately the 
output of incubation are all dependant on a variety of relationship specific factors in 
the dyad. Therefore, researchers should have proposed the conditions and variables 
that would promote the development of effective dyadic relations. Further, research in 
the area must aim to understand triggering behaviour in the incubator-client dyadic 
co-production unit and investigate the impact of dyadic norms and incubators’ 
structural properties on how incubation process evolves and unfolds in time.  
 
3.3.5 Incubation as an Outcome of Network Behaviour 
 
Researchers in this stream attempt to show the impact of internal and external 
network connections on incubatee development and growth (Tötterman & Sten, 2005; 
McAdam & McAdam, 2006; Bøllingtoft & Ulhøi, 2005; Hughes et al, 2007). There are 
a number of interesting findings from this stream; first, the physical space and the 
company mix of an incubator play an important role in increasing the network 
dynamic of an incubator. In other words, it is suggested, that two aspects promote 
active client networking inside incubators (a) some unique aspects of the architectural 
design and configuration of the incubator space, and (b) the type of companies 
inducted – some types of companies network more readily than others. Researchers, 
however, don’t go any further, therefore, there is no understanding of what types of 
design attributes promote active networking and what types of companies more 
readily network and the underlying reasons for such behaviour.   
 
Second, researchers discuss the importance of internal networks, as opposed to 
external, in incubation success. Drawing from network and social capital theory 
(Podsakoff, et al, 2000) researchers agree that incubators facilitate the creation of 
entrepreneurial networks. They argue that a very useful indicator for gauging the 
   
 
64 
quality of incubation is firm ‘network density’, i.e. new and live network nodes that 
client firms create as a result of the strategic involvement of the incubator 
management. Arguably, the higher the network density, the greater the client 
satisfaction with incubator services. The assumption here is that the more firms 
network, the more likely it is that they will ‘succeed’ post-incubation. However, 
according to recent research, the argument that networking opportunities between 
client firms leads to synergies, R&D agreements and innovation, does not hold 
(McAdam & Marlow, 2007; Evald & Bager, 2008). Further, research assumes that 
networking is an activity that incubating firms actively engage in on their own initiative. 
This is not always the case since common organisational values, leadership 
behaviours and other factors can significantly impact firm and individual network 
behaviour (Podsakoff et al, 2000). 
 
Therefore, there is no apparent settlement on the issue of internal firm networking – 
does networking promote firm development and increase chances of post-incubation 
success and if it does then in what way and under what specific conditions? 
Investigating this question becomes quite critical since, higher levels of networking, it 
is suggested, results from a variety of factors, which may be beyond the influence of 
incubator managements, such as proximity, initial personal assessments and 
entrepreneurs’ personality match.  
 
3.3.6 Incubatee Selection as a Predictable & Controllable Process 
 
According to Hackett & Dilts (2004a), little effort has been devoted to unpacking the 
individual variables or components associated with the incubation process. Most work 
carried out in the above area is generally restricted to examining the one component 
of selecting incubatees (Merrifield, 1987; Kuratko & LaFollette, 1987; Lumpkin & 
Ireland, 1988; Allen & McCluskey, 1990; Aerts et al, 2007; Bergek & Norrman, 2008). 
This is perhaps due to the fact that tenant screening is considered to be the most 
important component of the incubation process (Kuratko & LaFollette, 1987; Mian, 
1994a; Colombo & Delmastro, 2002; Peters et al, 2004). The six studies in this 
category make a straightforward case for the importance of tenant screening to 
overall incubation success [ including Merrifield (1987); Lumpkin & Ireland (1988); 
Hackett & Dilts (2004b); Aerts et al (2007); Bergek & Norrman (2008); Hackett & Dilts, 
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(2008)]. From the argument of economic rationality, the qualitative difference between 
incubation applicants must be taken into consideration. As such, only those firms that 
are “weak but promising”, or in other words, those that have a compelling business 
case but lack resources should be admitted whilst firms that cannot be helped 
through business incubation and those that do not need incubation, should be 
screened (Hackett & Dilts, 2004b)  
 




The importance of selection performance is also important. One underlying 
assumption researchers make is that once a firm’s ‘attractiveness’ and ‘fit’ to 
incubator strategy are established, ‘success’ is likely to follow. However, irrespective 
of the most ideal incubatee selection system, outside variables such as the efficacy of 
the incubation process, changing firm capability,  external national, regional and local 
factors and competence amongst a host of other factors impact considerably on 
‘success’ (Sherman & Chappell, 1998).  
 
Researchers suggest that new firms or incubatees can be rationally selected from a 
pool of available options by employing either ‘selection criteria’ (based on the 
attractiveness and fit of firm proposal to incubator strategy), or CSFs (critical success 
factors for firm marketplace success). There is a problem, however, with this 
assertion; it is not possible to develop a universally applicable set of CSFs or the 
capabilities firms ought to develop for marketplace success. This is because there are 
considerable differences between incubators, their client firms and the markets they 
service; therefore, any useful CSF assessment has to be specific to the context of a 
particular incubator. Furthermore, screening practices also differ between different 
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groups of incubators. Specific characteristics of incubator archetypes influence the 
way they select and incubate nascent firms. 
 
Ultimately, it is suggested that selection like other forms of organisational decision 
making is highly unpredictable (Cohen et al, 1972; Heimer & Stinchcombe, 1999). 
The incubatee selection decision is neither rational nor controllable for two main 
reasons: (a) the selection decision eventually lying with a single individual and his / 
her perceptive judgment, and (b) the decision making process itself being 
unpredictable and ad-hoc. Further research must look at the selection process more 
closely and to draw from the latest research in the heuristics and biases tradition to 
un-earth the social and cognitive processes that work to facilitate the client selection 
process and the context in which these processes occur. 
 
To summarise and distil the main arguments made in this section a synthesis table is 
presented below. This table presents the weaknesses found in previous 
conceptualisations of the incubation process and further research directions for 
developing new theory in the area. The analysis is ultimately used to develop the nine 
research questions which are explored in this research22.  
 
                                                 
22 ibid, see Table 4 in Chapter 5.. 
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Table 3 – Conceptualisations of Incubation, their Weaknesses & Further Research  
 
 Outline of Conceptualisation Weaknesses Further Research 
Incubation as a mechanism 
for new venture creation 
A step-by-step / staged process that awards 
legitimacy, opens network access and 
heightens community support for 
entrepreneurs.  
A lack of understanding of new 
venture creation as a gestalt of a 
number of dynamically interacting 
variables. 
Trace the dynamics of incubators’ 
internal venture creation processes in 
time, taking into account a gestalt of 
variables including the aspirations of 
the entrepreneur, the incubator 
manager, the client cohort, the 
internal normative environment and 
the structural properties of the 
incubator organisation. 
 
Incubation as a mechanism 
for resource allocation 
A mechanism of awarding a stock of 
tangible and in-tangible resources to client 
firms that results in, in addition to other 
benefits, client firm growth.  
The base assumptions of the 
resource-based view have been over 
turned. 
 
The most crucial factor determining 
the ability of firms to use incubator 
resources is an ‘effective 
management team’, developing such 
a team is, arguably, beyond the remit 
of incubation. 
 
A crucial factor for resource 
consumption is the quality of 
relationship between the incubator 
and client. Research must unearth 
micro processes and institutionalised 
patterns governing the rules of 
incubator-client firm interaction.  
 
Incubation as a socio-
political game 
A socio-political mechanism of creating an 
environment and perception of reduced risk 
and security within a boundaried physical 
space. 
Voice of the incubator management 
is entirely missing, therefore, the 
relevance of results is problematic 
The important role of the incubator 
manager in reducing self-interest and 
entrepreneurial conflict has been 
ignored and needs further 
investigation.  
 
Incubation as a co-product 
of incubator-incubatee 
dyads 
A process of co-producing developmental 
assistance in independent incubator-client 
dyads. 
Unit of analysis ought to be the 
incubator-client dyad.  
 
A lack of focus on relational variables 
that would boost co-production 
efficacy.  
The conditions promoting the 
development of effective dyadic 
relations and incubation triggering 
behaviour. It is also important to 
study the impact of dyadic norms and 
incubators’ structural properties on 
how the process unfolds. 
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Incubation as an outcome of 
network behaviour 
A system of increasing client firms’ network 
density. 
No understanding of what types of 
design attributes increase network 
density. 
 
No real understanding on what types 
of companies more readily network, 
and why. 
 
Networking opportunities do not 
always lead to benefits for clients. 
 
Incorrect assumption that clients 
actively engage in networking on 
their own initiative at homogenous 
levels across the board. 
 
In what ways and under what 
conditions is networking amongst 
client firms promoted? 
 
 
Incubatee selection as a 
predictable and controllable 
process 
As a process of selecting “weak but 
promising” firms for incubator induction. 
Selection performance is just one 
(not the only) of a myriad of factors 
contributing to clients’ post-
incubation ‘success’. 
 
Nearly impossible to correctly identify 
critical factors before-hand for future 
market place success. 
 
Client selection like other 
organisational decision making 
processes is rarely rational. 
Researchers should draw from work 
in the heuristics and biases tradition 
to un-earth the social and cognitive 
processes that work to facilitate the 
client selection process and the 
context in which these processes 
occur.  
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3.4 Discussion and Conclusion  
 
Overall, the literature review indicates that most research in the area is descriptive in 
nature, and not explanatory. In other words, researchers have not fully delved into the 
“process-oriented” nature of incubation. This view is supported by Hackett & Dilts 
(2004b) who suggest that most frameworks from organisational and social theory 
utilised in the past are not fully concerned with the true nature of incubation – a social 
process that enables human action. What seems to be missing is explanatory theory 
describing the underlying social or other (such as financial or legal) mechanisms that 
enable human action and behaviour in the context of incubation (Hackett & Dilts, 
2004b).  
 
Why has the above been the case? A number of previous literature reviews in the 
area (Hackett & Dilts, 2004a; Phan et al, 2005) highlight how research has 
progressed by adopting and adapting theory and models from other disciplines, 
especially economics and public policy. Previous reviews also highlight the diversity 
of disciplinary foundation in the area, however, such diversity does not automatically 
lead to a diversity of underlying meta-theoretical assumptions within an area (Burrell 
& Morgan, 1979; Gergen, 1994). Thus, without a rich meta-theoretical debate to distil 
the sub-textual essences that exist at the very core of the incubator-incubation 
discourse, it is unlikely that radically new research agendas would gain currency. 
Such debates have taken place in other areas of the social sciences, such as small 
business and entrepreneurship (Grant & Perren, 2002), strategic management 
(Alvesson & Deetz, 2000) and information systems (Gallagher & Webb, 2000) and 
have led to the consideration of the meta-theoretical foundations of competing 
discourses.  
 
Therefore, to lay the foundations for a paradigmatic debate in the incubator-
incubation area, a meta-analysis was conducted (see Appendix - B). This analysis 
presents a critical reflection on the ontological, epistemological and methodological 
foundations on the 23 studies reviewed in this chapter. This was done by analysing 
researchers’ philosophical worldviews, preferences for types of research questions 
and research designs, and the nature of their empirical and theoretical conclusions.  
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Arising from the above analysis, two important conclusions can be drawn: first, most 
published incubation literature falls within the functionalist rather than the interpretive 
paradigm. The analysis here simply suggests that the zeitgeist of research in the 
leading articles in the incubator-incubation area is functionalist in orientation where 
positivist methodologies and methods have remained dominant. Therefore, the 
current body of research helps us understand the ‘‘what’’ aspects of the incubation 
phenomenon through a number of empirical and normative descriptions of the factors 
or variables that researchers believe constitute the process. This is problematic since 
according to Hackett & Dilts (2004a), if the area of incubator-incubation research is to 
advance forward in a theoretically meaningful manner then our attention must turn 
from ‘‘what’’ – type research questions and lists of descriptive factors to ‘‘how’’ and 
‘‘why’’ and ‘‘in what context’’ (‘‘who’’ ‘‘where’’ and ‘‘when’’) these factors are 
interrelated. Such an anti-positivist approach should help in the development of more 
adequate explanatory theory.  
 
Had interpretivism been the dominant paradigm in incubator-incubation research, our 
understanding of the phenomenon may have been entirely different since the 
questions researchers would have thought important to investigate would have been 
entirely different. As a result, the methods employed would have been different and in 
turn what would count as knowledge about incubation would have been different. 
Rather than attempting to build rational models of incubation, incubator classifications, 
predicting incubatee outcome-states or assessing impact, interpretive researchers 
would view and research incubation differently - as a social process that is 
contextually sensitive, subject to changes triggered by internal events or shifts in the 
external environment and is politically charged with competing agendas and 
objectives. Research questions would attempt to understand the phenomenon 
through the meanings that people assign to the process and focus on the full 
complexity of human sense making as the process unfolds. Thus, interpretive 
methods of research in incubation would aim to understand the context in which 
incubation occurs, and the processes whereby incubation influences and is 
influenced by its context.  
 
The second conclusion drawn from the meta-analysis was that alongside functionalist 
meta-theoretical agendas, close scrutiny reveals the presence of instrumentalist 
ideals guiding incubation scholars’ research designs (see Appendix - B). This 
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becomes apparent from the some of the research questions that have been 
investigated in the past23. Instrumentalists regard theories not as attempts to describe 
the world but as instruments for making predictions. For the instrumentalist then, a 
theory is empirically adequate if it makes accurate predictions or all of its observable 
consequences are true (Eldridge, 1998, pp. 67). Thus, the “black-box’ analogy is an 
appropriate one for instrumentalism. The researcher inserts (intrinsically value-free) 
information regarding observed background conditions into a model black-box and 
the box then generates predictions regarding what one will ultimately observe 
(Newberry, 2007). Of no concern, therefore, is the mechanism inside the box – it can 
be anything ‘’as long as it works’’. There is no particular requirement that the black-
box and its mechanism depict the way the world really is. Indeed, “the mechanism is 
only an instrument, depicting the world is not its purpose” (Bird, 1998, pp. 125).   
 
The problem with “black-box” conceptualisations is that researchers fail in stipulating 
the mechanisms linking the explanans and explanandum - the real causes, 
antecedent events or necessary conditions impacting process dynamic. Put another 
way, in order to explain the relationship between two observed entities ‘A’ and ‘B’, we 
search for a mechanism ‘M’, which is such that on the occurrence of the cause of 
input ‘A’, it generates the outcome ‘B’. The search for mechanisms means that we are 
not satisfied with merely establishing systematic co-variation between variables / 
events / entities; rather a satisfactory explanation requires we are also able to specify 
the social ‘cogs and wheels’ that have brought the relationship into existence in the 
first place. Hence, a mechanism can be seen as a systematic set of statements that 
provide a plausible account of how ‘A’ and ‘B’ are linked to one another (Hedström & 
Swedberg, 1998).  
 
The instrumentalist’s focus on inputs-outputs without any real concern for 
mechanisms is precisely what Hackett & Dilts (2008) lament. They conclude that in 
order to truly understand incubation there is need to move away from ‘’black-box’’ 
approaches designed to simply predict incubation outcomes to understanding how 
incubation works in practice. No doubt, the prediction of incubation outcomes is an 
                                                 
23 For example: what are the core services of start-up incubators, and how can they be managed best? (vonZedtwitz & 
Grimaldi, 2006); what role does the incubator play in supporting the new firm in its development as represented by the 
lifecycle model? (McAdam & McAdam, 2007); what is the role of incubators in the entrepreneurial process? (Peters et al, 
2004); and how business incubators can support entrepreneurs, in their efforts to build up networks for the benefit of their 
own company, by focusing more on social capital? (Tötterman & Sten, 2005). 
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important aspect of interest to both researchers and practitioners / policy-makers, 
however, the lack of models that can make accurate predictions is clear testimony 
that value- and context-free black-box approaches are simply not enough.  
 
In conclusion, there has generally been a lack of theorising in the area of incubation 
research which is explained by an over reliance on instrumentalism. In this chapter, it 
is being suggested that if processes, norms and structural properties are to be 
analysed, then a new mechanisms-based approach is warranted.  Such an approach 
is developed in the next chapter and would be concerned with the sort of questions 
that have escaped careful scrutiny in the past: for example, how are the incubator 
and client firm linked?; how is incubation assistance triggered?; what are the 
conditions that will promote incubation activity?; and what is the relationship between 
the variables associated with the incubation and aspects of incubators’ internal 
normative environment and structural properties. The mechanisms lens helps in the 
development of a new seventh conceptualisation of incubation that includes a 
definition as well as base assumptions.  
 




Studying the Business Incubation Process:  





It has been demonstrated following the literature review that due to a lack of debate 
on the meta-theoretical foundations of previous research, when studying the 
incubation process, scholars in the past have not considered its true processual 
nature and have ignored the importance of incubators’ internal normative 
environment and structural properties. This has resulted in narrow ‘black-box’ 
conceptualisations which lack explanatory power. In this chapter, it is proposed that 
using the social mechanisms lens would allow a more nuanced and sophisticated 
understanding of incubation to emerge. Three different theoretical outlooks for 
studying social mechanisms are assessed. These are the rational choice, practice-
action and pragmatist traditions. It is shown that both rational choice and practice-
action traditions are not wholly compatible with what this research aims to achieve, 
and that the pragmatist worldview offers the most appropriate language, constructs 
and meta-theoretical worldview with which to analyse the incubation process. 
Applying Gross’s (2009) theoretical model, a new seventh conceptualisation of the 
incubation process is developed (in addition to the six identified in the previous 
Literature Revew chapter). Incubation as a social mechanism would consist of 
interlinked actors solving problem situations through the mobilising of more or less 
habitual responses. Based on this view, the focus of further research enquiry will be 
on uncovering why and how the parties in incubation develop predictable responses 
to certain problem situations through the habits of cognition and action. Such an 
approach, it is believed, will allow for the development of new knowledge that is both 
connected with the spirit of previous researchers and also addresses the inevitable 
knowledge gaps left behind due to an over-reliance on functionalism and 
instrumentalism. 
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4.1 Introduction  
 
Hackett & Dilts (2004b) have undertaken a comprehensive review of extant 
frameworks employed in past incubator-incubation research in their application to the 
incubation process. They have also assessed a number of other frameworks (those 
which, according to them, are yet to be deployed by researchers) that could possibly 
offer deeper insight. This review provides a very useful starting-point for assessing 
the viability (or otherwise) of a particular theoretical outlook in its application to 
incubation.  
 
Hackett & Dilts (2004b) briefly describe and attempt to operationalise (in the context 
of incubation) behavioural theories, economic theories (neo-classical economic 
reasoning and transaction cost economics), the resource- and knowledge-based 
views, the dynamic capabilities perspective, agency theory, institutional theory, 
structuration theory, scaffolding theory, social network theory and finally the real 
options theory from the domain of financial economics. They conclude that the 
application of only a few of the above theoretical frameworks may add to our existing 
knowledge. They made a case for using the Real Options theory and in Hackett & 
Dilts (2008) applied options theoretic reasoning to incubation. By their own admission, 
empirically, Real Options was not fully successful in developing powerful and elegant 
explanatory theory on the nature of the incubation process and in predicting 
incubation outcomes.  
 
It is clear that Real Options, the aforementioned theoretical frameworks and the 
dominant perspectives in the six conceptualisations presented in the literature 
review24 are not wholly adequate for explaining incubation’s processual dynamic. This 
is primarily because these frameworks are not concerned with the study of social 
processes or mechanisms like incubation. It is suggested that mechanisms-based 
theorising can help us understand incubation’s true nature.  
 
What is meant by mechanism-based theorising? Social mechanisms are “sometimes-
true theories that provide an intermediary level of analysis in-between pure 
description and storytelling, on the one hand, and universal social laws, on the other” 
                                                 
24 Bar, to an extent, Incubation as a Process of New Venture Creation 
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(Coleman 1964, pp. 516). If a regression tells us about a relation between two 
variables – for instance, if you turn the ignition the car will start - mechanisms based 
reasoning would require that one lifts the bonnet, take apart the machinery inside and 
show how (Davis & Marquis, 2005). Mechanisms describe “a set of interacting 
parts—an assembly of elements producing an effect not inherent in any one of them. 
A mechanism is not so much about ‘nuts and bolts’ as about ‘cogs and wheels’—the 
wheelwork or agency by which an effect is produced” (Hernes 1998, pp. 74).  
 
The self-fulfilling prophecy is a good example of a social mechanism: an initially false 
definition of a situation evokes behaviour that makes it become true (e.g., a run on a 
bank, widespread adoption of an innovation, collective action). Davis & Marquis 
(2005) give a number of other examples including: framing (the use of metaphors and 
symbols that organise perceptions of issues and cue courses of action by linking 
problems and actions to prevailing cultural conceptions), translation (how ideas that 
diffuse are modified and implemented to work in specific local contexts), bricolage 
(recombining elements, often borrowed from other contexts, to create a new 
configuration of social activity), commensuration (the institutional process by which 
entities become comparable and thus competitors, as firms in an industry), and 
evangelism (the reverse of diffusion, where adopters or their agents eagerly spread 
organisational practices). There are many more examples, but these should give a 
sense of the shape of the domain. 
 
Davis & Marquis (2005) suggest that mechanism-based theorising can aspire to 
explain but not predict. We may be confident that actors will respond to particular 
pressures, but uncertain what direction any response may take. This means that it 
may be possible to explain afterward but not predict prospectively. The point is not to 
accumulate findings about what is generally true about organisations — this proves to 
be a fruitless endeavour — but to use organisational mechanisms to explain social 
phenomena.   
 
Hence, for incubation researchers, a mechanisms-based investigation would be 
concerned with, for instance, how are the incubator and client firm linked, based on 
what relational variables, how do these variables impact the link between the 
incubator and client firm and as to how does the structure of the incubator contributes 
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to maintaining the incubator-client link? Such a meta-methodological outlook and 
approach is missing, and is needed to encourage deeper, more direct and fine-
grained explanations.  
 
In the following sections, an outline of the theoretical framework being adopted in this 
research is presented along with a new mechanisms-based conceptualisation of the 
incubation process. This is done by first discussing the two perspectives of studying 
social mechanisms – rational choice theory and the practice-action tradition. The 
discussion and eventual analysis reveals that both these traditions have a number of 
weaknesses when it comes to studying social mechanisms. Next, the merits of the 
pragmatist approach to studying social mechanisms is highlighted. This leads to a 
new mechanisms-based conceptualisation of the incubation process which provides a 
new definition and highlights the basic assumptions underlying studying incubation as 
a social mechanism.  
 
4.2 Theoretical Perspectives for Studying Social Mechanisms & their 
Weaknesses 
 
Social mechanisms have been conceptualised in various ways. According to Gross 
(2009), broadly speaking the explanation and extrapolation of social mechanisms has 
fallen into two major strands of work: the rational choice tradition and the body of 
work under the rubric of practice-action theory (existentialism, structural Marxism and 
anthropological structuralism; and building on other developments including 
phenomenology, ethnomethodology and work on “rule following” (inspired by 
Wittgenstein et al.). Although a huge  of contribution has been made by both of these 
strands, these lines of work on their own do not present a complete picture of social 
mechanisms. 
 
Ultimately, when it comes to rational choice theory or its variants, relatively few 
scholars agree that such models offer empirically or theoretically adequate 
descriptions of social action (Green & Shapiro, 1994; Somers, 1998; Archer & Tritter, 
2000). This has also been duly noted in the critique of the rational conceptualisations 
of the incubation process presented in the previous chapter (see section 3.3.6). 
Proponents of rational choice theory (especially those outside the ‘bounded 
   
 
77 
rationality’ framework) conceptualise rationality as a more or less equally available 
cognitive capacity and that individuals act rationally (or for the very least reasonably) 
in light of clear and coherent beliefs and desires (about maximising self utility).  
 
Sociological theorists have a problem with this rather bounded view of human 
cognition and action. They argue that different forms of rationality appear at different 
historical moments and come to be distributed unequally across social structures. 
Smesler (1998) holds that ambiguity rather than clarity has wide applicability in social 
life and Swindler (2001) maintains that the logical coherence of individuals’ beliefs is 
the exception rather than the rule. While rational choice theorists hold the belief that 
individuals (armed with beliefs and desires) step out of the flow of action to evaluate 
their options, compete means and make logical decisions, social theorists note that 
such moments are empirically rare, tend to take place in artificial settings and often 
involve a post-hoc / hind-sighted justification of goals once one or the other selected 
means are embarked upon. Finally, rational choice approaches that emphasise norm 
directed nature of action, assume that most action is motivated in some way. Many 
sociological theorists would argue that socially learned habit rather than norm is the 
major cause of human behaviour (Gross, 2009). Needless-to-say, not all theorists in 
the rational choice tradition are subject to these criticisms.  
 
Theorists in the second stream relevant to social mechanisms have argued that 
social practices – not discrete actions – should be the focus of social research. To 
such theorists practices are seen as constitutive of social life in numerous domains 
and historical settings. Practices are generally conceptualised as forms of doing or 
ways of acting and interacting that appear within particular communities or groups; 
they depend on shared pre-suppositions and assumptions; often have a significant 
material dimension; and unfold in individuals’ lives as a result of the active, creative 
and somewhat sub-conscious impacts of individuals’ pre-suppositions and 
assumptions, embedded in the context of sociobiographical exigencies. Practices 
conceptualised as such, are at the heart of Bourdieu’s theory of social fields 
(Bourdieu, 1990), Giddens’s theory of Structuration (Giddens. 1984), Knorr-Cetina’s 
investigations of the “epistemic cultures” of sciences and modern society (Knorr-
Cetina, 1999), Ortner’s efforts to reground anthropological understandings of culture 
(Ortner, 1984) and Sewell’s (2005) contributions to historiography. 
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Scholars of social practices have by no means ignored causality. Although embracing 
the notion of the active, knowledgeable, culturally interpretive agent found in earlier 
humanistic traditions (such as Symbolic Interactionism), contemporary theorists such 
as Ortner and Lareau depart from the anti-determinism that often characterises such 
approaches by showing the impact of patterned iterations of practice as the basis for 
the reproduction of social structures (Ortner. 1984; Lareau, 2003). Yet, as Gross 
(2009) argues, the direct production and reproduction of social structures by means 
of practices is only one kind of causal effect that may interest social scientists – what 
about the nature of other causal processes (whose impact remains unclear) that build 
on and intersect with social practices? In such a scenario, empirical research will find 
itself deprived of sophisticated action-theoretical foundations given that few in the 
practice-based tradition address social mechanisms.  
 
The way forward ought to be an approach that embraces the action and practice 
oriented spirit of the incubator-incubation discourse but at the same time moves away 
from black-box formulations of the incubation process. Therefore, in the next section, 
the usefulness of conceptualising incubation as a social mechanism through a 
pragmatist world-view rather than rational choice or practice theoretic is presented.  
 
4.3 A Pragmatist View of Social Mechanisms: How is it superior to the  
competing Rational Choice & Practice-Action Views? 
 
Within the incubation discourse, the impact of functionalism and instrumentalism on 
the nature of our understanding has been discussed in the previous chapter and in 
more detail in Appendix - B. It has been shown that incubator-incubation scholars 
have been advocating a move towards developing a more sophisticated 
understanding of the phenomenon by investigating more “how” and “why” type 
questions.  
 
Achieving this aim is conveniently possible in a pragmatist philosophy. Scholars 
regard pragmatism as an interpretivist approach (Benton & Craib, 2001; Bjørn, 2004) 
that is not committed to any one system of philosophy and reality, the focus is on the 
research problem and all available methods to derive knowledge about the problem 
(Creswell, 2009).  According to Creswell (2009), pragmatism awards a number of 
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advantages to researchers. Individual researchers have a freedom of choice where 
they are free to choose the methods, techniques and procedures of research that 
best suit their needs and purposes. Pragmatist researchers look to the what and how 
to research based on intended consequences; they do not see the world as an 
absolute unity but rather they believe that research is contextualised. A pragmatist 
will allow for more flexibility and “open doors to multiple methods, different worldviews, 
different assumptions as well as different forms of data collection and analysis 
techniques” (Creswell, 2009, pp. 11) in an attempt to explore the implications of 
context.  
 
For this research, it is envisaged that the methodological flexibility inherent in a 
pragmatist worldview will be helpful in unlocking the “black-box” of the incubation 
process. Attention is now turned to assessing the usefulness of pragmatism over 
rational choice theory (and its variants) and perspectives from the practice-action 
tradition. As discussed earlier, these would be the two other theoretical worldviews 
that could potentially shed light on the proposed study of incubation when 
conceptualised as a social mechanism.  
 
There are at least five ways in which pragmatism differs from and is superior to 
rational choice theory. First, pragmatism does not equate problem solving with the 
maximisation of utility. The kinds of problems of concern to pragmatists range much 
more widely and include all difficulties humans or collective actors face in life. Second, 
pragmatists insist that problem situations are always interpreted through cultural lens 
– even rationality. Third, pragmatists argue that much action is habitual and typically 
involves no conscious weighing of means and ends. Fourth, pragmatists maintain that 
instrumental rationality, when it does appear, is a kind of habit developed historically 
and is deployed in a situational context. Finally, as assumed in most rational choice 
models, means and ends are not always given priority over action – action is often 
disconnected from this instrumental rationality and is initiated on its own allowing 
actors to become attached to problem solutions they could not have imagined 
previously. Thus, Pragmatism draws neither explicitly on the common-sense notion of 
means-end rationality of Max Weber nor on the more rigorous conception of rational 
choice theory. Rather it suggests different rationalities existing in different contexts 
with many different means-ends chains, varying from situation to situation (Whitford, 
2002).  
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Some may argue that in the above form, pragmatism is close to practice theory, so 
why not prefer the latter? There is one crucial difference. Practice theorists, such as 
Bourdieu, tie their analyses of practices to questions of social-structural production 
and reproduction, which have not been a major concern for scholars working in a 
pragmatist framework. Bourdieu would view most lines of activity as connected to 
actors’ interests in leveraging themselves into favourable positions in 
multidimensional social hierarchies, and thus as tied to the maintenance or 
transformation of those hierarchies. Placing far too much emphasis on the strategic 
dimensions of action, practice theorists like Bourdieu become far too reductive at the 
level of action. As critics of Bourdieu have pointed out (Alexander, 1995), this analytic 
reduction is as problematic in its own way as rational choice theory is in its. 
  
As Gross (2009) points out, although pragmatist understandings of social action were 
not designed to account for social structure production-reproduction, it is able to 
better accommodate the diversity of action and practice unlike practice theorists such 
as Bourdieu. This is so because Bourdieu’s work does not see practices impacted by 
relatively autonomous identity commitments, variables disconnected from broader 
social structural positionings or the sheer force of tradition or institutionalisation. 
Nothing in a pragmatist approach would deny that some practices are closely 
associated with the reproduction of the social structures of inequality, however, the 
fineness of the model at the meso- and macro-levels gives it the range and flexibility 
lacking in other approaches.  
 
Therefore, the pragmatist worldview offers the most appropriate language, constructs 
and the meta-theoretical worldview with which to analyse social mechanisms. In the 
following section, Gross’s (2009) ‘pragmatist theory of social mechanisms’ is used for 
developing a new conceptualisation of the incubation process – based in 
mechanisms reasoning. To the best of knowledge, this is the first application of 
Gross’s general theory to a conceptual and empirical problem. 
 
   
 
81 
4.4  Conceptualising Incubation as a Social Mechanism using Gross’s (2009) ‘A 
Pragmatist Theory of Social Mechanisms’ 
 
There is much confusion regarding what exactly is a social mechanism. A number of 
conceptualisations have appeared in recent years, which describe (1) mechanisms as 
not necessarily observable; (2) mechanisms as observable processes that do not 
require the positing of motives; (3) mechanisms as lower order social processes; (4) 
mechanisms as triggerable causal powers; and (5) mechanisms as transforming 
events (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998; Gross, 2009).   
 
Gross’s view of a social mechanism is a “systems explanation”, consisting of the 
specification of the time and place of some event, structure or process within a larger 
set of interdependent variables. Mechanisms are described as events that alter 
relations among some specified set of elements. They come in three varieties: (a) 
cognitive mechanisms – operating through alterations of individual and collective 
perception; (b) relational mechanism – which alter connections among people, groups 
and interpersonal networks; and (c) environmental mechanisms – which exert 
influences on the conditions affecting social processes. There is emphasis here on 
time and place, in particular to ways in which social mechanisms can incorporate 
institutions, understandings and practices that have accumulated historically.  
 
This view not only accommodates the base-line assumptions of previous 
conceptualisations, but is also sufficiently broad to accommodate points of significant 
epistemological and methodological disagreement. Applying this definition to the 
incubation process results in a view of incubation that is quite distinct from the various 
conceptualisations discussed in the present thesis’s literature review.. Thus, defined, 
incubation is: a more or less general sequence or set of social events or processes 
initiated from inside an incubator organisation analysed at a lower order of complexity 
by which (in certain circumstances) some cause X tends to bring about some effect Y 
in the realm of incubator manager-client social relations. This sequence may or may 
not be analytically reducible to the actions of the parties in incubation, may underwrite 
formal or substantive causal processes, and may be observed, unobserved or in 
principle unobservable.  
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Although, it may seem that the above definition is quite reductive, in that it merely 
places emphasis on causal factors impacting the nature of X-Y relationships; under 
the pragmatist lens, however, it is much more: the search for mechanisms is the 
search for historically embedded deep causes operating in variable combinations, 
circumstances and sequences with consequently variable outcomes.  
 
What should be the primary points of analysis (or the factors that bring about the 
causal relationships) when analysing social mechanisms? For Gross (2009), people’s 
responses to certain situations are limited by a repertoire of behaviours to which they 
have exposure and that seem suitable to the problem at hand. Thus, according to him, 
social mechanisms can be understood as chains of actors, problem situations and 
habitual responses, coming together with varying degrees of efficacy with the 
assumption that a novel response to the actors’ problem would emerge. Our aim 
should then be to uncover the nature of such chains: the types into which they maybe 
classified, the actors involved in their operation, the habits employed by such actors 
and their origins, the circumstances in which the mechanisms operate, their 
interconnection with other mechanisms and their causal effects.  
 
Gross’s view on mechanisms has more to do with meaning and the ability of humans 
to interpret their situations in a culturally appropriate way than it does with identifying 
universals, in other words, it is an interpretive approach. This requires that we grasp 
how the relevant individual and/or collective actors (organisations such as incubators) 
understand and make assumptions about the situations before them and act on the 
meaning derived, helping thereby to enact the mechanism. Actors face problem 
situations and respond in habit-bound and culturally mediated ways. This suggests 
that actors are positioned in cultural systems from which they derive the 
understandings and assumptions, therefore, meanings and beliefs. This implies that 
mechanisms cannot be adequately understood without an analysis of such 
assumptions i.e. a project of cultural interpretation. In a way, Gross is proposing that 
cultural habits are the social mechanisms.  
 
To make sense of causal mechanisms operating at multiple levels of analysis, Gross 
distinguishes among habits and identifies three kinds:  
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1. Individual cognitive-affective habits – habitual ways actors have of understanding 
and responding emotionally to situations in general, resulting from their 
psychosocial experience or their biological endowments / propensities.  
 
2. Individual behavioural habits – deriving primarily from individual and social 
experience, these involve the disposition to enact specific behavioural routines 
when actors are faced with particular kinds of problem situations. 
 
3. Collectively enacted habits – ways that groups of actors have of working together 
to solve problems.  
 
Therefore, from Gross’s standpoint, incubation as a social mechanism would be 
composed of chains or aggregations of actors confronting problem situations and 
mobilising more or less habitual responses. The ‘mechanism’ would be the nuts and 
bolts processes by which cause and effect relationships inside the incubator 
organisation impact the associated (internal and external) actors’ habitualised 
responses to problem situations. This characteristic of the approach alongside two 
other elements: the centrality of meaning derived from cultural dispositions and the 
focus on human creativity and habit alternating to solve new and emerging problems, 
gives this view of incubation distinct leverage over previous conceptualisations. 
  
To understand incubation “S” (the social mechanism), we must examine the individual 
and collectives actors A1-n involved in the input-output I-O relationship. For each, our 
goal would be understand why and how, when confronted with problem situation Pn 
and endowed with habits of cognition and action Hn, along with other resources, 
response Rn becomes the most likely. Incubation S will, therefore, consist of all the 
relations (A1-n | Pn | Hn | Rn ), that in aggregate or sequentially, bring about the I-O 
relationship.  
 
For example, suppose we are interested in the relationship between ‘client propensity 
to engage in incubation’ and ‘incubation meta-approach or ethos’ when considering 
low-to-medium technology firms. These firms are based a mixed-use incubator 
organisation operating in an economic environment of stagnating or negative growth 
with a lack of public policy support for non-hi tech firms. Several kinds of actors, 
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problem situations and habitual responses make up this mechanism, but a pragmatist 
approach might concentrate on understanding how certain habits of thought and 
action are employed by both incubator managers and clients where certain client 
firms are coded as ‘incubation favourites’  in terms of their level of interest in pursuing 
incubation, potential need for strategic developmental assistance, industrial affiliation 
and a personal history, thereby, giving rise to an incubation system that allocates 
resources on perceptive judgement and not rationalised client assessments. 
Aggregated across mixed-use incubator organisations, such an A-P-H-R is the 
mechanism of incubation resource allocation.  
 
In conclusion, this new conceptualisation of the incubation process suggests that it 
works on the basis of interlinked actors solving problem situations through the 
mobilising of more or less habitual responses. On this basis, the focus of future 
research enquiry would be in uncovering why and how the parties in incubation 
develop predictable responses to certain problem situations through the habits of 
cognition and action.  
 
The value of the new conceptualization is ultimately an empirical question. Since the 
publishing of Gross’s article, cross citation databases have been checked to see if 
other researchers deployed Gross’s proposed framework to investigate social 
mechanisms. It seems to date this has not yet been undertaken and the research 
presented in this thesis is the first attempt at such an investigation. It is believed that 
a conception of incubation in the manner proposed by Gross will result in more clearly 




The purpose in this chapter was to present the outlines of a coherent theoretical 
framework to inform further empirical investigation on the incubation process. This 
has resulted in a new conceptualisation of incubation which suggests that the process 
works on the basis of interlinked actors solving problem situations through the 
mobilising of more or less habitual responses. The focus in this research will, 
therefore, be on uncovering how and in what ways the parties in incubation develop 
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predictable responses to certain problem situations through the habits of cognition 
and action. 
 
In the next chapter, a research design is proposed for studying the new mechanisms-
based conceptualisation of the incubation process developed in this chapter. It is kept 
in mind that the choices of ontology and epistemology have a direct influence on the 
choice of the theoretical framework, which in turn impacts the methodological choices 
considered. The meta-theoretical assumptions guiding the proposed enquiry are 
clarified, and the key objective of the research is presented. A rationale is then 
developed for studying the incubation process via the comparative qualitative multi-
site case study approach, followed by the presentation of a detailed case study 
protocol and a discussion on the measures taken to ensure the reliability and validity 
of findings. Finally, an elaboration on the data analysis and presentation techniques 
utilised is explained.    










In this chapter, in order to study incubation through the new mechanisms-based lens, 
a research design is proposed. Gross’s (2009) recommendation, whose theory of 
social mechanisms has provided the foundations for the new conceptualisation, 
influenced the development of an inductive, interpretivist and qualitative approach. A 
number of rationales are presented for carrying out the proposed investigation 
through the comparative multi-site case study. The bulk of the chapter presents the 
case study protocol which includes details on the overall case strategy, the research 
site selection approach and criteria, the process of negotiating access and a 
clarification on the unit of analysis. The section on ‘research questions’ is used to 
refer back to the findings of the literature review and proposals for further research to 
outline the process of the development of the nine research questions. These 
questions, linked to gaps in knowledge left behind in previous literature, contribute 
towards meeting the main research objective which is to carry out an investigation of 
the incubation process and incubators’ normative environment and structural 
properties. In order to collect data to answer the research questions, the methods and 
processes adopted are clarified. Operating within the confines of the case study 
methodology, semi-structured interviewing, non-participant observation and 
secondary data sources assisted in data collection. An example of how an interview 
transcript was coded is included at Appendix – D. Analysis and interpretation of 
qualitative data is immersive and requires a rigorous intellectual effort; the approach 
and process for categorising, coding and inferring-from raw data is explained and the 
emanating most significant themes presented in the analysis chapters are listed. The 
chapter ends with a description of the data presentation techniques adopted which 
includes reference to a table in the appendices that indicates the frequency of 
respondent data use (see Appendix – E). 





The research presented in this thesis is a study of the process of incubation, 
incubators’ internal normative environment and structural properties – aspects which 
allow incubator organisations to function and to meet their objectives. As already 
outlined in the Introduction chapter, the following is proposed as the research’s 
primary objective:  
 
“to investigate the normative environment, internal mechanisms and structural 
properties of incubator organisations for the purpose of identifying key 
elements that positively influence the development of new enterprises”.  
 
This aim will be achieved by tracing the development process of incubation 
relationships (between management and client firms) - from pre-incubation, selection, 
induction and onwards to graduation. It is proposed that this tracing of the 
development of incubation relationships will assist in the identification of the key 
variables that impact the “nature”25 and “success” of incubation in a given context. By 
breaking down the complex social phenomenon (the incubation process) into its 
component parts, it will become possible to analyse how aggregations of actors 
(involved in incubation) employ habits to resolve problem situations (in culturally 
mediated ways) and bring about systematic effects (in the incubation environment). 
Of these habits, it is envisaged that some would have a positive, whilst others would 
have a negative, influence on the relative “success” of incubation relationships.  
 
One major potential contribution of the research therefore, will be new explanatory 
theory to assist in the understanding of the behaviour of incubation parties under 
certain conditions, and such behaviour’s impact on the relative success of working 
relationships in an incubation setting.  
 
                                                 
25 By “nature” it is meant the key social mechanisms by which cause and effect relationships taking place inside the incubator 
organisation that are of moral, economical, political and intellectual importance come about.  
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5.2 Nature of Research Methodology 
 
An important question to ask at this stage is: what should be the broad elements of 
the research strategy which could facilitate the empirical investigation? The 
assumptions about incubation developed in the previous chapter have ontological 
implications, and these directly influence the methodology and research techniques 
employed and the conceptual framework in which the research is conducted.  
 
Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000) suggest it is generally accepted that the selection of 
a research paradigm is based on the complexity of the research area and the 
researcher's world-view. For the proposed investigation in this thesis, an approach is 
needed that allows for key patterns to emerge from which further theoretical 
development could occur (Gill & Johnson, 1997). This would require immersion in the 
research subjects’ world (Shaw, 1999) - incubator organisations in the case of this 
research. Further, these assumptions would hold true in an interpretive organisational 
research strategy using qualitative data and inductive methods of analysis (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979; Blaikie, 1993; Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). This 
strategy can be accommodated in an ontological worldview which recognises the 
presence of multiple realities. Lending credence to this choice is Gross (2009, pp. 
375) himself who recommends an “inductive and qualitative approach” to the study of 
social mechanisms.  
 
Allied to the notion of induction, is the idea that contributions to theory are made 
posteriori, in other words, theory development is the end point in this research. The 
logic of the inductive process requires first, the building from data, broad themes 
which then lead to a generalised model or theory. Following Creswell (2009), the 
research strategy (see Figure 11) began with the gathering of detailed information via 
fieldwork and then the categorisation of this information into themes using coding, the 
researcher’s experiences and existing literature on the topic. These themes were 
then developed into broad patterns or theories. Owing to the lack of literature focused 
on the incubation process for developing explanatory theory, ideas and concepts are 
drawn from a variety of researchers and cited in the analysis chapter as a way of 
confirming and theoretically grounding the research’s findings and conclusions. 
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Given the research’s raison d'être, the ‘how’ and ‘why’ – type formulation of research 
questions and the general time and resource limitations of a doctoral project; case 
study research provides the necessary methodological framework for a reliable and 
in-depth investigation of the internal process of incubation.  In-line with the pragmatist 
spirit driving this research, the case method is ideal when the outputs of research 
consider practical real world implications via a holistic and in-depth investigation 
(Feagin et al, 1991).  
 
5.3 The Case Method and its Relevance to the Project 
 
Case study research is a methodologically flexible approach to research design that 
focuses on a particular case – whether an individual, a collective or a phenomenon of 
interest. It has been referred to as a “paradigmatic bridge” because it is not assigned 
to a fixed ontological, epistemological or methodological position (Rosenberg & Yates, 
2007). Thus, such a methodology is able to accommodate the philosophical 
worldview adopted for this research.  
 
Over the years, the case method has gained popularity in the small business and 
entrepreneurship area as well as with incubator-incubation researchers. Perren & 
Researcher gathers information 
(e.g. interviews, observations) 
Researcher asks open-ended questions of participants 
or records field notes 
Researcher analyses data to form themes or 
categories 
Researcher looks for broad patterns, generalisations or 
theories from themes or categories 
Researcher poses generalisations or theories from 
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Ram (2004) for instance have published a study to show the impact of the case 
method in small business and entrepreneurial research (Perren & Ram, 2004). A 
number of researchers in the recent past have adopted the case study for 
investigating various aspects of the incubator-incubation phenomenon where explicit 
(case-based) methods have been utilised for establishing the parameters of the 
research, analysis of data and presentation of findings  (Lichtenstein, 1992; Autio & 
Kloftsen, 1998; Greene & Storey, 2004; Abetti & Rancourt, 2006; Hongyi et al, 2007; 
Evald & Bager, 2008; Schwartz & Hornych, 2008). Other research such as McAdam 
& Marlow (2007) and Bøllingtoft & Ulhøi (2005) based on a single-site ethnography 
and multi-site qualitative mixed methods respectively, may be categorised as case 
studies by some methodologists. 
 
Yin (2009) has identified a number of important components of case study research 
which should be planned carefully prior to the empirical / data collection phase of a 
project. These components as they are relevant to this research are discussed in the 
following sections. 
 
5.4 Designing the Research: Elements of the Case Methodology  
 
5.4.1 Case Study Strategy 
 
Stake (1995) has classified cases into three categories (1) intrinsic; (2) instrumental; 
and (3) collective. He noted that it is sometimes difficult to categorise a case as one 
or the other type. Researchers often have multiple research interests, and thus 
engage in both intrinsic and instrumental case research simultaneously. The key, he 
suggests, in both, is the opportunity to learn and shed light on the research problem 
(Stake, 1995).  
 
The “instrumental case study” appears to be the most suitable considering the 
objectives and requirements of this research. Here the case itself is secondary to 
understanding a particular phenomenon, therefore, the focus will remain on the 
‘incubation process’ rather than a particular ‘incubator organisation’ enacting that 
process.  
   
 
91 
For instrumental case research, the focus of the study is known in advance and 
designed around established theory and methods. The instrumental case is selected 
carefully to ensure that fruitful findings pertaining to the research aims and questions 
will be revealed. These important conditions have been considered in the design of 
this research. Stake (1995) also suggests that qualitative methods are best aligned 
with the philosophical underpinnings of the instrumental case, where researcher, 
participants and readers play a role in reconstructing experience. Data analysis relies 
upon careful coding with a focus on aggregate instances in the analytical write-up. 
The focus is on the specifics related to the research questions rather than on the 
complexity of the case.   
 
Another important aspect of the case study strategy was the use of multiple cases so 
as to maximise the opportunities for learning through cross-case comparison. The 
approach of using multiple cases for a comparative analysis has a number of 
advantages over single case studies. For instance, only a comparative approach can 
help in identifying the internal organisational principles that are specific to particular 
types of incubator organisations. Comparative analyses allow for prescriptive learning, 
such as looking at what management techniques or approaches can be transferred 
across models. Finally, comparative studies bring more rigour to research allowing 
the testing of generalisations such as dominant management models and 
techniques26.  
 
According to Yin (2009), when using multiple cases, case selection must lead to 
either (a) the prediction of similar results (a literal replication); or (b) the development 
of contrasting results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical replication). The 
difference between these two logics is quite important. Whereas, a literal replication 
can explain the conditions under which a particular phenomenon is likely to be found, 
a theoretical replication can explain the conditions when it is not likely to be found. 
Thus, for individual cases, the research write-up should indicate how and why a 
particular result was demonstrated (or not); AND why certain cases were predicted to 
have certain results, whereas other cases if any, were predicted to have contrasting 
results.  
                                                 
26 Issues relating to generalisability of case study findings are discussed later in the chapter in the section on Reliability and 
Validity. 
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In this research, the aim of the multiple case selection strategy was to compare and 
contrast results or theoretical replication – or to explain the conditions under which 
incubation mechanisms will be uniquely associated with a particular type of incubator 
organisation. 
 
5.4.2 Case Selection Approach & Criteria 
 
A look at Irish Government reports and websites on the local incubation environment 
containing information on different types of incubator models, their geographical 
location, contact person and details provided the necessary base information for case 
selection. Appendix – C presents an overview of incubators-incubation in Ireland 
including dominant models, coordinating agencies and details on some evaluation 
efforts. This overview provides a useful context for this research allowing the reader 
to visualise the incubator-incubation landscape in Ireland. 
 
The project’s empirical scope has been restricted to two major cases or incubator 
organisations. There is some debate between case study methodologists on how 
many cases ought to be included in a multiple-case design. Eisenhardt (1989), for 
instance, suggests that an appropriate number of cases for selection is between four 
and ten where the rationale for opting for the upper-end is provided by Perry (1998, 
pp. 791) who argues “with fewer than four cases it is difficult to generate theory with 
much complexity and its empirical grounding is likely to be unconvincing”.  
 
The above view, which seems to be suggesting that the case methodology is 
"microscopic" because it "lacks a sufficient number" of cases, is forcefully rejected by 
Hamel et al (1993). They argued that the relative size of the sample whether 2, 10, or 
100 cases does not transform a multiple case into a “macroscopic” study. The goal of 
the study should be to establish the parameters, and then should be applied to all 
research. In this way, even a single case could be considered acceptable, provided it 
met the established objective (Tellis, 1997). Blaikie (2010) also supports Hamel et al’s 
(1993) and Tellis’s (1997) view and argues that “just how many cases are used in 
multiple case designs will depend on the complexity of the phenomenon and the 
conditions under which it occurs” (pp. 191). To illustrate these points with extreme 
examples, consider Vaughan (1990) who undertook a case study of the NASA Space 
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Shuttle Challenger’s disaster and Weick (1993) who studied the death of 13 men in 
the Mann Gulch fire, (made famous in Norman Maclean's Young Men and Fire). A 
multiple case strategy would be meaningless in the above studies since it would be 
literally impossible to find similar cases and to replicate results. Hence, the notion of 
‘appropriateness of sample size’ (as Eisenhardt and Perry seem to be arguing for) is 
not as relevant to case study research. These reasons are augmented by the fact that 
there is precedent; a number of incubator-incubation researchers in the past have 
used two cases, for example Lichtenstein (1992), Autio and Klofsten (1998) and 
McAdam & McAdam (2008).   
 
There were a few criteria for the selection of case organisations: 
 
First, since the aim was theoretical replication two different types of incubator 
organisations had to be selected. In Ireland, as discussed in Appendix - C, four 
different incubator models are prevalent – community enterprise centres, university 
campus incubators, not-for-profit government sponsored incubators and cluster 
incubators27. In terms of numbers, ‘community enterprise centres’ are most prevalent 
followed by ‘campus incubators’. One exemplar organisation out of each of these two 
dominant categories was selected. Needless-to-say, as discussed above, issues 
relating to representativeness and sampling do not apply to qualitative case study 
research. 
 
Second, the sites were to be considered (by the wider enterprise development 
community) to be important or dominant examples in their respective categories. This 
could be by virtue of age, scale and scope of activities and accomplishments to-date.  
 
Third, the sites were to be officially designated as ‘business incubators’ and not 
science, technology or business parks. Finally, the sites were to allow reasonable 
access for an extended period of time for the purposes of the research. 
 
For the twin case strategies of analytic generalisation and theoretical replication, 
results from two cases would suffice.  
                                                 
27 It is contestable whether this category actually fits the preceise definition of an incubator. The Irish government, however, 
chooses to categorise a number of its programs as “cluster incubators”.  
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5.4.3 Negotiating Access 
 
Researchers often experience difficulties with the negotiation of access into 
organisations for the purpose of data collection (Buchanan et al, 1988). This is 
particularly common when the data required is sensitive in nature (Koosimile, 2002). 
Negotiating a workable level of access proved to be a very challenging task. The 
approach strategy was clearly thought out prior to initial contact. This usually 
consisted of the researcher’s supervisor making an introductory phone call, followed 
a face-to-face meeting to clarify the research’s aims and objectives. An offer for a 
management report with recommendations for process efficiencies based on 
international best practice was also made. During these meetings, two documents 
were handed over to clearly explain the nature of the research, its benefits and the 
outcomes. These documents also highlighted elements of research ethics and 
confirmed the confidentiality of findings and anonymity of all participants involved.  
 
Six different incubators in Dublin City were approached during early 2009. Incubator 
managers seemed generally suspicious of researchers and were reluctant to open 
doors. This may be due to the present research agenda in incubators-incubation, i.e. 
evaluation of incubation outcomes. At every stage of communication, it was clarified 
that the project’s objectives were to understand and make sense of how incubation 
works in practice and in no way was there any intent to conduct an ‘evaluation’. 
Ultimately, however, the researcher was often seen as a third-person wanting to 
scrutinise internal operations very closely. This attitude from the target community, 
and the qualitative case study methodology with its requirements of immersion in the 
research setting, created a special challenge in gaining access.  
 
With some effort, substantial access was finally negotiated with two incubator 
organisations who met the aforementioned criteria. These organisations, for the 
reasons of anonymity, have been dubbed DubInc and IncuWorks. The case work was 
conducted linearly with DubInc as the first case studied during March - August, 2009 
followed by IncuWorks during September, 2009 - January, 2010. The increased 
amount of time dedicated to the first case helped in refining data collection strategies, 
emerging categories and to match patterns with initial themes and propositions. 
Further details on these organisations are presented in the next chapter.  
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5.4.4 Unit of Analysis  
 
In the study of incubators, a number of levels of analysis have been considered in the 
past; which, according to Hackett & Dilts (2004a) are: (1) entrepreneur (individual); 
(2) incubator manager (individual); (3) incubatee (group / firm); (4) incubator (firm); (5) 
community (local); and (6) incubation (industry). This list was initially extended in this 
research project to include the ‘Incubator Manager’s Office’ (IMO), since, the 
incubation process is facilitated by not only the single individual incubator manager, 
but several other members of the incubator management, including business 
advisors, the facilities officer, trainers and members of the Board of Directors 
(McAdam & McAdam, 2008). 
 
Initially, two units of analysis were used: the ‘IMO’ and ‘client firms’. Here the 
rationale was that significant differences between these two units exist due to power 
distance, the aims of their individual roles as well as the distinct operating principles 
between the two life-worlds. Thereby, rich information could be analysed in a more 
organised and meaningful way.  
 
However, during the course of analytical work it became clear that the unit should be 
the ‘incubator (firm)’ since it was found that incubation is co-produced through the 
mutual agency of both the IMO and client firms working together. Analysing their life-
worlds separately was stripping away some of the richness and depth from the 
analysis. This was avoided by juxtaposing the two life-worlds under a single unit of 
analysis – ‘the incubator’ – which captured the gamut of involved actors and the 
patterns of their interaction and allowed the investigation of the internal normative 
environment and structural properties of the two selected case organisations in a 
cohesive-integrated manner.  
 
5.4.5 Research Questions 
 
According to Stake (1995), it is sometimes assumed that fieldwork in case study 
research is just keeping a sharp eye and being open to new impressions. Open 
minds and sharp eyes are indeed important, however, good case study research 
depends on discipline. One needs to think through, in advance, some of what may 
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come to pass. For some it will pass too quickly or too subtly to notice. Perhaps the 
most difficult task of the researcher is “to design good questions; research questions 
that will direct the looking and the thinking enough but not too much” (Stake, 1995, pp. 
15).  
 
In Blaikie’s (2010) view, it is not necessary to state aims or objectives in a case 
research design. Research questions provide a better way of expressing what a 
research project is trying to achieve. Therefore, for this research, a number of 
questions were formulated which helped in breaking down the research task into a 
number of feasible areas which could then be pursued independently (if required) 
depending on the feedback emerging from the case work. It is felt that without 
adequately framed research questions, some of the methodological rigour demanded 
of the instrumental case study would have been lost.  
 
As already outlined, the research questions used to addressed the main research 
objective emanated from the findings of the literature review presented in Chapter 3. 
The literature review has been instrumental in identifying weaknesses in previous 
conceptualisations of incubation, and for recommending areas for further research 
(ref: Table 3 - Chapter 3). Table 4 below shows the way these research 
recommendations have been developed into a number of research questions: 
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Table 4 – The Link between Literature Review & Research Questions 
 
Further Research Recommended based on 
Weaknesses in Extant Literature 
 
Associated Research Question(s) 
Trace the dynamics of incubators’ internal venture 
creation processes in time, taking into account a 
gestalt of variables including the aspirations of the 
entrepreneur, the incubator manager, the client 
cohort, the internal normative environment and 
the structural properties of the incubator 
organisation. 
 
How are the various stages organised in the 
development of incubator manager and client firm 
relations? 
 
What are the various strategies of dyadic co-
production? 
 
How do the structural properties of incubators 
impact on the organisation and orchestration of 
the incubation process? 
 
How does the internal normative environment 
impact on the organisation and orchestration of 
the incubation process? 
 
A crucial factor for resource consumption is the 
quality of relationship between the incubator and 
client. Research must unearth micro processes 
and institutionalised patterns governing the rules 
of incubator-client firm interaction.  
 
What is the nature of the relationship between the 
incubator organisation and client firm? 
 
 
The important role of the incubator manager in 
reducing self-interest and entrepreneurial conflict 
has been ignored and needs further investigation.  
 
In what ways does the incubator manager’s 
leadership style impact on co-production efficacy? 
 
The conditions promoting the development of 
effective dyadic relations and incubation triggering 
behaviour. It is also important to study the impact 
of dyadic norms and incubators’ structural 
properties on how the process unfolds. 
 
How is incubation triggered in a dyadic setting? 
  
 
In what ways and under what conditions is 
networking amongst client firms promoted? 
How does Client-Client interaction within the 
incubator organisation take place?  
 
Researchers should draw from work in the 
heuristics and biases tradition to un-earth the 
social and cognitive processes that work to 
facilitate the client selection process and the 
context in which these processes occur.  
 
How are new firms inducted for incubation?  
 
 
Following Creswell (2009), an effort has been made to keep the research questions 
neither too broad nor too narrow. In their present form, it is believed that they 
adequately capture and also limit the scope of research. Taken together, they will 
contribute towards achieving the aim of this research which requires an in-depth 
investigation of the incubation process and incubators’ internal normative 
environment and structural properties. 
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Needless-to-say, since the analytical approach adopted for this research is inductive, 
the role of the proposed research questions is to act as useful guides, starting points 
and parameters only rather than as strict boundaries to prove or disprove hypothesis 
as is usually the case in positivist / scientific research (Brody et al, 1993). Therefore, 
as expected, field exposure and initial investigations based on the research questions 
led the researcher into a number of new, interesting and useful directions, which 
could not be envisioned at the stage where the initial research questions were 
developed28. To illustrate, due to field exposure when the two units of analysis (‘IMO’ 
and ‘client firms’) changed to the ‘incubator’, it drove the investigation in a number of 
new directions including: why some IM-Client relationships are more effective than 
others?; what impact does the IM’s personal incubation style have on IM-Client 
relations?; how is an incubation event triggered?; how is the incubation relationship 
impacted by client background and qualifications?; and so on. 
 
Thus, the research questions were not meant to exhaustively capture the scope of 
the research nor was the analysis undertaken in a sequential / linear way to “answer” 
the questions. Certainly, a serious effort has been made to address the proposed 
questions adequately but given the complexity and the relatively unexplored nature of 
the phenomenon under study, “answers” appear in different sub-sections of the 
analysis chapters and across thematic areas. The final Discussion & Conclusion 
chapter, however, has been organised around the research questions to demonstrate 
how these have been ultimately ‘answered’.  
  
5.4.6 Data Collection Methods 
 
Based on the new conceptualisation of incubation presented in the previous chapter, 
the overall question which the researcher attempted to address, prior to the 
commencement of fieldwork, was: what can one reasonably expect to find when 
studying a complex multi-actor mechanism like incubation and developing an 
understanding of the internal normative environment and structural properties of 
incubators? Previous literature was not very helpful in awarding methodological clues, 
hence, it was felt that a more cautious two-staged approach would be suitable. During 
the first ‘testing-waters’ stage, at both case organisations, data was initially collected 
                                                 
28 Research questions were developed based on weaknesses identified in the extant literature.  
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through a period of observation and conversation with the incubator manager (IM) 
and other members of incubator staff along with some business founders (herein after 
referred to as ‘clients’). Table 5 below shows the areas covered with the IM initially:  
 







1. What is the nature of your work? 
2. What is the official policy on pre-incubation? 
3. How do you select clients? What is the process? 
4. Is there is a prevalent structured system of client management and 
monitoring? 
5. What is your relationship with a particular client (A) like? How do you 
gauge their resource needs? 
6. How do you initiate an incubation project with a particular client(A)? 
7. Are all clients equal when it comes to incubation intensity or is there a 
difference from client to client? 
 
 
This ‘testing-waters’ stage enabled the researcher to formulate a picture of the 
incubator; its objectives, the personnel involved and its operations within its context. 
Initial information was also collated from secondary data sources including annual 
reports and strategy documents relating to the incubator and client application forms 
on file.  
 
This stage allowed a greater sense of awareness to develop which facilitated stage 
two: ‘data collection’. It was felt that, considering the scale and scope of the research, 
and the context of the case organisations, data collection was going to take an 
extended period of time. Hence, as per the agreement reached with the case 
organisations, data was collected over a period of approximately six months at each 
case organisation during weekly visits. A variety of qualitative methods were deemed 
appropriate including: observations recorded in a field journal; digitally recorded 
transcriptions of semi-structured interviews; notes taken during interviews; notes 
taken at the end of the day on overall feelings and emerging patterns recorded in a 
diary and documents produced or sourced from participants as well as from 
secondary data / literature sources.  
 
The bulk of the data collection was via semi-structured interviews. This method was 
deemed appropriate for a number of reasons: first; the interview was used since it 
was felt that the best way to get into the ‘lived’ experience of a respondent who has 
experienced an important issue, is to enable that individual to narrate that experience. 
   
 
100 
The semi-structured interview is ideal when the researcher is interested in the 
person’s cognition, emotion, and behaviour as a unifying whole rather than as 
independent parts to be researched separately (Kvale, 1983). Second, since the kind 
of data sought included the descriptions of the research participants’ life-worlds with 
respect to interpretation of the meanings, the semi-structured interview provided the 
appropriate levels of flexibility and conduciveness to facilitate the disclosure of 
“heartfelt views and values” (Gubrium & Holstein, 2001, pp. 57). Third, due to the 
nature of enquiry, given the constraints of other methods such as surveying or 
participant observation, the semi-structured interview offers the maximum opportunity 
for complete and accurate communication of ideas between the researcher and 
respondent (Cannell & Kahn, 1968). Finally, as it will be shown in the following 
paragraphs, there was a need to develop rapport and trust with the respondents with 
repeat interactions where there was a need to cross check / correlate / further 
elaborate on information from other interviews. In such a scenario, semi-structured 
interviews offer advantages over structured or un-structured interviewing.  
 
It was kept in mind that interviews have certain weaknesses and over the years 
methodologists have critiqued this particular research method on issues such as 
consent, attitude towards participants, power, culture and confusion between 
research interview and therapy (Nunkoosing, 2005). In addition to issues of 
epistemology, interviews can be subject to biases including those induced both by the 
respondent (faulty memory, exaggeration, mis-understanding, courtesy bias and 
group influence), and the interviewer (desire to help the respondent, reactions to 
responses, failure to follow adequate questioning techniques) (Yin, 2009).  
 
The above criticisms are valid, yet proponents of the interview method have 
presented robust rebuttals. Amidst this ongoing debate, however, interviews remain 
popular as the most widely used method of generating data in qualitative social 
research (Nunkoosing, 2005) and the “most important form of data collection in case 
study research” (Gillham, 2000, pp. 65). Ultimately, it is important for a recognition to 
develop that interviewing is a “craft” (Kvale, 1996, pp. 105) or a “skill” characterised 
by a quality of naturalness (Gillham, 2000, pp. 4). It is in the use of the self, of 
relationship building, of acute awareness of the flow of conversations, of a sensitive 
awareness of the interviewer’s theoretical and professional position, and of his or her 
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research questions that qualitative data of high quality are constructed in the 
interview. The skilled, embodied interviewer uses his or her person to communicate 
with people to create stories (Nunkoosing, 2005). No matter how much one learns 
about interviewing, it is one’s own personal resources that breathe life into the 
technique and, in a way, take over from it (Gillham, 2000). Therefore, no interview 
can be totally bias free (Kvale, 1996) because human beings at any given point in 
time cannot be totally bias free (Cain & Detsky, 2008). Unacknowledged bias may 
entirely invalidate the results of an interview enquiry, however, a recognised bias or 
subjective perspective may come to highlight specific aspects of the phenomena 
investigated, bring new dimensions forward, contributing to a multi-perspectival 
construction of knowledge (Kvale, 1996). The researcher made significant efforts to  
reduce any potential biases by remaining neutral i.e. neither leading the interviewees 
nor asking value-laden questions, seeking clarifications, cross checking facts, using 
projective techniques or indirect questions that dealt with socially sensitive subjects 
and keeping a strict code of confidentiality to build rapport and trust.  
 
A research plan was drawn up in coordination with the IM (the point of contact) which 
contained scheduling details on a series of semi-structured, face-to-face interviews 
with both clients (business founders) and members of the incubator organisation. The 
purpose of these interviews was to obtain an understanding of participants’ 
perception of the incubation process, how it unfolded for their firm and the internal 
normative environment of the incubator. With support from the IM, emails were sent 
to clients to confirm the schedule. In addition to interviews, the research plan 
identified a number of up-coming ‘incubation’ events.   
 
Each interview with clients lasted between 30 to 45 minutes and the process was 
informed by Patton (2002). The interview began with broad, open-ended questions 
and as the interview progressed focus was turned to more specific areas. The 
questions were a mixture of factual questions relating, for example to the age of the 
founder or the turnover of the business; and open-ended questions relating, for 
example details on recent ‘incubation’ activity and relationship with the IM and other 
clients (see Table 6 below for an initial interview guide). The intention was to let the 
subject tell his / her ‘story’. The interview guide was used to check that all relevant 
areas were covered and to follow-up on any omitted area. The weakness here is that 
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the subject’s story may be only tangentially, and not directly, related to the issues 
explored (Patton, 1990). For instance, in some cases subjects had a lot to say on 
their firm’s pre-incubation or post-incubation strategy but not a lot on their induction or 
specific instances of interaction with the IM. The interview guide, with questions 
relating to specific areas of interest, was used to guide the subject back onto more 
directly relevant or unexplored areas.  
 




1. Describe early days when making your application. 
2. Recall any initial experiences with incubator management? 
3. Describe the application process. 
4. What was the settling-in period like? 
5. What were your interactions with the incubator management like in the 
early days? 
6. What were your interactions with other clients like? 
7. Do you think there has been a change in the nature of your interactions 
with the incubator management? 
8. How will you describe your relationship with the incubator manager? 
9. What do you think about the culture and nature of work here? What sort 
of a description comes to mind? 
10. During the past 2-3 months do you recall any interactions with the 
incubator manager? 
11. Are you working on any projects with the incubator manager? 




In addition to semi-structured formally arranged interviews, more informal exchanges 
during numerous chance encounters with clients also occurred, for instance, at the 
incubator’s cafeteria or at the reception. Any notable points arising out of these 
discussions were duly recorded in a field diary. This diary was also used to record 
observations and to chronicle thinking, feeling, experiences and perceptions 
throughout the research process. In addition, a field log was also utilised providing a 
detailed account of the ways time was spent when on-site.  
 
During each visit, in addition to the scheduled face-to-face interviews with clients and 
other members of the incubator organisation, there was an up to 30 minute meeting 
with the IM also booked. The strategy here was to obtain the perceptions from both 
parties associated in incubation which facilitated cross checking the validity of any 
assertion made against other interviews and secondary data sources.  
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An iterative approach was employed to categorise data into meaningful categories or 
‘codes’ which were then used to investigate any possible links between categories 
and to investigate differences between participants. Obtaining the perceptions from 
both parties in the incubation process allowed the juxtaposition of information relayed 
and the cross checking of the validity of any assertion made against other interviews 
and secondary data sources.  
 
The development of the semi-structured interview was an iterative process; in the first 
instance a baseline set of questions were designed for clients; developed in 
consultation with the IM utilising past observations and discussion. With a number of 
clients, based on subsequent discussions with IM, further interviews were scheduled. 
Question sets for these subsequent interviews were developed utilising the initial 
question set and information gathered from previous interviews, hence, were quite 
specific to the particular client being interviewed. The interview protocol, therefore, 
started with a client interview followed by a separate interview with the IM to discuss 
each client individually. At the end of the research process one final semi-structured 
interview was held with the IM.  
 
By interviewing clients first, detailed information about the business, the management 
team, the types of network accessed and their perception of how the process had 
progressed could be gleaned. This information was then used to inform the 
development of the question sets employed in subsequent interviews with the IM. The 
final interview at the end of the research with the IM allowed the investigation of 
issues that had arisen from the empirical data, the review of any discrepancies in the 
accounts of the two parties in incubation, and provided the IM with an opportunity to 
place the findings in the context of the strategic direction of the incubator. 
 
Although the approach utilised provided a holistic picture of the incubation process in 
the case sites, both an advantage and disadvantage of this was the large amount of 
data generated. Great detail was achieved but the analysis and organisation proved 
to be a very time consuming process. Conducting 30-40 interviews per site, and 
writing up a number of pages of text notes per interview resulted in a very large 
amount of information to sort through for analysis. Yin (2009) challenges the 
assumption that individual interviews should be "written up" at all, believing that the 
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more relevant task is to demonstrate converging evidence from various sources and 
to document such convergence (and divergence). Therefore, in repeat interviews, in a 
number of cases, only hand written notes were taken.  
 
To summarise, Table 7 below presents an outline of the data sources, and the 
amount of data collected (including interviews recorded and transcribed), and Tables 
8 and 9 present details on the interview subjects at DubInc and IncuWorks 
respectively. For DubInc background data on clients was collected but to ensure 
anonymity at their request details such as date of inception, precise nature of the 
business, annual revenue, growth figures during incubation and other details  are not 
disclosed. Background data on clients has been scrutinised to look at emerging 
patterns which have been matched with the second case. For IncuWorks (Table 9) it 
should be noted that due to privacy concerns and the proprietary or sensitive nature 
of client work, it was agreed that no questions relating to firm size and team 
composition, annual revenue, growth projections and precise nature of technology 
(including that which was under development) would be asked. In both cases, as 
much background details are included as were permitted.   
 
A client numbering system is developed which places DubInc clients in the range of 
1-20 and IncuWorks clients in the range of 21-39. This allows the tracing of specific 
quotes used in the analysis chapters back to particular respondents.  
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Table 7 – Data Sources & Amounts 
 









power politics and 
collaborative strategies 
to solve problems. 
1. Selection interview 
2. Two pre-incubation 
meetings 
3. A corporate 
meeting between 
the IM and several 
clients 
4. A meet-and-greet 
networking event 
5. Corporate trade 
show 
6. Information 
interaction at the 
reception and 
cafeteria 
Informal IM-Client and 
Client-Client interaction 
at an award ceremony, 
a seminar, in the 
cafeteria, reception and 
corridors 
Interviews To understand 
participants’ perception 
of the incubation 
process, how it 
unfolded and the 
internal normative 
environment.  
Total 37 interviews 
conducted and audio 
recorded; 31 
transcribed29 
Total 28 interviews 
conducted and audio 
recorded; 24 
transcribed 
Secondary data To formulate a picture 
of the incubator; its 
objectives, the 
personnel involved and 
its operations within its 
context. Initial 




annual reports and 
strategy documents 
relating to the incubator 
and client application 
forms on file. 
1. Incubator annual 
reports 
2. Websites of the 




to the incubator 
4. Client application 
forms on file 
5. Client promotional 
material. 
1. Incubator annual 
reports 
2. Websites of the 




to the incubator 
4. Client application 
forms on file 
 
 
                                                 
29 All interview transcription was done by the researcher.  
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1. Enterprise Manager 
2. Previous Enterprise Manager 
3. A member of the Board of Directors 
4. Enterprise Officer 
5. Facilities Assistant  
6. Receptionist Support Staff 
 
Clients Industry Nature Team Size Stage 
Client 1 Energy / Power Design >5  Year 3 
Client 2 Energy / Power Equipment Manufacture >5 Year 3 
Client 3 Energy / Petroleum Project Management 4 Year 4 
Client 4 General Social Entrepreneur  3 Year 3 
Client 5 General Medical Diagnostics 2 Year 1 
Client 6 General Bespoke Stitching  4 Year 1 
Client 7 General Health / Therapy   1 Year 4 
Client 8 General Consulting & Training 4 Year 4 
Client 9 Food Web Portal  1 Year 3  
Client 10 Food Processing & Sales 1 Year 2 
Client 11 Food Processing & Sales 1 Year 1 
Client 12  Food Processing & Sales 1 Year 1 
Client 13  Construction Recruitment 1 Year 2 
Client 14  Insurance / Energy Consulting 2 Year 2 
Client 15 Software Sales 1 Year 3 
Client 16 Hi-Tech / Knowledge
 
Consulting 3 Year 1 
Client 17 Publishing Design / Printing 2 Year 4 
Client 18 Property Management 2 Year 3 
Client 19 Optical Web sales 2 Year 1 
Client 20 Optical  Testing / Sales 4 Year 4 
Ex-Client 9.5 Internet & Web Dev. 5  -  
 
 
At DubInc, a total of 20 firms participated out of the 25 that were based there. Two of 
the five who chose to not participate were either using the premises for storage or as 
a satellite office only. Two were unreachable on multiple occasions although they 
agreed to participate. One refused due to time constraints. 
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2. Manager Enterprise Development 
3. Manager Communications 
4. Manager Technology Transfer 
5. Facilities Manager 
 
Client Industry Nature Route Occupancy  Stage 
Client 21 ICT Consulting, design, testing Spin-in Incubation Year 2 
Client 22 ICT Product design CCDP Desk Space Year 1 
Client 23 ICT R&D Spin-out Associate Extended  
Client 24 ICT Internet technologies  Spin-in Incubation Year 3 
Client 25 ICT Internet technologies CCDP Incubation Year 1 
Client 26 ICT Internet technologies Spin-in Associate Year 3 
Client 27 ICT Misc. Spin-in Desk Space Year 1 
Client 28 ICT Software Development Spin-in Desk Space Year 1 
Client 29  ICT Internet technologies CCDP Associate Year 1 
Client 30  ICT Internet technologies Spin-in Incubation Year 2 
Client 31  Telecom IP Commercialisation Spin-in Incubation Year 1 
Client 32 General / Hi-tech Consulting Spin-in Desk Space Year 1 
Client 33 General / Hi-tech Consulting  Spin-in Incubation Year 1 
Client 34 Bio-Tech Fuel Spin-in Incubation Year 2 
Client 35  Bio-Tech Engineering R&D Spin-out Incubation Year 3 
Client 36 Bio-Tech Clinical trials, drug testing Spin-out Incubation Year 3 
Client 37  Bio-Tech Drug Testing / Development CCDP  Associate Year 1 
Client 38  Bio-Tech R&D Spin-out Incubation Year 2 
Client 39  Bio-Tech Clinical R&D Spin-in - Graduated 
* Columns in this table differ from Table 8 due to differences in the types and quantum of information made available at the 
two case organisations. 
 
At IncuWorks, out of a total of 26 firms, 19 agreed to participate in the research. In all 
cases business founders were interviewed. To follow-up on feedback received from 
the IM on particular details arising from client interviews, in two cases, follow-up 
interviews were conducted over the telephone.  
 
During the course of the research, participants shared intimate details about their own 
businesses and their employees, their experiences with the incubator manager and 
other client firms, and the incubator managers provided on a number of occasions 
inside information (based on trust) about their Boards, client firms and other members 
of the incubator management team. It has been agreed with all the participants that 
all necessary precautions will be taken to ensure that should any of the research 
participants or members of the public (especially fellow incubator-incubation 
researchers / practitioners / policy makers) read this document, in no way should they 
be able to even roughly gauge where the research was conducted and “who said 
what about who”.  
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5.5 Issues of Research Rigor 
 
5.5.1 Validity & Reliability in Qualitative Research 
 
Validity and reliability are concepts often used in physical and social sciences to 
gauge the quality of measures used to analyse a phenomenon. However, it must be 
kept in mind that “reliability and validity are tools of an essentially positivist 
epistemology (Winter, 2000). Since this research is based on an interpretivist and 
qualitative approach, the traditional meaning of reliability and validity from the 
quantitative researcher’s perspective needs modification.  
 
Reliability in qualitative research is conceptualised as trustworthiness, rigour, 
authenticity, credibility and quality (Golafshani, 2003). Whereas, validity, as one of the 
strengths of qualitative research, is based on determining whether the findings are 
accurate from the standpoint of the researcher, the participant(s), or the readers of an 
account (Creswell & Miller, 2000). Thus, the criteria for judging a qualitative study 
differ from that of quantitative research. These criteria rest on the notion of 
‘believability’ or ‘plausibility’, which in turn is based on coherence, insight and 
instrumental utility (Eisner, 1991) and trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) 
achieved through a process of verification rather than through traditional validity and 
reliability measures.  
 
In the following sections, a number of issues are discussed relating to validity and 
reliability in qualitative research and a number of case study-based strategies are 
presented for achieving rigour in the research presented in this thesis.  
 
5.5.2 Achieving Validity & Reliability - 1: Triangulation 
 
The main way to achieve validity and reliability from the qualitative researcher’s 
perspective is to eliminate bias and to increase the researcher’s truthfulness of a 
proposition about some social phenomenon through triangulation (Golafshani, 2003). 
Triangulation in this case is defined as “a validity procedure where researchers 
search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to form 
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themes or categories in a study” (Creswell, 2000, pp. 126). For case-based research, 
Yin (2009) recommends a number of triangulation strategies: 
 
1. Data source triangulation, when the researcher looks for the data to remain the 
same in different contexts;  
 
2. Investigator triangulation, when several investigators examine the same 
phenomenon;  
 
3. Theory triangulation, when investigators with different view points interpret the 
same results; and  
 
4. Methodological triangulation, when one approach is followed by another, to 
increase confidence in the interpretation. 
 
For this project, data source triangulation was employed i.e. evidence from multiple 
cases is utilised (Denzin, 1984). The basic premise is that theoretical testing through 
the replication of findings from two cases (rather than one) will allow the possibility of 
analytic generalisation. This approach is often considered more compelling, and the 
overall study is, therefore, regarded as being more robust (Herriott & Firestone, 1983; 
Yin, 2009).  
 
5.5.3 Achieving Validity & Reliability - 2: Validity Strategies  
 
Allied with the concept of triangulation are strategies which Yin (2009) recommends 
for ensuring construct, internal and external validity.  
 
For ensuring construct validity, Yin suggests using multiple sources. For this study 
multiple sources of evidence have been used including interviews, observations and 
documents. In addition, a number of other measures as per Creswell’s (2009) 
recommendation were employed to enhance the notion of construct validity: 
 
1. Using rich, thick descriptions to convey findings. This description may transport 
the reader to the setting and give the discussion an element of shared experience. 
 
2. Clarifying the biases brought to the study, This self-reflection creates an open and 
honest narrative that will resonate well with readers. 
 
3. Presenting negative or discrepant information that runs counter to the themes or 
the notion of falsification.  
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4. Spending prolonged time in the field. In this way, an in-depth understanding of the 
phenomenon under study is developed. This helps in conveying detail about the 
site and the actors involved, thereby, lending credibility to the narrative account. 
 
5. Peer examination – the researcher’s supervisor and second reader served as 
peer examiners. In addition feedback was received through the presentation of 
papers at international conferences. 
 
Internal validity refers to the identification of a causal relationship, whereby, certain 
conditions are shown to lead to other conditions as distinguished from spurious 
relationships (Yin, 2009). In identifying a causal relationship an investigator may 
conclude that such a relationship exists between x and y. The threat to internal 
validity emerges when this conclusion is reached without due regard to some third 
factor that may actually have caused y. More broadly, the problem associated with 
case study research in this context is cause-effect inferences.  
 
Yin (2009) suggests that to overcome this problem some relevant questions ought to 
be posed, for instance, is this inference correct? Is the evidence convergent? Does it 
appear to be airtight? In this research, through a process of triangulation it was 
possible to identify facts. As each interview was conducted more information was 
acquired which was triangulated with other interviews and observational and 
documentary data, thereby, exposing the original information as either correct or 
incorrect. In addition, internal validity can also be achieved through the specification 
of “unit of analysis”.  
 
External validity amounts to knowing whether the results from the case are 
generalisable to some wider phenomenon. According to Yin (2009), the problem of 
generalisation associated with qualitative case study research has been due to the 
simplified understanding of the concept where it is generally assumed that a sample 
of cases has been drawn from a larger universe of cases. Thus, the incorrect 
terminology "small sample" arises, as though a single-case study were a single 
respondent. Yin argues that the confusion arises when one is unable to differentiate 
between ‘analytic generalisation’ and ‘statistical generalisation’. He refuted this 
criticism by clearly differentiating analytic generalisation from statistical. In statistical 
generalisation, an inference is made about a population (or universe) on the basis of 
empirical data collected about a sample (such as via surveys). In analytical 
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generalisation, previously developed theory is used as a template against which to 
compare the empirical results of the case study, in other words, the investigator is 
striving to generalise a particular set of results to some broader theory (Yin, 2009).  
 
The criticism against case studies in this area mostly relates to single cases (which is 
not the case with this research since multiple cases have been used). Furthermore, 
as per the adopted philosophical and theoretical approach - generalisation of results 
is made to theory rather than populations i.e. analytical generalisation. Multiple cases 
strengthen research results by replicating patterns, thus, increasing confidence in the 
robustness of theory. 
 
5.6 Analysis of findings  
 
Data analysis is one of the least developed components of the case study approach 
(Stake, 1995). Essentially, during the analysis phase the researcher needs to rely on 
experience and the literature to present the evidence in various ways, using various 
interpretations, since statistical analysis is not necessarily used (Stake, 1995; Yin, 
2009). The analysis process itself is iterative or cyclical and proceeds from more 
general to more specific observations (Palys, 1997; Silverman, 2000). Therefore, 
data analysis can begin informally during interviews or observations and continue 
during transcription, when recurring themes, patterns, and categories become 
evident. To give the analysis process a degree of structure, an approach 
recommended by Creswell (2009) was adopted (see Figure 12 below). Although the 
resulting scheme suggests a linear, hierarchical process, it was much more 
interactive in practice. Various stages were interrelated and not always visited in the 
order presented.  
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The analysis process commenced once interview transcripts, field journal and diary 
notes were typed up and available in digital format. The first task was formatting and 
high level categorisation (case organisation-wise) of the ‘raw’ data to facilitate 
reading and reflection. All raw data was then printed and read three times which 
increased the researcher’s overall familiarity with the respondents and helped in the 
mental recollection of key incidents. Salient points were underlined and brief 
comments were made to assist with the next stage which involved the coding of data 
and the identification of key structures.  
 
Raw data (transcripts, fieldnotes, etc.) 
Organising and preparing data for analysis 
Reading through all data 







Interrelating themes / descriptions 
6 




accuracy of the 
information 
Description 
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Coding is a procedure of organising the text of raw data from data sources such as 
transcripts, journals and diaries and discovering patterns within that organisational 
structure (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003).  In other words, coding is a category system 
that allows all of the data to be categorised systematically and a code is a label in that 
system attached to a section of text to index it as relating to a theme or issue in the 
data which would have been identified as important to interpretation (Patton, 2002). 
Patton (2002) suggests that developing codes is like constructing an index for a book 
or labels for a filing system. He suggests that one looks at what is there in the data 
and then gives it a name or a label. The challenge is to ensure that the categories are 
internally homogeneous and externally heterogeneous. This means that everything in 
one category must hold together in some meaningful way, and that the differences 
between categories need to be bold and clear. An example of how a transcript was 
coded is at Appendix – D.   
In developing the coding scheme Auerbach & Silverstein’s (2003) criteria was kept in 
mind. They suggest that a coding scheme must be (a) mutually exclusive – each 
segment should fit into one category only (unless one can justify placing certain 
segments in more than one category); (b) exhaustive – every example has to fit 
somewhere; and (c) meaningful – to be useful, the system must have social 
significance, relevance, and meaning. In order to develop a coding scheme along this 
criteria, first, interview transcripts, interview reflections and diary notes were re-read 
and a draft or trial structure was developed. Next, text was extracted for cataloguing 
in the various defined codes in the trial structure. This led to the development of new 
codes and the collapsing of others. As a result, the following hierarchical organisation 
emerged, with groups of similar codes clustered together to produce more general 
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1.0 IM’s views on the role 
1.1 What does incubation mean? 
1.2 What is the role of the IM? 
1.3 Management of competing priorities 
1.4 Triggering strategies 
1.5 Personal incubation style 
1.6 General views on client motives 
1.7 Ground rules 
2.0 IM’s Dealings with senior governing authority 
2.1 What is the organisation’s identity? 
2.2 Boundaries 
2.3 Purpose of the Board 
2.4 Board and IM relationship 
2.5 Strategic priorities 
3.0 IM’s Dealings with third party service providers 
3.1 Reasons for outsourcing 
3.2 Decision priorities: In-house vs. out-source 
3.3 Vendor selection approach 
4.0 Incubation activity - prospective clients: Dyadic view  
4.1 IM-Prospective client A 
4.2 IM-Prospective client x 
5.0 Incubation activity - existing clients: Dyadic view 
5.1 IM-Client 1 
5.2 IM-Client n*  
6.0 Critical incidents of incubation activity: Dyad and Triad View 
6.1 Incident 1 
6.2 Incident x 
7.0 Client views and experiences with other clients 
7.1 General views on being around clients 
7.2 Process of getting to know other clients 
7.3 Conflict 
7.4 Relationship: Respondent-Client 1 
7.5 Relationship: Respondent-Client n* 
8.0 Client perceptions on incubation 
8.1 How did they learn about incubation 
8.2 What does incubation mean to them 
8.3 Motivation to pursue incubation 
8.4 Process of taking up space 
8.5 View on the incubator’s staff ability to incubate 
8.6 Relationship with incubator manager 
8.7 Ground rules 
8.8 Value of developmental assistance: general courses and trainings 
8.9 Value of developmental assistance: specific assistance 
8.10 Value of infrastructural supports 
8.11 General views on developmental assistance 
8.12 Reasons for not engaging with IM 
9.0 IM’s Dealings with ex-clients 
9.1 Graduation dynamics 
10.0 Selection process 
10.1 IM view 
10.2 Client view 
11.0 Incubator History 
12.0 IM Strategic plans 
12.1 Promotional strategy 
12.2 Incubation services 
12.3 Specific strategy for Client 1 
12.4 Specific strategy to deal with Client x 
* n = 39 
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The major codes gave a good overview of the general direction of interviews, whilst 
lower-order codes allowed for very fine distinctions to be made within the case 
(Creswell, 2009). It also became evident that some codes were descriptive requiring 
little or no analysis of what was meant. For instance, in the transcript of an interview 
with an entrepreneur, a third-tier code was defined to identify the points in the text 
where the ‘incubator manager’ or ‘other clients’ are mentioned (such as under 5.1 and 
7.1 above). Other codes were more interpretive and therefore harder to define, for 
instance, an entrepreneur’s feelings about the mismatch between expected and 
actual incubation scope (such as 8.0 above). Further, Miles & Huberman (1994) point 
out that transcriptions often erase context along with some crucial non-verbal data. 
To ensure that data on proxemics, chronemic (pace of speech, length of silence), 
kinesic (gestures, body movements) and paralinguistic (voice pitch, volume) was 
captured, transcripts were adequately labelled to highlight silences, tonality and so on. 
Important audio recordings were re-listened to in order to clarify distinctions between 
‘what was said’ and ‘what was meant’. 
 
The final phase of the analysis was interpretation of the coded data. Jones (1985) 
suggests that qualitative data analysis involves processes of creativity and 
interpretation that are difficult to make explicit. This is because the inductive 
interpretation of qualitative data is a process of abstracting from the immense detail 
and complexity of coded raw data those features which are most salient for the 
research purpose, building understanding from thick descriptions, discovering 
patterns, making inferences, prescribing meanings, revealing causality and dealing 
with contradicting results (Dey, 1993). This required careful and rigorous intellectual 
work and was probably the most challenging aspect of the research. The interpretive 
work involved making a clear distinction between what the data said (descriptive 
data) and what the data meant (researcher interpretation). Therefore, prior to 
interpretive analysis the data was clearly formatted in a descriptive way, making 
reference to field journal and diary notes. This presentation of data helped the 
researcher "ground" the interpretive analysis in the actual data collected. Linked to 
the research objective and questions, this interpretive sense-making exercise led to 
the development of the 16 thematic areas presented in the following chapters. These 
thematic areas (presented below) were organised into categories that, as per the 
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research objective, present an analysis of the incubation process and incubators’ 
normative environment and structural properties: 
 
A) Relationships: Major dependent Variable 
The Nature of IM-Client Relations 
Inside the IM-Client Dyad: Understanding Co-Production’s Value 
Client-Client Interaction 
Impact of Client-Mix on Client-Client Interaction 
The Impact of Physical Layout on Client-Client Interaction 
Client-IM-Client Interaction 
Client-Third Party Interaction 
 
B) Normative Environment 
The Incubation Ethos 
Base Bonds of the Dyadic Relationship & the “Incubation-Click” 
The Triggers of Incubation: Stealth, Subtle Indicators & Heuristics   
 
C) Structure of the Incubation Process 
The Three Strategies of Incubation Co-Production 
Other Elements Impacting Dyadic Strategy 
Incubation Stages Experienced by Client Firms 
Pre-Incubation, Pre-Selection & Selection 
The Nature and Range of Co-Production Developmental Assistance 
 
D) Structural Properties of Incubators 
The Nature of IM Work & the “De-Coupling” of Incubator Structure 
De-Constructing the IM’s Role: Leadership & Organisational Culture 
Uncertainty in the Incubation Environment 
 
A key component of the interpretive approach was “replication” for comparison 
between the two cases. Here the primary focus was on the overall pattern of results 
and the extent to which the observed patterns (from the first case) matched a 
predicted one (in the second case). The approach was to examine the first case for a 
pattern and, if found, look to see if it is found in the second case. If the pattern was 
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not found, the original set theme was re-examined. If identical results were 
predictably obtained over both the cases, then a literal replication was achieved. If 
different results are obtained in the two cases, but for predictable reasons, then 
theoretical replication was achieved.  
 
Finally, since case study data analysis is, by nature, argumentative, it was therefore 
critical that the developing arguments were clearly spelt out, and competing 
hypotheses and evidence be considered which could disprove the primary lines of 
argument. In comparing the empirical data to more than one theory a more potent 
analysis could be performed. For example, a rival theory about the dualistic or 
subjective nature of incubation would be that it is rational and objective. In case 
studies, however, the best rival theory is not one that simply discounts the target 
theory. Therefore, rival theories were developed which acknowledged that IM and 
clients can work together effectively despite major or minor differences in 
expectations and delivery; that not all client firms value incubation assistance even if 
its high quality; that although Client-Client interfacing is useful as a socialisation 
exercise its use as an incubation mechanism is highly limited. Rather then 
discounting the target theory entirely, the use of rival theories helped in probing much 
deeper, helping unearth root causes and the impact of norms and contextual 
variables. 
 
5.7 Display of Research Data 
 
The main focus in qualitative research is the data itself, in all its richness, breadth, 
and depth. When all is said and done, the quality in a qualitative research project 
should be based upon how well the researcher has performed at collecting and 
presenting quality data. Therefore, it is important that every effort is made to feature 
collected data in the analysis.  
 
The data collected for this research was in the form of text. There were two 
categories of text data: (a) statements made by the research respondents which were 
recorded and transcribed; and (b) observations of various events, meetings and other 
significant episodes made by the researcher and  subsequent descriptions of these 
recorded in a case diary. A number of techniques have been used to display the 
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textual data in the analysis chapters, including using (a) direct quotes from the 
respondents displayed in an indented, italic and within quotes (“”) paragraph; (b) case 
/ critical incident histories and backgrounds which were recorded (sometimes from 
more than one source and then collated) and displayed in a grey shaded and 
bordered / outlined box; and (c) to present the output of two or more conversations 
with a single individual, a single easy-to-follow narrative is produced which is also 
displayed in a grey shaded and bordered / outlined box. At Appendix – E a table is 
presented which highlights the frequency with which data from particular client 
respondents are quoted in the research. 
 
Out of several logics defined by Constas (1992) the Narrative Logic was used in 
presenting data i.e. data are arranged with an eye for storytelling. The Narrative Logic 
requires researchers to plot out the data in a fashion which allows transition from one 
exemplar to another, like narrators arranging details in order to best relate the 
particulars of a story (Constas, 1992). An effort has been made to enrich the analysis 
with as much textual data as possible to give a voice to the “other” – the participants 
of the research, to allow them to tell their own story in their own words. 
 
In conclusion, this chapter has been instrumental in clarifying the research’s 
philosophical approach, strategy, unit of analysis and describing in detail the methods 
and processes of data collection, analysis and presentation while ensuring rigour 
through attention to the criteria of validity and reliability in qualitative research. The 
next chapter presents non-analytical background details of the two case 
organisations studied. These are included in order to provide an overall context for 
the following four analytical chapters that address the research objective and 
questions.  
 










Ellet (2007) recommends that case study data analysis should commence after 
sufficient background and contextual details on the case(s) are presented. Therefore, 
the purpose in this chapter is to acquaint readers with the case organisations’ history, 
structure, client mix and incubation approaches. The case descriptions have been 
collated using primary interview data as well as secondary sources including websites 
and annual reports. To ensure anonymity, exact dates, names and genders have not 
been disclosed. These details are presented with a minimum level of interpretation 
and should aid in the visualising of incubation activity at the case organisations. The 
main aim is to give readers sufficient contextual and background information on the 
two case organisations. This in turn will help in relating to the researcher’s 
interpretation of case data presented in the following four chapters.  
 





6.1.1 Historical Perspective 
 
DubInc was established in the mid-1980s as a result of a decision at a large public 
meeting organised by a local community in Dublin. The community met to decide on 
options to remedy the significant problem of unemployment in the area. The answer 
at the time was proposed by a visiting foreign consultant and backed by a number of 
public-spirited local businessmen. The idea came from the US, where local 
volunteers offered their expertise to unemployed people, helping them become 
entrepreneurs. The suggested vehicle was an ‘Enterprise Centre’ which would be set 
up to supply offices, work space and communal secretarial services. It was agreed 
that the initiative’s key objective would be ‘job creation’ and ‘community revitalisation’. 
To assess the viability of the idea, a steering committee and a number of sub-
committees of local business people was established to look at local business 
opportunities, investigate sources of funding, to carry out a survey of the unemployed 
and so on.  
 
As a result of this background work, the local community agreed that an Enterprise 
Centre must be set up to: 
 
1. Help young people, unemployed persons and others to establish their own 
businesses 
 
2. Assist small businesses already in existence to expand and provide further 
employment 
 
To initiate the project, a Board of Directors was set up comprising prominent business 
people who lived locally 30 . A strategically located premises in the locality was 
identified. This building had been lying vacant for a number of years under the 
ownership of a Bank (which had taken over the property due to a loan default). A 
significant loan was negotiated with the Bank on the personal guarantees of the 
Board members. The premises needed considerable refurbishment to make optimum 
                                                 
30 These original members remain on the Board of DubInc until this day. 
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use of space. Since there were no local precedents available31, the decision on 
internal design was based on what the Board assumed would be the needs of their 
business clientele. Based on the advice available at the time, the Board decided to 
convert the premises into small units of 100 sq. feet each, with two larger units of 500 
sq. feet each. Initially the dividing walls between the units were just 6 feet high, to 
facilitate internal communication and bonding, however, in later years due to privacy 
and noise-related concerns the design was changed from an open plan space to self-
contained units. A coffee shop, reception area and a display area were also part of 
the design. A refurbishment was carried out in mid-1990s through the help of the Irish 
government which added a conference room, improved the reception area and 
resolved a number of other internal architectural problems.  
 
Funding for the Centre came from a combination of initiatives. Since there was no 
government-based mechanism, funds were raised through the issuance of ordinary 
shares. This allowed local residents to become real shareholders in the initiative. In 
addition, the project was financially backed by local business people. Fund raising 
events such as a marathon, barbeque, and door-to-door collections also contributed. 
Although, a number of government schemes have been tapped into over the years for 
working capital (such as staff salaries), these have been intermittent.  
 
The Centre started its operations under the guidance of a Manager (who held the 
position until 2008). It was established as a company limited by guarantee, however, 
in the late 80’s in order to avail of a government funding scheme, the Centre changed 
its legal status to a charitable trust (provident society). This remains its legal status to-
date. 
 
It took exactly one year after the idea was proposed to open the doors for business.  
The first five projects included manufacture of soft furnishings, sign-writing, kitchen 
cabinets, home and commercial care and servicing and repair of motor vehicle clutch 
and transmission systems. The initial service portfolio available to both clients housed 
in the facility, and individuals and businesses located in the local area included: 
 
                                                 
31 It is claimed that DubInc was the first community run Enterprise Centre in Ireland and helped in diffusing the concept 
across the country. 
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1. A pool of local volunteers with expertise in business-related disciplines 
providing professional advice. This was also available via a drop-in service 
where advice was available on unemployment, business projects and available 
government assistance for new ventures. 
2. Secretarial and telephone answering services. 
3. As a space for students to gain work experience. 
4. Offering incubation workspace which could be rented at very nominal rates. 
5. A register of unemployed people in the area which could be used as hiring 
directory.  
6. A business address and telephone answering service. 
7. Photocopying. 
8. An evening start-your-own business course (attendance at which became a 
necessary condition for tenancy). 
 
Monthly Board meetings helped set direction and focus on finance, premises, staffing, 
client profile, new project development, customer service issues, occupancy rates 
and associated issues (for instance, clients staying too long) and so on. By the end of 
1980, the Centre housed 24 new small businesses who employed approximately 80 
people. In addition, the Centre had placed a further 90 people in employment in the 
local area. By 2009, approximately 250 businesses had been through the Centre with 
a 70% success rate and 700+ jobs created. 
 
From this initial base, the Centre has evolved significantly in terms of its client-base, 
range of services and consolidation of ownership and management. The Centre’s 
present organisation structure, service portfolio, client base and management policies 
are discussed in the following sections. 
 
6.1.2 Organisational Structure & Division of Labor 
 
The Centre has eight staff members who provide advisory and administrative support 
to client businesses. In addition, they also perform duties relating to the running of 
DubInc. Although hierarchical relationships do exist, the general environment was 
more ‘family-like’ or communal. The Board of Directors was the apex governing body 
mandated to provide managerial oversight and to set new policies. The Enterprise 
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Manager 32  holds a seat on the Board. Figure 13 below roughly describes the 
organisational structure: 
 













The Centre’s staff had varied roles and job descriptions. This flexibility was required 
to ensure that the organisation remains competitive, economically efficient and lean, 
responds quickly to changing environmental conditions and was able to provide 
services as per the needs of its clients and the wider community. For instance, the 
Manager, as the overall in-charge of the facility, wears a number of ‘hats’: a main 
point of contact for incubation-related activity including client screening, monitoring, 
assistance and graduation; lead facilitator for the First Friday business orientation 
session; the individual responsible for preparing and filing funding proposals; 
overseer of a number of revenue generating community out-reach programmes and 
administrative supervisor (which would include addressing any staffing concerns, 
facilities management, planning for expansion, audit coordination and organising and 
participating in Board meetings). The Manager’s most pressing concern was financial 
sustainability and ability to meet short, medium and long term financial targets. In this 
respect, although the organisation was legally a charitable trust, in true essence it 
was governed and managed like a for-profit corporation. Alongside tenancy-related 
revenue from incubation clients, the Manager had to develop other reliable streams to 
                                                 
32 Referred to as the DubInc Incubator Manager (IM) in the forthcoming chapters. 
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ensure there were financial resources available for budgeted fixed and working 
capital expenditure.  
 
During the course of the research several members of DubInc staff were interviewed, 
a few on multiple occasions. These included the Enterprise Manager, the previous 
Enterprise Manager, a member of the Board of Directors, the Enterprise Officer, the 
Facilities Assistant and Receptionist Support Staff. 
  
6.1.3 Service Portfolio & Revenue 
 
The services offered by DubInc can be categorised in a number of ways: according to 
their various types of clients; the type of service itself (such as infrastructural or 
advice-based or a combination); whether they were free or charged; whether they 
were exclusive to a particular category or available across the board and so on. Table 
10 presents a general snap-shot: 
 









28 fully serviced* incubation units (3 food units)  - - 
One-to-One Business Advice & Guidance  free -  free 
Assistance with business planning  free -  free 
Assistance with funding applications  free -  free 
Business network meetings  free -  free 
Training 
Computer training courses -   
Start-your-own business course    
Monthly business orientation sessions - -  free 
Infrastructural 
Wireless broadband    -  
Fax facilities   -  
Courier and mail handling   free -  
Secretarial service  free -  
Training / conferencing facilities   free -  
Computer training facility    -  
Parking  - - 
 
* This includes fire insurance, reception service, security, caretaking, waste disposal 
 
The two significant revenue streams for the Centre were rentals paid by incubation 
clients and the array of training courses offered. The training courses were offered to 
designated members of the local community with support from a government agency. 
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A part of the course’s cost was subsidised by the government agency. Similarly, 
subsidy was also made available through another government agency for the start-
your-own business course. Revenue was also generated via ad-hoc schemes which 
the government announces from time-to-time, for instance, the Centre recently made 
a successful application to the Enterprise Ireland Innovation Vouchers scheme. 
However, these did not form a part of the Centre’s usual income.  
 
As of 2010, the Manager was in the process of submitting an infrastructure grant 
request for the expansion of the Centre to accommodate an adjacent building and to 
redesign internal facilities more efficiently (note: the building was not purpose built for 
incubation, its original purpose was entirely different, which presents, to this day, 
many challenges when it comes to efficient utilisation of space and a set up friendly to 
incubation activity).  
 
6.1.4 Client Base 
 
A diverse mix of clients was based at DubInc with a range of backgrounds, industry 
exposure, experience and business models. Clients at DubInc can be categorised in 
a number of ways: based on their industrial affiliation; nature of business (for-profit vs. 
non-governmental organisation; consulting vs. food processing); their stage in the 
incubation process; by the size of the firm (in terms of financial growth and company 
valuation); by the number of employees; business model (B2B vs. B2C), legal / 
corporate structure and so on. Therefore, there is no one best way to categorise, it 
would depend on the purpose of the categorisation. In Table 11 below all those 
clients who participated in the research are categorised along a number of 
dimensions: 
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Industry Nature Team Size Incubation 
Stage 
Client 1 Energy / Power Design >5  Year 3 
Client 2 Energy / Power Equipment Manufacture >5 Year 3 
Client 3 Energy / Petroleum Project Management 4 Year 4 
Client 4 General Social Entrepreneur  3 Year 3 
Client 5 General Medical Diagnostics 2 Year 1 
Client 6 General Bespoke Stitching  4 Year 1 
Client 7 General Health / Therapy   1 Year 4 
Client 8 General Consulting & Training 4 Year 4 
Client 9 Food Web Portal  1 Year 3  
Client 10 Food Processing & Sales 1 Year 2 
Client 11 Food Processing & Sales 1 Year 1 
Client 12  Food Processing & Sales 1 Year 1 
Client 13  Construction Recruitment 1 Year 2 
Client 14  Insurance / Energy Consulting 2 Year 2 
Client 15 Software Sales 1 Year 3 
Client 16 Hi-Tech / Knowledge
 
Consulting 3 Year 1 
Client 17 Publishing Design / Printing 2 Year 4 
Client 18 Property Management 2 Year 3 
Client 19 Optical Web sales 2 Year 1 
Client 20 Optical  Testing / Sales 4 Year 4 
 
Background data on clients was collected but to ensure anonymity at their request, 
details such as date of inception, precise nature of the business, annual revenue, 
growth figures during incubation and so on are not being disclosed. Background data 
on clients has been scrutinised to look at emerging patterns which have been 
matched with the second case.  
 
The participating clients, as it is evident from the table above, represent an array of 
industries, business models and stage in incubation which led to a very rich dataset. 
Furthermore, two clients graduated during the duration of the research whilst three 
clients were inducted via different pre-incubation and selection routes. One client 
after an intense period of pre-incubation chose to not proceed.  
 
Finally, most clients were operating as sole proprietors or partnerships. Only a 
handful of clients were incorporated as private limited companies.  
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6.1.5 Incubation Policy & Practice: Formal Mechanisms  
 
Prospective clients were attracted through a number of mechanisms. These included 
advertising on letting websites and other advertising media, signage, word-of-mouth 
and via the orientation sessions and courses. DubInc employs a number of systems 
to screen, induct, facilitate and graduate clients. The selection procedure commences 
after a prospective client makes initial enquiries and inspects the premises. The first 
step in the process was the completion of an Application Form, which was essentially 
a summary business plan. Table 12 below highlights the various pieces of information 
that DubInc requests of prospective new clients: 
 
Table 12 – DubInc Incubation Unit Application Form 
 
1 Details of the Promoter. 
2 Details of the Business (such as name and legal structure). 
3 Space required. 
4 A brief description of the nature of the business. 
5 Has trading commenced? If so when? 
6 Number of employees. 
7 Relevant qualifications / training. 
8 Experience relevant to the project. 
9 Who are your customers? 
10 Where are they based? 
11 How will you sell your product / service? 
12 Who are your main competitors? 
13 Why will a customer choose to buy your product or service? 
14 Location – Explain why the work unit is essential for your business now. 
15 Who will be responsible for business administration i.e. book keeping, sales, PR etc.? 
16 Estimate employment potential for the next 2 years 
17 Estimate Year 1 and 2 income and expenditure. 
18 List your start-up expenses. 
19 How will these costs be financed? 
 
After the submission of this information, it was reviewed by the Enterprise Manager 
and shared with a member of the Board (the assessors). Next, an interview was 
scheduled between the applicant and the assessors. This was a fairly comprehensive 
interview, the purpose of which is to establish: 
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1. Whether the prospective client’s business idea is viable in the ongoing market 
scenario and whether it had growth potential. 
2. Whether the prospective client is suitably qualified, experienced, motivated 
and has an agreeable demeanor. 
3. Whether the prospective client has the ability to pay rentals on time. 
4. Whether the prospective client is likely to remain in the Centre for an extended 
duration. 
5. Whether the prospective client will remain committed to the community-
oriented DubInc ethos. 
 
The prospective client was made aware of any concerns or further data needs during 
the interview and was asked to address these in due course. The prospective client 
was also given a formal brief on the background and ethos of the Centre. No 
information on developmental assistance related services were routinely mentioned 
at the interview stage. Information on these was available on the Centre’s website 
and promotional material. 
 
The next stage was the communication of the assessors’ decision after which a 
‘Licence Agreement’ was signed which formalises the relationship. This agreement, in 
the case of DubInc, was more or less like a standard commercial tenancy agreement. 
The salient features of this contract were: 
 
1. An agreement on the licence fee or monthly rental 
2. The specification of the deposit 
3. The term of the licence (which was a maximum of 4 years 9 months) 
4. The licensee's obligations relating to house keeping 
5. The Centre’s housekeeping obligations 
6. The procedure for termination (notice period of 1 month) 
 
None of the incubation related developmental assistance and the other free or 
separately paid for services were mentioned in the Agreement. Once the contractual 
formalities were complete, the client was handed over keys to the premises and 
assistance was provided in settling down. The office spaces come equipped with 
basic furnishings, network / internet and telephone connections. Kitchen units were 
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fully fitted to comply with commercial standards and as such were ready to be used 
immediately.  
 
No formal mechanisms were in place for client monitoring during the term of the 
licence. Similarly, for incubation-related developmental assistance, formal procedures 
to initiate contact and to log progress and activity were absent. Needless-to-say, both 
client monitoring and developmental assistance were conducted keeping in view 
client requirements. These were managed on an informal basis, the principles of 
which are discussed in the next chapter.  
 
By and large, only in-house resources (in terms of sector knowledge and technical 
expertise) were utilised for incubation-related developmental assistance. As the 
research period was coming to end, the Centre began a process for implementing an 
‘incubator management’ software which was to act as a mechanism for introducing 
more structure to incubation activity at DubInc. 
 
Graduation ought to be defined as the instance when a client successfully (i.e. 
meeting most or all pre-set and agreed targets) completes the incubation period 
(Schwartz, 2008). At DubInc, however, any client who left the Centre due to any 
foreseen or unforeseen reason and irrespective of the completion of the term of the 
licence was counted as a graduate. Graduation involved either party serving the other 
with a notice for the termination of the License a month in advance. Assistance was 
provided to help the client move which included advising on other available space in 
the area and evaluating and advising on post-incubation business strategy.  
 





6.2.1 Historical Perspective 
 
IncuWorks is based at a prominent Dublin university. Prior to its establishment in the 
early part of this decade, its functions were carried out by a Campus Innovation 
department. This Department was set up in the late 1980s to tie the University’s 
scientific and other technological research to the commercial world’s requirements. 
Due to the University’s changing priorities and increased focus on innovation, 
technology transfer and commercialisation of scientific research, extensive plans 
were drawn up for a new entity which would spearhead initiatives towards the 
accomplishment of these priorities.  
 
This new entity was to be a public-private partnership with the University providing a 
part of the capital whilst the remaining was to come from private investors. Investors 
were chosen to bring an appropriate mix of expertise and experience to support the 
initiative. Funding was raised in a number of phases and came from prominent 
institutions in the banking, financial services and technology sectors. The remaining 
funds were contributed by Enterprise Ireland and the University. Under the 
shareholders agreement the incentive offered to investors was the opportunity to hold 
a small shareholding (% commensurate with the amount of the investor’s contribution 
in proportion to the total investment) in all companies that were, in the future, going to 
be set up at IncuWorks.  
 
The old Campus Innovation department (which also used to run a small incubation 
facility) was re-branded as IncuWorks and was officially inaugurated two years later 
(in the early 2000s). The entity, although a part of the University, is quite autonomous 
with its own Board of Directors that determined the organisation’s strategic focus. Its 
corporate status remains as a department of the University. The Board consists of 
representatives from all the original private investors, Enterprise Ireland and the 
University. The Board had been mandated to function under the broad strategic 
outlook of the University’s innovation strategy. This strategy had three main 
objectives: 
 
   
 
131 
1. To maximise the impact of the University’s knowledge and expertise. 
2. To foster a culture of innovation and entrepreneurship at the University. 
3. To build the critical social and corporate partnerships for a knowledge 
economy. 
 
IncuWorks’ primary function was to further these strategic objectives. This was 
spelled out in its own vision statement: “to become an international leader in the 
commercialisation of research and other knowledge-intensive activity for the benefit 
of the economy and society”. Its scope of activities were grouped into four major 
areas: 
 
1. Promoting a Culture of Innovation and Entrepreneurship at the University to 
increase the focus of its scientists and researchers towards commercialisation. 
2. Managing Technology Transfer by identifying and capturing the intellectual 
property arising from the University’s research programmes. IncuWorks was 
also responsible for implementing the University’s policies on intellectual 
property. 
3. Supporting Start-ups from the early feasibility stage through to business 
development, growth and investment. 
4. Building Partnerships and bridging the gap between academic research and 
industry. Building national and international relations with industry and with the 
knowledge transfer network was also an important element of IncuWorks’ 
commercialisation strategy. 
 
A very experienced member from IncuWorks’ predecessor department was appointed 
as a Director, assisted by other qualified supporting staff. The staff members were on 
the University’s payroll; however, their performance was assessed under the targets 
set by the Board. The staff at IncuWorks was suitably qualified with adequate levels 
of commercial experience to engage successfully with both the University’s research 
community and the commercial world.  
 
The physical facility was located within the University confines in an up-market area 
of Dublin city with close proximity to the city centre, bookshops, banks, restaurants, 
sports and other facilities. In addition, the general area was serviced by residential 
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and industrial estates. The facility was located in a completely re-designed and 
restored mansion. This mansion was the center piece of the IncuWorks complex with 
a number of other attached buildings. The complex was bright, airy and open with 
high-quality shared and circulation spaces. The layout had been designed to 
encourage formal and informal interaction amongst the client firms.  
 
Since its inception, IncuWorks had been recognised both locally and internationally 
through a number of awards as a high quality and effective organisation. It is claimed 
that IncuWorks’ clients have created well over a 1000 high-quality jobs and the total 
investment and realisation in University spin-out companies, over the past decade, 
was more than €200 million. Other accomplishments include facilitating the 
acquisition of one its incubation clients for a multi-million euro value, a large amount 
of revenue generated for the University from the commercialisation of research, 
supported 50 start-ups, incorporated over a dozen University spin-outs, 100s of 
invention disclosures and a large number of priority patent applications and licence 
agreements. On a yearly basis, IncuWorks organises 100s of networking and other 
informational / commercial events and hosts its own innovation awards.  
 
In addition, it had taken over the running of the University’s Campus Company 
Development Programme (CCDP) and runs a variety of training courses in 
association with its commercial partners for the benefit of client firms, the University’s 
researchers and other outside partners.  
 
Initially, IncuWorks’ name, logo and other promotional material did not carry the 
University’s name. It was thought that by branding the entity as completely 
autonomous a signal would be conveyed emphasising its true commercial focus. 
However, very soon the Board found out that building a separate brand for the type of 
work and at the scale being envisioned would take much longer and would consume 
a lot of resources. Instead, the Board agreed that leveraging the University’s 
established reputation and image was the best way forward, thus, IncuWorks own 
logo was abandoned and its name was appended with the University’s. 
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6.2.2 Organisational Structure & Division of Labor 
 
The initial staff complement of only a few members shortly increased to 15 
professionals responsible for overall leadership, operations, enterprise development, 
technology transfer and intellectual property protection, communication and PR, 
continuing professional development, facilities management and administration. Due 
to the technical demands of IncuWorks’ four areas of activity, staff members work in a 
compartmentalised, yet well coordinated hierarchy. Line and reporting relationships 
were very well defined and salaries and other benefits follow the University’s standard 
scales and HR policies. Figure 14 roughly describes the organisational structure: 
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Administrative functions such as financial management and human resources were 
carried out through the University’s own departments. Facilities maintenance such as 
janitorial services, heating, landscaping, lighting and ventilation were also provided 
via the University’s contractors and billed to the University. This led to a significant 
reduction in non-essential administrative load. Furthermore, the organisation was 
very well funded and did not have large recurring overheads such as bank loans, 
rental, salaries and facilities maintenance costs. This resulted in the staff having very 
well defined roles and responsibility areas. They were able to perform their specific 
functions without the expectation of being pulled into other areas of work.  
 
Supporting the Enterprise Development function was a powerful outside network of 
individual experts and specialist firms. IncuWorks had organised this network through 
the assistance of its private sector investment partners to offer legal, financial, 
corporate, marketing and other advisory services free of charge or at subsidised rates 
to incubation clients.   
 
6.2.3 Service Portfolio & Revenue 
 
IncuWorks offers a vast array of services in its four strategic areas of operation 
(departments). An exhaustive listing of services will not be instructive since they were 
flexible and tailored to suit the needs of a particular client. A number of services 
overlap across departments and may not be directly relevant to incubation; however, 
IncuWorks’ four strategic areas were inter-related and mutually impacting which 
necessitates a certain degree of elaboration. Table 13 presents a general snap-shot: 
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Table 13 – IncuWorks Service Portfolio 
 







Promotion of an 
Entrepreneurial 
Culture 
Occupancy Options 1. 14 desk spaces 
2. 42 incubation units ranging from 50 sq. feet to 210 
sq. feet  
3. 6 fully equipped bio-incubation or ‘wet-lab’ 
laboratories (1115 sq. feet) 
Infrastructural Supports 4. 24/7 access, ample car parking and security  
5. Dedicated server room  
6. Free Microsoft software for start-ups 
7. Permanent large boardroom  
8. Numerous seminar and meeting rooms of various 
sizes 
9. Reception services  
10. Wireless  network  
11. Café with external deck  
 
Developmental 
Assistance 1 – 
Enterprise 
Development Advice 
- Feasibility study  
- Business plan development  
- Company formation 
- Access to sources of finance and investment 
- Business growth advice 
- Introductions to potential investors (individual 
introductions to VCs and business angels) 
- Introductions to business advisors (legal, financial, 
tax, marketing, etc) 
- Collaboration with MBA programme projects 
Developmental 
Assistance 2 – Monthly 
1-to-1 Advice Clinics 




- Finance and Tax 
- Marketing 
- Sales 
- Intellectual Property 
 
Developmental 
Assistance 3 – Regular 
Workshops & Training 
Sessions 
Through a dedicated Manager responsible for 
continuing professional development. Organised were 
various business planning and development 
workshops for knowledge intensive start-ups  
Developmental 
Assistance 4 – 
Facilitated linkages to 
research at the 
University 
Via twinning, matching, introductions and other 
facilitation mechanisms 
Developmental 
Assistance 5 – 
Networking 
Opportunities 
Through the participation in networking events, local 




Assistance 6 – Media 
Exposure 
Through a dedicated Communications and PR 
manager who helps promote client businesses and 
achievements in local and international press and 
other media.  
Developmental 
Assistance 7 – Campus 
Company Development 
Programme 
This was a nine-month, part-time enterprise support 
initiative designed for researchers and academics. It 
comprises a mix of practical training and consultancy 
support including 12 half-day workshops, one-to-one 
advice and consultancy meetings, and a series of 
networking events. The aim was to assist prospective 
entrepreneurs in the establishment and development 
of knowledge-intensive enterprises to commercialise 
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the output of their research and innovative ideas. The 
Programme helps participants in defining and 
developing their innovative ideas and preparing a 
detailed business plan 
Developmental 
Assistance 8 – 
Innovation Awards 
These were established to highlight the University’s 
commitment to innovation. The Award was presented 
annually to an individual, company or organisation in 
recognition of excellence in, contribution or 
commitment to innovation or in recognition of success 
achieved in the commercialisation of the University’s 









Services for University 
Researchers  
- Support for researchers with regard to IP 
considerations for funded research projects  
- Preparing research contracts, non-disclosure 
and material transfer agreements  
- Assisting researchers in identifying intellectual 
property and completion of invention disclosure 
forms  
- Performing due diligence on completed invention 
disclosure forms  
- Searching patent databases in association with 
researchers  
- Developing strategies for protection of 
intellectual property  
- Preparing patent filings in association with patent 
agents  
- Developing and implementing commercialisation 
strategies to exploit University IP  
- Sourcing of licensees and marketing of 
inventions  
- Drafting and negotiating of licence agreements  
- Meeting contractual obligations including the 
timely reporting of newly discovered intellectual 
property to the relevant state agencies. 
 Services for Industry - Development of co-operation with the industry and 
business community.  
- Point of contact for companies seeking 
information and advice on licensing and other 
commercial opportunities and partners for 
collaborative research. 
 
IncuWorks’ revenue came from only one major source: client rentals. Rental pricing 
was competitive and based at par or slightly below existing commercial letting rates in 
its vicinity. Another policy was the retention of minor shareholding in all client firms, 
irrespective of whether they were spin-ins or spin-outs. The exact % shareholding 
and the share category was not standardised (or disclosed), it depended on 
negotiations. According to information provided to the researcher by both the 
IncuWorks’ management and client firms, dividend income was negligible.  
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6.2.4 Client Base 
 
IncuWorks attracts clients in the hi-tech sector and its support programmes were 
designed for their unique requirements. During the research period, 26 ventures 
occupying 37 units were housed at IncuWorks. Since its inauguration, 16 companies 
have graduated. Clients fall into a number of categories based on their occupancy 
option and their route to incubation; whether they were spin-outs, spin-ins or come 
from the CCDP.  
 
There were several occupancy options: desk space client; incubation client (including 
bio-tech / wet-lab); associate client (virtual clients) and CCDP clients. The strict 
definition (according to IncuWorks) of spin-out was any firm that had been set up in 
collaboration with a department of the University and was actively involved with the 
University’s research. Whereas, all other clients were considered spin-ins, 
irrespective of whether they were set up by ex-students or ex-staff. Definitions, 
however, remain flexible, actual relationships were much more nuanced. The CCDP, 
for instance, was open to both members of the University and to interested and 
competent individuals from the outside. In Table 14 below all those clients who 
participated in the research are categorised along a number of dimensions: 
 









Client 21 ICT Consulting, design, testing Spin-in Incubation Year 2 
Client 22 ICT Product design CCDP Desk Space Year 1 
Client 23 ICT R&D Spin-out Associate Extended  
Client 24 ICT Internet technologies  Spin-in Incubation Year 3 
Client 25 ICT Internet technologies CCDP Incubation Year 1 
Client 26 ICT Internet technologies Spin-in Associate Year 3 
Client 27 ICT Misc. Spin-in Desk Space Year 1 
Client 28 ICT Software Development Spin-in Desk Space Year 1 
Client 29  ICT Internet technologies CCDP Associate Year 1 
Client 30  ICT Internet technologies Spin-in Incubation Year 2 
Client 31  Telecom IP Commercialisation Spin-in Incubation Year 1 
Client 32 General / Hi-tech Consulting Spin-in Desk Space Year 1 
Client 33 General / Hi-tech Consulting  Spin-in Incubation Year 1 
Client 34 Bio-Tech Fuel Spin-in Incubation Year 2 
Client 35  Bio-Tech Engineering R&D Spin-out Incubation Year 3 
Client 36 Bio-Tech Clinical trials, drug testing Spin-out Incubation Year 3 
Client 37  Bio-Tech Drug Testing / Development CCDP  Associate Year 1 
Client 38  Bio-Tech R&D Spin-out Incubation Year 2 
Client 39  Bio-Tech Clinical R&D Spin-in - Graduated 
 
* Client nos. continue from Table 11 to give each client respondent a unique identifier  
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Due to privacy concerns, permission was not given for meeting clients in their own 
incubation spaces. Furthermore, due to the proprietary or sensitive nature of their 
work, it was agreed that no questions relating to firm size and team composition, 
annual revenue, growth projections and precise nature of technology (including that 
which was under development) would be asked.  
 
The participants represented a fair representation of the IncuWorks client base with 
different incubation stages, routes to incubation and occupancy arrangements. Two 
clients (spin-outs) were in the pre-incubation stage participated whilst one graduated 
spin-in client (out of several who were contacted) agreed to participate.  
 
6.2.5 Incubation Policy & Practice: Formal Mechanisms  
 
IncuWorks had a number of channels to attract prospective clients. The spin-in vs. 
spin-out ratio was nearly 50:50. Spin-ins were primarily attracted via word-of-mouth 
and referrals from in-house or graduated clients. Some advertising on letting websites 
and other advertising media was also done. A steady stream was also ensured via 
activities on University campus such as awareness events, workshops and other 
meet-and-greet functions. The CCDP with its approximately 15 participants per year 
also contributes, with a few converting to desk space or incubation clients.   
 
IncuWorks had a formalised client screening, inducting, incubating and graduating 
procedure. For spin-ins, just like in the case of DubInc, the selection procedure 
commences after a prospective client makes initial enquiries and finds the premises 
suitable. Spin-outs were University researchers and academics. They were usually 
quite aware of the facility and its role through their personal networks or the CCDP. 
Irrespective of whether a prospective client was spin-out or spin-out, formal 
procedures for induction remain the same.  
 
The first step in the process was the completion of a Unit Application Form. This 
Form had two versions, one for desk space and the other for an incubation unit. 
There were subtle differences between the two. The Incubation Unit Form requests 
much more ‘business plan’ oriented details and requires a number of banking and 
trade references (desk space applicants only need to service one banking reference). 
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Another difference was the requirement for a defined legal / corporate structure for 
incubation unit applicants, whereas, this was not expected of desk space applicants. 
The two Application Forms are compared in Table 15 below: 
 
Table 15 – IncuWorks Desk Space & Incubation Unit Application Forms 
 
Desk Space Incubation Unit 
Short biography for each promoter 
 
− Registered Company Address 
− Registered Company Number 
− Name and registered company number 
for any associated companies / 
subsidiaries 
− Short biography for each promoter 
− Company Shareholders & Amounts 
− Company Directors 
 
Date of Incorporation Date of Incorporation 
University Shareholding to date (if applicable) University Shareholding to date 
Start Date 
 




− Preferred Unit 
− Date Required 
 
Requirement (in months) 
 
Relationship with University (if applicable) 
 
Relationship with University: 
 
− Include potential to benefit from 
University expertise, resources, facilities 
− Include potential for employment for 




- Knowledge based dimension to project 
- IP ownership 
- Business proposition 
- Investment to date and potential to attract 
investment 
- Any environmental implications of 
business operation 
- Potential market 
- Management structure / management 
team (short biographies of each team 
member) 
 




− Knowledge based dimension to project 
− Key features of science / technology 
− Product development needs (if 
applicable) 
− IP status / ownership.  In which legal 
entity is the IP vested? 
− Business proposition 
− Projected major milestones for the next 
12 months 
− Funding requirement / Investment to date 
and potential to attract investment 
− Environmental implications of business 
operation 
− Potential market 
− Management structure / management 
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Provide a trade / personal banking reference 
 
References (2 required from industry 
sources) 
 
Personal banking reference where company 
is not trading 
Deposit amount 
 
Company expectations of IncuWorks 
Agreement to document entitled “Desk space 
– Services, Charges, Terms and Conditions” 
 
The Desk Space and Unit Application forms (described in Table 15) reveal 
IncuWorks’ important priorities when it comes to screening clients, including: 
 
1. University shareholding. The University retaining a certain % (usually small) 
was a mandatory requirement in all incubation clients. This rule may or may 
not apply (on the management’s discretion) to desk space clients. However, 
when desk space clients upgrade to incubation clients, then they must agree to 
University shareholding.  
 
2. The relationship of mutual benefit a client will develop / maintain with the 
University. For incubation clients, it was important to demonstrate (a) how they 
plan on utilising the University’s knowledge and other resources for the 
development of their business; and (b) whether they will create opportunities 
for the employment, internships or training of the University’s graduates. 
 
3. The focus on the knowledge dimension of prospective clients. This was to 
develop a pool of similar companies. IncuWorks strategy was to strictly attract 
firms with a hi-tech and intellectual property dimension.  
 
Desk space clients were usually not interviewed because of their prior affiliation with 
IncuWorks (through the CCDP for instance). For spin-in and spin-out incubation unit 
clients, interviewing was a requirement. This interview was scheduled after the 
submission of their Unit Application Forms. These were reviewed by the Enterprise 
Manager and the Director (the assessors). In this interview, the assessors would 
attempt to establish a number of things: 
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1. Whether the applicant firm had some intellectual property or was in the 
process of protecting it. 
2. Whether the applicants (and their management team) were capable and 
motivated. 
3. Whether the business had the potential to raise capital (VC or other angel 
investment). 
4. Whether the applicants have a clear strategy for engaging with the University. 
5. Whether the applicants actually need incubation assistance (and how much). 
6. Whether the applicants will contribute to the IncuWorks’ community. 
 
The interview or a series of interviews (depending on the outcomes of the first 
interview) was conducted by the Director, the Incubator Manager and one member 
from the Board. During this interview the proposed new client was allowed to make a 
formal presentation or ‘pitch’. The interviewers’ aim was two-fold; first, to ascertain 
the degree of alignment between IncuWorks’ goals, vision, mission and services and 
the proposed new client’s short to medium term strategic goals and possibilities of 
contribution to IncuWorks’ reputation, and second, to assess the probability of the 
proposed new client’s survivability post the incubation period.  
 
Once the applicant satisfies the assessors, the next stage was to sign a formal 
contract and for the prospective client to pay a deposit.  Information on 
developmental assistance related services was made available and also discussed 
during the interview. The contract was more or less like a standard commercial 
tenancy agreement but with a number of modifications / additions. The salient 
features of this contract include: 
 
1. An agreement on the monthly fee 
2. The specification of the deposit 
3. The term of the licence (which was a maximum of 4 years 9 months) 
4. Fee escalation clause 
5. The Contractee’s obligations relating to house keeping 
6. The Contractor’s housekeeping obligations 
7. The procedure for termination (notice period of 1 month) 
8. The Contractee’s obligation to report regular progress 
9. The availability of (implied free-of-charge) developmental assistance-related 
services (mentioned in an annex of the contract) 
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Both Desk Space and Incubation units come equipped with basic furnishings, network 
/ internet and telephone connections. Wet-lab / Bio-Tech units were fully fitted to 
comply with stringent health and safety and other standards.  
 
Incubation-related assistance was offered through one formal mechanism: the 6-
month review of client firm progress. This was a formal due-diligence / appraisal of 
client progress as per the goals and targets agreed with the Enterprise Manager33 (in 
the previous appraisal). Clients were required to furnish a summary report and 
participate in a meeting to report progress.  Specific problem areas were identified 
where the Enterprise Manager and associated network of contacts could provide 
assistance. During these meetings client feedback was sought for the type of 
activities / services that IncuWorks ought to offer in the future.  
 
Free-of-charge development assistance-related services such as the 1-to-1 advice 
clinics, workshops, trainings, networking events and PR were widely advertised for 
clients’ benefit (if they chose to avail). Graduated companies were kept notified of 
IncuWorks’ activities and invited to events and other ceremonies.  They were also 
advertised on IncuWorks’ websites. Graduates had the option of retaining a virtual 
office at very nominal rates. Assistance was available to help the clients, once their 
incubation terms of a maximum of 4 years 9 months were over, to move to new 
premises.   
 
6.3 Summary: Comparative Overview of DubInc & IncuWorks 
 
Table 16 presents a bird’s eye view of the two case organisations. This comparison is 
meant to be non-analytical based on factual data. The case selection strategy, 
discussed in the previous chapter, employed theoretical replication rather than literal 
replication i.e. the development of contrasting results but for predictable reasons, thus, 
emanating differences between the two organisations are instructive; however, the 
reasons behind the differences and resulting impacts on organisational structure and 
incubation strategy are discussed in the chapters that follow. 
 
                                                 
33
 Referred to as the IncuWorks Incubator Manager (IM) in the remainder of the thesis. 
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Table 16 – Overview of DubInc & IncuWorks 
 




Established Mid-1980s Early 2000s 




Converted from an un-utilised 
building meant for recreational 
purposes 
Largely purpose-built facility 
Accomplishments 250 graduates since inception 
70% success rate  
700+ jobs created 
Less than 20 graduates since 
inception 
Not claimed 
1000 high-quality jobs  
Total investment and realisation in 
University spin-out companies - 
€200 million+ 
Client Focus Mixed-use Hi-Tech knowledge intensive  
Original goals 1. Help young people, 
unemployed persons and 
others to establish their own 
businesses 
2. Assist small businesses 
already in existence to expand 
and provide further 
employment 
 
1. Promoting a Culture of 
Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship at the 
University  
2. Managing Technology 
Transfer by identifying and 
capturing the intellectual 
property arising from the 
University’s research  
3. Supporting Start-ups  
4. Building Partnerships and 
bridging the gap between 
academic research and 
industry 
Structure 
Apex body Board of Directors Board of Directors 
Leadership Centre Manager Director 
No. of Staff 8 15 
Hierarchy Informal, flexible, need-based Structured, defined roles 
Administration All admin functions performed Administrative links with University 
Management Lean, corporate principles  Public-Private Partnership  
Services 
Occupancy options 28 (including 3 food units) approx. 
100 sq. feet each, with two larger 
units of 500 sq. feet each 
1. 14 desk spaces 
2. 42 incubation units ranging 
from 50 sq. feet to 210 sq. feet  
3. 6 fully equipped bio-incubation 
or ‘wet-lab’ laboratories (1115 
sq. feet) 
Developmental  1. One-to-One Business Advice 
& Guidance 
2. Assistance with business 
planning 
3. Assistance with funding 
applications 
4. Business network meetings 
5. Start-your-own business 
course 
1. Enterprise Development 
Advice 
2. Monthly 1-to-1 Advice Clinics  
3. Regular Workshops & 
Training Sessions 
4. Facilitated linkages to 
research at the University 
5. Networking Opportunities 
6. Media Exposure 
7. Campus Company 
Development Programme 
8. Innovation Awards 
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Infrastructural  1. Wireless broadband  
2. Fax facilities 
3. Courier and mail handling  
4. Secretarial service 
5. Training / conferencing 
facilities  
6. Computer training facility  
7. Parking 
1. 24/7 access, ample car 
parking and security  
2. Dedicated server room  
3. Free Microsoft software for 
start-ups 
4. Permanent large boardroom  
5. Numerous seminar and 
meeting rooms of various 
sizes 
6. Reception services  
7. Wireless  network  
8. Café with external deck 
Revenue Client rentals, trainings, ad-hoc 
government schemes 
Client rentals, dividend and other 






Participants 20 19 
Sectors Food, Energy, Power, Consulting, 
Software, ICT, General 
ICT, Telecom, Bio-Tech, 
Consulting 
Routes Local community Spin-in, Spin-out & CCDP 
Incubation Policy 
Selection Process Application form > interview  Application form > interview 
Screening Focus 1. Business idea is viable in the 
ongoing economic scenario 
2. Suitable background and 
qualifications 
3. Ability to pay rentals on time 
4. Likely to remain in the Centre 
for an extended duration. 
5. Commitment to the 
community-oriented ethos. 
 
1. Intellectual property or is in 
the process of protecting it. 
2. Applicants and team capability  
3. Business had potential to 
raise capital  
4. Clear strategy for engaging 
with the University. 
5. Need for incubation 
assistance  
6. Contribution to IncuWorks’ 
community. 
Contract  Standard tenancy agreement Standard tenancy agreement + 
the mention of development 
assistance and the requirement to 
monitor progress 





Findings from Case Studies - I 





In this chapter, it is shown that a dynamic inter-change exists between the parties 
involved in incubation, and it is through these ties or relationships that incubation 
activity is facilitated. The overall purpose is to unearth intricacies of human relations, 
behaviour and action which provide the incubation process’s normative foundations. 
According to Aaboen (2007) there are three categories of incubation relationships - 
internal, semi-internal and external. Internal ties include those between clients and 
their business developer; between clients; and between clients and other business 
developers. Semi-internal include those between clients and business networks; 
between clients and external financing; between clients and graduated clients; and 
between clients and the affiliated university. And, external ties include those between 
clients and customers; and between clients and other actors. Aaboen’s categorisation 
is indeed comprehensive, however, it is also subjective and based in the 
geographical context of the case organisation she studied. Incubators in Sweden 
(where Aaboen conducted the research) and Germany show different structural and 
organisational attributes to incubators in the UK and Ireland 34 . For instance, in 
Sweden there are a number of “business developers” employed by the incubator and 
client firms are assigned one; these business developers have no role in incubator 
corporate management. This is not the case in Ireland – there is usually one 
Enterprise Manager or Incubator Manager looking after the entire portfolio of client 
firms assisted by an outside network and usually this manager would have a degree 
of corporate incubator management-type duties also. Further, in contrast to the 
Swedish environment, existing clients’ linkages with graduated clients were virtually 
non-existent.  
                                                 
34 ibid, see Chapter 2 for a comparative analysis of country incubator-incubation environments. 
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Lichtenstein (1992) has also looked at the broad patterns of interactions which 
facilitate incubation; including interactions among entrepreneurs, between 
entrepreneurs and the incubator manager, between entrepreneurs and outside 
individuals associated with the incubator and interaction between entrepreneurs and 
other incubator staff. This scheme, it is believed, presents the most meaningful and 
relevant incubation relationships, therefore, following Lichtenstein (1992) in this 
chapter the IM-Client, Client-Client, Client-IM-Client and Client-Third Party 
relationships are analysed. Whilst the focus of both Lichtenstein (1992) and Aaboen 
(2007) was on identifying instrumental benefits of good relationships and on 
improving the understanding of the factors that lead to an increased exchange of 
resources, the aim in this chapter is different: it is to highlight the significance of 
norms, written and un-written rules and the role of subtle aspects of human behaviour 
in the development of incubation relationships.  
 
7.2 The Nature of IM-Client Relations 
 
Overall, the main theme emerging from the case data is that incubation occurs within 
the backdrop of the nature human relationships. The following quotes demonstrate a 
range of views and beliefs held by the incubation parties on the significance of 
perceived relational quality on willingness to engage in incubation-related 
developmental assistance. The quotes also highlight the value that client firms attach 
to the IM’s involvement in their growth and development35: 
 
[IncuWorks IM] “…My academic background and doctorate helps build a 
rapport with our clients, especially spin-outs, because they feel that I can 
emphatically understand the unpredictable process of commercialising 
scientific research…” 
 
(Client 4] “…I think it makes a big difference if the IM is emphatic, experienced 
and has good contact…there is a need to build trust and rapport without which 
I don’t think there will a chance to move forward…here I suppose the IM needs 
to come across as interested and proactive…otherwise how would we know…” 
                                                 
35 Refer to Chapter 10 – section 10.3 for a number of other relevant quotes.  
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[Client 27] “…Relationships are good…the IM takes an interest in the growth of 
the firm, introduced us to other clients and has helped us identify 
customers…this a good benefit…” 
 
[Client 7] “…There is a lot of trust and rapport between us and XYZ (the IM)…it 
definitely easier to work with people with whom you are on friendly terms… ” 
 
[Client 28] “…I have never felt any unease in approaching the IM or other staff 
here…we can talk whenever needed…but it is quite rare that I’d approach the 
IM with a business problem because we have our own network and there is a 
lot of support from the parent company…” 
 
[Client 23] “…We have been here for over 3 years now but the relationship 
with ABC (IncuWorks Director) goes back to over a decade and it was 
because of this history that it became just natural for us to locate here…” 
 
[Client 16] “…The relationship between us and the Centre is sticky…I feel they 
don’t consider clients as proper customers…there is a need for a bit more 
professionalism…I would not treat my customers like the Centre treats its 
clients…” 
 
Following Rice (2002), it is argued that incubators and entrepreneurs operate in an 
inter-dependent ‘co-production dyad’ where business assistance is co-produced 
between the incubator manager and client firm. Rice’s approach is quite intuitive, that 
the readiness of the entrepreneur to engage in co-production of business assistance 
impacts the incubation process’s outputs. Such mutual co-production of incubation 
assistance is primarily driven by the nature of the relationship between the incubator 
manager and the entrepreneur, the aspect this section will focus on. 
 
Relationships form the very basis of how aspects of incubation are communicated, 
delivered and signalled, and consequently how these are received, accepted and 
internalised. The quality of client relationships with the IM and vice-versa determine 
the very nature, intensity, frequency, scale, scope and ultimately the output of 
incubation. These relationships are forged from the time a prospective client 
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expresses an initial interest to become a member of the incubator organisation, to 
subsequently when the client moves in, and then over a period of time, is ready to 
move out.  
 
Besides Evald & Bager (2008) and McAdam & Marlow (2007), the impact of relational 
quality on the incubation process has not received much attention. This aspect of 
relational quality and dynamics is dealt with extensively in the Relationship Marketing 
literature. Leading researchers in the area assert that for gaining competitive 
advantage and superior financial performance, it is imperative that firms (and their 
managers) identify, develop, and nurture an efficiency and effectiveness enhancing 
portfolio of relationships (Lages et al, 2009; Cannière et al, 2010; Davenport & Early, 
2010; Watson & Johnson, 2010). Theoretical models in the area are used to predict 
consumer (or partner) behaviour in a repeat buying (or doing business) context. 
Relationships are assumed to be economic in nature and working on commercial 
principles, such as loyalty to a particular brand or franchisor-franchisee relations.  
 
When it comes to incubation, the interesting departure here is that the IM-Client 
relationship is not “strictly business”, though undoubtedly legal and contractual 
obligations form the very basis of the bond. These are purposefully layered-over by 
the language and signals of fraternity and kinship. The setting of such a norm re-
enforces the idea that the IM is not simply a commercial landlord interested in 
deriving rental income. In fact, the IM has to go to some lengths to shed this image of 
the commercial landlord, and to replace it instead with an image of a keen 
stakeholder genuinely interested in the development of client business, despite, in 
many cases, having no real financial stake. In the words of the two IMs: 
 
[DubInc IM] “…As an organisation our aim is to enable employment creation in 
the local community…this requires working with people and offering the sort of 
services they can’t get in a standard tenancy. As businesses come in here, 
they see the difference and ease between starting up here versus taking up an 
office or work unit with a commercial landlord. Quite a few of our clients don’t 
want to leave at the end of their licence term because of the environment we 
have created and all the extra facilities they have, free from headaches…” 
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[IncuWorks IM] “…We have a multi-facetted role, on one end of the scale are 
commercial landlords, in the middle you would have managed office spaces 
and on the other end…I suppose…science and technology parks. At 
IncuWorks we go much beyond what science parks have to offer. The clients 
we select come with a set of expectations, yes I agree there is a bit of a gap 
there, but to really understand what incubation and research commercialisation 
is about in practice, they need to experience it and become a part of our 
community…once they are inducted we tend to work with them 
individually…for some it takes considerable effort and a while to understand 
where this facility is in terms of tenancy and enterprise support…” 
 
In order to understand the IM-Client relationship, there is a need to understand the 
nature of the dyad. Georg Simmel’s work is quite instructive in this regard. He 
describes dyads as “super-individual societal units”, wholes composed of only two 
participants where there is a greater individualisation of their members than larger 
groups do (other things being equal). In the dyad, there can be no majority which 
could outvote the individual. Simmel observes that a dyadic relationship differs 
qualitatively from all other types of groups in that each of the two participants is 
confronted by only one another and not by a collectivity. Since this type of “group” 
depends only on two participants, the withdrawal of one would destroy the whole 
(Wolff, 1964). In his own words: "A dyad depends on each of its two elements alone - 
in its death though not in its life: for its life it needs both, but for its death, only one. 
This fact is bound to influence the inner attitude of the individual toward the dyad, 
even though not always consciously nor in the same way. It makes the dyad into a 
group that feels itself both endangered and irreplaceable, and thus into the real locus 
not only of authentic sociological tragedy, but also of sentimentalism and elegiac 
problems" (Wolff, 1964, pp 124).  
 
Thus, the dependence of the whole on each partner is obvious; in all other groups 
duties and responsibilities can be delegated, but not in the dyad, where each 
participant is immediately and directly responsible for any collective action. Because 
each partner in the dyad deals with only one other individual, who forms a unit with 
him, neither of the two can deny responsibility by shifting it to the group; neither can 
they hold the group responsible for what he has done or failed to do.  
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Simmel described a number of elements that form the core of the dyadic relationship: 
a common fate or enterprise; an agreement of “secrecy”; triviality or an immediacy of 
interaction; and intimacy or what each of the two participants gives or shows only to 
the one other person and to nobody else (Wolff, 1964, pp, 125-127).  These elements 
tie the dyadic parties in a manner that is very different to groups of three or more. The 
notion of the secret, in modern times, can be denoted with ‘confidentiality’ and must 
be an important given in an incubation setting (McAdam & Marlow, 2007). Similarly, 
practitioner researchers in the past hinting at the need for ‘immediacy of interaction’ 
and “intimacy” between IM-Client relations (Garvey et al, 2009).  
 
By incorporating Simmel’s core elements, IM-Client dyadic relations come quite close 
to modern day coaching and mentoring relationships. We find that theorists on 
coaching and mentoring also stress on the relevance of Simmel’s core elements of 
coach-coachee and mentor-mentee relationships. They, however, add a further three 
elements including “trust”, “commitment” and “active involvement” as important 
relational elements (Garvey et al, 2009, pp 19) – all of which, conceptually, also apply 
to IM-Client incubation relations.  
 
7.3 Inside the IM-Client Dyad: Understanding Co-Production’s Value 
 
Co-production involves a joint effort between two parties, such as a coach-coachee, 
mentor-mentee or IM-Client, who jointly determine the output of their collaboration. 
The unique issue here is the involvement of the “consumer” in the production of the 
output. Contrary to being passive recipients as in most situations, in a dyadic co-
production situation, the efforts of the consumer are central to the production of the 
dyadic output. The producer or initiator alone cannot determine the quality or the 
quantity of the output (Parks et al, 1981).  
 
There are a number of examples from the public services where consumer-producer 
co-production is essential. For instance, the output of an educational programme is 
‘‘learning.’’ When students are not actively involved in the process, any university, 
however good the professors or the facilities, will be ineffective in imparting useful 
knowledge. Similarly, the democratic process would be ineffective if citizens did not 
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turn out to vote and a city government’s solid waste management programme would 
not function if households did not cooperate.  
 
The co-production logic also applies to incubation. Incubation’s basic purpose is to 
help entrepreneurial ventures start up, survive, and succeed. Towards this end, the 
parties in incubation (the IM and entrepreneur) engage in co-production to 
compensate for the firm’s gap in knowledge, competencies and resources. Co-
production in the short-term gives clients the capacity to deal with momentary crises 
and other shocks. In the long-term, it is meant to help client firms develop the 
knowledge and competencies and accumulate resources necessary to achieve 
autonomy from the co-production partner and to become sustainable as an economic 
entity. Rice (2002) gives the following illustrative example: in order to resolve any 
internal crises an entrepreneur would need to invest resources from the firm’s stock. 
If the entrepreneur’s stock of resources is insufficient and inadequate to address the 
crisis, (s)he will turn to the incubator manager to contribute the missing resources. If 
the incubator manager is unable to contribute, there would be no co-production. 
Similarly, the incubator manager may be prepared to invest resources in resolving a 
crisis faced by the entrepreneur, but if the entrepreneur refuses to engage, there is no 
co-production of business assistance targeted at the crisis. 
 
In order for co-production to be effective, there are a number of assumptions which 
must hold true: 
 
First, as mentioned above, the entrepreneur must be willing to engage in co-
production activity.  
 
Second, both parties must contribute resources for an effective resolution of a 
problem at which co-production is directed.  
 
Third, the IM must have sufficient capacity in terms of general and domain specific 
knowledge.  
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Fourth, clients selected for incubation must have the potential to benefit from co-
production or have substantial challenges to overcome to grow out of the start up / 
survival mode.  
 
And fifth, and quite importantly, the clients must actually benefit from co-production. 
Lichtenstein (1992) proposes that entrepreneurs receive three types of benefits 
through work with the IM: psychological, instrumental and developmental. Each 
entrepreneur focuses on different benefits and recognises that their importance 
changes over time. Lichtenstein’s three benefits are valid and corroborated by data 
from the case work. In terms of psychological benefits and moral and support, clients 
at the case organisations expressed its importance in a number of ways: 
 
[Client 3] "… It is quite comforting to be here when you don't know from one 
day to the next if you're going to make it…"  
 
[Client 22] “…There is a feeling of camaraderie and collegiality here which 
makes a big difference... “ 
 
[Client 32] “…There are people here you can talk to without being judged…you 
see others besides your own employees all the time…which is a good 
pressure release valve…” 
 
[Client 37] "Moral support is hard to quantify...it is intangible but it is 
tremendously valuable…" 
 
[Client 12] "..A good working environment makes you feel good and it gives 
you a boost…because when you are emotionally down and all that, its much 
harder to perform…” 
 
Instrumental benefits relate to the business of doing business. They can take the form 
of increased sales, lowered costs, enhanced capabilities and reduced risk. Most of 
the benefits incubation awards come from sharing or borrowing resources, sharing 
information and receiving advice on decisions – which results in lowered costs and 
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reduced risks. Clients at the case organisations expressed the importance of these 
benefits: 
 
[Client 13] “…The contacts and introductions by the manager have been quite 
valuable, these are people and organisations we did not directly know…” 
 
[Client 31] “…Being in the facility has been helpful on many different 
levels…the location especially has awarded us great credibility and visibility…” 
 
[Client 17] "…Interactions and discussions with others makes you think in a 
better way…this is much better in terms of reducing risk when you relied purely 
on your own resources….” 
 
[Client 25] “…XYZ (the IM) has introduced us to a number of contacts who 
have run companies bigger than ours…they have been there and done it…so 
their back stopping is quite valuable…” 
 
Incubation provides opportunities for clients to receive developmental benefits36 such 
as opportunities to observe others (pooled interdependence), to ask as well as 
answer questions (sequential interdependence), and to discuss issues interactively 
amongst themselves. Clients at the case organisations expressed the ways in which 
they valued developmental benefits: 
 
[Client 7] “…The First Monday is good forum to ask questions and to simulate 
situations…the responses I get…when I share them with other people in the 
company they do get genuinely surprised…” 
 
[Client 1] “…You get chances to make mistakes and ask the sort of questions 
you wouldn’t be able to in a real world scenario…” 
 
                                                 
36 Development is not to be confused with technical assistance; whereas, technical assistance is a service that has an 
assigned value and can be purchased, development for entrepreneurs is to know when they need such services, how to 
acquire them and how to use them for their gain.  
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[Client 26] “…I have learnt a number of things just observing and talking to 
other clients…simple things like delivering an effective and convincing 
performance during a presentation…” 
 
Both the IM (the regular producer in the co-production dyad) and client firms (the 
consumer producers in the co-production dyad) bring their own unique knowledge, 
resources and experience to the dyadic relationship. The power balance, however, is 
relatively tipped towards IMs since the real purpose of business incubation is to allow 
client firms to take advantage of the greater knowledge, experience resource 
munificence of the IM. Extending Rice’s (2002) work, it is suggested that although 
entrepreneurs have much to gain from engaging in co-production activities, the extent 
to which they engage in co-production and their perceptions of the value of such 
engagement is varied. The co-production experience is unique to an incubating dyad 
and the variance in levels of IM-Client engagement is impacted by, according to 
Lichtenstein (1992), nine different variables: (1) the types of business; (2) the 
personal characteristics of entrepreneurs; (3) the stage of their firm's development; 
(4) space or social distance; (5) the existence and design of forums; (6) the presence 
of a critical mass of firms; (7) norms and attitudes; (8) the actions of key individuals 
within a network (in this case, the incubator manager); and (9) time. A further four 
variables are proposed to augment Lichtenstein’s list of nine; and the impact of these 
in the development of relationships has been emphasised time and again by previous 
researchers: (1) dyadic history; (2) psychological compatibility and degree of vision 
commonality; (3) IM leadership style; and (4) trust. Taken together, it is argued, from 
a practice standpoint, a system can be developed to effectively select and pair IMs 
with clients with a view to increasing the chances of building positive incubation 
relationships. 
 
7.4 Client-Client Interaction 
 
Of late, the role of incubators in promoting different types of client interpersonal 
contact has been highlighted where it is suggested that co-location of incubator 
clients with other young and growing firms provides benefits (Hansen et al, 2000; 
Peters et al, 2004; Bøllingtoft & Ulhøi, 2005; McAdam & McAdam, 2006). Co-location, 
besides creating opportunities for tangible economic activities, it is suggested, can 
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also create intangible benefits such as facilitating informal networking activity allowing 
client firms to become familiar with each other and form a distinct support network for 
sharing resources, knowledge, motivation and counselling (McAdam & McAdam, 
2006).  
 
Lichtenstein (1992) suggests that co-location of client firms can also create benefits 
due to three types inter-dependencies: pooled, sequential or reciprocal (see Figure 
15). Pooled interdependence is created when two or more individuals come together 
to share inputs or outputs to greater advantage than any one person could achieve 
alone. The purchase of group insurance is an example. In sequential 
interdependence, individuals directly interact in series, each performing a different, 
complementary function and then passing the work on to the next participant. 
Assembly line production exhibits this form of relationship among the various parts. 
Reciprocal interdependence involves back and forth interaction and feedback 
between individuals engaged in a joint effort. Brainstorming sessions and group 
efforts are two examples.  
 










Client interpersonal contact can take a number of forms including: (1) clients 
maintaining only a superficial social contact with other clients; (2) clients becoming 
friendly associates socialising inside and outside the incubator without being involved 
in inter-trading or other business collaborations; (3) clients becoming inter-trading 
partners involved in direct economic exchange of goods and/or services; (4) clients 
coming together in dyads, triads or groups for ‘agglomeration economies’ (Keeble & 
Wilkinson, 2000) - such as jointly bidding for large contracts; and (5) clients 
Pooled Sequential Reciprocal 
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interacting for the purposes of ‘collective learning’ (Moulaert & Gallouj, 1993) i.e. 
coming together for enhancing capacity for learning, sharing and creation of new 
knowledge.  
 
Some practitioner literature suggests that the above forms of client interpersonal 
contact may not necessarily yield real economic or inter-trading benefits beyond 
social support (UKBI, 2006). The research is based on client feedback about 
interpersonal contact and may allude to the fact that perhaps clients themselves do 
not seem to value the intangible benefits associated with co-location, a point that is 
also confirmed from some of the client quotes in McAdam & McAdam (2006).  
 
It is proposed that the amount of interpersonal contact among clients has the 
potential to both positively or negatively affect client attitudes, beliefs and behaviour 
towards their own work, the incubator organisation and their ability and willingness to 
engage with other clients. On the one hand, more client interpersonal contact can 
provide opportunities to share thoughts, feelings and values - as a result, clients may 
develop friendships, resolve interpersonal conflicts, share knowledge, work together 
for mutual gain and receive high levels of interpersonal feedback: 
 
[Client 28] “…this is our third year here and I have to say that we have made 
some good friends with whom we will keep in touch with after we leave…” 
 
[Client 24] “…had it not been for the other companies here, I honestly think we 
would not have done as well…just being able to talk and bounce ideas off of 
other people is in itself invaluable…” 
 
On the other hand, higher degrees of Client-Client contact can also adversely affect 
the quality of client interpersonal relationships and the ability of clients to effectively 
do business. This is due to issues such as lack of privacy and demands on time and 
other resources for engaging in activities that do not directly benefit client business.  
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[Client 20] “…some of the guys here are quite competitive you know…one of 
our staff members wanted to join a company here and we were not very 
comfortable with this, had he been not been a core technical person…it would 
have been okay I suppose…” 
 
[Client 39] “…we do a lot of sensitive work and are very time poor…and the 
staff usually have no time to socialise…” 
 
For this research, it is assumed that Client-Client interaction is largely beneficial and 
a real possibility if adequately moderated; however (and this would be the research’s 
contribution), it does not occur to a high degree due to a number of barriers. Barring 
the work of McAdam & McAdam (2006), few researchers delve into the real dynamics 
of Client-Client interaction, its various categories, levels and outcomes. Thus, in the 
sub-sections that follow two important aspects are explored which impact the 
development of strong Client-Client relations (i.e. those that yield economic or other 
benefits to both parties).  
 
7.4.1 Impact of Client-Mix on Client-Client Interaction 
 
An incubator’s client mix is thought to have an important impact on Client-Client 
interaction and subsequent relationships, in other words, whether incubator policy 
encourages or discourages a similar client base. The assumption here is that the 
chances (and incidents) of Client-Client interaction would be high when clients are 
similar i.e. share sectors, markets, have similar customers and staff expertise 
(McAdam & McAdam, 2006; Schwartz & Hornych, 2008).  
 
The two case organisations differed in their policy on the nature of client mix. 
DubInc’s policy focused on a diverse client mix where no two businesses were to be 
completely alike. In their experience businesses operating with the same client base 
introduced unhealthy competition, thereby, negatively impacting the environment of 
the incubator. To this effect, the IM stated: 
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[DubInc IM] “…there are businesses here that are in the same market but are 
quite different from each other…I think its just not fair to someone starting up 
in this community…which is already quite small…to face competition from the 
very start. We had a few problems in the past with clients complaining about 
price undercutting and the like…we did not really investigate these incidents 
because the complaints were not very serious but now the Board is quite clear 
on this…we cannot have two very similar businesses…” 
 
IncuWorks on the other hand believed in a sectoral focus and strategically selected 
clients to be from the bio-tech, ICT or closely related sectors (the organisation’s focus 
areas). The rationale for this policy was that a similar client base allowed the pooling 
of resources, encouraged knowledge and experience sharing and promoted the 
development of a community that shared a common purpose. The IM gave another 
important reason for the two (bio-tech and ICT) sector strategy: 
 
[IncuWorks IM] “…it makes our life here simpler because with clients who 
share common problems and have similar resource needs we can be much 
more effective and focused…which I don’t think will be possible with clients 
coming from a very wide range of sectors…even with bio-tech and ICT we are 
pushed to capacity because of their specialist requirements…” 
 
One would imagine that with IncuWorks’ strategy of a similar client mix, Client-Client 
interaction would be higher in comparison to DubInc; however, the analysis reveals a 
slightly counter-intuitive scenario. Although incidents of Client-Client interaction (for 
the purpose of doing business together) were generally rare at both case 
organisations, no extraordinarily high levels were reported at IncuWorks. In fact, 
DubInc clients were able to recall more incidents of Client-Client interaction than 
IncuWorks’ clients: 
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[Client 10] “…X (another food sector client) and I make a very natural 
collaboration…we both love the food business but in different ways…we are 
not competitors because of the ways in which we earn our incomes…moreover 
we have different types of expertise, experience and background…(gender ref. 
removed) gives me business and I return the favour…[pause]…a lot of it has to 
do with how our personalities have clicked…” 
 
[Client 17] “…Yeah I have done some work with clients here…I have kept 
flyers at the reception which helps…I am here to do business you know and all 
companies here need to get designing and printing of some kind done from 
time-to-time...there is a small captive audience here for me but not major 
volumes…” 
 
[Client 19] “…The guys down at XYZ (another client) are great, we spoke once 
in the coffee dock about a software program they had purchased but were 
having trouble with its implementation…they didn’t know I was in the software 
business…so I gave them my card and didn’t think that they were going to get 
in touch…but they did and I got some work…I didn’t do it for free you know but 
it was also not a complete favour either…all in all a good experience…” 
 
One reason cited by IncuWorks’ bio-tech clients for being cautious about Client-Client 
interaction was the desire to guard sensitive intellectual property. The bio-tech clients 
displayed more concern about this aspect; perhaps due to their greater reliance on IP 
when compared to ICT clients. Further, Bio-Tech clients felt that the nature of their 
work was more R&D-focused which did not require much Client-Client co-
production37: 
 
                                                 
37 It is also instructive to note that by the time Bio-Tech clients felt they were ready to form commercial alliances; their 
maximum allowed time in the incubator was up. Perhaps there is a need for incubators then to re-assess the incubation 
period for certain types of technology-based start-up firms, generally believed by the incubator ‘community of practice’ to be a 
maximum of three to four years.  
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[Client 36] “…We meet other clients at the coffee shop…there is informal chat 
and we give each other tips and leads…but we have not considered a serious 
collaboration because of no real need at this point…we are working on 
sensitive and proprietary technology that we plan to licence out…when that 
stage arrives…it would be more sensible to consider commercial alliances…” 
 
[Client 38] “…We would like to develop more collaborative relationships but the 
nature of our work and all the confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements 
we have signed make this quite difficult…” 
 
The ICT clients on the other hand were open to establishing open relationships with 
similar clients: 
 
[Client 27] “…I have worked with another desk space client here, we sit right 
across from each other and I know him through the CCDP…we traded 
solutions…(gender ref. removed) helped me with programming and I gave my 
input in (gender ref. removed) site’s interface design…” 
 
[Client 21] “…It is always great to have people around who are at a similar 
stage as you are…we have worked with companies here in the past and if the 
opportunity presents itself in the future we would like to work again…there is 
certainly rapport and mutual respect…” 
 
Overall, at IncuWorks, only seven incidents of meaningful Client-Client contact were 
recorded – all of which were between ICT firms. Therefore, it seems that policy-
makers need to re-assess their views about the advantages that specialist campus-
based hi-tech incubators offer – there is potential for greater Client-Client 
collaboration in some areas whilst such potential is negligible in others.  
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7.4.2 The Impact of Physical Layout on Client-Client Interaction 
 
A factor impacting Client-Client interaction is the incubator organisation’s physical 
layout and infrastructure – an element which has been touched upon by Bøllingtoft & 
Ulhøi (2005) and McAdam & Marlow (2007); however, generally speaking this area 
has been largely neglected by both academic researchers and practitioners. ‘How to’ 
manuals and books by industry organisations such as the UKBI and NBIA have not 
brought forth any in-depth analysis on incubator physical design – the area which 
demands the most financial investment. It is felt that incubation researchers need to 
explore the broader question of what would be an ideal design that would promote 
the meta-ideals behind the concept of incubation, one of which would certainly be 
encouraging the development of a cohort of client companies working together to 
gain competitive advantage.  
 
Numerous studies have explored the role of the physical layout of work spaces on 
human behaviour, attitude and perceptions (Bitner, 1992). Lichtenstein (1992) 
suggests that physical space directly affects the probability, frequency, quality, 
intensity, costs and speed of interaction. According to him, studies indicate that the 
probability of two people communicating at least once a week drops from 98% at a 
separation distance of 2 metres to 6% at 50 metres. Further, research in environment 
and behaviour, social psychology, ergonomics, and organisational behaviour 
suggests that the physical setting can influence levels of satisfaction, productivity, 
motivation and interpersonal contact of the users of the space such as workers and 
customers (Oldham & Rotchford, 1983; Klitzman & Stellman, 1989; Bitner, 1992; Lee 
& Brand, 2005; Robertson, et al, 2008; Aries et al, 2010).  
 
The closest researchers can get to exploring the impact of incubator physical design 
on Client-Client interaction is by drawing ideas from research on similar spaces, such 
as offices. However, caution must be exercised since incubators are not like 
traditional office spaces based in commercial real estate. The general principles of 
commercial office design do not necessarily promote business interaction, in fact 
designs favour client privacy much more. For example, Oldham & Rotchford (1983) 
conducted pioneering research in the area of office design and worker interaction but 
their focus was physical design aspects impacting worker interaction within offices, 
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they were not concerned with features that promoted firm-to-firm interaction. They 
suggest four general characteristics of design – openness, density, architectural 
accessibility and darkness38  - that influence the amount of interpersonal contact 
amongst staff. Upon scrutiny these four characteristics do not fully apply to an 
incubator / Client-Client context but nonetheless (in the absence of other meaningful 
frameworks) provide a useful analytical scheme to categorise the feedback from the 
two case organisations. 
 
In the discussions with the two IMs (in the case of IncuWorks the Facilities Manager 
also), several aspects of design were suggested as being important to the core team 
involved in setting up the facilities. A number of common aspects were thought to 
enhance the incubation experience of clients and to facilitate the role and objectives 
of the incubator. However, the design ethos and its evolution at the two case 
organisations differed. For instance, back when DubInc was set up, incubators were 
virtually non-existent in the Country, therefore, for the core team there was no model 
to follow when it came to a design ethos. The DubInc IM felt that due to the lack of 
site options and resources available at the time of setting up the facility, the core 
team took the decision of using and improving whatever infrastructure was already 
available rather than commissioning a purpose built facility. DubInc, thus, started 
operations in a building that was originally designed for an entirely different purpose, 
where there was no semblance whatsoever between the two organisations’ aims. 
This, in the IM’s view, led to a sub-optimal facility: 
 
                                                 
38 Openness - refers to the overall openness of the office, more specifically, to the ratio of total square footage of the office to 
the total length of its interior walls and partitions. If square footage is kept constant, then offices with few interior boundaries 
are considered more open than offices with many walls and partitions.  
 
Density - refers to the number of square feet available to an employee in the office. Offices are dense to the extent that a 
large number of employees work in a relatively small area or space. 
 
Architectural accessibility - refers to the extent to which an employee's individual workspace (e.g., desk) is accessible to the 
external intrusions of others.  
 
Darkness - refers to the overall darkness of the office setting. Illumination levels and wall colours would contribute 
substantially to this dimension. Thus, dark offices are here defined as those that have both low levels of illumination and dark-
coloured walls (Oldham & Rotchford, 1983). 
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[DubInc IM] “…As you know this building was the old XYZ…we knocked down 
a number of walls and added a whole new floor to accommodate a maximum 
number of units…over the years we have made modifications but the truth is 
that there is not much else we can do to improve the aesthetics and other 
facilities in the building unless we start greenfield…”  
 
DubInc’s view on client interaction from the start was positive. The IM narrated that 
the initial thinking of the core team was to create an integrated and transparent 
community of new clients inside the building. Therefore, initially, the internal layout of 
the facility included plasterboard partitions which did not go all the way up to the 
ceiling. This meant that the facility’s ‘openness’ and ‘architectural accessibility’ were 
quite high. Since the initial approach was also to create as many units as possible in 
order to accommodate the maximum number of unemployed residents, the facility’s 
‘density’ was also high due to narrower corridors and closely spaced units. Further, 
the original design of the building did not have many windows and this could not be 
corrected in the renovations, therefore, levels of ‘darkness’ were also generally high 
due to a lack of natural lighting with many units without any windows looking to the 
outside.  
 
According to the IM, clients did not prefer this initial layout due to a number of 
reasons: (1) lack of privacy - especially when other clients could overhear phone and 
other conversations in a unit; (2) a concern about security since the units had no 
doors; and (3) distraction from own business affairs because of too much interaction 
with other clients – the negative scenario described by Oldham & Rotchford (1983). 
Due to these reasons, within a few years of inauguration, the plasterboard partitions 
were replaced with ceiling high concrete walls and the units were provided with 
lockable doors (without windows to look inside). These changes did address the 
clients’ concerns but at the cost of reducing opportunities for Client-Client 
interpersonal contact and impacting perceptions about the dense and dark layout of 
the facility. A number of clients expressed this: 
 
   
 
164 
[Client 2] “…It sometimes gets quite claustrophobic sitting here all day without 
a window…but there is no distraction and I can focus on my work…” 
 
[Client 5] “…Don’t get me wrong, the facility is great for our purposes but if you 
compare it with some of the more modern buildings that are coming up it does 
look a bit cramped and out-of-date…” 
 
[Client 6] “…If you have clients over then as you can imagine it is very difficult 
to have a private meeting with all the other staff members in the same 
unit…meeting rooms would have been very handy…” 
 
However, there was a flip-side also where a few clients preferred the layout attributes 
and stated: 
 
[Client 15] “…I prefer my own space and privacy because of the nature of my 
work…when the door is shut and the engaged signed is displayed we do not 
get disturbed…because in filming, background noise and someone just 
walking in is not something desirable…the people next door are also quiet and 
hardly have any visitors…which makes this place perfect for my work…” 
 
[Client 11] “…I don’t know about the rest but my unit (food) is very good, I park 
my van outside and can bring in supplies or quickly load up for 
deliveries…because of exhaust and fumes etc. you the know the unit is a part 
of the building but also not a part because I have my own access and do not 
go through the main reception…maybe this is why I don’t know many people 
here…I have only gotten to interact with X (another food sector client) because 
the IM introduced us…” 
 
Apart from layout attributes, it seems that physical proximity also has the potential to 
enable (or conversely breakdown) client interpersonal contact i.e. clients socialising 
with their immediate neighbors or other clients in close vicinity on the same floor of 
the building. This aspect has also been discussed by Bøllingtoft & Ulhøi (2005). It 
was found that clients were mostly in touch with their immediate neighbors on the 
same floor. A number of clients who moved offices to different floors lost their initial 
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contacts, were unable to form similar relationships with their new neighbors and 
expressed concern on becoming slightly isolated: 
 
[Client 9] “…Apart from our immediate neighbors, I would not know anyone on 
the floors above…maybe if I went upstairs to the cafeteria there would be an 
opportunity but the place is too small so I take my lunch in the office…” 
 
[Client 18] “…I was in one of the smaller units on the floor below…as a one 
man team it was good enough but then ABC (the partner) decided to come in 
full-time and we needed more space…so XYZ (the IM) moved us to this unit… 
I have been here for a year now and I don’t know anyone on the floor…got 
along well with the lads on the 2nd floor but now we are out of touch… ” 
 
The experience at IncuWorks was somewhat different when it came to layout 
planning. The Facilities Manager narrated that in order to define the parameters and 
facilities requirements of IncuWorks a team of senior personnel including the Director, 
the Facilities Manager (who was a qualified and experienced engineer) and a few 
members from the University’s old commercialisation department was set up. This 
Team was assisted by an external ‘Incubator Consultant’ who had a lot of experience 
in advising in the area of physical incubator design. The Team worked with a firm of 
architects to create, in the words of the Facilities Manager, “a world class facility 
based on the latest thinking and technological and physical facilities”.  
 
The existing building which was acquired for housing IncuWorks was substantially 
modified and upgraded with modern fittings including a whole new wing, wide 
corridors, meeting rooms, conferencing facilities, communal areas, large central 
cafeteria, server room, wireless networking and so on. For the Team, client 
interaction was considered important from the very onset and the brief to the 
architects incorporated a number of ideas that would facilitate interaction, however, at 
the same time steps were taken which were to give requisite levels of privacy and to 
minimise distraction.  
 
To elaborate on the above, all doors to individual units provided a good level of 
soundproofing, privacy and security but were also fitted with windows so passer-bys 
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could peer inside without intruding. To this effect, the Facilities Manager stated, “We 
wanted transparency and the ability to show visitors what was going on in the 
building.” This feature created ‘openness’ and helped in lighting the corridors 
naturally. Another feature was the location of the cafeteria – by creating a large 
communal place in the ‘heart’ of the building where all clients, members of the 
incubator management and visitors passed by in order to access other areas in the 
building, the chances of interpersonal interaction were thought to increase but in an 
informally in a communal space. Spaces were also created for facilitating formal 
working meetings between clients; meeting rooms of various sizes were added which 
were equipped with projection and other equipment. Separate wings were created to 
house clients in similar areas: such as bio-tech, ICT or deskspace; with the idea that 
clients in similar lines of business and stages were more likely to interact for business 
reasons.  
 
Finally, a number of design aspects balanced client needs for security and controlled 
access and the incubator core team’s desire to not give an impression of IncuWorks 
being (in the words of the Facilities Manager) “a locked down prison like some other 
government buildings”. To ensure security: first, there was a single access point into 
the building via the reception area where all visitors were required to sign in; and 
second, access to units was controlled by restricting access to individual wings and 
then to individual client units via swipe card-controlled doors. Thus, no unauthorised 
access was possible into client units, however, the rest of IncuWorks’ facilities 
remained easily accessible due to the way the building was laid out, which was quite 
convenient (from the core team’s point-of-view) when conferences and other events 
open-to-public were held. 
 
Setting up layout attributes to promote Client-Client interaction requires a trade-off 
between requirements of client privacy and minimum distraction and the incubation 
ideal of creating a well integrated and communally benefiting client cohort. It also 
seems that designs that diverge from any trade-off ‘balance’ to become either 
‘privacy-minimum distraction’ or ‘transparency-integration’ focused also have the 
potential to appeal to a sub-section of a client population making the eventual choice 
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quite subjective. Therefore, in order to reach the ‘design ideal’, it seems, a balance 
must be negotiated between incubator priorities and client preferences39.  
 
Thus, certain universal aspects of physical design do promote interpersonal contact, 
but the debate which was introduced initially on whether high levels of interpersonal 
contact amongst incubation clients is a necessary requirement of incubation, or 
indeed beneficial to the development of all types of client businesses, is still very 
much ongoing.  
 
7.5 Client-IM-Client Interaction 
 
Researchers believe that Client-Client interaction increases in the format of Client-IM-
Client interaction, in other words, when the IM plays the role of a broker in facilitating 
Client-Client interaction (Bøllingtoft & Ulhøi, 2005; Tötterman & Sten, 2005; Hughes 
et al, 2007). It is suggested that client interaction and inter-trading would improve if 
incubators were to proactively facilitate the process through different mechanisms – 
acting as the intermediating ‘third party’ (UKBI, 2001, UKBI, 2006). While in network 
analysis this attention to a ‘third party’ in acting as a bridge between unconnected 
nodes or networks, and the opportunities for advantage as a broker is relatively new, 
it has, in fact, a long history, going back, in particular, to the work of the Georg 
Simmel – whose theory on dyads informs this research’s theoretical base. The 
difference here is that with the addition of the IM as the broker, the Client-Client dyad 
turns into a Client-IM-Client triad, whose dynamics are quite different.  
 
Georg Simmel argued that triads are a fundamental unit of sociological analysis and 
that the three actors in a triad may allow qualitatively different social dynamics that 
cannot be reduced to individuals or dyads. For example, among three parties A, B, 
and C, party A may have a dyadic relation to C but also may have an indirect relation 
                                                 
39 Although from the research it would seem that the balance was somewhat reached at IncuWorks and that DubInc was 
lagging, however, the words of the DubInc IM made the following statement regarding the organisation’s apparent 
infrastructural deficit:  
 
[DubInc IM] “…Our facilities need to be viewed in context…we are a true community organisation that is self-
sustaining, our clients are micro to small enterprises working in traditional sectors whose needs are different to 
HPSUs…I believe that the package we offer with all the extras which the clients only realise once they leave by the 
way…and at the price we do is very competitive…” 
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to C through B. Party B (as a broker) may then serve to alter the strength or the 
nature of the relation between A and C, such as solidifying an alliance or mediating a 
conflict. If A and C do not interact directly, party B may broker a transaction between 
them due to this intermediary position. Thus, the role of the broker is an important 
one in bringing together two previously disconnected or weakly connected individuals. 
 
Ronald Burt has extended Simmel’s work considerably and suggests that brokers 
realise economic benefits from connecting disconnected actors, they are tertius 
gaudens: the laughing third who benefits by exploiting asymmetric resource flows and 
contests for control (Burt, 2004). The important role of brokers in transferring 
knowledge across groups or bringing together diverse sets of knowledge to create 
new knowledge or to enable action is well documented. For instance, DiMaggio 
(1992) describes Paul Sachs's role as a broker in establishing the Museum of Modern 
Art in New York and Hargadon & Sutton (1997) discuss how Edison and his 
colleagues brokered their knowledge of electro-magnetic power from the telegraph 
industry, where they first worked, to transfer ideas that were new to the lighting, 
telephone, phonograph, railway, and mining industries (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; 
DiMaggio, 1992).  
 
Further, Burt (2004) also extracts from the literature many empirical examples which 
highlight the contribution of brokerage behaviour and the filling of structural holes to 
increased organisational learning, absorptive capacity, creativity and higher 
performance. Burt’s (2004) own study of several hundred managers in a large 
company showed that there were numerous opportunities for brokerage, and 
managers were rewarded for brokerage in the sense that compensation, positive 
performance evaluations, and promotions were disproportionately given to managers 
who brokered connections across structural holes Therefore, a question to pose is 
what sort of brokerage behaviour by the IM can facilitate Client-Client interaction 
leading to benefits for all parties including the broker? 
 
The two case organisations differed in their belief on the efficacy and real value of 
incubator brokerage behaviour. The IM at DubInc, due to a number of ‘failed’ 
attempts in the past, felt that attempts by an incubator to bring clients together was a 
fruitless exercise due to a lack of interest and initiative by clients: 
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[DubInc IM] “…We started several activities to get clients together, like the 
Monday coffee morning and client presentations at lunch…but there was no 
interest and hardly anyone showed up…so the activity sort of died out…” 
 
Nonetheless, the IM expressed that if in someway clients did become interested and 
took an active part, there is a possibility that they could benefit. To foster client inter-
linkages and trading, the incubator had a bulletin board facility at the reception area 
which the clients were encouraged to use. In addition, to generate more interest, the 
IM had recently re-themed the bi-monthly client presentation lunch event by inviting 
guest speakers.  
 
The DubInc clients had their own views on why Client-Client inter-linkage was weak: 
 
[Client 8] “…I think people would feel more comfortable if the environment 
were more informal…like going out to the pub for a few drinks…” 
 
[Client 17] “…The timings just don’t suit me, being a [parent] (gender ref. 
removed) of…I can’t do lunch or early morning because I need to drop off and 
then pick up the kids from school…” 
 
[Client 14] “…I understand that meeting other clients in the building can be 
good for a bit of craic but our business has little in common with anybody 
else’s so what are the chances of doing business together…” 
 
[Client 13] “…there is no proper place to sit down here and have a 
conversation privately…” 
 
The above quotes perhaps highlight a number of factors that are inherent in mixed 
use incubation facilities that may discourage Client-Client interaction. However, 
despite DubInc’s allegedly weak role as a broker, informal groups and working 
friendships amongst clients lead to a number of professional engagements and 
exchanges of products / services. As the quality of the inter-personal relationship 
dictated the nature of incubation in IM-Client dyads, this also occurred between 
Client-Client exchanges. Clients gave the impression that the greater the perception 
   
 
170 
that there was a mental-match and bond based on mutual respect, trust and 
collegiality, the greater the likelihood that the linkage would yield mutual benefit and 
repeat interaction.  
 
IncuWorks’ case was slightly different when compared to DubInc in that the 
organisation had a continued and deliberate policy of fostering Client-Client co-
production through the IM’s active intervention. To this effect, the IM stated: 
 
[IncuWorks IM] “…We want to create an environment where clients can learn 
and help each other…for example we have a number of monthly events and 
other opportunities for clients to meet with each other formally…there is also 
the cafeteria which is designed to be in the heart of the building and is the 
centre of all activity…I come here daily and see clients networking, if there is a 
new inductee I make sure he or she is introduced to everyone…naturally some 
clients are more prone to networking than others but our effort is to try and 
encourage the activity as much as possible…” 
 
IncuWorks’ ICT clients held generally positive views about the potential for Client-
Client inter-linkage. An incident where the IM facilitated the formation of a consortium 
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When one client wanted to bid for a large ICT contract but only had the technical 
expertise to undertake just one of its aspects, the IM got a number of other ICT 
clients involved. The IM felt that by forming a consortium to bid collaboratively for the 
contract there was a greater chance of winning the bid on technical grounds. The IM 
surveyed the client base and chose a number of prospects who in the IM’s opinion 
had the required technical expertise, necessary resources and capacity to deliver the 
remaining aspects of the contract requirements. The selected clients were first 
approached face-to-face and when they expressed interest, formal details and 
technical requirements of the bid proposal were shared. The IM coordinated the 
construction of the technical and financial proposals and added in a component 
highlighting IncuWorks’ input (in the form of physical and computing facilities). In this 
manner, the IM, took an almost lost client opportunity and turned it into a useful 
example of incubators encouraging client co-production. The IM was in the best 
position to judge client capabilities and to act as a ‘well meaning and trustable 
broker’. This led to a successful bid submission and the successful ‘image building’ of 
IncuWorks to outside agencies.  
 
The above incident describes an event that brought clients together in an activity by a 
broker (the IM) with the intention of building ‘agglomeration economies’ (Keeble & 
Wilkinson, 2000) and ‘collective learning’ (Moulaert & Gallouj, 1993). This is a 
concrete example of the way the IM can play an important role in boosting Client-
Client interaction by bridging gaps in knowledge and expertise for clients.  
 
The logic here is quite simple, if the IM has relationships with all clients and with other 
resourceful outside entities, which the client base does not, then the information the 
IM derives from those relationships gives him/her an advantage.  As a result, since 
the IM is seen as a trustable and selfless agent, (s)he is in a unique position to broker 
information between clients and to facilitate client-client interaction. However, is this 
the only type or level of brokerage behaviour possible or are there other more 
significant levels? 
 
In order to shed light on the above question, an understanding must be developed of 
the different levels of information arbitrage through which a person (the broker) could 
create value. Burt (2004) suggests a number of levels which fit in quite neatly with the 
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IM’s role and work. The first basic level is to make people on both sides of a structural 
hole40 aware of interests and difficulties. The second level is transferring best practice 
where people familiar with activities in two groups are more able, than people 
confined within either group, to see how a practice in one group could create value in 
the other. Such brokers also know how to translate the practice into language 
understandable to the target group. Synthesis is an advanced level of brokerage. The 
idea here is that people familiar with activities in two groups are more likely to see 
new beliefs or behaviours that combine elements from both groups.  
 
We can see that the example of IM brokerage behaviour described above is close to 
the first level. However, the role of the IM as a broker can go beyond building client 
consortia; for example transferring best practice and linking up clients with other 
entities / individuals that are dis-similar to themselves – the latter fact having been 
stressed upon by incubation researchers as being quite important in building social 
capital (Hughes et al, 2007; Bøllingtoft & Ulhøi, 2005; Tötterman & Sten, 2005). To 
this effect, the IncuWorks IM stated:  
 
[IncuWorks IM] “…we have an environment here of continuous learning…I 
cannot be expected to be an expert in all aspects of hi-tech firm development, 
so I must rely on our senior clients who too are constantly learning…we try to 
transfer this learning to our younger clients through workshops and expert 
sessions…” 
 
Empirical research on clusters can also be drawn upon to make a strong case for the 
usefulness of linking up clients to dis-similar entities. For instance, research on bio-
tech clusters attributes ‘growth in revenue’ and ‘number of patents granted’ to the 
extent to which a company had multiple kinds of alliance partners at start-up. 
Companies with a heterogeneous mix of alliance partners enjoyed faster revenue 
growth and a dramatic advantage in obtaining patents (Baum et al, 2000). In the 
context of IncuWorks and its bio-tech client base, active brokerage behaviour by the 
IM can, therefore, lead to a number of potential advantages: the linkup up for instance 
of its spin-out bio-tech clients with unrelated outside agencies which can potentially 
                                                 
40 Structural holes can be strategically filled by connecting one or more links to link together other points (Granovetter, 1973).  
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increase the impact of commercial spin-out activity and the IM acting as a trusting 
“middle man” to transfer skills, knowledge and best practice. 
 
[IncuWorks IM] “…I see one of my key roles here as research 
commercialisation…and this requires that spin-out clients most of whom are 
serious academics and scientists…be introduced to the commercial world of 
consultants, financiers and potential licensees…we try to do this as effectively 
as possible and our performance shows that this approach works…” 
 
7.6 Client-Third Party Interaction 
 
The IM-Client dyadic process can also transcend the boundaries of the incubator 
organisation (both physical and virtual). This is not a universal rule but the incubation 
environment seems to have fairly distinct boundaries at the initial stages of the 
process, where resources are channeled to the client firm from within the physical 
confines of the incubator and the personal capacities of the IM (Aaboen et al, 2008). 
However, as the process and the dyadic relationship mature, and the resource needs 
of the incubating firm become more sophisticated, boundary-level fragmentation 
starts to occur. In other words, a stage arrives in the dyadic process that in-house 
incubator / IM resources become insufficient or not-specialised-enough to meet the 
precise needs of a particular client firm.  
 
Therefore, depending on the nature of the dyadic relationship and the client’s 
particular resource needs, the IM at some stage (in order to meet client resource 
needs) needs to move beyond his / her own capacity and incubator resources to 
channel incubation from specially organised and incubator-affiliated ‘expert 
individuals / groups / consultants’, ‘resource partners’, ‘trainers’ and ‘business 
mentors / coaches’. Extrapolating and analysing the Client-Third party dynamic is 
important since expert groups, specialist consultants and other resource partners 
have over the years become integral components of ‘good’ incubation programmes 
and are highly recommended by industrial bodies as important arrangements to 
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increase chances of incubation success41. Together with the IM, these third parties 
form a sort of incubation eco-system.  
 
To understand Client-Third Party relations is to explore the question how (and on 
what grounds) do incubators establish which actors must be integrated into the 
organisational hierarchy and which actors must be dealt with via market mechanisms 
(such as contracting) when setting up resource pools for servicing client firms? The 
concept of ‘boundaries’ will help us shed light here; boundaries are a central 
phenomenon in organisation theory and the area has been shaped significantly by 
transaction cost economics (TCE) and related exchange-efficiency perspectives 
(Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005). Coase’s (the father of TCE) insight was that the 
boundaries of firms are determined by the transaction costs of coordinating 
production under imperfect information; these costs may mean that it is economically 
efficient to include certain activities within the firm than to subject them to market 
exchange (Coase, 1937) – the market and firm being TCE’s two governance 
mechanisms.  
 
This insight has been subsequently fleshed out and refined by later theorists and 
what has emerged is an improved understanding of the mechanisms that impact 
choice of governance form or where the organisational boundary must be drawn. The 
argument goes that the choice of governance form is determined by the comparative 
performance, particularly transaction cost and production cost efficiency, of 
alternative forms. Transaction costs encompass the costs of negotiating, monitoring, 
and enforcing contracts that arise directly from opportunistic behaviour (Klein et al, 
1978; Williamson, 1985) or from difficulties in measuring the goods or services being 
exchanged (Demsetz, 1988). Transaction costs also typically encompass the 
management costs associated with internally governing these exchanges. Production 
costs include the direct costs of producing and delivering a product or service and 
may reflect differences in scale or production capability.  
 
                                                 
41 For instance, the NBIA advises its members to “develop stakeholder support, including a resource network that helps the 
incubation programme's client companies and supports the incubator's mission and operations” 
(http://www.nbia.org/resource_library/best_practices/index.php). 
   
 
175 
The choice of governance structure would depend on the option that maximises 
performance through the minimisation of transaction and production costs. This 
“governance efficiency” conception when applied to organisational boundaries 
(Williamson, 1985) suggests that all organisational transactions (production, 
marketing, supply chain management and so on) should undergo an assessment of 
the make-or-buy choice to minimise governance costs (Madhok, 1996; Demsetz, 
1988; Williamson, 1985). A boundary decision is, therefore, the choice of whether to 
conduct a particular transaction inside the organisation or through a market exchange 
on the outside. Given this view; organisational boundaries are managed in an 
atomistic way through the accumulation of independent make-or-buy decisions to 
arrive at an ‘optimal’ trade-off that balances organisational transactions in an 
‘economically rational and efficient’ way. 
 
Both case organisations seemed to have adopted an optimal (economically efficient) 
strategy for offering their service portfolios to client firms. IncuWorks’ service portfolio 
in comparison to DubInc was significantly broader with a number of specialist 
advisory services and other opportunities for clients to acquire specialist skills. 
Offering a number of such specialised services was beyond the professional and 
technical capacities of its existing staff complement. Therefore, the management 
strategy to achieve an efficient balance between services offered in-house vs. those 
offered through outside parties involved strategically selecting and including at the 
Board level the sort of investment partners whose services client firms were likely to 
use. Such partners included specialist service providers such as accountants, tax and 
legal attorneys, IP advisors, marketing and advertising agencies and so on. Board 
membership and investment partnership effectively aligned IncuWorks’ goals with its 
third-party service providers, thereby, incentivising their active involvement42, thereby, 
eliminating the need for formal contracting (and associated monitoring costs) and 
creating no additional cost overheads (such as professional fees) for IncuWorks.  
 
Clients were kept regularly informed of the services available through IncuWorks’ 
partners. The partners conducted monthly advice clinics or “surgeries”, where they 
met clients face-to-face to discuss potential or existing problems and dispensed free 
                                                 
42  If IncuWorks’ clients share value went up (as a result of or otherwise the intervention and assistance of external 
stakeholders) then the value of the Board members’ shareholding would also increase.  
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(no obligation) professional advice in brief 30-45 minute time slots (which could be 
booked in advance). The initial advice was indeed “free and no obligation”, however, 
for further more in-depth and regular consultation, the partners had an agreement 
with IncuWorks whereby a special subsidised rate was offered to client firms. Thus, 
the strategy was optimal - it effectively positioned IncuWorks as a “Centre of 
Excellence” due to co-branding with its partners at no additional cost, the client firms 
enjoyed good deals on professional advice (which they would not have gotten in an 
open-market scenario) and the partners got ready access to potential clients. 
 
At DubInc, the situation was slightly different, the management felt that due to the 
nature of its client base, specialist IP, marketing, legal and other forms of professional 
advice were not in high demand. Although the scale of the firms at DubInc was 
comparable to those at IncuWorks, their level of sophistication and scope of activities 
was different. The client firms at DubInc (in contrast to IncuWorks) were operating in 
well established and traditional sectors where, over the years, the “rules of the game” 
had become fairly well established, thereby, reducing uncertainty associated with 
conducting the affairs of business and the need for costly specialist professional 
advice. In situations where professional advice was needed in well established 
sectors, recognised and well organised membership-based industry institutions and 
other participatory bodies had adequate resources and mechanisms. Therefore, a 
majority of client firms, as they informed the researcher, did not have a regular 
retainer with professional service providers, since they were not really needed due to 
the free or highly subsidised availability of high quality advice.  
 
The areas where the DubInc IM felt most of its client base needed specialist advice 
were raising finance, accounting, marketing / PR and tax. Client feedback generally 
corroborated the above view – degrees of emphasis on particular areas obviously 
differed.  A few clients felt that they needed IT / website-related assistance in addition 
to the above areas, which when mentioned to the IM (making the clients anonymous), 
suggested that the management was aware of this demand, however, beyond 
general internet set up-related assistance, DubInc did not have the internal resources 
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In other to meet the assistance requirements of the client base, the IM suggested that 
an adequate level of expertise was available in-house and that between the IM and 
the Enterprise Officer, requisite levels of knowledge, qualification and experience was 
available to cater to clients’ advisory needs. Since the research agenda was not 
‘evaluatory’ in nature, no attempt was made to gauge client firms’ opinion on whether 
the management was ‘good enough’, however, clients on their own did not bring up 
any concerns (which does not necessarily mean that they were ‘satisfied’).  
 
DubInc had just one outsourced service provider, an ex-client who provided technical 
IT ‘hot desk’ and ‘on-site’ assistance. This service provider was interviewed and a 
number of interesting details were revealed: 
 
An ex-client had initially lobbied for internet facilities at DubInc. At the time, being 
most qualified, this client was officially sanctioned by the DubInc management to set 
up the internal network infrastructure and to negotiate internet access and related 
technology (whether ISDN, DSL, Cable or Microwave) through an external internet 
service provider.  The initial plan was to provide wireless internet access inside the 
facility; however, due to the restrictive design of the building, many sections had poor 
reception. Therefore, the individual went to some lengths to set up and install network 
cabling in addition to wireless routers. The result was a complex network serviced by 
an array of routers, hubs and switches connected to a microwave internet dish, 
whose technical layout and potential / known ‘problem areas’ (in the absence of 
technical drawings) were known to only the individual – the ex-client - who set it up. 
This situation had led to a difficult stalemate between the ex-client, DubInc and the 
existing client base. Whenever a network / internet problem was reported by clients, 
DubInc’s only recourse was to call upon its ex-client - the only individual who 
(presumably) knew how to fix the problem. This was done under the pre-text that any 
technical glitches were under some ‘assumed’ warranty because money had changed 
hands. To the ex-client, however, DubInc was not a very serious client because the 
work that was put in was done more like a favour and informally (on a cost-to-cost 
basis) and that each time a call was placed for network servicing, it took substantial 
time and energy to resolve without any expectation for remuneration. Both parties 
were tied due to dependence on the one hand and a feeling of personal affinity and 
history on the other (the ex-client having gotten a first break into business at DubInc). 
Neither of the two parties initiated any plans to develop a permanent and 
comprehensive solution to the problem. This resulted in a general client disapproval 
of DubInc’s internet facilities, which although had improved over the years, still from 
time to time, caused client distress.  
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The above scenario highlights that outsourcing via third party contracting has the 
potential to lead to losses in quality, control and productivity. According to TCE, the 
solution to such a problem is ‘vertical integration’ (Williamson, 1994) - a style of 
ownership  and control where companies share a common owner and each member 
of the hierarchy produces a different good or service, and the products combine to 
satisfy a common purpose. For DubInc then, hiring the ex-client or purchasing the ex-
client’s business would be an optimal strategy (assuming this was possible – but 
unlikely in the real world considering the amount of investment DubInc would need to 
make). Whether or not this strategy was indeed ‘optimal’ would be based on 
management prioritisation: the question presumably being: would offering improved 
internet performance have the potential to significantly boost the ability of clients to 
pay rentals (which they were doing anyway irrespective of internet problems due to 
highly competitive rates) and ensure a steady stream of new prospects (which also 
did not seem to be a problem)?  
 
Economists might argue that vertical integration could create opportunities for 
‘economies of scope’ i.e. using the ex-client for other ‘revenue generating’ managerial 
tasks which may offset the additional working capital expenditure. The reality of the 
matter is that DubInc’s eventual strategy, its rationalisation and political evolution, 
was best known to its governing body (the Board), and for outside parties (such as 
the researcher), it is nearly impossible to re-create here by isolating precise chains of 
causality without falling into traps such as the ‘hindsight bias’ (Kahneman et al, 1982).  
 
In conclusion, in the context of incubators, offering an extended portfolio of services 
requires that the incubator management subject each extended service to the 
essential make-or-buy assessment i.e. an examination of the economic and other 
efficiencies gained or lost if a particular service is offered via in-house resources or 
through an outsourced supplier. Offering services that are beyond the knowledge / 
technical capacities of an incubator’s existing in-house staff pool would mean 
additional capital / working-capital expenditure on specialised human assets, 
increased costs of governance and higher degrees of information load on the 
hierarchy; but on the other hand, offering such services through third parties in order 
to off-load the above costs would mean a loss in control (over quality and impact) and 
taking the risks of a potential “hold-up” (due to human asset specificity), the supplier 
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going out of business and security and confidentiality issues. Ultimately, the optimal 
strategy would be subjective to the assessment that a particular incubator 
management arrives at taking into account client needs, and the most viable 
(managerially speaking) and economical approach in meeting those needs. 
 
7.7  Concluding Remarks 
 
From the analysis presented in this chapter, it becomes evident that in certain dyads 
and triads, the incubating parties can develop a more durable cognitive / relational 
match. The quality of this match determines the scale, scope, frequency and 
ultimately the effectiveness of the dyadic incubation process. The key to 
understanding why certain dyads are more successful at enabling incubation activity 
is to develop an understanding of the factors that lead to more durable dyadic and 
triadic bonds.  
 
Without the voluntary and active participation of client firms, the mechanisms that 
facilitate dyadic co-production would break down. In order to improve the chances of 
client participation, the IM must build high quality client relationships to facilitate 
dyadic co-production. Underpinning IM-Client relations are a number of sub-
contextual, unwritten and often unsaid expectations and rules which define the dyadic 
parties’ role and incubation behaviour. Bypassing, neglecting, overlooking or breaking 
these rules and mis-managing expectations are several of the factors leading to a 
breakdown in incubation relationships, eventually leading to a slowing down or an 
altogether halting of developmental co-creation.  
 
The analysis in the chapter also makes a number of contributions to the debate on 
influencing client ‘agglomeration economies’ and ‘collective learning’ – aspects of 
social capital. Findings from the research highlight that Client-Client interaction can 
be of several types, and each of these types of interactions has the potential to both 
positively and negatively affect client attitudes, beliefs and behaviour towards their 
own work, the incubator organisation and their ability and willingness to engage with 
other clients. Thus, the assumption that social capital will automatically increase as a 
result of an increase in client interpersonal contact is a flawed notion. It is not as 
simple to increase social capital as some researchers in the past assume. A variety of 
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psychological factors related to human experience, cognition and decision-making 
would need to be scrutinised in order to determine the ideals which are likely to 
promote the development of positive social capital. 
 
Findings also suggest that the client-mix of university campus incubators should be 
carefully managed. Clients should be adequately screened according to their industry 
and area of expertise, because in certain industries and types of business activities, 
there are more opportunities for forming mutually beneficial relationships than in other 
sectors. In areas where there is less potential for the development of meaningful 
Client-Client relations, the IM’s brokerage behaviour has the potential to boost 
interpersonal contact. The analysis suggests that active brokerage behaviour by the 
IM that facilitates the connection of clients in consortia for facilitating joint bidding for 
large compartmentalised contracts, or linking up clients individually or in groups to 
unrelated outside agencies, has the potential to enhance client cooperative behaviour 
leading to tangible economic benefits.  
 
In the next three chapters, analyses covering the three key areas of investigation 
proposed in the research objective are presented: the normative environment, 
internal mechanisms and structural properties of the case organisations. In Chapter 8 
which follows here, the nature and properties of the case organisations’ internal 
normative environment is first explored. 
 





Findings from Case Studies - II 
Norms & Triggers 
 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter the focus was on ‘relationships’ - a meta-organising principle 
which provides a normative structure within which incubation activity is organised. In 
this chapter the analytical focus is turned to the first aspect of the overall research 
objective, that of the internal normative environment. A number of important macro-
level mechanisms which enable IM-Client incubation activity are explored. These 
provide the rules under which the parties in incubation interpret their respective roles, 
develop social bonds to channel resources and trigger developmental assistance 
activity. It is shown that incubation activity occurs within the confines of an ethos or a 
set of guiding beliefs and ideals manufactured by the incubator’s apex governing 
body. An incubator’s ethos provides answers to questions relating to organisational 
identify, the incubator’s role in the wider community and most importantly its own 
definition of what incubation is or ought to be. These in turn define the IM’s priorities 
which then impact the incubator’s incubation delivery mechanism.  
 
Ethos elements create the normative environment within which IM-Client incubation 
activity occurs; hence, aspects of this environment which include the nature of, often, 
hidden and unsaid rules, biases and assumptions are explored. These aspects of the 
normative environment influence a “click” or mutual IM-Client meeting-of-the-minds. 
Some IM-Client dyads develop a positive incubation “click” based on a number of 
variables, thereby, enhancing the possibility of dyadic co-production, whilst in other 
dyads the flip-side scenario of the negative “click” occurs; within such dyads 
incubation activity (once again based on a number of variables) either slows down or 
halts altogether. The variables which promote the development of the positive and 
negative “clicks” are also explored. 
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Finally, within those dyads where a positive “click” has developed, a host of variables 
can trigger events or incidents of incubation activity. Such triggers are discussed, and 
it becomes evident that trigger factors include a variety of unpredictable and 
untraceable variables along with a number of ‘effort economising’ heuristics deployed 
by clients.  
 
8.2 The Incubation Ethos 
 
An important aspect that influences the real aims and objectives of incubation is the 
ethos manufactured by the apex governing body of the incubator organisation. The 
research found evidence for the presence of an incubator-specific “macro-level 
approach” to incubation. This approach or “incubation ethos” is impacted by a number 
of factors. The most important of these is the incubator’s apex governing body’s 
(usually the Board of Directors) self classification of incubator-type or answers to 
questions such as: what sort of an incubator are we?; what do we wish to 
accomplish?; and, how will be meet our short and long term targets? Thus, 
irrespective of external labels ascribed to particular incubators, there exists an 
independent, and at times divergent, system of meaning and classification internal to 
the incubator organisation.  
 
The Board of Directors (BoD), where a member of the management usually holds a 
position (the IM in case of DubInc and the Director in case of IncuWorks), from time 
to time negotiate and agree on what their organisational identity is. Organisational 
participants have a need for some stability of meaning which comes through 
organisational identity. It influences how individuals interpret issues and take action 
(Dutton & Dukerich, 1991). Organisational identity determines what the participants’ 
‘true’ purposes are and what sort of management decisions they ought to be taking in 
order to accomplish management strategy and goals (Kjærgaard, 2009).  
 
Though a number of key general principles may be held sacrosanct, ultimately there 
is no fixed organisational identity. Depending on internal and external demands, the 
BoD or key participants, through changes in management policy, decide on levels of 
flexibility in policy and practice, thereby, changing internal and external perceptions of 
organisational identity (Brickson, 2005).  
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The resulting changes in organisational identity impact upon incubation ethos. For 
instance, at a recent meeting of the DubInc BoD:  
 
An important agenda item related to a re-assessment of what, in principal, the 
incubator organisation really stood for. It was agreed, that DubInc was a ‘business 
incubator’ and not a ‘community enterprise centre’. Thus, it was necessary that those 
clients, who were located in the facility for more than four years, would be asked to, 
with caution and sensitivity (adhering to community-oriented principles), move on to 
other premises. Through this change in meta-approach, the BoD, in aligning with 
standard incubation practice, solved a potentially problematic legal issue related to 
clients gaining increased rights under the commercial tenancy act after a period of 
residency beyond 4 years 9 months.  
 
In addition to organisational identity, the client-mix or the incubator’s preference to 
either have similar clients (in terms of industrial / technological orientation) or to have 
a wider array of clients (involved in mostly unrelated lines of business) should also, 
arguably, have an impact on incubation ethos. Logically, the developmental 
assistance needs of similar clients should be simpler to cater to (with specialised 
expertise, networks and resources) than those clients whose businesses are in un-
related sectors (McAdam & McAdam, 2008). Servicing similar clients would mean 
less physical and personnel resources and greater degrees of flexibility in delivering 
incubation and monitoring progress.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the above logic was found reversed. 
Developmental assistance at IncuWorks with relatively similar clients was much more 
comprehensive, structured and organised which required greater resources. One 
reason for this resource munificence could be that IncuWorks was relatively well-
funded in comparison to DubInc. However, a more plausible rationale is the 
specialised developmental needs of hi-tech firms which operate in turbulent markets 
with technology whose real commercial impact cannot be accurately predicted 
(unless tested over a period of time). In contrast, clients at DubInc were operating in 
less turbulent markets and conventional sectors and encountered business problems 
that did not require highly specialised expertise for resolution. Thus, incubation ethos 
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is impacted by the client mix’s degree of specialisation and the ensuing need for 
specialist developmental and infrastructural assistance. 
 
The ethos elements of “organisational identity” and “client mix” impact incubation’s 
“normative delivery mechanism”. This mechanism tends to follow a general rule. Such 
a rule, in the case of DubInc, was one of an “open-door policy to incubation”: 
 
[DubInc IM] “…As you can see my office is at the very front of the building…I 
see everyone who comes in and they see me, it is a very open and transparent 
culture here…clients and I usually greet each other in the mornings, they know 
my door is always open should they need any help…but it is not our policy to 
go knocking on clients’ doors asking them if they need my help…” 
 
Under this rule, the IM carries the complicated identity of a helpful and watchful equal 
(not mentor or superior), conveniently reachable for advice in times of need but 
whose advice (although to be taken seriously) is to be accepted on a voluntary basis 
and not to be considered a final verdict due to a lack of the IM’s real / tangible 
stakeholdership and legal liability.  
 
The DubInc IM is also to seen as a commercial landlord when it comes to facilities 
management and associated ground-rules: 
 
[Client 16] “…We have had a number of…how should I put it…flash points with 
XYZ (the IM)…we were of the view that since this is a community enterprise 
centre…there would be greater degrees of flexibility in terms of last minute 
room bookings or using vacant units…but this is not the case and it goes to 
show that XYZ runs this place like a landlord rather than a manager of a 
community centre…” 
 
At the same time, however, the IM is also seen as someone who is flexible and 
understanding when it comes to the case of those clients who, for reasons beyond 
their control, are unable to meet their obligations to the incubator (in the words of the 
DubInc IM):  
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[DubInc IM] “…Rent holidays or deferred payments is a facility we offer to all 
our clients…we are also quite flexible when it comes to utilities and water 
tax…” 
 
This is treated as a general rule only, since a particular client’s perceptive judgment 
of the IM is entirely dependant on the nature of the dyadic relationship.  
 
The “open-door policy to incubation” acts as a convenient filter to sift through those 
clients who genuinely feel they need the IM’s guidance and assistance, and those 
who: (a) deceptively signal need at the time of application and then do not engage 
much in co-production activities; (b) those that entered the facility genuinely thinking 
that they would engage with the IM but for a variety of reasons (some of which could 
relate to incubation ethos) chose not to; and (c) those that both the IM and particular 
client recognise do not need developmental assistance. Through this policy the IM 
economises on time, resources and effort and is able to maintain her/his complex 
identity. 
 
The IM, under the open-door ethos, has to maintain a very fine balance when it 
comes to, on the one hand, engaging in developmental assistance with the above 
categories of clients and, on the other, ensuring the financial sustainability of the 
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A client at the pre-incubation stage (Client B), although having signed the tenancy / 
licensing agreement and paid the required deposit, did not move in as their business 
plan and funding proposal were incomplete. The IM provided focused assistance to 
Client B in terms of reviewing the Client’s business plan, advising on necessary 
changes, holding brain storming sessions and using contacts to move the client’s 
funding application along. Client B on a number of occasions expressed gratitude for 
the IM’s tangible assistance, however, was not making serious progress towards 
physically taking up tenancy. Thus, the IM, came to a critical threshold point, where 
the cost of time and input to Client B versus the likelihood of that client becoming a 
‘real’ and paying client were weighed. In keeping with the IM’s identity and incubation-
ethos, the IM created a very positive scenario of genuine concern, and through a 
colleague, who conducted a financial assessment of Client B’s business, convinced 
the would-be entrepreneur that the idea was not ready for implementation. The 
process was helped along by the IM’s own judgment of the Client’s state-of-
entrepreneurial-readiness. The IM came to believe, after picking up information from 
subtle indicators (such as the Client’s life-partner not showing support by either 
visiting the new unit or phoning), that Client B was not really ready for what the IM 
believed were the risks and responsibilities of entrepreneurship. The point of 
departure between the IM and Client B was cordial since the Client felt, according to 
the IM’s assessment at the time, quite agreeable to the idea of not going into 
business.  
 
The prevailing incubation delivery mechanism at IncuWorks was different. In addition 
to the issues outlined above, there were a number of other elements impacting ethos. 
The incubation meta-approach there was found to be more “proactive” where there 
was a constant and urgent concern for client progress. The IM had two sets of clients 
to engage with and had developed, in a way, two “alter identities” for engagement 
with them. One set of clients included the University’s spin-out companies. Due to the 
IM’s academic qualifications and work experience, such clients considered the IM an 
“insider” who understood the complex nature of developing IP and commercialising 
university research. The one challenge here for the IM was to shed the “insider” 
image just about enough to show knowledge and expertise of the “outside” or the 
commercial world. In the words of a spin-out client when asked about why it was felt 
that the IM was (or was not) suited to the role of IncuWorks’ IM: 
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[Client 34] “…We are still working on the final elements of our patent 
application and have not as yet moved in, however, IncuWorks has been a 
great help, they have advised and encouraged us…we receive invitations to 
attend various presentations. A colleague of mine has also been going to the 
CCDP classes. They have been assisting but IP commercialisation can be a 
long and difficult process…[goes into describing the process]…I know X (the 
IM) has worked at…so with a…background…I suppose [gender ref. removed] 
is quite experienced and useful…”  
 
The spin-in clients had a different set of expectations when it came to IM skill set. The 
IM’s predominantly spin-out related expertise, although respected, was not (in some 
cases) considered directly relevant to the sort of areas where the ICT-based clients 
especially needed most assistance (such as expert domain, technical and market 
knowledge). For instance one client stated: 
 
[Client 31] “…a lot of the events here have something to do with IP and patent 
protection for the science and technology sector…especially bio-sciences…but 
as an IT company, we can’t really take out patents, software is subject to 
copyright law…I don’t think that there is much in-house knowledge on 
accounting, tax and the channel to market and supply chain issues that IT 
companies face…” 
 
The IM was keenly aware of this deficit and met this through external resources such 
as the experts’ panel and by encouraging Client-Client incubation. To some clients, 
this made IncuWorks’ real focus the commercialisation of the hosting University’s 
research: 
 
[Client 30] “….My impression is that most speakers, events and panel experts 
here are university research focused especially bio-tech. For us as an IT 
company, marketing and other strategic planning support is not to say 
unavailable but maybe not as well developed…” 
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The “proactive incubation approach” at IncuWorks was not found to be a blanket and 
completely homogenous mechanism. There were degrees of “proactivity” when it 
came to client engagement. This was based on a variety of influencing factors 
relating to client category, entrepreneur experience and abilities, the incubator’s 
capacity to effectively and economically offer developmental  assistance (to certain 
clients it was nearly impossible to do so due to their highly specialised nature) and 
the IM-Client “meeting-of-the-minds”.  
 
Thus, in both cases there is evidence of an incubation ethos which is a macro-level 
mechanism governing IM-Client, Client-Client, Client-IM-Client and Client-Third Party 
relations and the ways in which the parties respond (together or separately) to norms, 
values and identities.  
 
8.3 Base Bonds of the Dyadic Relationship & the “Incubation-Click” 
 
An assumption being made in this research is that there is significant variability in the 
responsiveness of entrepreneurs to engage in incubation activities. It is suggested 
that this variability is related to the nature of IM-Client relations. IM-Client relations 
are at a number of levels, including a person-to-person relationship between the IM 
and client entrepreneur(s), or a business-to-business relationship between the 
incubator organisation and client firm. In the management of IM-Client relations, a 
myriad of IM-Client identity-related aspects including those that deal with personality, 
background and experience work to create, what is being called, a state of positive 
‘”incubation-click”:  
 
[Client 4] “…why do we work so well with XYZ (the IM)?…I suppose we have 
really clicked…you know when there is rapport, we share a common goal and I 
can see (gender ref. removed) is genuinely interested in our business…I can’t 
see myself working with someone I don’t get along with on a personal level…” 
 
The “click” that the above client describes is a state where both the incubator 
manager and a client develop a mental bond based on a number of key elements 
which come across as important variables. These variables are presented below 
along with a cross section of quotes from respondents:  
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First, a shared awareness by both the IM and entrepreneur of the firm’s gaps in 
knowledge, competencies, and resources. 
 
[Client 2] “…we had a number of meetings with XYZ (the IM) on our funding 
proposal…it is quite important that this goes through at this stage...and both of 
us are now on the same wave length…” 
 
[Client 29] “…I have not participated in a business plan competition before…it 
is great for public relations and the prize money is very welcome…and yeah 
XYZ’s (the IM) input is invaluable…I can see (gender ref. removed) has a lot of 
experience…” 
 
Second, a mutual willingness to engage in incubation activities. 
 
[DubInc IM] “…There is really not much you could do with a client who doesn’t 
ask for assistance or doesn’t need it…we try to engage with them but it is not 
our policy and nor in our interest to….(pauses to think)…I suppose to impose 
ourselves where clearly no help is needed…” 
 
[Client 26] “…The sort of support we need at this stage is very focused and 
requires a lot of sector expertise and contacts…I am not sure that we can get 
this here…” 
 
Third, a recognition that the IM (and associated networks) can help fill the knowledge, 
competency and resource gaps. 
 
[Client 12] “…I know XYZ (the IM) has been able to help a few other clients 
here with government grant applications…cash flow is likely to become a 
serious issue for us so this is something that must work on…” 
 
[Client 10] “…For me it was difficult to imagine all that goes into writing up a 
business plan…you know for the bank loan…I really value XYZ’s (the IM) 
input, (gender ref. removed) knowledge and expertise in the food sector is 
really helping put it all together…” 
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Fourth, the capacity of the IM to commit sufficient time in order to implement the 
breadth of incubation activities and to achieve a level of intensity required for impact. 
  
[DubInc IM] “…Would like to spend more time with clients but as you can see I 
wear a number of different hats…” 
  
[IncuWorks IM] “…My role here is quite well defined…there are annual targets 
to be achieved and clients’ performance influences my KPIs…” 
 
There is a flip-side scenario to the “incubation click”. Clients may subliminally signal, 
or even overtly communicate, no particular need for developmental assistance. This 
could be due to a number of factors such as:  
 
First, entrepreneur confidence in personal abilities. 
 
[Client 32] “…I have substantial experience working in the industry which is 
why my clients value my advice…consulting is a very peculiar field…it is about 
clients being convinced of your technical and professional abilities…so I don’t 
really see how IncuWorks can help…” 
 
[Client 11] “…I have a fixed daily routine…I come in 7, prepare the fish and 
leave it to cure…then on with the deliveries for the day…back in the afternoon, 
prepare the catering orders and then close shop at 6 or sometimes 7…this has 
been working and there is growth…but it is slow…” 
 
Second, allied to the above is a summary image of the IM as not competent enough 
to advise.  
 
[Client 15] “…they don’t really have expertise on web-based marketing here, 
yeah for regular products and services I could go for advice to the IM but I 
doubt that there will be any point in raising the question of search engine 
optimisation downstairs…” 
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[Client 25] “…We are working on content management and data mining 
systems…from a core technical standpoint I don’t think XYZ (the IM) can be 
expected to be of much assistance…there are other areas where I see (gender 
ref. removed) involvement…”  
 
Third, uncertainty about what particular business related problems to bring to the IM’s 
knowledge. This could be due to the perceived risk of either a negative self-image, or 
disclosing business details to a third-party. For the client, uncertainty about engaging 
with the IM could also be due to a lack of awareness that the IM is actually capable of 
solving a particular business problem and / or the client’s own assessment of their 
business problem’s worthiness of the IM’s time. 
 
[Client 34] “…when we were starting off there were all sorts of teething 
issues…strategy was more a day-to-day sort of thing for the first year or 
so…then things settled down…” 
 
[Client 20] “…A person starting up a business should be ready for the perils of 
entrepreneurship…you can never a 100% ready but I think you have self-
confidence and a drive to make it…” 
 
Fourth, no genuine need for assistance, where a client does not really need 
incubation but chooses to locate in an incubator facility due to the non-developmental 
conveniences offered.  
 
[DubInc IM] “…One of the things we try to do in the selection interview is to 
judge why a client has applied…now consider the case of ABC (a client)…it is 
a special arrangement under circumstances which are not in (gender ref. 
removed) control…” 
 
[IncuWorks IM] “Yes, there are a number of clients who don’t participate as 
much in our workshops or make use of the surgeries…it takes a while for both 
us and the client to understand what it is that is required…and sometimes a 
hands-off approach is all that is needed…” 
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In this negative ‘click’ scenario, the IM is faced with the peculiar task of judging the 
nature of the incubation relationship. The IM, usually with experience over the years, 
comes to this judgment in the first few meetings with a prospective client at the pre-
incubation stage.  
 
[DubInc IM] “…I have worked at enterprise centres for a long time and with 
time and experience you can tell after a few months if a client will want to 
engage or not…if they stop and talk and that is more then a hello…that is a 
good sign…” 
 
There are also instances where a potentially positive “incubation click” turns into 
negative one. For instance at DubInc: 
 
The IM through a chance conversation with a colleague from a public authority came 
to know of a client’s previous financial and legal history. This client was availing of 
rent holidays and was held in high-esteem due to linkages with the local community. 
The Client, according to the IM, had not highlighted past legal and financial problems, 
where such problems, could follow the client to DubInc (such as ‘pushy creditors’ or 
‘angry landlords’), thereby, tarnishing DubInc’s organisational identity and reputation. 
As a policy, clients at DubInc were required to declare such details at the time of the 
selection interview. With this new knowledge, the nature of the dyadic relationship 
changed. The focus, rather than a tacit and positive awareness of client health, 
became more calculated, cautious and withdrawn. As per the IM’s assessment, the 
Client, despite past problems, had sufficient business turnover to meet financial 
obligations to DubInc. Ultimately, this issue was resolved through a formal process 
which took several months. During this time, according to information related by both 
the IM and Client, there was little or no developmental assistance-related co-
production activity. 
 
The “click” dynamic is also impacted by explicit and implied ground rules of client 
behaviour. A number of important written and un-written ground rules established at 
the very onset of the relationship by the IM act as the base-bonds for the dyadic 
relationship. For instance, at DubInc, a number of such stated and unstated ground 
rules acted as dictates to the dyadic relationship, these were hinted at by the IM: 
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[DubInc IM] “…We are a community enterprise centre…we don’t expect a lot 
from clients but the way this place is run is very much like a business, we have 
to ensure financial sustainability and that there is a positive level of 
engagement with the local community…it is made very clear to all clients that 
payment of their monthly rental is crucial…we try to keep them involved in our 
community outreach efforts and where there is the odd complaint or something 
which is against stated policy then we consult with clients professionally…a lot 
of hard work has gone into building our image and the Board takes this matter 
seriously…” 
 
Therefore, at DubInc, there are a number of normative expectations from clients:  
 
1. Subscribing to the “community oriented spirit” of the incubator organisation; 
 
2. Developing a disciplined and predictable pattern of monthly rental payment 
and payment of other overheads or taxes; 
 
3. Adhering to standards of house-keeping set by the IM or facilities manager 
(such as not misusing common facilities); and  
 
4. Adhering to generally accepted standards of conducting their business affairs 
(such as refraining from intense retail oriented activity so as not to disrupt the 
work of other clients).  
 
At IncuWorks, in addition to the above, a number of other ground rules were also 
prevalent which were hinted to by the IM: 
 
   
 
194 
[IncuWorks IM] “…When clients sign a contract with IncuWorks a number of 
things are clarified at the onset…it is important that there is participation in our 
6-monthly review process…it is helpful in keeping everyone informed and 
creates an opportunity for us to step-in formally if there is a need...(a 
clarification is sought)…it is crucial that we assess whether there are 
opportunities for a spin-in to engage with the University, either in terms of a 
research collaboration or there maybe an opportunity for the University to 
licence out IP, sometimes it doesn’t happen but a potential must 
exist…naturally, other elements cannot obviously be a part of contract but as 
stakeholders in client businesses there is an expectation here that IncuWorks 
is associated with hi-tech and leading edge work…” 
 
Thus, at IncuWorks it was expected that a client: 
 
1. Participate in an active but voluntary basis in 6-monthly progress update 
meetings; 
 
2. Demonstrate keenness to engage with the University, even if there were no 
immediate or tangible results; 
 
3. Consider IncuWorks a true stakeholder and partner beyond the “business-like” 
relationship governed by the shareholder’s agreement; 
 
4. Avail of the free-of-cost developmental assistance-related services on offer; 
and 
 
5. Subscribe to the organisation’s “growth oriented” culture and contribute to its 
“Hi-Tech” identity. 
 
The relationship dynamic rapidly changes when those clients, who in the IM’s 
judgment, are found to overlook or break established ground rules. For instance, the 
following incidents at DubInc show changes in relational quality:  
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A very senior client (Client A) at DubInc started to use unlocked vacant units for ad-
hoc meetings. The IM claimed that Client A, without making formal bookings, used 
the conference room at their leisure for long meetings. Another aspect of the Client’s 
operations that particularly concerned the IM was their own foray into training, 
especially in areas where DubInc itself specialised. Client A on the other hand, as 
senior clients, felt that it was appropriate to use un-utilised facilities for business 
purposes. Thus, the IM-Client A relationship, due to a conflict of interest and the 
perceived negation of incubation ethos, became “business like”. Opportunities for the 
parties to engage in developmental assistance, thereby, reduced due to diminishing 
trust and lack of confidence. 
 
 
A new “very enterprising” client (Client C) was inducted at DubInc during the research 
period. Client B had moved to DubInc from another Enterprise Centre and had 
informed the IM that the previous tenancy was not being renewed. Under an informal 
understanding between Enterprise Centres in the Dublin region, it is encouraged that 
clients not be allowed to maintain units in different Enterprise Centres. Three 
incidents occurred in rapid succession which led to a downturn in IM-Client relations; 
first, the IM after a month of tenancy, found out that Client B had not given up the 
other unit. This was unacceptable to the IM and therefore Client B was urged to give 
up this unit. Client B on the other hand insisted that the other unit was not under 
(gender ref. removed) formal management and control but the firm’s “silent” partner’s. 
Under the terms of the tenancy, the IM did not have a legal provision to ensure that 
whilst its clients were doing business at DubInc, they did not maintain units at any 
other Enterprise Centre in the Dublin region. Next, Client B (based in the food unit) 
started to “test market” a number of new products to other clients in the building 
during lunch time. The IM encouraged this activity, however, when Client B 
distributed flyers to the public to attract more customers, the IM stepped in and had a 
“chat” with Client B. Essentially, the IM did not feel it was appropriate for retail clients 
to come inside the building to buy food. This, in the IM’s view, would have tarnished 
organisational reputation and would have created disturbance for other clients. 
Finally, Client B, one day brought in hi-fi equipment and started to play “house music” 
(bass heavy club/dance tracks). In Client B’s view playing music helped in pacing 
work activity, broke down the monotony of working alone and moreover, this was 
   
 
196 
always done in the past and was allowed in the previous Enterprise Centre. However, 
Client B once again had to have a “chat” with the IM and was urged to reduce the 
music’s volume. In the words of the IM: 
 
               [DubInc IM]  “…we don’t have any policy against playing music as long as it 
doesn’t interfere with the work of other clients…now we had a few 
complaints from XYZ (Client B’s neighbour) about this and it just doesn’t 
give a professional image to walk-in customers and people coming over for 
meetings with other clients in the building. If it was Bach or Beethoven it 
would be something else but this (makes club bass sounds) is something 
else altogether…” 
 
Therefore, due to these incidents, there was incongruence between Client B’s 
expectations and requirements and what the IM could allow and offer, in other words, 
a misfit between incubator and client strategy. Opportunities to engage in 
developmental assistance became scarce even though the IM being very well 
connected and an expert in the food sector, was expecting and expected to engage 
quite heavily with Client B. Eventually, after only 3 months of tenancy, Client B served 
a formal notice to move out. 
 
The case at IncuWorks was slightly different. For instance, the screening process and 
induction criteria filtered out any clients with whom potential IM-Client conflicts-of-
interest could develop. Due to a high degree of client involvement (or opportunities for 
involvement) in IncuWorks’ activities, ground-rules were constantly reaffirmed. This 
becomes evident in the words of a client: 
 
[Client 35] “…there is a lot going on here…we get emails almost on a daily 
basis…usually something is relevant to us…the advice clinics and the guest 
speakers are especially good…it’s stuff that is actually useful so we do get 
involved…it took us a good few months to figure out the culture here…which I 
think is meant to push us to achieve targets…” 
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To conclude, the “click” between the IM and a particular client enables incubation 
activity, it reveals the true scale and scope of the level of assistance needed and the 
purposes of a client’s strategic motives for joining the incubation programme.  
 
8.4 The Triggers of Incubation: Stealth, Subtle Indicators & Heuristics   
 
A social relationship, such as the one between an IM and Client, naturally has a time 
dimension, forming; evolving and dissolving over time (Burt, 2000; Cummings & 
Higgins, 2006). An IM-Client relationship’s intensity changes in time from dormant to 
active when projects are mutually initiated. This initiation, which leads to the 
relationship status changing to active, can be triggered by either the IM or a Client.  
 
In the case of DubInc, one way the IM triggers mutual projects is by sending out 
personalised emails informing clients of potential leads or sources of grant funding. In 
addition, the IM also creates “triggers” to engage with those clients who, according to 
the IM’s judgment, are either facing, or about to face, difficulties in doing business:  
 
[DubInc IM] “…Over so many years in this role I have developed a system of 
monitoring clients without giving the impression that they are being 
monitored…monitoring is not something that we here are meant to do in the 
strictest sense…the clients have not signed up for this…but naturally I am 
responsible for ensuring our financial sustainability and also to help clients 
keep buoyant…” 
 
From the above quote it becomes clear that the IM must ensure that clients remain 
stable enough to be able to meet their financial obligations to DubInc. The IM’s task is 
made quite complicated since there is little or no access to client financial data. 
Hence, the IM develops and relies on subtle client-specific indicators that ‘as a matter 
of coincidence’ allude to client business performance. Such a system of gauging 
client performance complements the nature of the complex and nuanced IM-Client 
dyadic relationship at DubInc.  
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Depending on the type of client business, the IM, through watchful awareness, is able 
to link specific client activities and behaviours with the overall health of their 
operations and if there is instability foreseen, the IM proactively attempts to trigger an 
episode of developmental assistance. For instance, the IM narrated an account of a 
particular client involved in waste-recycling: 
 
[DubInc IM] “…I did not see their truck move an inch from its parking space for 
three weeks and they were hardly getting any telephone enquiries…now for a 
business that depends on income generated by collecting recyclable 
waste…for them not moving their truck for so long and not getting any phone 
calls either…rings warning bells…” 
 
These subtle indicators triggered an event of developmental assistance. The IM 
called over to the client’s office and had a ‘’chat’’ about internal affairs, showed 
empathy, and offered advice and support in the form of deferred rental payments or 
rent ‘’holidays’’. 
 
Subtle client-specific indicators, apart from non-interventionist monitoring and helping 
the IM trigger incubation assistance, can also be used for negotiating with clients. For 
instance:  
 
When a Client requested a rental holiday for an extended period the IM was able to 
effectively negotiate down the holiday time period on the basis of a subtle client-
specific indicator – observations on the number of the Client’s walk-in customers. 
With a large number of walk-ins, it was difficult for the IM to believe that the Client 
was facing financial difficulties. 
 
The role of subtle client-specific indicators had little or no impact on triggering 
incubation activity at IncuWorks. This was due to higher levels of transparency due to 
regular disclosures of financial and operational performance during the 6-monthly 
review process. The IM did not have to use stealth to gauge whether the client was 
about to “go under”. At the review meetings, any adverse circumstances that clients 
faced were mutually diagnosed in an open environment and strategies were 
discussed and agreed upon to counter negative impacts: 
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 [IncuWorks IM] “…The review meeting is not meant to be a monitoring 
exercise…we are very careful to not give that impression…we want to show 
client firms that IncuWorks is a real stakeholder and partner. During the 
meetings the clients make presentations about their progress and present 
plans for the next review period. Our effort is to see where we can contribute 
towards the realisation of their plans…” 
 
In fact, the review meetings were the greatest source of incubation triggers. For 
instance: 
 
During one review meeting, it became clear that a Desk-Space client was struggling 
to meet the firm’s cash flow requirements. The IM recommended that they work on 
entering several local and international competitions for innovative hi-tech firms 
where, as per the IM’s assessment, the struggling Client had a chance of winning 
substantial prize money. This strategy for raising capital was agreed upon and the 
Client started to work under the guidance of the IM to prepare and submit documents 
and presentations according to the requirements of various competitions. The IM 
gave substantial input to the Client on preparing submission documentation. Due to 
this the Client firm was nominated for a high-profile EU level competition. The IM 
worked with the Client to hone the final presentation and to prepare for its delivery 
and subsequent Q&A. The IM went one step further and actually flew with the Client 
abroad to oversee the presentation delivery, to help make last minute adjustments 
and to provide moral and emotional support. This mutual agency led to the Client 
being placed in the Competition’s top tier and not only winning substantial prize 
money, also benefited from press coverage, networking and general exposure. The 
IM was able to ensure that IncuWorks benefits from the hype and publicity associated 
with winning a high-profile competition. 
 
Incubation is co-produced in a two-way process, therefore, some clients (not all), 
under certain conditions, also proactively trigger incubation activity. Each client has a 
unique attitude and a set of beliefs when it comes to seeking IM intervention and 
assistance which in turn leads to a number of “automatic solution-seeking 
behaviours”. These behaviours or heuristics are programmed responses triggered 
when clients sense the build up of a business-related problem. The presence of 
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several types of programmed responses for triggering incubation developmental 
assistance were found, including: 
 
1. When faced with a ‘problem’ which the client feels lies within the IM’s area of 
expertise, the response, with other IM-Client relational factors considered 
“normal”, is proactively establishing contact with the IM in the expectation of an 
efficient resolution to the ‘problem’. The programming and response are 
altered when IM-Client relations (in the view of the particular client) are not 
“normal”. 
 
2. When faced with a ‘problem’ which the client cannot correctly judge to be lying 
within the IM’s area of expertise, the response (once again relational normalcy 
being a necessary condition) is establishing a moderating contact in order to 
gauge IM response, attitude and resourcefulness. Levels of further 
engagement are based on the particular client’s assessment of how the IM 
reacted.  
 
3. When faced with a ‘problem’, whose resolution, the client knows to be within 
the abilities and resources of the IM but whose nature is deemed to be 
“personal” or an area where the client feels getting any assistance erodes 
pride / ego, the response here is to establish no IM contact for problem 
resolution. 
 
4. When faced with a ‘problem’ whose resolution the client judges to be beyond 
the ability and capacity of the IM, the response is to establish no contact with 
the IM. 
 
The above four types of programmed responses do not constitute an exhaustive list. 
However, there are a number of elements which remain constant as variables 
impacting whether client programmed responses lead to ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ 
triggering behaviour. These elements include: 
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1. IM-Client relational quality or whether the client judges his/her relations with 
the IM to be “normal”, “progressive” or “regressive”. Progressive and normal 
modes are likely to positively influence programming. 
 
2. Client strategic motives for incubator placement - behavioural programming for 
a client who takes up space inside an incubator knowing that he/she does not 
really need or prefers any developmental assistance, is likely to be negative.  
 
3. The nature of client ‘problem’ – this would is client’s own assessment of the 
problem’s appropriateness and could constitute the strategic weighing of the 
benefits or otherwise of engaging with the IM, whether the client judges the 
problem to be worth IM’s time or whether the problem is judged to be 
‘personal’.  
 
4. The client’s perceptual judgment of IM resourcefulness and likely attitude and 
response towards the problem. 
 
Heuristics (such as those discussed above) work well under most circumstances, but 
in certain cases lead to systematic errors or cognitive biases (Kahneman et al, 1982). 
For instance, when a particular client at DubInc faced a problem related to a 
programming code bug in a sophisticated IT project, the Client’s automatic response 
was to disqualify the IM as a probable (and effective) solution provider due to a bias 
that the IM is not technically qualified in the particular technology platform in which 
the problem arose. When the same client faced problems in raising capital, due to a 
bias that the IM is an expert in the area, a quick and effective dialogue was opened 
impulsively in the hope of an efficient solution. The subsequent experience and 
outcome of this particular IM-Client engagement would then either confirm and 
strengthen or dis-confirm and alter the programmed bias.  
 
Evidence of such “programming” was found in a number other of cases, for instance 
at IncuWorks a client stated (when asked for what particular problems would (s)he 
contact the IM): 
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[Client 15] “…they don’t really have expertise on web-based marketing here, 
yeah for regular products and services I could go for advice to the IM but I 
doubt that there will be any point in raising the question of search engine 
optimisation downstairs…” 
 
Incubation triggering mechanisms and dynamics are complex and our understanding 
is likely to remain limited because, methodologically, there is probably no viable 
strategy to capture the incubator’s entire social environment in totality. What is 
observed and recorded is only a cross-section. Incubation can be triggered by totally 
random events such as hearsay, chance meetings and casual conversations between 
the IM (or other members of the incubator organisation) and a particular client at any 
point in time inside or outside the incubator organisation. Due to the inherent 
randomness of the triggering mechanism, questions relating to ‘why a client chose to 
contact the IM to resolve a particular problem’ or ‘why the IM decided to pursue a 
particular client’ are likely to remain, in the absence of empirical data, open-to-
speculation. However, there is one unchanging certainty that will hold true in any 
incubation environment: IM-Client relational quality is the real denominator for 
developmental co-production quality (i.e. deep understanding, trust and mutual 
respect between two professionals). 
   
8.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter, it became clear that a mix of variables as well as internal and external 
conditions trigger incubation co-production. The main factor that has a high degree of 
bearing on these variables and conditions is the incubation ethos. This is a macro 
mechanism governing the various incubation relationships and the ways in which the 
parties in incubation respond (together or separately) to norms, values and identities. 
Alongside the impact of ethos, a second important factor is the incubation “click” or a 
meeting-of-the-minds between the IM and a particular client. The “click” opens 
channels for the co-creation of developmental assistance and its durability signals the 
true scale and scope of IM-Client engagement.  
 
When the conditions for the “click” to occur hold true, dyadic co-production is 
triggered via a number of mechanisms; first, through the IM’s ‘watchful awareness’ of 
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client activity that tangentially signals developmental assistance need; second, 
chance serendipitous encounters; third, structured progress review meetings; and, 
fourth, since dyadic co-production is a two-way process, under the influence of 
heuristical programming, through clients proactively approaching the IM. 
 
The above understanding of incubators’ normative environment is likely to contribute 
to the debate on why and how comparable incubation environments differ when it 
comes to co-production efficacy. It also goes someway to explaining why certain IM-
Client dyads in a particular environment seem to quite actively co-create 
developmental assistance whilst others do not. Towards this end, it is argued that first 
and foremost there is a need to accept a more nuanced explanation for why 
differences in incubation co-creation efficacy exist. What the research in this thesis is 
suggesting is that incubation occurs within a complex mix of relational and normative 
variables related to human cognition and behaviour and without a better 
understanding (and appreciation) of these variables it is unlikely that approaches can 
be developed to effectively boost the level of developmental activity within any type of 
incubation environment.  
 
In the next chapter,  based on the second area of investigation proposed in the 
research objective, the internal mechanisms that facilitate incubation activity at the 










Findings from Case Studies - III 





In this chapter, the focus turns towards de-constructing the various facets of the 
incubation process. The themes presented explore (1) the strategies IMs employ for 
client engagement; (2) the way various stages in the process are organised; (3) the 
factors that influence the client selection decision; and (4) the relationship between 
the range of co-production developmental assistance services, on the one hand, and 
the characteristics of the client base and incubator corporate goals, on the other.  
 
The research presented shows that due to client differences (in terms of behavioural 
attributes and nature of businesses), the IM resorts to using one of (or at times a 
combination of) three strategies of client engagement. What is demonstrated is how 
these strategies, along with the general needs of the client base and the pressures 
from the external environment, influence the way time and resources are devoted by 
the IM to the co-creation of developmental assistance. A staged model is presented 
which highlights that clients move through six stages after establishing initial contact 
with the incubator. Although each stage represents a logical progression towards the 
eventual aim of incubation, some clients skip entire stages, while for others any one 
particular stage may not apply.  
 
An important stage in the incubation process relates to client pre-incubation, pre-
selection and selection. The findings of the research presented in this chapter sheds 
light on a number of important aspects in this stage from the clients’ and 
incubators’/IM’s perspective. From the clients’ perspective a number of aspects are 
discussed including the impact of client understandings and expectations from 
incubation, motivators for pursuing incubation and strategic motives for incubator 
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placement. From the perspective of the incubator and IM, an example of a client 
selection decision is used to highlight the role of both systematic information provided 
by the proposer as well as pre-conscious, intuitive and experiential processes in the 
client selection process.  
 
The final theme highlights the differences between the overall approaches to 
delivering incubation developmental assistance in the two case organisations. A 
categorisation of the gamut of services available assists in providing an 
understanding of the nature and range of developmental assistance services which 
incubators can offer. This in turn allows an examination of the rate at which clients 
consume incubator resources and IM time. 
 
9.2 The Three Strategies of Incubation Co-Production 
 
A myriad of client-related factors working together influence the way an IM develops 
and deploys an initial client-specific incubation strategy. Such factors can be 
categorised into a number of areas including: 
 
1. IM-Client Rapport – the IM-Client incubation “click”’; the IM’s personal 
relationship with a particular client or knowledge of his/her background and 
vice versa;  
 
2. Client’s Personal Attributes - industry experience and education, skills, 
personality and temperament, management style and so on; and 
  
3. Client Business Attributes – industry sector, market potential and level of 
complexity.  
 
The IM’s initial incubation strategy, lays down the meta-rules of subsequent IM-Client 
engagement. This strategy starts to evolve from the very first IM-Client meeting and 
solidifies with subsequent interactions during the pre-incubation, selection and 
induction stages. By then IMs, exercising their judgment and using accumulated 
experience, are able to develop an understanding of client needs, attitude towards 
co-production developmental assistance and strategic motives for incubator 
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placement. Although, the application form and formal interview add a rational 
dimension, ultimately it is perception, intuition and “gut-feeling” which drive the IM’s 
initial incubation strategy. In the words of IncuWorks’ Director: 
 
[IncuWorks Director] “…When we come across an applicant a number of 
questions tend to cross our minds…what help does he need, does he know 
himself what help he needs, why is he applying here, does he need to be here, 
will he become involved in our activities here, will he contribute to the culture of 
IncuWorks…you work on gut-feeling and instinct to try and work out a strategy to 
engage with the applicant…there is no right or wrong strategy, it is also not just 
based on first impressions…we keep an open mind and it naturally evolves…and 
in the process we learn…” 
 
Three possible incubation strategies were found that IMs adopted for incubation co-
production. These strategies include: 
 
1. Dormant – both the client and IM subliminally agree that incubation would be 
restricted to the client mostly availing of the infrastructural facilities of the 
incubator organisation. These would include besides shared services and 
facilities, subsidised rent and advantages associated with the location of the 
facility (e.g. proximity to markets, car parking and centrality of location). It was 
found that a number of clients at both DubInc and IncuWorks, chose the facility 
due to reasons unrelated to its core offering, that of incubation developmental 
assistance. A number of clients admitted that subsidised rent and flexibility in 
payment was the most attractive reason for them to apply and stay on. Other 
clients suggested that benefits accruing from shared facilities and the presence of 
other clients made DubInc a more feasible destination to do business than for 
instance a serviced office or a commercial property. 
 
2. Reactive Incubation Engagement – this can be viewed as the “open door policy” 
to incubation. As a part of this norm, there is no structured form of assistance and 
oversight of client operations. The IM and client engage in developmental 
assistance in an episodic manner or as and when opportunities arise. Requests 
could come from clients, such as advice or assistance in dealing with a specific 
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problem such as a funding proposal, guidance on promotion / marketing, tax-
related queries, or other perceived competence areas of the IM. The IM also 
signals the availability of developmental assistance via email bulletins and adhoc / 
impromptu conversations with clients. Arguably, this incubation strategy leads to 
the resolution of short term problems or crisis events in client businesses.  
 
3. Proactive Incubation Engagement – This is the most intensive approach to 
incubation developmental assistance. It requires that a particular client and the IM 
agree on business progress goals and benchmarks, as well as a mechanism of IM 
oversight and monitoring. Periodically, the client and IM may develop particular 
projects to pursue together, such as network enhancement, new product 
development, raising capital and so on. With proactive engagement, it can be 
argued, that alongside short term problems, the long term developmental needs of 
the client would also be managed. Therefore, client resource consumption would 
be high in comparison to the previous two approaches.  
 
Generally speaking, the first two of the above approaches were prevalent at DubInc 
whilst IncuWorks had a mix of the second and third. In the words of the two IM’s: 
 
[DubInc IM] “…My door is always open, sitting here in full view of the Centre’s 
entrance I can say hello and ask clients to come in for a brief chat as they go 
to their units. The culture here is very friendly but my approach is to let clients 
decide what their problems are and whether they need our help. I send out 
emails regularly to let them know of relevant activities, supports and events 
available at the Centre and through the Dublin Chamber, Enterprise Ireland 
and other state agencies. Those clients who genuinely feel they would benefit 
from the support available here approach us on their own…” 
 
[IncuWorks IM] “…We have developed systems to encourage clients to 
actively participate in our support services. There has been a lot of investment 
and effort that has been into making these available, mostly free-of-cost or at 
highly subsidised rates. The half-yearly review and planning meeting allows us 
to develop a common understanding of what is required and what each party 
will do to contribute to accomplishing agreed targets. Our vision is to be seen 
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as a leading Centre of technology transfer and entrepreneurship in 
Europe…and we can only realise this if our clients clock substantial growth on 
a year to year basis. We bring in the sort of entrepreneurs who are driven to 
materialise double digit growth and set up hi-profile ventures…by combining 
their drive with our supports and facilities…the results are slowly emerging…” 
 
Incubation strategies are not blanket approaches applicable across the board; they 
are specific to a particular IM-Client dyad. The strategy can also shift from one to the 
other depending on changing circumstances (such as for e.g. external environmental 
pressures or a sudden break through at the client level such as an acquisition or 
investment offer) and evolving IM perceptual judgment. Furthermore, the IM’s client-
specific incubation strategy is effective in so far as that particular client decides to 
accept the approach and “play along”.  
 
Each dyadic co-production strategy has consequences for IM time and incubator 
resources. Infrastructural support does not place much demands, whereas, the 
Reactive and Proactive strategies, depending on the nature of the dyadic relationship 
and the client problem being addressed, could put substantial demands on IM time 
and incubator resources.  
 
In the case of IncuWorks, the IM’s role was dedicated to enterprise development. 
There were no major and obvious distractions due to the availability of dedicated staff 
for each of the four strategic areas of IncuWorks’ operations. The key performance 
indicators for the IM were also related to client firm progress, creating direct 
ownership and responsibility by the compartmentalising of the role.  
 
The case of DubInc was slightly different, the IM’s role required the maintenance of a 
fine balance between time and resources dedicated to, on the one hand, the core 
“incubation co-production activities” and, on the other, to the non-core (but equally 
essential) “activities to ensure organisational sustainability” and “other non-incubation 
job requirements”. The IM was faced with the task of managing the affairs of a highly 
complex organisation, where performance was evaluated on the accomplishment of 
organisational targets relating to financial sustainability, upholding of reputation and 
maintaining organisational identity. In the words of the DubInc IM: 
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[DubInc IM] “…We have no ongoing government support, therefore, there is a 
lot of pressure here to ensure there is cashflow and reserves to meet our 
monthly financial obligations…I have to worry about paying staff salaries, utility 
bills and creditors at the end of each month for which client rentals are just not 
enough. If we did not concentrate on our trainings and community outreach 
programmes the Centre would not be financially sustainable…” 
 
Thus, the relative “role diversity” of the two IMs (low in the case of IncuWorks and 
high in the case of DubInc) has an impact on IM time and resource allocation to 
incubation.  
 
9.3 Factors Influencing IM Time & Resource Allocation 
 
Besides the three incubation strategies discussed in the previous section, there are a 
number of other elements that influence the allocation of IM’s time and resources to 
incubation – a key aspect influencing the quality of co-production developmental 
assistance. One important element is the developmental needs of the client base. In 
the case of IncuWorks, due to the intensive support requirements of its hi-tech client 
base and the largely unpredictable market and industry spaces they occupied, the 
proactive strategy was the ideal approach. On the other hand, DubInc’s client base 
was different, it was comprised of firms doing business in conventional sectors with 
well developed institutions; quite a lot of developmental assistance-type support was 
available through established industry associations and existing government 
schemes. Although the businesses were operating in a variety of sectors, the 
complexity of their problems was much lower than the problems faced by IncuWorks’ 
clients. Since the range of client problems at DubInc could be easily grouped into a 
few categories only, the IM was able to substantially economise on time and 
resources using common routines. The nature and variation in client problems is 
discussed further in section 9.6. 
 
The external environment, stakeholder priorities and the incubator organisation’s 
financial health also impact the time and resources available to the IM for incubation 
co-production. For instance, In the case of DubInc, when the external economic 
environment became turbulent, a number of clients wound up operations and moved 
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out, others requested for rental holidays and enquiries for new units dried up. Overall, 
these circumstances had a tremendous impact on DubInc’s financial health. 
Therefore, it was agreed that the IM would dedicate time and resources to actively 
attract new clients, fill vacant units and stabilise cash-flow. This additional important 
and urgent task had an impact on the IM’s ability to engage in co-production 
developmental assistance-type activities with the remaining client base.  
 
[DubInc IM] “…As you can see we are quite hard-pressed these days, the 
recession has come down really heavily on SMEs and consequently to us…when 
it is a matter of survival, you go into basic instinct mode…we are doing some 
serious marketing these days, and I have to tell you, we have never had to do this 
much promotion before…we had 10-15 good enquiries every week…we had a 
waiting list, now we have units vacant and hardly any enquiries…” 
 
Unlike DubInc, IncuWorks was relatively well protected from environmental 
turbulence and incubation strategy was influenced by a number of other factors such 
as the hosting University’s priorities. The incubator was the prime implementer of the 
University’s vision, mission and strategic plan related to the commercialisation of its 
science and technology research. Periodic meetings between IncuWorks’ top 
management and the University’s select committee on research commercialisation 
provided an active forum for knowledge sharing and progress appraisals. The 
University’s interest in supporting the establishment of IncuWorks was clear: to help 
create and grow spin-out companies and to work with the University’s researchers to 
identify, protect and licence technology. Almost all spin-out firms housed at 
IncuWorks were focused on the bio-tech sector, which shows the University’s 
research priority also. As a consequence, IncuWorks’ support programmes were set 
up with the purpose of progressing the University’s research focus and 
commercialisation strategy. If these priorities were to change in any way, they would 
in-turn impact IM resource allocation strategy at IncuWorks. In the words of the 
Director: 
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[IncuWorks Director] “…Tech. Transfer is our core business which includes 
trying to identify IP, protecting and licensing it and negotiating IP agreements 
with companies...we have all the support systems in place here for meeting 
our strategic goals” 
 
The factors that influence the allocation of IM time and resources to co-production are 
complex and nuanced. This allocation strategy is an evolving complex and in order to 
understand it better there is a need to develop a greater appreciation for random and 
unpredictable influencers that may in principle be observable or unobservable.  
 
9.4 Incubation Stages Experienced by Client Firms 
 
The three incubation strategies discussed in section 9.1 influence a number of client-
specific stages of incubation. Interestingly, strategic IM-Client interaction during the 
various stages of incubation influence the nature of the above incubation strategies. 
For instance, a prospective client with no previous rapport may engage with the IM at 
the pre-incubation stage and then build rapport thereby influencing incubation 
strategy. From the empirical data, no clear cut relationship was, however, apparent 
between “incubation strategies” and “incubation stages”.  
 
The idea of various stages in the incubation process was introduced in the mid-80s 
when the very first studies on the phenomenon were published. Process models 
remain popular to-date with incubator-incubation researchers breaking down aspects 
of the phenomenon with 2x2 matrixes and flow diagrams. One of the biggest 
problems with rational conceptualisations is that they layer over social complexity. 
Stage models are ideal for describing the processes that enable physical or chemical 
change, such as automated or semi-automated manufacturing where there is a high 
level of predictability (Cohen et al, 1972; Heimer & Stinchcombe, 1999). When it 
comes to the social world, however, which is characterised by high levels of 
randomness, they usually fail to present an accurate picture of what really happens 
on the ground.   
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For instance, the research data shows that the incubation stages a particular client 
experiences depends on a number of factors and that not all clients face the same 
types or number of stages. These factors include a client’s own attributes, the 
strategic outcome of the IM’s selection decision and the nature of the IM-Client dyadic 
relationship. Furthermore, even if one were to assume that a number of common 
stages do apply to all clients, there is still the matter of unequal progression. The 
empirical data showed no straightforward link between “client time spent in 
incubation” and “incubation stage”. Thus, for some clients, progression is quicker, 
some skip entire stages whilst for others progression maybe slower due to completely 
unforeseen or unpredictable rare events.  
 
Despite the above points, stage models are still useful and remain popular with 
management researchers. They are pragmatic, helping with broad-level planning and 
introducing structure and control mechanisms. Therefore, the following stage-wise 
model of the incubation process, as experienced by client firms, is presented:  
  
1. Initial contact – leading to either pre-incubation or selection. How the initial contact 
is made is an interesting denominator in future IM-Client rapport and incubation 
strategy. In the case of client referrals, the referring individual and the context is 
important, as well as how that person was known to the IM. Previous IM-Client 
acquaintance, through either the community, colleagues or network membership, 
also creates greater IM-Client rapport.  
 
2. Pre-incubation – leading to either selection, virtual incubation or termination. It 
was found that clients, based on their own unique circumstances, backgrounds, 
aspirations, experiences, relationships with partners and other factors, at times, 
chose to use the abilities of the IM strategically; for instance “free-riding” i.e. 
knowingly using IM time and resources to get free feedback on business plans or 
test market prototypes. At times pre-incubation clients knowingly ignore the 
available developmental assistance services because their strategic motives are 
to only avail of the economic benefits of incubation, such as subsidised rental.  
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3. Selection – facilitated by written policy and IM / selection committee intuition. 
Prospective clients are usually required to submit a written business plan or a 
summary plan which is followed by an interview. The client is then required to 
address the queries raised in the interview. 
 
4. Incubation Phase I – Induction – This phase is initiated when the client signs a 
formal contract and pays a deposit. Housekeeping information and regulations are 
provided along with introductions to other clients in the building. IM-Client 
interaction is usually high during this phase. Based on the quality of the 
“incubation-click”, one of the three incubation meta-approaches is set as the norm 
for IM-Client developmental assistance-related interaction.  
 
5. Incubation Phase II – Institutionalisation – Once a client becomes a part of the 
social fabric of the incubator, understands organisational culture and the 
normative mechanisms for engaging with other clients and members of the IM’s 
office, this client has then been successfully inducted and institutionalised as a 
legitimate member of the organisation. 
 
6. Incubation Phase III – Consolidation – This is the phase during which IM-Client 
rapport reaches a point where projects are initiated to diagnose, tackle and 
resolve client business problems. Client business at this stage begins to 
effectively consume incubator-IM resources as a part of developmental 
assistance.  
 
7. Graduation – A graduation mechanism sets the rationale for deciding when a 
client should venture out on its own. This phase commences prior to client exit 
from the incubator organisation where the client is consciously prepared to move 
out into the “real world”. The IM works with graduating clients to develop some 
surety that they will continue to grow in the community where they first started. 
Help may be provided in finding new accommodation, linkage with local 
chambers, assessing a potential location, meeting with estate agents and related 
activities.  
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Although the above model suggests a linear system of client progression, it must be 
noted that not all stages necessarily apply to all clients in an incubation facility, some 
clients may skip entire stages and still others may be ‘outliers’ or a type of client to 
which the model simply may not apply. Nevertheless, the model’s seven stages more 
adequately describe what occurs, from a processual standpoint, starting at the point 
of initial client contact to graduation, than previous models do. The model is superior 
because it takes into consideration the perspectives of both the incubator and the 
client. Thus, the resulting multi-perspective scheme more adequately captures 
incubation’s previously ignored relational and normative dimensions. 
 
9.5 Pre-Selection, Pre-Incubation & Selection  
 
A significant amount of incubation process-related research is dedicated to the client 
selection process, where researchers have described and compared various 
selection approaches and their aims (Kuratko & LaFollette, 1987; Merrifield, 1987; 
Lumpkin & Ireland, 1988; Allen, & McCluskey, 1990; Aerts et al, 2007; Bergek & 
Norrman, 2008). Why is client selection so important? This question was posed to 
both IMs, who had slightly differing views. The common points of agreement, 
however, were that by selecting those firms that actually need incubation assistance, 
those which from a strategic perspective are a good match between both the 
incubator’s and firm’s aims, and have a sound business proposition backed by a good 
team / proposer will ultimately have greater chances of “succeeding” post-incubation, 
thereby positively reflecting on incubator reputation.  
 
The detailed selection criteria and a description of the formal selection system 
prevalent at the case organisations has been presented in sections 6.1.5 and 6.2.5. 
The impression that comes across in the case write-up is that new clients are 
rationally selected from a pool of available options by employing a number of 
“selection criteria” and a formal selection mechanism to assess (a) applicant fit with 
incubator objectives; and (b) critical factors for firm marketplace success. There is no 
denying that such criteria and formal mechanisms do exist but the process itself is far 
from rational, the criteria and selection mechanism are subjective and require much 
flexibility to be of any practical use.  
 
   
 
215 
Most clients went through the formal system, and their resulting experiences were 
quite different on aspects such as how they actually found out about the incubator 
organisation, their first visit to the facility and meeting with the IM, the subsequent 
reflection on available tenancy options, the process of filling out the application form, 
attending the interview, negotiating the terms of the contract and then being inducted 
into the organisation.  
 
Most clients at DubInc, although from the area and a part of the local community, 
were not really aware of the organisation’s precise role and its history – aspects 
which have an impact on their overall pre-incubation, selection and induction 
experience. For instance, clients narrated: 
 
[Client 1] “…I always drove by here and I saw the building and the board but it 
never crossed my mind that it was a community enterprise centre, I mean it 
was on the board but you know you don’t really think about it until one day I 
needed an office space and I thought…hhmmm…oh yeah there’s DubInc and I 
walked in one day and now here I am …” 
 
[Client 8] “…its funny how I have lived here all my life but I only found out 
about DubInc through Daft (an internet property website)…” 
 
[Client 18] “…I did know it existed and it had something to do with enterprise 
development but wasn’t really sure of what that meant or how it was done…” 
 
The above pattern was somewhat repeated at IncuWorks, the difference lay in higher 
levels of awareness in spin-out clients; a large majority of spin-in clients though 
ended up at the facility serendipitously: 
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[Client 33] “…I met XYZ (the Director) at a conference where I was giving a 
presentation…this was when I was at ABC building an innovation team… 
(gender ref. removed) told me about IncuWorks and what they did…this was 
my first introduction to enterprise development centres…but then cutting a long 
story short, when I was made redundant a few years later I was going through 
my visiting card index and XYZ’s card just propped up, so I went and saw 
(gender ref. removed)…” 
 
From the clients’ perspective, another factor that has significant impact on pre-
incubation and selection (also on the later stages), is clients’ judgment on what 
enterprise development or incubation meant in practice at the time prior to and during 
selection. Initially, this understanding is quite vague and fragmented; it is only through 
later experience and by engaging with other clients once inducted do they develop a 
clearer understanding. This caveat emptor “understanding” of what incubation was (to 
them), differed from client to client and depended on the nature of the IM-Client 
dyadic relationship and fit between client needs and the infrastructural and knowledge 
resources available at the incubator organisation. Therefore, it was possible that two 
entrepreneurs operating in the same sector would have a remarkably different 
understanding of what incubation was and whether it benefited them. This point is 
illustrated in the two quotes below by IncuWorks’ clients: 
 
[Client 36] “…before and after? (respondent then makes a joke about weight 
loss products)…I guess I wasn’t expecting much, I had most elements of my 
business plan well thought out, I was going to look after business development 
and my partner was responsible for the technical infrastructure…we do need 
help with funding and we discussed this during the interview…now ABC (the 
IM) did say we help with this but what does it actually mean “help”…what does 
it entail…this would be from a case-to-case basis…making the company worth 
investment would be my role…then what other help do I need?…” 
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[Client 38] “…I had a colleague of mine who did the CCDP send me here and 
he felt it was excellent and I’d say he was right…the advice clinics were too 
general and very basic but what we got in PR was beyond my 
expectation…we made a connection here with another company that was 
working with XYZ (IP consultants)…didn’t know that we could use their 
services at those rates, so we are now in touch with them and it has been very 
useful all-in-all…” 
 
Clients’ strategic motives for making applications to the case organisations also 
differed substantially. Our understanding of the selection process from the client’s 
side is under-developed especially the understanding on what motivates 
entrepreneurs (from a strategic perspective) to choose an incubator organisation (out 
of a host of other options) to start-up and grow a business. A greater understanding 
of this factor should help incubator organisations with their marketing strategies and 
in designing their developmental assistance programmes. In addition, by 
understanding the true (and often hidden) objectives of why clients choose to locate 
in incubators, an understanding can develop of the areas where the true impact of 
incubators lies in the development of new enterprises.  
 
It must be noted here that clients’ initial agenda is likely to change once they gain 
experience in the incubation environment and understand the ways in which 
incubation benefits (or does not benefit) them. During the research two major 
categories of motivators were found – ‘economic and infrastructural’ and 
‘developmental’. For instance, when clients were asked to recall the reasons that 
were initial motivators for incubator location, those who were motivated by economic 
and infrastructural reasons often cited subsidised rental as the most important 
motivator followed by flexible lease, proximity to home, car parking, central location, 
proximity to markets, cafeteria, meeting rooms, and (in the case of IncuWorks) high 
quality building and prestigious brand image. Developmental motivators which were 
usually listed as advice and support, training, workshops and networking 
opportunities were rare at DubInc but more common at IncuWorks. As clients gained 
experience, in a number of cases, ‘economic and infrastructural’ motivators were 
swapped to ‘developmental’ and vice-versa. For instance, a client at IncuWorks 
stated: 
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[Client 24] “…when were starting up…to be very blunt…it was the competitive 
rent that attracted us…you got one bill for everything and it was 
convenient…we thought we didn’t really need much help so to say…but now 
the rent is at par with market rates…so if you ask us why we are still here…I’d 
have to say the culture of the place, it is very conducive to the work we are 
doing, we have done some great projects with ABC (the IM)…and would like to 
stay longer if possible…” 
 
For some DubInc clients, ‘economic and infrastructural motivators’ changed to an 
entirely different category (rather than ‘developmental’) as strategic rationales for 
remaining in incubation: not really motivators but a mix of dependency and 
inconvenience avoidance. In the words of a client who was forced to graduate due to 
a new rule putting a cap on the tenancy period at 4 years 9 months: 
 
[Client 17] “…I have now been here five years…my clients know where I am 
based…my office is set up exactly the way I like it…I am paying the overheads 
I can afford…any more I won’t make enough profit to warrant the investment I 
am making in time…so if you ask me… this is bringing about a big disruption in 
my life…but don’t get me wrong here…I also understand that I need to move 
on from an enterprise centre…” 
 
Motivators for pursuing incubation also influence how clients strategically use the free 
pre-incubation period. The research shows that clients based on their own unique 
circumstances, backgrounds, aspirations, experiences, relationships with their 
partners and other factors, chose to use the abilities of the IM to either ‘free-ride’, 
ignore pre-incubation developmental assistance OR strategically make applications to 
avail the incubators’ economic benefits whilst in the knowledge that they do not 
require incubation assistance. The case of the pre-incubation ‘free rider’ becomes 
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A prospective client in the food sector was able to work with the IM for an extended 
period (around 10 weeks) improving the proposed firm’s business plan, getting 
introductions to various agencies, developing a bank loan application and test 
marketing products to customers through the IM’s contacts and references. This 
prospective client received an inordinate amount of pre-incubation assistance without 
signing any formal agreements or making a firm commitment to lease space. It was 
only after a considerable lapse in time, when the IM was fast reaching a state where 
there was a clear realisation that the cost of resource input was incommensurable 
with the perceived benefit, that the prospective client was urged to make a formal 
commitment. At this stage the prospective client decided to not make a formal 
commitment due to personal reasons. 
 
The ongoing recession and the presence of vacant units (impacting incubator cash 
flow) may have caused the IM to pursue pre-incubation with this prospective client to 
its logical conclusion. It can also be argued that this prospective client received 
comparatively greater levels of pre-incubation assistance due to the IM’s own interest 
in the food sector and the strong introduction the client received from one of the IM’s 
industry peers. There may be some weight in these falsifying arguments, but 
ultimately the IM was acting within his/her mandate and would be obliged (under the 
DubInc ethos) to provide similar levels of assistance to any other client.  
 
The tipping point in the selection process is the IM’s assessment of a prospective 
client’s application form and the subsequent interview. These two stages are a 
complex mix of intuitive and rational programming. The IM (as the assessor) has a 
programmed code for determining the suitability of a particular client based on what 
decision researchers call “attribute substitution” – a cognitive process occurring 
without conscious awareness. In Heuristic theory “attribute substitution” occurs when 
individuals are faced with a computationally complex and cognitively difficult problem, 
they deal with it by answering a simpler problem, without being aware that this is 
happening. In other words, cognitive complexity is dealt by the unconscious 
substitution of an easily calculated heuristic attribute (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).  
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For example, stereotypes (or in the case of incubation “mental profiles of clients”) can 
be a source of heuristic attributes. Stereotyping is done due to bounded rationality – 
the idea that the rationality of individuals is limited by the information they have, the 
cognitive limitations of their minds, and the finite amount of time they have to make 
decisions (Simon, 1991). Social psychologists have frequently characterised 
stereotypes as energy-saving devices that serve the important cognitive function of 
simplifying information processing and response generation - they spare perceivers 
the ordeal of responding to an almost incomprehensibly complex social world (Allport, 
1954; Tajfel, 1969; Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Anderso et al, 1990). 
Individuation, in its many guises, is a rather time consuming and effortful affair (Fiske 
& Pavelchak, 1986; Brewer, 1988). Stereotyping, in contrast, relies only on the 
execution of some rather rudimentary skills: most notably, the ability to assign people 
to meaningful social categories (Hamilton, 1979; Hamilton et al, 1990). Once 
achieved, this categorisation provides perceivers with a veritable wealth of stereotypic 
information.  
 
In a face-to-face conversation with prospective new clients, judging motivation, 
professional reputation, suitability to incubation and ability to pay future rentals are 
much more computationally complex than judging their professional background. 
Therefore, if the IM develops a mental profile (or stereotype) about the relative 
chances of “well educated” and “local” applicants to “succeed” rather than less 
educated and non-local ones, these attributes might substitute for the more intangible 
attributes of motivation, reputation, suitability and rental payment ability. Thus, due to 
stereotyping, for the IM, any well educated and local new applicants may 
automatically qualify other desired attributes.  
 
On the flip side, stereotyping is a form of experiential processing and although is 
highly efficient and adaptive in most circumstances, in other circumstances, it is error-
prone and a source of maladaptive bias (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). For example, 
in the case of DubInc, when an “educated”, “refined” and “local” new client had 
trouble paying rent, the IM stated: 
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[DubInc IM] “…I could never have guessed that a person of ABC’s calibre 
would have old dead skeletons in (gender ref. removed) cupboard…(gender 
ref. removed) is pretty well educated and obviously good in what (gender ref. 
removed) does…we had to give (gender ref. removed) a chance because XYZ 
firm was in business in the community for some time…” 
 
At both case organisations, the selection interview had no set format. The IM was 
accompanied by either a member of the BoD (in the case of DubInc) or the Director 
(in the case of IncuWorks). Usually, only one representative from the applicant’s team 
/ firm was requested to appear before the panel. The researcher was allowed to 
observe one selection interview at DubInc; however, IncuWorks felt that the 
researcher’s presence would breach their privacy policy. The panel, in both cases, 
attempted to judge the suitability of the applicant along a number of criteria. These 
criteria reflected the strategic “time-bubble” the incubator organisation was in. For 
example, during the time the research was conducted, Enterprise Centres, such as 
DubInc were faced with an inordinate amount of financial pressure due to increasing 
small business failures and low start-up rates, thereby, affecting rental income. Client 
firms faced pressures due to the ongoing recession affecting their ability to pay 
rentals and there were few new applicants to take up units left vacant by clients 
moving out (either shutting down operations, going into a hibernating state or down-
scaling by working from home). Thus, selection criteria were relaxed to accommodate 
a number of real strategic challenges that the organisation faced. To illustrate, at 
DubInc: 
 
A prospective client was leased space despite the fact that the business was not a 
start-up and that the proposer had considerable business experience already – 
factors which under “normal” conditions would have caused, under DubInc’s standard 
client selection criteria, an application rejection. Selection criteria became more 
flexible for this particular client not only due to the external environment and the 
general lack of applicants, but also due to a somewhat incubator-client shared 
experience; the proposer was a member of the local community and was compelled 
to move due out of the old premises due to financial reasons.  
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This did not mean though that the general quality of client applicants was reduced (in 
the words of the DubInc IM):  
 
[DubInc IM] “…People walking through the door nowadays are serious 
business men, who have considered all their options because it is not easy to 
start-up and grow a business in such times…true quite a few might have been 
forced into starting up a business due to the massive amount of redundancies 
happening these days, but they are experienced and qualified professionals 
who had some business ideas but never really the opportunity…so 
redundancies in a rather unexpected and cruel way are fuelling new start-
ups…” 
 
On the other hand, Campus Incubators, like IncuWorks, were put under pressure by 
their hosting Universities and through government institutions such as Enterprise-
Ireland (who also sit on IncuWorks’ board as investors) to work more efficiently to find 
and commercialise intellectual property, and to grow and move out at a quicker pace 
High-Tech Potential Start-ups (HPSUs). New technology policy targets placed a great 
emphasis on the number of new HPSUs created on a yearly basis and performing 
well on this indicator meant ongoing government policy-level support for IncuWorks.  
 
From the above it becomes clear that selection criteria was not static but rather a 
changing complex which juxtaposes two facets of the applicant (a) “the soundness of 
the business idea” and (b) “the capacity of individual (proposer) / team to successfully 
implement the business idea” with (c) “inviolable incubator meta-principles (such as 
reputation, culture, ethos)” and (d) “the present strategic outlook / challenges faced 
by the incubator organisation”. In other words, the interview panel is trying to judge 
the chances of the new applicant violating (more appropriately not augmenting) the 
incubator’s meta-principles and whether the new applicant will contribute to the 
indicators through which the incubator’s / IM’s performance is judged.  
 
Incubation researchers have often described the client selection decision as a rational 
process (as suggested at the beginning of this section). The empirical case work 
suggests otherwise. The selection decision is a complicated mix of rational and non-
rational intuitive and experiential processes as suggested by the IncuWorks’ director: 
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[IncuWorks Director] “…there is no way to tell if a person will make it or not, 
the cashflows and the business plan just tell one side of the story, in the end 
we just have to go with gut feeling and experience…I know it doesn’t sound 
very scientific but its something you cannot explain too easily…” 
 
The traditional view of human decision making has been that people make rational 
choices predicated on maximising pleasure or gains and minimising pain or losses. 
Over the past several decades, this rational model has been increasingly challenged 
from a variety of theoretical perspectives as well as on empirical grounds (Kahneman 
et al, 1982; Simon, 1991). Alternative perspectives assume that people process 
information in two different modes, one identified by terms such as rational, analytical, 
deliberative, propositional, and extensional and the other by terms such as 
experiential, automatic, intuitive, narrative, and natural (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). 
The rational system is a deliberative, verbally mediated, primarily conscious analytical 
system that functions by a person's understanding of conventionally established rules 
of logic and evidence. Whereas, the experiential system, operates in an automatic, 
holistic and associationistic manner - represents events in the form of concrete 
exemplars, schemas inductively derived from emotionally significant past experiences 
and is able to generalise and to construct relatively complex models for organising 
experience and directing behaviour by the use of prototypes, metaphors, scripts and 
narratives (Epstein, 1990). 
 
According to Epstein et al (1992), behaviour is guided by the joint operation of the two 
systems, with their relative influence being determined by the nature of the situation 
and the degree of emotional involvement. Certain situations (e.g., solving 
mathematical problems) are readily identified as requiring analytical processing, 
whereas others (e.g., interpersonal behaviours) are more likely to be responded to in 
an automatic, experientially determined manner. Holding such situational features 
constant, the greater the emotional involvement, the greater the shift in the balance of 
influence from the rational to the experiential system. The experiential system is 
assumed not only to automatically direct human behaviour, but also to automatically 
influence conscious human thought. To the extent that this is true, humans can 
respond rationally (in the sense of engaging their deliberative, rational system in an 
objective, unbiased manner) only to the degree to which they are aware of and can 
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compensate for their experientially influenced thoughts and response tendencies 
(Epstein et al, 1992). 
 
Therefore, the selection system is guided by both a rational / analytical approach 
facilitated by the assessment of concrete matter-of-fact details provided by the 
proposer in the application form as well as pre-conscious, intuitive and experiential 
processes (such as stereotyping). The nature of the selection process explains how 
IMs can be influenced by non-rational variables while thinking that they have made an 
honest, unbiased evaluation of the proposer’s business and personal attributes as 
well as other difficult-to-rationalise variables such as motivation, professional 
reputation, suitability to incubation and ability to pay future rentals. This system 
seems to work well in an unpredictable and complex environment with a huge variety 
in the types of clients and the nature of their businesses.  
 
9.6 The Nature and Range of Co-Production Developmental Assistance 
 
The available range and types of developmental assistance services vary with the 
type of incubator organisation and its objectives, funding situation and the needs of its 
client base amongst other variables. The basic purpose behind providing such 
services is to fill knowledge and resource gaps faced by client firms. Knowledge gaps 
may include a lack of capacity in risk management; raising capital; legal and 
intellectual property issues; finance; marketing; technology/product/service 
development; business planning; team building; and so on. Developmental 
assistance also fills client firm resource gaps such as the provision of testing 
equipment, certified food processing facilities, conferencing, computing and other 
infrastructural facilities. The incubator and its network may supply important contacts 
to fill these needs (Rice, 2002).  
 
Exhaustive lists of developmental services have been put together by incubator 
industry associations such as the NBIA and UKBI and are available in their 
documents and websites. An incubator’s “menu of services” is not static and tends to 
change due to experimentation and changing client requirements. In the words of the 
IncuWorks IM: 
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[IncuWorks IM] “…We have a wide range of services to which we keep on 
adding. Others have become outdated over the years or when clients did not 
show interest we decided to withdraw them…we ask for anonymous feedback 
on some trainings and workshops but overall how clients respond to a new 
initiative is a good indicator of its value…” 
 
In the delivery of different items on the “menu” there also lie subtle differences 
between incubators. For instance, at IncuWorks “Enterprise Development Advice” 
was generally taken to mean a process of mentoring, whereas, at DubInc the similar 
“One-to-One Business Advice” was viewed as coaching. The fact that DubInc’s 
Enterprise Officer had recently completed a business coaching certification somewhat 
corroborates the above assertion.  
 
Mentoring and coaching, both requiring co-production, have a lot in common, but 
there are a number of important differences. Mentoring is a power free, two-way 
mutually beneficial learning situation where the mentor provides advice, shares 
knowledge and experiences, and teaches using a low pressure, self-discovery 
approach. The mentor is both a source of information / knowledge and a Socratic 
questioner (Garvey et al, 2009). Coaching is different and tends to focus on the 
achievement by coachees of a goal or specific skill. Methodologies for coaching are 
positioned away from the directive or the facilitative, and rest on accompanying 
clients within a dialogue that will allow emerging patterns and solutions to surface. 
Coaching lies out of the scale between mentoring and training on one end, and 
psychotherapy and counselling at the other (Garvey et al, 2009). Table 17 presents a 
snap-shot overview of mentoring-coaching differences: 
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Table 17 – Mentoring & Coaching Differences43 
 
Mentoring Coaching 
Ongoing relationship that can last for a long 
period of time  
Relationship generally has a set duration 
Can be more informal and meetings can take 
place as and when the mentee needs some 
advice, guidance or support  
Generally more structured in nature and 
meetings are scheduled on a regular basis 
More long-term and takes a broader view of 
the person  
Short-term (sometimes time-bounded) and 
focused on specific development areas/issues 
Mentor is usually more experienced and 
qualified than the ‘mentee’. Often a senior 
person in the organisation who can pass on 
knowledge, experience and open doors to 
otherwise out-of-reach opportunities  
Coaching is generally not performed on the 
basis that the coach needs to have direct 
experience of their client’s formal 
occupational role, unless the coaching is 
specific and skills-focused 
Focus is on career and personal 
development  
Focus is generally on development/issues at 
work 
Agenda is set by the mentee, with the 
mentor providing support and guidance to 
prepare them for future roles  
The agenda is focused on achieving specific, 
immediate goals 
Mentoring revolves more around developing 
the mentee’s professional abilities 
Coaching revolves more around specific 
development areas/issues 
  
From the table above, it becomes possible to link mentoring and coaching 
approaches with incubation strategies. DubInc’s reactive and episodic approach 
echoes coaching’s nature with a set duration, focused agenda and achievement of 
specific targets. IncuWorks’ proactive approach is, however, more in-line with 
mentoring with a focus on long term growth and development. However, there is 
much overlap and the boundaries are at best blurry. Whether the IM-Client dyadic 
relationship is one of coach-coachee or mentor-mentee, an important determinant of 
relational success is the IM-Client cognitive match or “incubation click”.  
 
In Chapter 6, the “menu” of developmental services offered by the two case 
organisations was presented, however, these lists did not capture in entirety the full 
range and extent of IM-Clients’ co-production-related engagement. This fact becomes 
clear from the following categorisation:  
 
                                                 
43 From the Coaching & Mentoring Network UK’s website: www.coachingnetwork.org.uk (accessed May, 2010) 
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1. One-to-One Business Advice & Guidance – either between an IM and a client 
or an outside expert and a client. In some rare cases, it can also occur 
(usually informally) between client to client. This is a very broad category and 
can include a whole array of advice relating to client problems that the IM can 
potentially resolve such as advice on finance, raising capital, HR, marketing, 
corporate governance and so on. IncuWorks’ monthly advice clinics would 
also fall into this category.  
 
2. Project Conceptualisation and Management – the IM-Client dyad can initiate 
and conduct business projects together where the aim would be to either 
resolve crises at the client firm or to instigate growth. These could include 
developing a funding proposal, preparing the client firm to enter a competition, 
developing a shareholding plan for a VC and so on. IM-Client projects tend to 
have more tangible outcomes, require much more intimate contact and IM 
involvement over a long duration. The media exposure facility and facilitated 
linkages to university research at IncuWorks would also fall into this category. 
 
3. Structured Non-Specific Training – the CCDP, start-your-own business course, 
distinguished speaker series and other workshops / seminars would fall into 
this category, as well as would IncuWorks’ trainings offered in alliance with 
various external bodies such as the Chartered Institute of Directors.  
 
4. Internal and External Networking – both incubators facilitate internal and 
external client networking by arranging socialising events and introducing 
clients to established industry networks.  
 
From the above it becomes clear that unlike infrastructural supports such as meeting 
and conference rooms, broadband connection and car park which are commonly 
available with equal levels of access to all clients, the benefits of developmental 
services to clients are subjective, unequally distributed and some are quite specific to 
an IM-Client co-production dyad.  
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A final point to make about the delivery of incubation services is that researchers in 
the domain of social capital and knowledge creation theory suggest that the ‘novelty’ 
value of a partner’s knowledge relative to one’s own depreciates over time 
(McFadyen & Cannella, 2004). Through this logic, incubation services would be co-
produced on a diminishing rate, in other words, as clients mature in the process, it is 
likely that they will consume / require less resources.  
 
A number of clients at both case organisations reported that initially their assistance / 
resource requirements were high and as time passed, their need for IM time and 
incubator resources reduced due a number of reasons including; first, a move 
towards self-sufficiency: 
 
[Client 21] “…We made our application to IncuWorks in 2008…at the time my 
partner and I were operating out of my living room with two laptops…but as we 
moved in there were a number of areas that we identified along with the IM in 
which we needed specialist advice and expertise. If we had to pay-by-the-hour 
for these, it would have been a huge drain on our finances. In a year or so, when 
our cash flow improved, we hired our own advisors and consultants…”  
 
Second, external investment can bring in greater financial resources, thereby, the 
reliance on IM time and resources may reduce: 
 
[Client 35] “…Our aim from the very start was to attract VC investment. For this 
we received a lot of help from the IM, who introduced us to several funds. We 
also worked together on preparing our business plan and presentation. Once 
XYZ (the VC fund) made the offer and came in we had the funding available 
meet our staffing requirements…yes I would say our interaction with the IM 
was not as intense but we kept in regular touch and consulted on and off…”  
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Third, due to a building of client capacity:  
 
[Client 5] “…I didn’t know much about business when I came across ABC (the 
IM), I have received a lot of help…you know just brainstorming and bouncing 
ideas off of each other. But I think as I have understood the XYZ business I 
feel more confident and don’t go running to ABC (the IM) every time I have an 
issue…” 
 
Interestingly, for a number of clients resource requirements either did not change and 
in a rare case they increased. For instance, a client at DubInc reported: 
 
[Client 3] “…I found ABC (the previous IM) quite formal and to-the-point, not that 
there was any problem…but you know what I mean…I didn’t feel reassured 
enough to come forth and be open but when XYZ (the new IM) took over, things 
changed dramatically, XYZ was quite friendly and open, came to my office a few 
times and kept in touch…so yeah I did feel confident enough to start a few 
projects with (gender ref. removed)…” 
 
The above cases bring into question the notion of ‘novelty’ value of knowledge 
depreciating over time. The aspect of novelty (the unique set of IM knowledge set and 
resource base) had little to do with the reduction in client requirements for 
developmental intervention and specialist resources. The reduction in dependence 
that did occur was due to clients finding alternate channels for meeting their resource 
needs. The motives for seeking these alternate sources differed from client-to-client, 
but there was no case where a client reduced IM dependence due to a diminishing of 
‘novelty’ value of IM skill set and resource base.   
 
9.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter, it has been shown that the co-creation of developmental assistance 
occurs through one of three strategies: dormant, reactive and proactive. Each 
strategy signals the level of IM-Client relational quality, the positive or negative state 
of incubation “click” and clients’ strategic motives for incubator placement. A dormant 
relationship where both the IM and client understand that only infrastructural non-
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specific benefits of incubation are sought signals a relatively low quality of 
relationship at the professional level, a negative state of incubation “click” and client 
rationale for incubator placement as being purely economic. On the other hand a 
proactive strategy would signal the opposite, a high quality IM-Client personal and 
professional relationship, positive incubation “click” and client placement in the 
incubator due to a genuine need for developmental assistance. It must be noted, 
however, that the strategy adopted by the IM initially, based primarily on perceptual 
judgment, can change abruptly at any stage of the incubation process if the client 
chooses to change the relational dynamic. This could occur due to changes in client 
circumstances, shifts in the external environment or a serendipitous / chance 
encounter with the IM leading to useful new information which the client may wish to 
act on or pursue. Thus, incubation strategy is an evolving complex specific to an IM-
Client dyad.  
 
Seven stages have been identified in the incubation process from ‘initial contact’ to 
‘graduation’. Previous models have not recognised how crucial the first stage of initial 
contact is to the overall process. The mechanism, circumstances and time frame 
under which IM-Client contact is made has tremendous bearing on future levels of 
rapport and incubation strategy. The credentials of the introducer (if there is one) also 
have influence. The likelihood of a proactive incubation strategy being setup would be 
greater if the client was introduced to the IM through the campus company 
development programme, the start-your-own-business course or a county enterprise 
board contact rather than through a random walk-in application.  
 
Ultimately, during the client selection process, the IM (along with other involved 
stakeholders) is not only attempting to assess the likelihood of a prospective client’s 
post incubation “success” but also (quite importantly) whether the client genuinely 
needs developmental assistance, whether both parties would be able to develop an 
effective working ‘incubation’ relationship and the impact the client would have on 
other clients in the facility and the reputation of the incubator organisation. The clients 
bring open and hidden agendas but so do the IMs.  
 
In the next chapter,  based on the third area of investigation proposed in the research 
objective, the unique and interesting features of the case organisations’ structural 
properties are explored. 





Findings from Case Studies - IV 





The purpose of this chapter is to present three themes which draw attention to the 
status of incubators as truly unique hybrid organisations. According to Williamson 
(1991), hybrid organisations are neither markets nor hierarchies and have 
characteristics of their own. Ménard (2004), following Ronald Coase, stresses that 
there is a need to explain why hybrid organisations exist and what makes them viable 
substitutes to alternative modes of governance. He agrees with Coase that hybrids 
are not “strange forms”, rather, they are a major if not predominant mode of 
organising transactions and, therefore, economic activities. Hybrid forms are highly 
complex, which makes their study both challenging and stimulating.  
 
Therefore, in this chapter attention is paid to a number of interesting hybridising 
attributes of incubators' structure. As suggested in the Introduction chapter – structure 
is seen as the "established pattern of relationships among the parts of the 
organisation" (French et al, 1985, p. 348). Of particular importance are the patterns in 
relationships and duties. These include themes of 1) integration (the way activities 
are coordinated), 2) differentiation (the way tasks are divided), 3) the structure of the 
hierarchical relationships (authority systems), and 4) the formalised policies, 
procedures, and controls that guide the organisation (administrative systems). 
Focusing on these themes helps to shed light on a number of interesting structural 
properties of incubators including de-coupling; mis-alignment of managerial 
incentives and aspects which introduce uncertainty, leading to information 
asymmetry, contracting complexities and alternative forms of organisation. 
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10.2 The Nature of IM Work & the “De-Coupling” of Incubator Structure 
 
The IM’s role as a manager and leader is multi-faceted and complex. When analysing 
the IM’s job description, two distinct areas of intervention become apparent; (a) the 
role as manager-leader of the incubator staff and organisation (corporate and 
physical); and (b) the role as a mentor-coach to incubation clients. The responsibility, 
accountability, incentives and rewards associated with these two areas are different, 
and the IM is usually on a tightrope in order to ensure that the allocation of energy 
and time to corporate vs. incubation activities is in accordance with the expectations 
set out by the incubator’s Board of Directors. For the IM, like any top-tier manager, 
meeting the Board’s expectations and achieving set targets is linked to compensation 
and promotion. Therefore, IM time allocation should be impacted by the way in which 
Board strategic targets are tied in with IM incentives.  
 
The Board, however, are only able to effectively govern (and as a consequence 
evaluate) the IM’s corporate role, since associated outputs are usually in the form of 
tangible numeric indicators, such as % growth in revenue or implementation of a 
certain infrastructural upgrade scheme. Evaluating the IM’s incubation-related role is 
much more difficult to evaluate due to the problem associated with identifying and 
putting a measure on intangible indicators. For instance, the DubInc IM stated: 
 
[DubInc IM] …Putting a dollar value on our work is unrealistic…I mean…how 
will the allocation of three hours of joint-planning time with an IT client be 
weighed in comparison to one hour of commenting on a food sector client’s 
business plan?... 
 
Thus, what is observed in the case of incubators is what organisational theorists term 
as “de-coupling” – the idea that the creation and maintenance of gaps between formal 
policies and actual organisational practices allows certain types of organisations to 
function. De-coupling has been observed in a variety of organisations, including 
educational organisations (Meyer & Rowan, 1978; Delucchi, 2000), corporations 
(Westphal & Zajac, 2001), government agencies (Lines, 2005), and social movement 
organisations (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). In order to understand the reasons which 
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lead to de-coupling, the case of educational organisations is used to draw parallels 
with incubators.  
 
Meyer & Rowan (1978) argue that when the scale of social activities expand, higher 
levels of coordination and control are required and that bureaucratic controls emerge 
to structure these activities efficiently, however, in the case of educational 
organisations evidence suggests that they lack close internal coordination especially 
of the content and methods of what is their main activity – instruction. Student 
achievement data is rarely used to evaluate the performance of teachers or schools, 
a teaching technology or even a detailed instructional programme is largely missing in 
schools; educational administrators have little direct authority over instructional work. 
However, certain areas of organisational structure are more tightly controlled such as 
scheduling of classes and teacher recruitment. 
 
Therefore, organisational control does not affect all areas of activity equally. The 
critical activity of instruction tends to be removed from the control of organisational 
structure – structure is disconnected from technical (work) activity, and activity is 
disconnected from its effects. This is so because linking the theory of education to the 
activities of instruction would create conflict and inconsistency, and discredit and 
devalue the meaning of ritual classifications in society. Educators thus operate on a 
‘logic of confidence’ by decoupling structure from instruction – working smoothly 
obtaining support and maximising meaning and prestige of the ritual categories of 
people they employ and produce (Meyer & Rowan, 1978). 
 
In the case of incubators, the de-coupling of structures maintains the legitimacy of the 
organisation. Incubators avoid close inspections 44  because elaborate displays of 
confidence and trust can increase the commitments of internal participants. By 
agreeing that IMs have incubation delivery competence, maximum social 
responsibility for upholding the ethos of incubation goes to the IMs. And much of the 
value of incubation has little to do with the efficiency of developmental activities.  A 
good building, external networks, Client-Client experience and other factors have a 
more significant impact). Measuring what clients learn and the impact of that learning 
                                                 
44  ibid, see Chapter 2 for a discussion on why incubator impact evaluation is inherently difficult to conduct and  why 
incubators have avoided, and are likely to continue avoiding, close scrutiny which would link ‘investments made’ to ‘macro-
economic benefits’. 
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on economic growth targets and what IMs are actually delivering / contributing 
introduces unnecessary uncertainty, and creates doubts about the effectiveness of 
the status structure of the incubator organisation. Even if indicators and measures 
were developed, due to the randomness and complexity inherent in incubation 
(discussed in the next chapter), capturing and logging precise details (for later 
appraisal) is likely to lead to a high cost administrative overload. By minimising 
resources devoted to coordination and control, the incubator furthers its ability to 
increase the ceremonial worth of its contribution to client firm development and 
“success”.  
 
It is clear then that de-coupling enables incubator organisations to gain legitimacy 
with their external constituents while simultaneously maintaining internal flexibility to 
address practical considerations. However, there are degrees of structural de-
coupling, impacted by the IM’s task variety and key performance indicators. For 
instance, amongst the most important indicators by which IM performance was 
judged at DubInc (in the absence of external assured income), was ensuring that the 
organisation generates enough revenue on a month-to-month basis to meet its short 
and long term financial commitments. Assuring performance on this key indicator 
meant that the IM’s energy and time was diverted to a variety of corporate revenue 
generating activities such as funding and developing community schemes, marketing 
training programmes and running short courses. The IM’s compensation and benefits 
were linked to the liquidity situation of DubInc and not strictly to how well client firms 
were performing (which ought to be, by some standards, the real IM performance 
indicator). This led to higher degrees of structural de-coupling within DubInc’s primary 
activity and raison d'être – incubation. Incubation activity served an important 
ceremonial purpose i.e. legitimating the continued institutionalisation of the 
‘community enterprise centre’ but its real share, benefit and subsequent impact in the 
organisation’s total workflow remained uncontrolled and unmonitored.  
 
Interestingly, the DubInc IM, although realising that the de-coupling inherent in 
incubators’ structure allowed the organisations to function effectively, felt that in the 
long run, higher degrees of de-coupling had the potential to tarnish organisational 
reputation:  
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[DubInc IM] “…We do a lot of work with our existing clients and people walking 
in but there is no way to show the impact of all this effort…we want to start 
compiling data about our clients and the progress they make…so when we 
present our case to Enterprise Ireland we will have concrete figures…” 
 
The IM had, therefore, commissioned a software company to implement a tracking 
and monitoring system to log incubation activity. This system (under design when the 
research was conducted) was to contain client firm data in the form of profiles created 
on the day of first contact till the time a client graduated. It is important to note that 
this new software system was exclusively for incubation and was in no way meant to 
be connected to the incubator’s corporate accounting, payroll, inventory and other 
systems.  
 
Lower levels of structural de-coupling were observed at IncuWorks with a number of 
incubation-focused key performance indicators for the IM. The IM’s role (as 
described) was “tech. transfer from University to spin-outs”. Towards the 
accomplishment of this primary role, a number of key performance indicators 
(monitored on a yearly basis) were allocated to the IM including: (1) number of new 
spin-outs created; (2) number of new desk space clients inducted; (3) number of new 
unit clients inducted; (4) number of feasibility grants acquired from Enterprise Ireland; 
and (5) seed funding / capital raised by new clients. These indicators are meant to 
report actual performance not actual performance vs. set targets. In other words, at 
the strategic level, there were apparently no firm targets set out on a yearly basis 
including how many new spin outs were to be created or how many new unit clients 
were to be inducted.  
 
According to the IncuWorks’ IM, the performance indicators were reviewed annually, 
however, it was not revealed whether there were any consequences for non-
performance. Due to our new understanding of incubators based on the concept of 
de-coupling, it may be argued that even with the presence of key performance 
indicators, the IncuWorks’ IM’s true role remained largely uncontrolled and 
unmonitored. Consider the efficacy of the indicator - “number of new spin-outs 
created”; a number, let us assume ‘3’ new spin-outs, what does it really tell us about 
the precise role and contribution of the IM? Similarly, the number of new desk space 
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and unit clients inducted may or may not have anything to do with the IM’s effort. 
Numerically, how will the IM’s contribution by way of a VC introduction be delineated 
from the (hypothetically speaking) €500,000 of seed capital raised by a client? Thus, 
the indicators are not true measures of IM performance and this fact has also been 
brought out in practitioner literature and surveys (UKBI, 2001; UKBI, 2006).  
 
These indicators, however, perform other important roles that contribute to 
organisational legitimacy and reputation. The indicators give an impression of high 
quality and professional management and allow IncuWorks to publish an annual 
report detailing accomplishments on a year-to-year basis. They also greatly aid in 
bolstering organisational reputation and are devices that indicate progress to 
IncuWorks’ key sponsors and stakeholders. Based on the publishing of these 
numbers, IncuWorks is able to draw in support and augment its institutionalised 
position as a model ‘campus-based incubator’ in Ireland. 
 
This section highlighted two important elements; first, structural de-coupling is 
inherent to incubators where the major activity of the organisation (incubation) tends 
to be disconnected from organisational control structures and the activity itself is 
disconnected from its true impacts. It tends to serve other purposes such as 
bolstering legitimacy and reputation. Second, the complex and nearly impossible-to-
monitor work of the IM raises a number of interesting points, such as, what is truly 
required of an incubator manager?; and, whether personal leadership style has any 
impact on incubation ethos, strategy and triggers? These issues are analysed in the 
next section. 
 
10.3 De-Constructing the IM’s Role: Leadership & Organisational Culture 
 
Incubator management as a role is not as well defined when compared to roles in 
other professions such as Chartered Accounting, Actuarial Science or Law. In this 
section an attempt is made to deconstruct the profile of an Incubator Manager to 
highlight how the complexities inherent in the position make it nearly impossible to 
define the precise role of ‘incubator management’, thereby, making difficult the task of 
measuring IM performance and contribution to client firm growth. Developing an 
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understanding of this role and its various requirements is important to gauge the 
contribution of incubator managers to client firm growth and aligning IM incentives.  
 
In the absence of a recognised academic or industrial qualification for incubator 
managers, incubator professionals often rely on imagination, previous business 
experience and by learning on the job (SUMMIT-II, 2010). Practitioner literature time 
and again emphasises that the success of an incubator is heavily dependent on the 
person appointment as the Manager. The NBIA recommends, for instance, three 
principal qualities of an IM: (1) must be a good ‘people manager’ since the IM 
simultaneously needs to manage the Incubator Board, stakeholders, staff and clients; 
(2) should have entrepreneurial experience, having succeeded or failed in starting 
his/her own business (preferably in the targeted industries) so that client firms can 
relate to and respect the individual; and (3) must be a good communicator since a 
really critical task for the IM is to promote the incubation programme in all kinds of 
business settings and to market it to different stakeholders, including the client firms 
(Boyd, 2006).  
 
Although there is no accepted code defining the precise role and accompanying tasks 
of an incubator manager, practitioner literature suggests the broad outlines of an 
average IM’s job description (UKBI, 2001; Byrne, 2005; NBIA,  2008):  
 
1. Providing counselling, coaching or mentoring (as per need and assessment) to 
companies;  
2. Preparing entrepreneurs to take advantage of external resources;  
3. Linking companies to external resources;  
4. Encouraging companies to make the best use of incubator resources;  
5. Marketing the incubation programme to multiple stakeholders including 
potential clients;  
6. Corporate governance – Board of Directors management and strategic 
planning; 
7. Business Administration – HR, finance, facilities management, procurement, 
legal and other administrative functions; and  
8. Show contribution to local and regional economic development.  
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The IM job description breaks down the task of ‘incubator management’ into two 
basic categories: (1) corporate activities aimed at running the organisation like a 
business; and (2) activities focused on helping client firms grow. The IMs at the case 
organisations, when asked what the requirements of the role were, responded as 
follows: 
 
[DubInc IM] “…My job requires a number of things of me, I am here to 
progress DubInc’s vision and mission of local community development through 
the promotion of an enterprise culture, I am responsible for the overall 
management of the facility and for making plans for its expansion and to 
provide whatever support we can to our clients…” 
 
[IncuWorks IM] “…I will have to say that tech-transfer from the University 
(hosting institution) to the market is my key role. This requires the identification 
of intellectual property, working with our scientists and researchers to develop 
commercial proposals and business plans and then help in raising funding and 
launching their businesses…it is a whole cycle. Besides this I am required to 
monitor and facilitate the progress of our existing clients, organise the CCDP 
programme, attend networking meetings and widen our service network, work 
with my other colleagues to organising trainings and promote our client 
companies in local and international competitions…” 
 
The following quotes show what the IM’s felt were key aspects of their role: 
 
[DubInc IM] “…My most useful aspect is my commercial background as 
manager….working in various organisations in different capacities…this helps 
me strategising with our clients and coordinating everything…” 
 
[DubInc IM] “…The greatest influence I have on client firms is in the day-to-day 
stuff that allows them to get on with their business…remove worries…” 
 
[IncuWorks IM] “…My academic background helps build a rapport with our 
clients, especially spin-ins, because they feel that I can emphatically 
understand the unpredictable process of commercialising scientific research…” 
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[IncuWorks IM] “…Helping companies to understand the need to be innovative 
at all times and not being fixed on only one product or aspect of the 
business…” 
 
[DubInc IM] “…Would like to spend more time with clients but as you can see I 
wear a number of different hats…” 
 
While the DubInc IM’s tasks fall into both the above categories (corporate and 
incubation), evidence showed that IncuWorks’ IM’s role is much more focused on the 
second category i.e. incubation activities aimed at helping client firms grow. 
Corporate and administrative responsibilities fell into the Director’s domain who was 
assisted by a variety of specialised staff. Therefore, in judging and planning the 
incubator management role, it is apparent that balances need to be struck between: 
 
1. Premises management and client support services 
2. The provision of day-to-day help and strategic inputs 
3. The focus on the current and potential client firms and focus on local and 
regional economic development 
 
In the absence of an incubation profession regulatory body (like those that regulate 
the medical, accounting and actuarial professions) time allocation to the above three 
categories of ‘competing priorities’ by IMs is usually a reflection of Board expectations 
and the IM’s ‘personal leadership style’. The ‘leadership style’ aspect seems to have 
a very strong bearing on client attitudes towards incubation. The IM-Client dyadic 
relationship is quite closely related to the IM’s leadership and management style and 
impacts whether or not a client decides to work with the IM. To illustrate, a number of 
clients stated: 
 
[Client 9] “…Contact with the IM has been informal with good access…lots of 
interaction…(gender ref. removed) is quite approachable and easy-to-talk-
to…” 
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[Client 31] “…Relationships are good…the IM takes an interest in the growth of 
the firm, introduced us to other clients and has helped us identify 
customers…this a good benefit…” 
 
[Client 39] “…I sometimes get useful nuggets of information by talking with the 
management here, but I personally don’t know the IM at all…” 
 
[Client 16] “…The relationship between us and the Centre is sticky…I feel they 
don’t consider clients as proper customers…there is a need for a bit more 
professionalism…I would not treat my customers like the Centre treats its 
clients…” 
 
[Client 28] “…I have never felt any unease in approaching the IM or other staff 
here…they are not pushy…we can talk whenever needed…but it is quite rare 
that I’d approach the IM with a business problem because we have our own 
network and there is a lot of support from the parent company…” 
 
(Client 4] “…I think it makes a big difference if the IM is emphatic, experienced 
and has good contact…there is a need to build trust and rapport without which 
I don’t think there will a chance to move forward…here I suppose the IM needs 
to come across as interested and proactive…otherwise how would we know…” 
 
The effectiveness of leadership styles has long been a topic of discussion in both 
academic and practitioner circles (Howell & Avolio, 1993; Avolio & Bass, 1995; 
Avolio, 1999). Most managers exhibit components of several different leadership 
styles such as transformational behaviour, contingent reward leadership and 
management-by-exception leadership (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999), therefore, it 
becomes difficult to precisely point-point an individual manager’s exhibited style. 
However, researchers agree that effective leadership in any role requires a manager 
to be adept at a number of common skills such as being able to develop and coach 
subordinates, communicate clearly, resolve conflicts, analyse problems, make sound 
decisions, be able to respond to work challenges in a positive way, use time 
efficiently, and delegate work (Davis et al, 1996).  
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Based on the client quotes above, and other confidential client firm feedback, dyadic 
co-production would be greatly enhanced if the IM displayed emphatic behaviour, 
showed a keenness to devote personal time, had domain (market, sectoral and 
technical) knowledge and had a dense network of useful and resourceful contacts. If 
these important ingredients were missing in an IM’s leadership style, clients felt that 
the role of the IM would become irrelevant and it was likely that dyadic co-production 
would greatly slow down or halt altogether. The importance of these IM leadership 
attributes became prominent when clients were requested to compare the leadership 
and management styles of one of the case organisation’s previous IMs with the 
recently appointed new IM. In the words of clients: 
 
[Client 19] “…X (previous IM) was I am sure a very nice person but seemed 
very formal and reserved, was usually in the office with the door closed, we did 
not really have much contact, perhaps once a week in the corridor when we’d 
see each other and wave hello or something…but since Y (the new IM) took 
over, things are very different, (gender ref. removed) comes to my office every 
week, sends out personalised emails regularly, is very friendly and seems 
keen…I think age also makes a difference…we are like peers now…”  
 
[Client 14] “…the culture here is entirely different since Y (the new IM) took 
over, there is much more openness and rapport, it feels more like an incubator 
now…previously I’d say it was somewhat like a commercial office let…” 
 
Ultimately, the leadership style of IMs has an important bearing on the range and 
quantum of dyadic co-production. The greater the degrees of perceived empathy, 
proactivity, domain knowledge and network density, the greater are the chances that 
clients will engage in developmental co-production. Previous practitioner research 
has highlighted that there is no clear evidence that the skills and time inputted to 
face-to-face involvement with clients and the leadership / management style of the IM 
have direct influence on the development of incubator clients as a whole (UKBI, 
2001). However, this research has found that there are examples where the amount 
of time spent with individual clients, and/o r where the level and type of intervention is 
higher, leads to greater benefits being perceived by clients. Clients and graduated 
firms regard support and encouragement from the IM very highly. Even though the 
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IM’s personal involvement may not be a direct cause of improved business 
performance for all clients, the IM remains significant in terms of the clients feeling 
recognised and appreciated within the incubator.  
 
10.4 Uncertainty in the Incubation Environment 
 
In this section, aspects that contribute to contracting and other social uncertainties in 
the incubation environment are scrutinised. To precisely isolate all possible sources 
of uncertainty and risk in any given social or economic transaction is not possible, in 
fact a futile exercise. But human beings have a desire to understand properties of the 
unknown, to be able to predict future events in order to take actions prior and gain an 
advantage.  In this context, knowledge must be based on tangible and intelligible 
evidence whilst limiting the derivation of general rules from particular sets of evidence 
as one can be missing hidden properties. It is in this cautioned spirit, after extensive 
discussions with clients at both case organisations, a number of common elements 
are discussed below that clients felt led to uncertainty in the incubation environment. 
 
First, was the issue of clients not being able to precisely pin-point the areas where 
they needed help or what organisational economists would call “complexity of 
product/ service description” (Malone et al, 1987). At DubInc, this may be attributed to 
the absence of any client-specific development planning exercise (coordinated by the 
IM) to structure incubation activity. At IncuWorks, where a formal mechanism of 
assisting clients with periodic strategic planning existed, clients once again remained 
largely uncertain about the practicality of following any sort of a “plan” during the 
start-up phase. In the words of a client at IncuWorks: 
 
[Client 34] “…when we were starting off there were all sorts of teething 
issues…after those came problems of strategic market orientation, then 
financial management and finally I would have to say legal [when we were 
being assessed by a VC]…they were not predicted to be occurring in our 
business plan…strategy was more a day-to-day sort of thing for the first year 
or so…then things settled down…” 
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Second, there was uncertainty surrounding the scope of incubation activity and this 
was due to the fact that generally speaking incubator services were not formally 
communicated during the initial induction period. This led to clients expressing 
uncertainty about what developmental assistance, coaching and mentoring actually 
meant. In the words of a Client at DubInc: 
 
[Client 20] “…we do know that XYZ (the IM) is always available to help, what 
does this mean always available [emphasis added]…always available for what 
particular help…I am not sure…do I have to pay for it?” 
 
Clients became aware of the facilities either through their experience of interaction 
with the IM during the pre-incubation stage; by engaging with the IM on a potential 
lead / project and learning through experience or through ‘stories’ narrated by other 
clients in the facility. In other words, what services were available to clients seemed 
to be a matter of perceptual judgment and differed from client to client. 
 
Third, even if clearly formulated problems did exist, clients expressed uncertainty 
about whether they should or could approach the IM for assistance and advice on a 
given “problem”. One explanation for the presence of such uncertainty can come from 
Transaction Cost Economics and its treatment of the problem of “incomplete 
contracting” (Williamson, 1994). The tenancy / licensing arrangement between the 
incubator and the client firm details primarily the terms of the tenancy. The provision 
of developmental assistance is not an explicit part of the formal contract between the 
incubator organisation and client firms. Thus, in legal terms, neither DubInc nor 
IncuWorks are legally obliged to provide incubation assistance. Further, even if any 
advice or assistance is provided during the tenancy period, it is done so at the risk of 
the client where the incubator organisation bears no real legal liability for any 
resulting client losses. Thus, the IM-Client formal incubation relationship is based 
mostly on good faith.   
 
As a result of the above, generally speaking, clients were either (a) not formally 
aware (or even if they were aware not really sure of what it actually meant in practice) 
of a facility to provide developmental assistance; or (b) questioned the usefulness of 
“free”, “no obligation” and “non-liable” professional advice. The latter point came 
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across as a mental block for incubation engagement in a number of clients. For 
instance, a client at IncuWorks stated: 
 
[Client 26] “…when we need professional advice we set up a meeting with our 
solicitor or tax attorney and they charge us by the hour…I am not sure if we 
can really value free professional advice…”  
 
Explicit contracting may ultimately prove to be detrimental to the incubation 
environment. The complexity and cost related to preparing a tight legal document 
setting the scope and limits of incubation-related assistance is quite high. This is due 
to the unpredictability of the type of support needed during the tenancy period. 
Moreover, a standard legal document would not suffice for each client in a mixed-use 
incubation facility comprised of different types of firms from varying backgrounds in a 
wide spectrum of industries. The cost, preparatory work and time needed for drafting 
individual client contracts is likely to be debilitating and toxic in a start-up and 
entrepreneurial environment.  
 
A final point to make is that although replacing explicit contracting with good faith 
introduces administrative efficiencies, these elements do not necessarily improve the 
IM-Client incubation relationship which would ultimately depend on associated costs 
and benefits. Whilst the costs of forming and maintaining relationships are recognised 
(Adler & Kwon, 2002), they are rarely made explicit in the management literature as 
they are in (say) economics (Hummon, 2000). The knowledge sharing literature does, 
however, make clear that knowledge is sticky, and transferring and creating 
knowledge is not a costless activity (Szulanski, 1996; Haas & Hansen, 2007). Costs 
and risks arise in relational as well as intellectual terms; some relationships are 
arduous and de-energising (Cross et al, 2003), and some people are more 
trustworthy than others (Levin & Cross, 2004).  
 
Thus, in balancing anticipated benefits against costs and risks, the prime concern is 
the value of the relationship. The incubation relationship is such that, in aggregate, 
neither of the two parties (IM and Client) faces a draining out scenario or is 
significantly vulnerable without each other, but nonetheless, the relationship provides 
necessary and sufficient benefits. Therefore, the risk in sharing and imparting 
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knowledge is reduced since, due to the nature of the relationship, the likelihood of 
one partner abusing or exploiting the relationship is low – since there is no real 
incentive in abusing the relationship.  
 
10.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter, the impact of structural de-coupling and the IM’s leadership style on 
the scale, scope and nature of ‘incubation’ work was discussed within the context of 
relevant research findings. Levels of de-coupling influence a particular leadership 
style to emerge, thereby, influencing incubation strategy (dormant, proactive or 
reactive) and incubation approach (coaching or mentoring). In incubators with high 
levels of de-coupling, the focus of IM activity would be organisational self 
preservation and bolstering legitimacy and reputation. This is at a cost of devoting 
time and resources to the core purpose of the incubator – incubating. Lower levels of 
de-coupling is likely to have an opposite effect i.e. a greater IM focus on the core 
organisational activity due to higher levels of accountability, monitoring, tie-in of IM 
incentives to incubating, clearer definition of the IM’s role and the presence of 
alternate ‘resources’ to manage the incubator firm or corporation.  
 
The personal leadership style, personality and behavioural traits of the IM have 
tremendous bearing on the overall quality, levels and intensity of developmental 
assistance activity at an incubator organisation. Building and nurturing an IM-Client 
relationship is much more difficult than building more conventional familial or 
professional relationships such as those between a VC-entrepreneur and landlord-
tenant. The IM operates in a number of different capacities, at a number of different 
levels, and as a consequence maintains several different relationships with clients 
including that of landlord, shareholder, mentor, referee and broker. Depending on the 
nature of the IM-Client dyadic relationship, the IM must wear a number of different 
‘hats’ simultaneously whilst maintaining enough levels of rapport to facilitate dyadic 
co-production. An upset in any one of these roles can have an impact on the level of 
rapport, thereby, on the efficacy of dyadic co-production. Thus, the IM’s role is by its 
very nature a complex one, and is primarily about influencing clients by building and 
maintaining quality relationships. 
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The one normative advantage the IM has, in balancing anticipated benefits against 
costs and risks, is the value of the relationship. The incubation relationship is such 
that, in aggregate, neither of the two parties (IM and Client) is significantly vulnerable 
without each other, but nonetheless, the relationship provides necessary and 
sufficient benefits. Therefore, the risk in sharing and imparting knowledge is reduced, 
since, due to the nature of the relationship, the likelihood of one partner abusing or 
exploiting the relationship is low as there is no real incentive or gain by abusing the 
relationship.  
 
In the following, final chapter of the thesis, referring back to the research’s questions, 
the major theoretical contributions of the research are extracted from the present and 
the preceeding three analysis chapters and presented. There is also a reflection on 
the limitations of the research; further, a number of recommendations for professional 
practice are made, areas for further research are identified and the thesis is 
concluded with a number of closing remarks. 
 





Discussion & Conclusion 





The main aim of this chapter is to pull together, and present, the major contributions 
of the research. These are discussed at two levels. At the first, theoretical level, the 
contribution of the research’s output towards addressing the research questions is 
presented. To reiterate the points made in the Introduction and Methodology chapters, 
as this research was based on a qualitative-inductive approach, the research 
questions acted as useful guides only and were not utilised for ring-fencing the scope 
of enquiry. Due to the qualitative nature of the analytical work, in a number of 
instances answers appear across several of the 16 inter-linked themes presented in 
the preceding four chapters. By organising the research outputs under specific 
questions it is easier to understand what, in terms of new knowledge, this research 
has produced which is novel, useful and interesting. Such an approach allows for the 
demonstration of the research’s key contributions and demonstrates the implications 
for further theory development in the area.  
 
At the second level, the research process is scrutinised to see whether it has any 
implications for the theoretical lens adopted - social mechanisms. The purpose here 
is to highlight some difficulties that can arise when attempting to develop a general 
model of incubation. These arise due to randomness inherent in the internal incubator 
environment and the difficulty of factoring-in the impact of unpredictable rare events 
which impact client development. The chapter concludes with a number of 
recommendations for professional practice and suggestions for further research. 
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11.2 Theoretical Contributions 
 
The objective of this research, as highlighted in the Introduction chapter, was “to 
investigate the normative environment, internal mechanisms and structural properties 
of incubator organisations for the purpose of identifying key elements that positively 
influence the development of new enterprises”. Nine research questions were 
developed based on the knowledge gaps identified in a systematic review of previous 
literature. These questions facilitated a systematic investigation of the three areas 
proposed in the research objective. The original research questions were: 
 
1. How are the various stages of incubation organised? 
 
2. What are the various strategies of dyadic co-production? 
 
3. How do the structural properties of incubators impact on the organisation and 
orchestration of the incubation process? 
 
4. How does the internal normative environment impact on the organisation and 
orchestration of the incubation process? 
 
5. What is the nature of the relationship between the incubator organisation and 
client firm? 
 
6. In what ways does the incubator manager’s leadership style impact on co-
production efficacy? 
 
7. How is incubation triggered in a dyadic setting? 
 
8. How does Client-Client interaction within the incubator organisation take place?  
 
9. How are new firms inducted for incubation?  
 
In the following sub-sections, major theoretical contributions arrived at in the 
preceeding four analysis chapters are collated and linked to the above questions. A 
number of these questions have been paired with another closely inter-linked 
question, including questions ‘5’ and ‘4’, questions ‘1’ and ‘2’, and questions ‘3’ and 
‘6’. Combining these questions allows the presentation of the research’s major 
contributions in a logical and coherent manner. To illustrate, unless questions 4 and 5 
are paired it is not possible to present clearly one major theoretical outcome – that 
the nature of relationship between the IM and a client firm is the key variable that 
dictates the overall quality of IM-Client dyadic co-production efficacy. By combining 
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research questions in the manner described, it becomes possible to demonstrate 
more clearly the ways in which the analytical work has addressed the research 
questions. For clarity, a summary of the major findings and contributions is presented 
in Table 18, including an indication of the section where the relevant, detailed 
analysis can be found.  In the sections that follow, more information and related 
figures are provided. 
 
Table 18 – Summary of Major Findings & Theoretical Contributions 
 
Section Question(s) Summary Findings & Contributions 
11.2.1 What is the nature of the 
relationship between the 
incubator organisation and 
client firm?  
 
How does the internal 
normative environment 
impact on the organisation 
and orchestration of the 
incubation process? 
 Quality of IM-Client relations determine the quality of dyadic 
co-production. 
 Presentation of a conceptual model (Figure 16) which 
describes how relationships produce meaningful incubation 
outcomes. 
 Extension of Rice’s (2002) work by drawing on Georg 
Simmel and theorists in the coaching and mentoring area 
which helps in the identification of the key variables that 
form the basis of the dyadic bond. 
 Normative rules are a dynamic complex impacted by human 
experience and signalling behaviour. They determine why 
some incubation environments and relationships “click” 
whilst others do not. 
 
11.2.2 How are the various stages of 
the incubation process 
organised?  
 
What are the various 
strategies of dyadic co-
production? 
 Presentation of a conceptual model (Figure 17) that 
contextualises incubation ‘strategies’ and ‘stages’. 
 The IM adopts one of three strategies to engage with clients 
and clients move through a number of stages in the 
incubation process. 
 The ‘coaching’ or the ‘mentoring’ approaches are the two 
meta-ideals that guide IM incubation behaviour. 
 Development of four broad categories which capture the 
essence of incubation services offered. 
 
11.2.3 How are new firms inducted 
for incubation? 
 The incubator induction process for clients is random with a 
number of broad patterns. 
 Clients bring in multiple, often unsaid and hidden, agendas 
and pursue ends that sometimes negate the incubation 
ethos. 
 What it means to receive incubation assistance differs from 
client-to-client – no standard set of perceptions or 
expectations. These are also dynamic, changing as clients 
gain incubation experience. 
 The process of selecting clients for induction is guided by 
both a rational / analytical approach as well as sub-
conscious, intuitive and experiential processes. 
 
11.2.4 How is incubation triggered in 
a dyadic setting? 
 Increased understanding of the cognitive programming that 
triggers incubation in a dyadic setting. 
 An extension of Lichtenstein’s (1992) original list of nine 
precursors of effective incubation relationships. Four 
additional variables have been proposed: dyadic history; 
psychological compatibility and degree of vision 
commonality; IM leadership style; and trust. 
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11.2.5 How do the structural 
properties of incubators 
impact on the organisation 
and orchestration of the 
incubation process?  
 
In what ways does the 
incubator manager’s 
leadership style impact on co-
production efficacy? 
 The discovery of structural de-coupling in incubators 
 An exploration of the impact of IM leadership style on 
incubation efficacy. The IM has two distinct and competing 
areas of activity (and priority): “incubator management” and 
“incubation management”.  
 A number of elements contribute to contracting and other 
social uncertainties in the incubation environment: (1) clients 
not being able to precisely pin-point the areas where they 
needed incubator intervention; (2) clients uncertain about 
what developmental assistance, coaching and mentoring 
actually meant in practice; and (3) clients uncertain about 
whether they should or could approach the IM for assistance 
and advice.  
 Better communication of incubation’s goals, the incubator’s 
expectations and incubation services can contribute towards 
reducing internal environmental uncertainty. 
 In setting efficient organisational boundaries incubators do 
not wholly base their service menu decisions on the 
principles of economic efficiency, rather, such decisions are 
influenced by a mix of economic as well as non-economic 
factors such as relationship quality, complexity of the service 
and degree of client need specialisation. 
 
11.2.6 How does Client-Client 
interaction within the 
incubator organisation take 
place?  
 Client-Client interaction can be of several different types and 
each type has the potential to both positively or negatively 
affect client attitudes, beliefs and behaviour towards their 
own work, the incubator organisation and their ability and 
willingness to engage with other clients. 
 Contrary to what has been suggested in the past, the client-
mix of an incubator does not have a well defined relationship 
with boosting Client-Client interaction. Increased levels of 
Client-Client interaction depend on the nature of clients’ 
business and industrial affiliation. 
 Active brokerage behaviour by the IM that facilitates the 
linkup of clients in consortia or links clients individually or in 
groups to unrelated outside agencies has the potential to 
enhance client cooperative behaviour.  
 Several attributes of an incubator’s physical layout are quite 




11.2.1 What is the nature of the relationship between the incubator organisation 
and client firm? & How does the internal normative environment impact 
on the organisation and orchestration of the incubation process? 
 
One of the most crucial findings of the research related to the importance of 
relationships. The conceptual framework presented below constitutes the mental map 
or architecture for the investigation of this issue. This emerged iteratively in the effort 
to make sense of the activity in the case organisations, but is being set down here in 
a linear fashion for clarity. The framework is built on the proposition that relationships 
are a necessary condition for economic development and entrepreneurship. It is 
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summarised in the following flow diagram (Figure 16), and outlines the process by 
which relationships between the IM and clients and between clients produce 
meaningful incubation outcomes:  
 














Simply stated, various factors lead to a cognitive match between the parties in 
incubation. This ‘match’ is important since it allows the development of productive 
relationships which opens up avenues for engaging in mutual co-production activity. 
Once there is an agreement on the nature of this activity, roles and responsibilities 
are assigned and co-production of incubation activity commences. This leads to 
either positive or negative outcome states which in turn reinforce or degrade the 
quality of the cognitive match. 
 
The IM-Client incubation relationship is quite nuanced; a good analogy according to 
Lichtenstein (1992) would be that the entrepreneurs in the incubator stand in a similar 
relationship to the IM as do the guests in a party to the host. The IM as the host has 
no real authority over the entrepreneurs as guests. Indeed, entrepreneurs are 
expected to behave in certain ways but beyond this they have the freedom of choice 
to make whatever decisions they choose. The IM can simply provide an encouraging 
environment to allow the entrepreneurs to access opportunities not otherwise 
available, whilst allowing them to exercise their own initiative and to make their own 
Cognitive & Social Match 
A Meaningful Relationship 
Avenues for Incubation 
Activity 
Co-Production 





   
 
252 
choices. This is the unique challenge which IMs face: to identify the conditions which 
are crucial to the establishment of positive relationships and to manage them in a way 
that such an environment emerges. The importance of high quality IM-Client relations 
cannot be stressed enough, without this basic building block, incubation co-
production activity is likely to slow down or halt altogether 
 
The incubation relationship is dyadic and works on the principles of co-production. It 
was Rice (2002) who first used dyadic theory to explain the nature of incubation; 
however, his pioneering work needed extension to provide an understanding of the 
subtle, hidden and often unsaid rules that contributed to the willingness and ability of 
the dyadic parties to engage in co-production activities. In other words, from a 
theoretical stand-point, there was a need to augment Rice’s initial conceptualisation 
by focusing on questions such as: how, why and under what conditions does the IM-
Client dyad work effectively to promote the ideals and objectives of incubation? 
Without developing an understanding of the underlying normative rules that influence 
the dyadic parties’ behaviour, the true nature of incubation cannot be correctly 
understood. Further, it will be difficult to develop an understanding of the reasons why 
certain IM-Client dyads are much more effective than others. 
 
In order to enrich Rice’s work, the original proposer of dyadic theory, Georg Simmel 
was referenced along with other pioneers in the area (primarily Relationship 
Marketing researchers). Concepts and ideas were drawn from their work to develop a 
framework and starting-point for this investigation. This assisted in extending Rice’s 
original ideas on IM-Client co-production to include a number of other core elements 
which were found to be prevalent in incubation environments. These elements form 
the very basis of the dyadic bond articulated in Simmel’s terminology, and include: a 
common fate or enterprise; an agreement of “secrecy”; triviality or an immediacy of 
interaction; and intimacy regarding what each of the two participants gives or shows 
only to the one other person and to nobody else. It is acknowledged that these 
aspects have been discussed in the past, mostly singularly, by individual researchers; 
however, to the best of this researcher’s knowledge, previous work has not presented 
a holistic analysis of the factors that determine IM-Client relational bonds and quality. 
By incorporating Simmel’s core elements, IM-Client dyadic relations come quite close 
to modern day coaching and mentoring relationships. Following an examination of the 
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extensive coaching and mentoring literature, it became possible to draw out a further 
three elements including trust, commitment and active involvement as important 
relational elements.  
 
It is important to stress here that it is not an easy task to interpret the meanings of 
unsaid rules and normative behaviour. It requires a rigorous effort in data collection 
and analysis to ensure consistency (i.e. that what the researcher took down as notes 
and wrote up was as close as possible to what was said and meant). To ensure this 
consistency, the researcher shared his interpretation of normative rules with the case 
participants and requested their feedback. Extended fieldwork and an examination of 
two case organisations also proved to be useful in the sense that both common 
themes, as well as organisation-specific norms emerged, lending credence to the 
assumption about incubation being a highly complex and largely unpredictable social 
process.   
 
The normative rules that form IM-Client base-bonds are not static, they are a dynamic 
complex impacted on by human experience; in other words, either of the two parties 
can choose to change or violate certain rules under certain conditions (and not in 
others) determined by their experiences (and recorded memory) of the other party’s 
behaviour in (perceived-to-be) comparable instances in the past. The subtle (or 
otherwise) changes in behaviour and attitude of one party is picked up (and 
interpreted) as signals by the other party and it is signalling that allows the dyadic 
parties to determine the relative ‘applicability’ of normative rules in particular 
situations. For instance, in a highly simplified scenario, consider an IM, who is 
normally quite active in following up on client requests for assistance, may become 
withdrawn or even suspicious when a particular client who has signalled self-
sufficiency and independence in the past suddenly (and perhaps even genuinely) 
makes a new assistance request.  
 
The determination of how this new signal is perceived and interpreted by the IM, is 
best left to psychologists, but at this juncture it would be true to say that signalling, 
and relative changes in normative rules determine the overall quality, quantity, 
frequency, intensity, scale, scope and ultimately the output of incubation. It is quite 
possible that by studying changes in the dyadic parties’ psychological profiles, 
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signalling behaviour and the accompanying changes to norms, it can be determined 
why some incubation environments and relationships “click” whilst others do not.  
 
11.2.2 How are the various stages of the incubation process organised? & What 
are the various strategies of dyadic co-production? 
 
In Chapter 3 previous research on the incubation process was reviewed. One of the 
major conclusions drawn was that researchers in the past did not fully explore the 
true nature of the incubation process. It was also demonstrated that previous 
incubation knowledge was based primarily on a few rational models from the 1980s, 
at a time when incubator-incubation research began to appear in peer reviewed 
journals. The critique of the literature in Chapter 3 highlighted a number of problems 
inherent in previous models including: ignoring appropriate contexts, lack of 
appreciation of the clients’ role and attempts that were made to describe a non-linear 
and scalable process as linear. Therefore, in order to increase understanding in this 
area, and to further investigate the various facets of the incubation process, a 
theoretical framework based on social mechanisms theory and an inductive-
qualitative case study methodology was developed. The output of this endeavour, in 
the form of the model below, makes a strong contribution to the understanding of a 
variety of factors that have escaped careful scrutiny in the past.  
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In the model outlined in Figure 17, a number of aspects of the incubation process are 
described: First, depending on a number of variables such as the incubator’s goals 
and the resultant incubation ethos, pressures from the external environment and the 
perceived needs of the client-base, the IM adopts one of three possible strategies to 
engage with client firms - dormant, reactive and proactive. The adopted strategy is 
client-specific and signals the intensity, scope and frequency of incubation-related 
developmental assistance that is to flow from the IM to a particular client in a dyadic 
setting. These three strategies have different ranges (depending on the nature of 
relations in a particular IM-Client dyad). For example, the strategy ‘reactive incubation 
engagement’ for Client ‘A’ could mean a quicker, more thorough response to an 
assistance request by the IM than for Client ‘B’ due to experience memory and the 
nature of their relationship. Furthermore, the initially adopted strategy can also evolve 
over time depending on the changes in the IM-Client relationship. Hence, there is no 
one master strategy. If for example an incubator has 30 client firms, then a separate 
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evolutionary, it can change abruptly at times depending on changes in the IM-Client 
dyadic relations.  
 
Second, process models and practitioner research suggests that client firms complete 
a common set of stages from selection to graduation.  Case analysis shows that this 
is not an adequate representation of what really happens. The different incubation 
stages that a particular client experiences are unique, and clients’ stage-wise 
progress depends on a variety of relational / dyadic and internal-to-the-firm factors. 
Some clients progress much quicker than others (and not necessarily positive 
progress), some skip entire stages, whilst for others progression may be slower due 
to completely unforeseen or uncontrollable circumstances not linked to the quality of 
an IM’s developmental interventions. However, when everything is considered equal, 
a client firm would certainly go through a number of logically organised stages, with 
each progression bringing the client closer to the ultimate goal of successful 
incubation. The stages presented in Figure 17 augment previous models with a 
number of new stages; references and a justification for these have been drawn from 
the case data.   
 
Finally, three findings help to shed light on the nature and range of co-production 
developmental assistance-type services offered at incubators. Firstly, research 
revealed that there are two meta-ideals, depending on the nature and range of 
services offered at a particular incubator, that IMs adopt in service delivery – the 
“coaching” approach and the “mentoring” approach45. There also seemed to be a 
correlation between the broadly adopted incubation strategy at an incubator and the 
incumbent meta-ideal. Secondly, the “menus” of services at the two case 
organisations had a number of differences (in terms of nature and range). It was 
possible however to develop four broad categories which adequately captured the 
essence of the full range of services offered at incubator organisations in general: 
one-to-one business advice and guidance; project conceptualisation and 
management; structured non-specific training and internal and external networking. 
Thirdly, it is often assumed that incubation developmental assistance-type services 
                                                 
45 Some incubators have a “mentoring programme” available for clients with a fee; the IM outsources incubation in such an 
instance to an outside ‘expert’. Whether it is the IM or an outside ‘expert’ engaging with a client, the overall approach to 
developmental assistance adopted would be either mentoring or coaching. As it has been shown in section 9.6, there are 
important between the two approaches.  
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are offered at a “diminishing rate”; empirical data analysis, however, revealed that this 
was not the case, instances were recorded where the delivery rate increased, at 
times not due to the increased resource requirements of a particular client, but due to 
changes in the nature of IM-Client relations. 
 
11.2.3 How are new firms inducted for incubation?  
 
Published research in the past, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, does not 
examine the process by which clients identify, approach, assess, select and finally 
make applications to incubators. In the past, “selection” research has been incubator-
centric where researchers have used a number of quantitative approaches to 
highlight the existence and appropriateness of a rational approach to making a 
“selection” decision [see for instance the critical reviews of Merrifield (1987); Lumpkin 
& Ireland (1988); Aerts et al (2007); Bergek & Norrman (2008); and Hackett & Dilts 
(2004b; 2008) in Literature Review - Chapter 3].  
 
The research presented in this thesis has extended the area of “selection” research in 
two ways; firstly, by exploring (from the clients’ perspective) motivations for pursuing 
the incubation route for new venture creation and their actual experiences in gaining 
access to incubator services. The case data analysis reveals that far from being 
rational, the actual process through which a client makes an application follows no 
identifiable pattern, in other words, it is random and quite specific to a particular client. 
Clients bring in multiple, often unsaid and hidden, agendas, and pursue ends that 
sometimes negate the incubation ethos [a point also stressed by McAdam & Marlow 
(2007)]. They have different views as to what precisely incubation developmental and 
infrastructural support means, and are also highly likely to change initial views and 
dyadic approaches once they gain actual incubation experience. Arguably, a better 
client-centric understanding of the selection process would allow practitioners and 
policy makers to make positive changes to the way incubators attract and retain 
potential clients.  
 
Secondly, the actual “selection decision” by the incubator management, is not purely 
rational either, rather it is guided by both a rational / analytical approach facilitated by 
the assessment of concrete matter-of-fact details provided by the client, as well as 
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sub-conscious, intuitive and experiential processes (such as stereotyping). It was 
found that IMs can be influenced by non-rational variables whilst believing they have 
made an honest, unbiased evaluation to admit a client to an incubation programme.  
 
11.2.4 How is incubation triggered in a dyadic setting? 
 
To contribute to an increased understanding of why comparable incubation 
environments differ when it comes to co-production efficacy, and why certain IM-
Client dyads in a particular environment seem to quite actively co-create 
developmental assistance whilst others do not, there was a need to understand some 
of the factors that led to the effective triggering of co-production activity. If an 
understanding develops around the variables and (internal and external) conditions 
that trigger incubation co-production, it could result in two benefits; first, explanations 
may be developed regarding why certain environments and dyads excel in co-
production efficacy whilst others do not, and second, from a practice standpoint, it 
may become possible to introduce catalysts to promote positive triggering behaviour, 
thereby, heightening the quantum and scale of dyadic co-production.  
 
This research has contributed to the understanding of incubation triggers by 
developing a number of arguments; first, being a dyadic process, incubation can be 
triggered by either the IM or a particular client, both of whom bring their own 
motivations and agendas. At times, such motivations and agendas promote the ethos 
of incubation whilst in others it promotes self-interest. Second, research showed that 
the IM relies to a great degree on clients themselves when it comes to triggering 
incubation co-production, after all, common sense dictates that clients are in the best 
position to judge what existing and foreseeable problems they need assistance with.  
 
When it comes to clients triggering incubation, the emerging picture becomes quite 
complex, because there is evidence of a certain degree of cognitive “programming” in 
terms of a client’s relative desire to engage with the IM. Due to the notion of bounded 
rationality, a host of pre-programmed loops, or client “concerns” and “pre-
conceptions” (biases) regarding incubation itself and IMs’ abilities, were discovered. 
These led to a number of programmed behaviours (heuristics) when opportunities to 
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engage in incubation co-production presented themselves46. Following the inductive 
spirit guiding this research, the discovery of heuristics and biases inevitably takes the 
research into the domain of behavioural psychology, the scope of which falls outside 
the original remit of this research. However, their discovery through the methods 
employed, it is believed is very much valid until, in the tradition of cognitive and 
behavioural psychology through clinical experimentation (a popular approach 
recognised for its rigour) they can be either disproved or modified.  
 
When it comes to triggering positive incubation co-production, a problem of 
evaluating relational variables is encountered, in other words, which aspects of the 
clients and the IM when paired would result in triggering effective and high levels of 
co-production activity? When investigating this problem, the clear issue was that 
there seemed to be no concepts for thinking about the value of and investment in 
relational variables such as teamwork training or establishing consortia of 
organisations collaborating on large contracts. The challenge comes from the fact 
that relationships are intangible, they cannot actually be seen, their existence can 
only be inferred. Therefore, the development of an effective relational approach would 
require a great deal of conceptual work as well as field testing.  
 
The contribution made in this area is as follows: Lichtenstein (1992) proposed nine 
factors that contribute to the development of positive relationships in incubation: the 
types of businesses, their stage of development, the personal characteristics of the 
entrepreneurs, critical mass, the incubator space, forums, norms and attitudes, the 
actions of the incubator manager and time. Lichtenstein’s list has been augmented by 
this researcher with four additional variables; (1) dyadic history; (2) psychological 
compatibility and degree of vision commonality; (3) IM leadership style; and (4) trust. 
From a professional practice standpoint, it is foreseen that a psychometric tool or 
system can be developed based on these variables for matching clients with IMs. The 
purpose would be to increase the chances of building positive incubation 
relationships, thereby leading to more triggering behaviour and increased co-
production activity.  
 
                                                 
46 The presence of heuristics and biases were also discovered at the IMs’ end, such as “stereotyping” when making the client 
selection decision. 
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11.2.5 How do the structural properties of incubators impact on the 
organisation and orchestration of the incubation process? & In what 
ways does the incubator manager’s leadership style impact on co-
production efficacy? 
  
Arguably, given their purpose – an organisation designed to grow other organisations 
– incubators, as truly hybrid organisations, are much more complex than the 
conventional firm model47 put forth by economists. However, as cases for study, they 
have been largely ignored by organisational theorists. From an organisational theory 
perspective, incubators are fascinating because traditional explanations for the 
existence of firms such as those emerging from heterodox economics (transaction 
cost economics for instance) do not wholly or elegantly apply when it comes to 
incubators. The Weberian model of the rational bureaucracy to coordinate and control 
organisational activity is also deficient, since incubators exercise very limited control 
over the participants of incubation activity and consequently their actions. Ecological 
perspectives from institutional theory could provide a degree of explanation for the 
structure of incubators by suggesting the impact of the environment and the overall 
incubator eco-system; however, in the case of incubators, such an explanation would 
become too complicated because the internal structure of the incubator is composed 
of a variety of different micro host-firm structures that are also impacted by their own 
unique eco-systems and markets. Prominent recent attempts to analyse the structural 
dimensions of incubators include one by Aaboen (2009). She attempted to 
conceptualise incubators as professional service firms, but once again, by her own 
admission, ran into a number of (allegedly irreconcilable) problems, for example, 
absence of a clear identification of who is the real customer of incubator services, and 
issues of division of responsibility and control.  
 
The research’s contribution to this interesting area comes from three lines of 
argument which provide valid explanations for why, due to aspects of their 
organisational structure, it continues to be difficult to evaluate the performance and 
socio-economic impact of incubators, which is a major area of incubator-incubation 
research and a question of much policy interest. The arguments presented are 
grounded in concepts from organisational theory which explain the nature of 
                                                 
47 Even venture capital firms (who unlike incubators exercise a high degree of control over their ‘portfolio of investments’). 
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incubators’ structure and strategy, which in turn shed light on the reasons why 
incubator evaluation and impact assessment are fraught with difficulty:  
 
First, by thoroughly de-constructing the two IMs’ roles, speaking with Board members 
and observing the IM Offices’ activities it has become clear that incubators, like some 
other hybrid organisations (such as universities and social movement organisations 
for instance), function with “structural de-coupling”. The de-coupling of structure is the 
idea that the creation and maintenance of gaps between formal policies and actual 
organisational practices allows certain types of organisations to function. In a nut-
shell, when it comes to incubators, their real activity, which is incubating nascent 
firms, tends to be disconnected from organisational control structures, and incubation 
as an activity is disconnected from its true impacts. Structural de-coupling allows 
incubators to avoid close inspections because elaborate displays of confidence and 
trust increase commitments of internal members. By assuming that IMs are 
competent at incubating, maximum social responsibility for upholding the ethos of 
incubation becomes the IMs’ responsibility.  
 
The IM’s personal leadership style has tremendous bearing on the perceived quality 
of developmental assistance co-production. The IM Leadership style, an area which 
has not received much attention in the past, also has an impact on the overall 
performance of the incubator. Data analysis revealed two distinct areas of IM activity 
– “incubator management” and “incubation management”. Whilst the former is 
generally overlooked since its nature is administrative, its overall impact on an IM’s 
available time has a big impact on the latter, which is traditionally assumed to be the 
IM’s primary focus of attention. The case organisations’ IMs’ particular “incubation 
styles” had an impact on the perceived quality of clients’ incubation experience. 
Measuring this impact, however, can prove to be very difficult, as tools to extract the 
incubator’s and the IM’s precise role in the “success” of a graduated client firm do not 
exist. It is suggested that such an evaluatory exercise would not only be resisted, but 
would also ultimately negate the ethos of incubation. The one way to assess the IM’s 
impact is to measure levels of client satisfaction and perception of the quality of the 
IM’s role. The greater the degrees of perceived IM empathy, proactivity, domain 
knowledge and network density, the greater the chances that clients would value the 
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IM and, therefore, be willing to engage in, (and appreciate the benefits of), 
developmental co-production.  
 
On the flip-side, measuring what clients learn and the impact of that learning on 
economic growth targets and what IMs are actually delivering, introduces 
unnecessary uncertainty and creates doubts about the effectiveness of the status 
structure of the incubator organisation. Even if indicators and measures were 
developed, due to the randomness inherent to incubation, capturing and quantifying 
precise details of what intervention, made by what internal resource, led to what 
particular client advantage is likely to lead to a high cost administrative workload. By 
minimising resources devoted to monitoring and control, the incubator furthers its 
ability to increase the ceremonial worth of its contribution to client firm development 
and “success”.  
 
Second, using concepts from transaction cost economics (TCE), the research 
highlights elements that contribute to contracting and other social uncertainties in the 
incubation environment. A better understanding of incubators’ structural factors that 
give rise to complexity and uncertainty in the internal managerial environment will, 
once again, help in explaining why incubator evaluation and impact assessment 
cannot be meaningful using traditional evaluation tools. Discussed in the analysis are 
three aspects that lead to client-level uncertainty, which to the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, have not been previously examined: (1) clients not being 
able to precisely pin-point the areas where they needed incubator intervention; (2) 
clients uncertain about what developmental assistance, coaching and mentoring 
actually meant in practice; and (3) clients uncertain about whether they should or 
could approach the IM for assistance and advice.  
 
The analysis presented argues against the traditionally held view regarding the need 
to introduce measures to reduce uncertainty (for better monitoring and control). It is 
being suggested that the presence of uncertainty, in the case of incubators, to a 
degree, helps them maintain structural and strategic integrity – although from the 
clients’ perspective uncertainty is problematic. To reduce uncertainty, Transaction 
Cost Economics recommends the use of explicit contracting; however, introducing 
explicit contracting is not only impractical but may also ultimately prove to be 
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detrimental to an incubation environment48. This is due to the fact that the cost and 
administrative burden associated with preparing comprehensive legal documents for 
each client (with different, generally unknown and evolving needs) outlining and de-
limiting the scope of incubation-related assistance would not only be debilitatingly 
high but would also be highly toxic in a start-up and entrepreneurial environment. 
Other measures though can be taken to reduce the level of uncertainty including: 
improved communication of incubation’s goals, the incubator’s expectations and 
details of the available incubation services and expertise. 
 
Third, is the issue of “boundaries”, or how (and on what grounds) do incubators 
establish which actors (and their associated developmental services) ought to be 
integrated into the organisational hierarchy, and which services must be acquired via 
open market transactions (such as contracting) when setting up resource bases to 
service client firms. The strategy recommended by TCE is to subject each potential 
service to the “make-or-buy” decision analysis. When applied to the case 
organisations, it became clear that although both organisations had come to 
(arguably) economically efficient boundary decisions, the eventual choice in practice, 
required a number of compromises. Offering services in-house versus via outsourced 
suppliers meant gains or losses in efficiency and control, varying investment needs in 
human resources (which ran the potential risk of hold-up problems) and fluctuating 
governance costs and information loads on the hierarchy. In reality, it was found that 
incubators do not wholly base their service menu decisions on the principles of 
economic efficiency, rather, decision making in the area was influenced by a mix of 
economic as well as important non-economic factors such as relationship quality (with 
third party suppliers), complexity / technicality / niche nature of the service and 
degree of client need specialisation. Evaluation in such a scenario, once again, 
becomes quite complex since the responsibility of delivering incubation-related 
assistance moves beyond the IM to a wider eco-system of service providers.  
 
These three arguments highlight that incubators are a very interesting study-case for 
organisational theorists because they are unusual organizations.  “Outliers”, and 
                                                 
48 This interpretation of TCE applies only to the neo-institutionalist (Williamson’s) version of TCE.  The original version, 
namely that of Coase, did not have the same focus on explicit contracting. 
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other such cases usually present opportunities to extend extant theory and 
knowledge. 
 
11.2.6 How does Client-Client interaction within the incubator organisation take 
place?  
 
The research has highlighted that Client-Client interaction can be of several different 
types and each of these different types of interactions had the potential to either 
positively or negatively affect client attitudes, beliefs and behaviour towards their own 
work, the incubator organisation and their ability and willingness to engage with other 
clients. Thus, the assumption that social capital will automatically increase as a result 
of an increase in client interpersonal contact is a flawed notion. It is not as simple to 
increase social capital as some researchers in the past assume – a variety of 
psychological factors relating to human experience, cognition and decision-making 
would need to be scrutinised in order to determine the factors which are likely to 
promote the development of positive social capital. 
 
To explore the question of the conditions under which effective Client-Client 
interaction can take place, three factors which were thought to improve client 
interpersonal contact were scrutinised. First of these is the idea that bringing together 
similar clients in a specialist incubator somehow improves client interpersonal 
contact. The finding here is quite interesting and suggests that, overall, the client-mix 
does not have a well defined relationship in terms of boosting Client-Client 
interaction. IncuWorks – being a specialist incubator with more similar clients when 
compared to DubInc – a mixed use incubation facility, did not show significantly high 
levels of Client-Client contact that triggered the development of economically 
beneficial relationships. The interesting revelation here is that clients of a certain type 
at IncuWorks (ICT-based) had comparatively higher levels of interaction when 
compared to other types (Bio-Tech). The explanation is that increased levels of 
Client-Client interaction depend on the nature of clients’ business and industrial 
affiliation.  
 
The second factor explored is whether the IM’s enhanced brokerage behaviour has 
the potential to boost client interpersonal contact. Research revealed mixed results. 
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However, overall, in a specialist incubation environment, active brokerage behaviour 
by the IM that facilitates the linkup of clients in consortia to facilitate joint bidding for 
large compartmentalised contracts and for linking up clients individually or in groups 
to unrelated outside agencies has the potential to enhance client cooperative 
behaviour leading to tangible economic benefits.  
 
The third factor involves an examination of the impact of the design and physical 
layout of the incubator where it is felt that certain design ideals have the potential to 
promote client interpersonal contact. The area of physical incubator layout has not 
received adequate attention by both academicians and practitioners. To shed light on 
this important area, research conducted in environment and behaviour, social 
psychology, ergonomics, and organisational behaviour was drawn upon and it has 
been suggested that setting up incubator layouts for the purpose of promoting Client-
Client interaction requires a trade-off between demands by clients for “privacy” and 
“minimum distraction”, and the incubation ideal of creating a well integrated client 
cohort. Based on the empirical findings, it is concluded that in order to reach the 
‘design ideal’, it seems that a balance must be negotiated between the conflicting 
priorities and strategic requirements of incubators and clients.  
 
This research is, therefore, suggesting that the chances of clients forming beneficial 
relationships with other clients can improve in a number of ways: (1) the IM acting like 
a proactive broker between clients; (2) the physical / architectural properties of the 
incubation space designed to increase opportunities for client inter-personal contact; 
and (3) grouping clients in incubators according to the nature of their business and 
industrial affiliation. On this last point, the research outputs suggest that certain types 
of industries and businesses allow more opportunities for the development of 
meaningful economically beneficial relationships than others. In the categories where 
there is little opportunity for forming meaningful relationships, means of venture 
creation support other than incubation would be economically rational. 
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11.3 Reflections on Social Mechanisms Theory & Research Limitations  
 
The social mechanisms literature is vast, and it was not a purpose in this research to 
critically review this material as this important work has already been carried out by 
Gross (2009). Gross has extensively critiqued the practice-action and rational choice 
traditions to propose a new pragmatist direction in mechanisms research. His work, 
along with others, provided a useful theoretical and methodological basis for this 
research; especially the synthesis of how researchers in the past had conceptualised 
social mechanisms. It was also highlighted in Chapter 4 that Gross’s theoretical view 
of studying social mechanisms has not as yet been applied in an empirical context, 
making this research pioneering. Applying mechanisms-based reasoning to the 
incubation process became possible by extracting a number of assumptions common 
to these conceptualisations. Following Gross, a view of incubation was adopted which 
suggested that we can more or less predict how the dyadic parties will react when 
confronted with a particular problem situation by looking at habitualised human 
responses.  
 
During the empirical work and data analysis, a number of difficulties in empirically 
capturing the notion of “habitualised responses to known problems situations” were 
encountered.  With further reflection, it is clear that this notion is flawed and presents 
a difficulty when developing new mechanisms-based theory in the context of 
incubators-incubation. The difficulty encountered relates to the random nature of the 
internal incubator environment. This environment is prone to, at times, large-scale, 
unpredictable shifts in normative patterns occurring as a result of chance. These 
include highly improbable, serendipitous or rare events, meetings or other 
unforeseeable and uncontrollable environmental variables impacting upon the dyadic 
parties’ behaviour and approach. For example, a majority of clients, when asked 
about how they ended up at either DubInc or IncuWorks and indeed found out about 
incubation support, recalled the important role of chance conversations or meetings 
(with graduated clients or incubator staff or individuals who knew incubator staff at 
conferences and other public events) or randomly coming across signage or 
information online (such as looking for office space and coming across an ad from 
DubInc). Most clients could not foresee what their support needs were going to be in 
the medium to long term because of unpredictable outcomes of their present strategy. 
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Clients also suggested that important turning points in their businesses arrived when 
they pursued random opportunities which were not originally planned for. For an 
illustration, please see Appendix – F. Therefore, it is nearly impossible to track 
incidents occurring inside the incubator organisation with a degree of precision to be 
able to identify cause-effect type relationships.  
 
The role of unpredictable, chance or random variables also has a major impact on the 
life-world of the IMs. To illustrate, in analysing the story of how DubInc was set up, 
the important role of chance and serendipity becomes very difficult to ignore. By 
chance an incubation “expert” from the US was visiting Dublin, by chance this 
individual was known to a prominent member of the local community, and this 
individual was invited to speak at a community meeting. The expert chose to accept 
this invitation despite his busy schedule, his advice on boosting local employment 
was put to a vote along with other suggestions and again, by chance, came out as 
the winner. The trajectory of these unpredictable variables could not have been easily 
forecast.  
 
Most interaction between IMs and clients is also based on chance and serendipity. At 
DubInc for instance, where there is no mechanism for ongoing formal client 
appraisals, all IM-Client interaction is unstructured – chance meetings in the 
corridors; a client walking by the IM’s office stops to say hello, one conversation leads 
to another and all of a sudden a joint project is initiated. Further examples include: the 
IM and client running into each other by chance at an outside conference and the IM 
introducing the client to an important contact which in turn leads to a turning point in 
the client’s business; the IM sending out a general information email to all clients, 
which is randomly taken seriously by a few clients who get in touch with the IM, and 
one or two then decide to work with the IM on a joint co-production-type activity.  
 
As the case notes were reviewed, due to the random nature of the internal incubation 
environment, it became clear that developing a robust mechanisms-based theory 
which produces a level of certainty about causes and effects is difficult. It is not being 
suggested here that incubators don’t make a difference to the post-incubation 
survivability of new enterprise. The existence of incubators actively supporting the 
development of new enterprises through mentoring, coaching, distribution of 
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resources and facilitating the development of networks do, in fact, make positive 
incubation outcomes more likely. 
 
The reader of this thesis may have two questions (or thoughts) at this stage; was the 
choice of social mechanisms as a theoretical framework an inappropriate one given 
the conclusions in the previous section? And, to what extent are the findings from this 
research generaliseable to the wider incubator-incubation phenomenon? In response 
to the first question, the reader is reminded of two things: first, a serious attempt was 
made to assess the appropriateness and fit of extant theoretical frameworks (see 
Chapter 4) to the investigation proposed. It was on this basis that the social 
mechanisms approach was selected. Second, this research was carried out using the 
inductive and qualitative approach recommended by Gross (2009) whose recent 
article “A Pragmatist Theory of Social Mechanisms” laid the foundations for the 
mechanisms-based conceptualisation of the incubation process presented in Chapter 
4 (section 4.4). Gross’s work was at once both elegant and simple with clear 
methodological guidelines, thus its appeal. Using Gross’s approach, to study the 
incubation process, the following approach was adopted: examine the individual and 
collective actors (IM and clients) involved in the process’s input-output relationship 
where the aim was to understand why and how, when confronted with a problem 
situation, the actors involved responded.  
 
This was genuinely attempted. However, a number of problems arose chief of which 
was overwhelming complexity. No evidence was found for standard responses to 
problem situations which arose with particular clients. Every client was different and 
had a unique set of problems most of which bore no resemblance to the problems of 
other clients. Therefore, the IM had client-specific approaches and these approaches 
were constantly evolving. For example, suppose the relationship between ‘IM 
incubation strategy’ and ‘type of client problem’ at DubInc is examined – a mixed-use 
incubator organisation where clients are low-to-medium technology firms, and the 
operational economic environment is one of stagnating or negative growth with a lack 
of public policy support for non-high-technology firms. According to Gross’s (2009) 
approach, several kinds of actors, problem situations and habitual responses make 
up this mechanism. Attempts to identify which habits of thought and action were 
employed by the IMs, under what incubation strategy, to solve a client’s problem of, 
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let us say, (out of the myriad of client-specific problems) “lack of technical capacity” 
seemed superficial – the answer too specific with little or no application to other 
clients and / or other incubator organisations. This is primarily due to the fact that the 
mechanisms-based approach does not account for context, and ultimately any 
approach which attempts to factor in a contextual analysis becomes over-complicated. 
There is a possibility that hypothesis testing on a systematic sample (rather than 
random stratified), under given contextual parameters using a quantitative approach 
might yield some interesting findings.  
 
It must be noted however, that had it not been for the mechanisms-based approach, 
the research’s outputs would have been quite different, and perhaps not as 
interesting or useful. In the pursuit of finding evidence for standard mechanisms, the 
researcher was led into a number of important areas which had not been previously 
investigated and the research approach recommended by Gross added a degree of 
methodological rigour during data analysis in both the single case and cross case 
comparative scenario.  
 
At this juncture, it is also important to reflect on the choice of methodology. Although 
the qualitative multi-site case study strategy was the most appropriate approach 
considering the objective of this thesis, it is sincerely hoped that the reader does not 
get the impression that the researcher believes there is little possibility of a 
contribution coming from deploying quantitative designs for further research. Quite 
the opposite, the pragmatist’s stance on research methods is very flexible: use 
whatever works to answer the research question. Quantitative methods such as a 
survey have a lot of potential in building on the findings from this research. There are 
active plans in place to employ a hypothetico-deductive (as opposed to the inductive) 
approach to shed light on a number of emanating questions, for example testing 
hypotheses using a survey on the IM-Client cognitive match. From this research, it is 
clear that such a “match” is the very basis for effective incubation performance. In 
order to identify the common features of effective cognitive matches (and to perhaps 
compare these with those which are not as effective) a survey complemented with 
statistical data analysis would be the ideal approach.  
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On the issue of generalisation, it is important to note that generalisation does not 
really apply to the qualitative paradigm because its philosophical, theoretical, 
instrumental, and methodological foundations are separate from those of the 
quantitative paradigm (where generalisation is of concern). Making a value judgment 
between the two paradigms, for the pragmatist, is not of real concern. Nevertheless, 
there is value and merit in generalisation, and in the Methodology chapter – section 
5.4.1, it was pointed out that the strategy in this research was ‘analytic generalisation’ 
as opposed to ‘statistical generalisation’. To reiterate, analytic generalisation is not 
generalisation to some defined and “randomly sampled” population, but to a theory of 
the phenomenon being studied, a theory that may have much wider applicability than 
the particular case studied. In this, it resembles experiments in the physical sciences, 
which make no claim to statistical representativeness (physicists do not draw random 
samples of atoms), but instead assume that their results contribute to a general 
theory on quantum mechanics. With the theoretical contributions discussed in this 
chapter, it is believed, that the aim of analytic generalisation has been achieved. 
 
11.4 Practice Recommendations, Further Research & Concluding Remarks 
 
From a practitioner perspective, in order to improve the performance of incubators, a 
number of recommendations can be made: First, as highlighted in Chapter 7, the IM 
has an important role to play in building high quality individual relationships with 
clients. The “success” of the IM-Client relationship is closely linked to the overall 
quality of a particular client’s incubation experience. Improving this experience would 
require the presence of high levels of trust and rapport, which means that IMs need to 
go a few extra steps and get to know clients on a personal level. Relationship building 
takes tact, skill, certain personality traits and investment in time and resources. 
Although it is not an exact science however, relationship building can be learnt as a 
craft through training and practice. It is recommended that IMs be trained in this 
valuable craft and be actively encouraged to practice it.
 
 
Second, further findings analysed in Chapter 7 indicate that there is a need for 
incubation practitioners to re-assess the value of Client-Client interaction and the 
issues that promote and stall Client-Client activity. The life-world of the IM is 
strenuous; and in the day-to-day management of the incubator and the short term 
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requirements of the role, it is possible that IMs do not get the opportunity to develop 
the ‘chess board thinking’ that is needed to promote the Client-Client interaction that 
is economically beneficial. The recommendation here is that the IM, in consultation 
with other incubator support staff, engages in a degree of strategic planning which 
goes beyond setting targets and developing KPIs (Key Performance Indicators). This 
is needed because a significant level of the IMs’ work, and as a result their 
contribution, cannot be captured through quantitative metrics. To illustrate, such 
planning could include a rotating twinning arrangement where clients are paired with 
another client to work on mutually beneficial business tasks under the IM’s 
moderation.  
 
Third, the analysis presented in Chapter 9 shows that the IM adopts one of three 
strategies for alignment with strategic client agendas and intentions (some of which 
may not be purposefully disclosed). The current thinking on this issue is to dis-
continue incubation assistance for those clients with whom the IM adopts a ‘dormant’ 
strategy i.e. those clients who wish to avail of the infrastructural or economic benefits 
of incubator placement only, including those such as subsidised rent, locational 
advantages and convenient car parking facilities. On the basis of the research here, it 
is recommended, that such final decisions are taken carefully, and on a case-to-case 
basis, as accommodating dormant clients may not necessarily be a disadvantage. 
They can at times augment an incubator’s brand image and reputation, and play 
useful roles in promoting Client-Client interaction.  
 
Fourth, as discussed in Section 10.2, the IM has two distinct areas of activity, 
“incubator management” and “incubation management”. The latter would be regarded 
as core, hence, it is recommended that incubators organise their internal structure in 
such a way so as to allow the IM to devote maximum possible time and resources to 
“incubation” activity. A recognised certification / qualification / training for the IM would 
be helpful in this regard, along with the provision of incubator-incubation management 
software to track and log client development progress.  
 
Fifth, as indicated in the Section 10.4 analysis, in order to reduce the impact of a 
number of factors which introduce uncertainty in the incubation environment, it is 
recommended that the IM and prospective client discuss and plan the ways in which 
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the incubator could offer support, in what particular areas, using which resources and 
by when, and how progress will be periodically discussed and monitored. This kind of 
disclosure and transparency should help clarify the relationship’s deliverables, and at 
the same time strategically align incubator and client firm goals and strategy.  
 
In terms of further research, there is potential in a number of avenues for advancing 
knowledge in the incubator-incubation area. First, more research needs to be 
conducted in order to improve an understanding of the variables that positively (and 
negatively) influence the IM-Client relational match. Such an exercise could help in 
the development of psychometric tools / methods; these could be deployed as a part 
of the client selection process. Further, by understanding the nature of the variables 
which lead to a break down in IM-Client relationships it may become possible to 
develop and incorporate “advance warning systems” or pre-emptive strategies at 
critical junctures in the incubation process. By focusing on actively maintaining the 
health and quality of the incubation relationship, maximum impact and effectiveness 
in the least possible time can be ensured. This, it is felt, would be an important 
advance in incubation research.  
 
Second, future research must look at developing further explanatory theory about the 
structure of incubator organisations. This research has suggested that incubators are 
an interesting case for organisational theorists (because of a number of structural and 
strategic properties discussed in this research), and have to-date not received 
enough attention.  
 
Third, researchers must turn their attention towards the physical design of incubator 
facilities; no peer-reviewed or even practitioner publications looking at this particular 
aspect of incubators-incubation were found. Physical design of the incubator facility 
undoubtedly has a powerful impact on the quality and scale of incubation activity, 
therefore, what are an incubator’s design ideals which will best promote the ethos 
and goals of incubation?  
 
Fourth, from a policy and practice perspective, research is needed in two important 
areas: (a) for developing carefully contextualised measurable standards / indicators to 
determine the efficacy of a particular facility’s incubation process as without 
standards, certification and rating will not be possible; and (b) for developing a 
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suitable qualification for training and certifying incubator professionals, perhaps along 
the lines of the qualifications for management consultants, company secretaries and 
marketing professionals.  
 
To conclude, what has been proposed in this thesis is a return to core principles i.e. a 
recognition of the need to focus on human relational factors. This research has raised 
the profile of “incubation” research within the incubator-incubation discourse in two 
major ways. First, the major theoretical outcomes of the case work have been pulled 
together, where, as a result of the research, an understanding of the incubator-
incubation phenomenon has increased in a number of areas: the dyadic nature of 
incubation, cognitive programming that triggers and stalls incubation activity, the 
structure and strategies in the incubation process and client-client interaction. Second, 
the qualitative-inductive approach’s merits and drawbacks were presented in the 
critical meta-methodological reflection of the social mechanisms theory. Together, 
these two levels of contributions (theory and methodology), constitute a clear 
advancement of knowledge in the incubator-incubation arena.  
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Meta-Theoretical Analysis of Published Incubation Research 
 
At the outset, it is important to highlight that incubator-incubation research falls within 
the small business and entrepreneurship discipline. This discipline incorporates 
different research trends (Torres 2003) and that the field is made up of '... a diverse 
group of scholars from various disciplines ... ' that bring in '... a range of definitions, 
theoretical frameworks, levels of analysis and methodological approaches' 
(Landstrom 2005). Hence, the paradigm debate that commenced much earlier in 
other management disciplines, such as organisational studies, has only latterly 
begun to take place in this field also (Savage and Black 1995).  
 
Although incubator-incubation has attracted a variety of researchers since the early 
1980s, the more theoretically rich work has only recently started to emerge. A 
number of previous literature reviews in the area highlight how research has 
progressed by adopting and adapting theory and models from other disciplines, 
especially economics and public policy. Further, previous reviews also highlight the 
diversity of disciplinary foundation in the area, however, such diversity does not 
automatically lead to a diversity of underlying meta-theoretical assumptions within an 
area (Burrell and Morgan 1979, Gergen 1994). Thus, without a rich meta-theoretical 
debate to distil the sub-textual essences that exist at the very core of the incubator-
incubation discourse, it is unlikely that radically new research agendas would gain 
currency 
 
Therefore, the present meta-analysis is both timely and novel in that it is not only is a 
reflection on the ontological, epistemological and methodological foundations of 
published incubation research, but also a conduit to help start a healthy debate about 
future research agendas. Similar analyses have been conducted in other areas of the 
social sciences, such as strategic management (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000) and 
information systems (Gallagher and Webb 2000, Hirschheim. and Klein 1989), and 
have led to the consideration of the meta-theoretical foundations of competing 
discourses (Grant and Perren 2002). The aim of the present analysis is similar; to 
better inform the methodological development in the field.  
 
This analysis will draw inspiration from similar work conducted in related areas, such 
as entrepreneurship and small business (Grant and Perren 2002), and will thus adopt 
the broad paradigmatic taxonomy provided by Burrell and Morgan's (1979) influential 
work. Due to publication-related constraints, it remains outside the remit of this article 
to describe the major components and key dimensions of Burrell & Morgan’s 
paradigmatic framework or to consider its subsequent criticisms and developments49. 
As Grant & Perren (2002) argue, that while criticisms and extensions from Burrell and 
Morgan may be helpful in the context of incremental development of discourses 
within organisational theory, in the context of the mapping of the incubation literature, 
which falls within the small business and entrepreneurship discipline, it is felt that the 
original thesis provides a reasonable basis upon which to build, being one of the 
most widely disseminated paradigmatic frameworks.  
 
The Table below provides such an analysis of the studies included in the literature 
review. The structure and construction-approach has been adopted from Grant & 
Perren (2002). 
 
                                                 
49 It is recognised that many authors, not least Burrell and Morgan (1979) themselves, have provided an overview 
of the underlying meta-theoretical foundations of organisational theory [e.g. (Hirschheim. and Klein 1989)] 
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Campbell et al (1985) 
 
Realist 
pp. 43, pa. 9 
Positivist 
pp. 44, pa. 6 
Nomothetic 













Hisrich (1988)  
 
Realist 
pp. 222, pa. 3 
Positivist 
pp. 226, pa. 4 
Nomothetic 




Lumpkin & Ireland (1988) 
 
Realist 
pp. 59, pa. 1 
Positivist 
pp. 60, pa. 3 
Nomothetic  
pp. 68, pa. 3 
Determinism  Functionalist 
Weinberg et al (1991) 
 
Realist 
pp. 149, pa. 4 
Positivist 
pp. 152, pa. 1 
Nomothetic  





pp. 164, pa. 4 
Positivist 
pp. 166, pa. 3 
Nomothetic  
pp. 179, pa. 4 
Determinism Functionalist 
Hackett & Dilts (2004b; 2008)c 
 
Realist 
pp. 42, pa. 2 d 
Positivist 
pp. 44, pa. 1 d 
Nomothetic  
pp. 3, pa. 2 e 
Determinism  Functionalist 
Peters et al (2004) Realist 
pp. 84, pa. 1 
Positivist 
pp. 85, pa. 3 
Nomothetic 
pp. 88, pa. 2 
Determinism Functionalist 
Bøllingtoft & Ulhøi (2005) 
 
Realist 
pp. 266, pa. 1 
Anti-Positivist 
pp. 276, pa. 1 
Ideographic   
pp. 284, pa. 2 
Voluntarism  Interpretivist   
Totterman & Sten (2005) 
 
Realist 
pp. 487, pa. 1 
Positivist 
pp. 489, pa. 2 
Nomothetic  
pp. 498, pa. 2 
Determinism  Functionalist 
McAdam & McAdam (2006) 
 
Nominalist 
pp. 88, pa. 2 
Anti-Positivist 
pp. 90, pa. 3 
Ideographic  




Aerts et al (2007) 
 
Realist 
pp. 255, pa. 3 
Positivist 
pp. 255, pa. 6 
Nomothetic  
pp. 262, pa. 4 
Determinism  Functionalist 
Hughes et al (2007)  
 
Realist 
pp. 155, pa. 3 
Positivist 
pp. 166, pa. 2 
Nomothetic  
pp. 145, pa. 4 
Determinism  Functionalist 
McAdam & Marlow (2007) Nominalist 
pp. 366, pa. 3 
Anti-Positivist 
pp. 367, pa. 1 
Ideographic 
pp. 374, pa. 2 
Voluntarism  Interpretivist 
Bergek & Norrman (2008) 
 
Realist 
pp. 20, pa. 3 
Positivist 
pp. 23, pa. 3 
Nomothetic  
pp. 25, pa. 4 
Determinism  Functionalist 
Evald & Bager (2008) Realist 
pp. 351, pa. 4 
Positivist 
pp. 355, pa. 2 
Nomothetic 
pp. 356, pa. 2 
Determinism Functionalist 
   
 303
McAdam & McAdam (2008) Realist 
pp. 278, pa. 2 
Anti-Positivist 
pp. 281, pa. 2 
Nomothetic 
pp. 284, pa. 1 
Voluntarism Interpretivist 
Patton et al (2009) Realist 
pp. 622, pa. 2 
Anti-Positivist 
pp. 625, pa. 2 
Ideographic 
pp. 633, pa. 2 
Voluntarism  Interpretivist 
Warren et al (2009) Realist 
pp. 482, pa. 2 
Anti-Positivist 
pp. 485, pa. 2 
Ideographic 
pp. 492, pa. 3 
Voluntarism Interpretivist 





pa. 44  
Voluntarism Interpretivist  
 
‘a’ and ‘b’ – Both studies have been authored by practitioners and are as such neither structured nor organised as academic articles. No primary data was 
collected for these studies either. However, the studies’ recommendations are oft cited in the incubator-incubation literature since they represent some of the 
most comprehensive and early works in the area. Moreover, both the studies have been separately reviewed in an incubator-incubation literature review by 
Hackett & Dilts (2004a).  
 
‘c’ – The earlier study in 2004 draws on Real Options Theory from the domain of finance and investments to propose an Options Theory of Incubation, whilst, 
the later 2007 study, tests the developed model’s various assumptions and aspects.  
 
‘d’ – Citations from the 2004 study. 
 
‘e’ – Citation from the 2008 study.  
 
‘f’ – Available online only, therefore, page nos. could not be mentioned. Paragraphs nos. commence from the full-text. 
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Findings from the Analysis - 1: The Meta-Methodological Implications of 
Functionalism 
 
Most published incubation literature falls within the functionalist rather than the 
interpretive paradigm, when using Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) classification schema. 
The analysis here simply suggests that the zeitgeist of research in the leading 
articles in the incubator-incubation area is functionalist in orientation. Functionalist 
theories of organisations predominantly focus on functional coordination, integration 
and cohesion, need satisfaction and social order rather than aspects such as 
emancipation, structural conflict or radical social change (Gooijer 2006). Therefore, 
the current body of research helps us understand the ‘‘what’’ aspects of the 
incubation through a number of empirical and normative descriptions of the factors 
that should be included in attempts at explaining the process.  
 
 
In contrast, an interpretive sociology of organisations, according to B&M, is primarily 
concerned with understanding the subjective experience of individuals and is anti-
positivist in approach. Such an epistemological position has, on the whole, not 
gained currency amongst incubator-incubation researchers where positivist 
methodologies and methods have remained predominant.  
 
Interpretive methods of research, in contrast to positivist methods, adopt the position 
that value-free data cannot be obtained. Interpretivist researchers start out with the 
assumption that access to reality (given or socially constructed) is only through social 
constructions such as language, consciousness and shared meanings (Walsham 
1995). Thus, if for instance, had interpretivism been the dominant paradigm in 
previous incubator-incubation research, our understanding of the phenomena may 
have been entirely different since the questions researchers would have thought 
important to investigate would have been entirely different. As a result, the methods 
employed would have been different and in turn what would count as knowledge 
about incubation would have been different.  
 
We find that past incubator-incubation research is pre-dominantly interested in 
building a rational and causal model of incubation that allows for the creation of 
generally applicable incubator classifications and the prediction of incubatee 
outcome-states. Whereas, interpretive researchers would view incubation as a social 
process that is contextually sensitive, subject to changes triggered by internal events 
or shifts in the external environment and is politically charged with competing 
agendas and objectives. Research questions would attempt to understand the 
phenomena through the meanings that people assign to the process and focus on 
the full complexity of human sense making as the process unfolds. Thus, interpretive 
methods of research in incubation would aim to understand the context in which 
incubation occurs, and the processes whereby incubation influences and is 
influenced by its context.  
 
According to Hackett & Dilts (2004a), if the area of incubator-incubation research is 
to advance forward in a theoretically meaningful manner then we must turn our 
attention from ‘‘what’’ – type research questions and lists of descriptive factors to 
‘‘how’’ and ‘‘why’’ and ‘‘in what context’’ (‘‘who’’ ‘‘where’’ and ‘‘when’’) these factors 
are interrelated. In other words, studies of how incubation works in the real world. 
Such an anti-positivist approach should help in the development of more adequate 
explanatory theory.  
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Finds from the Analysis - 2: The Inevitable Epistemological Problem 
Associated with Instrumentalism - Black-Box Conceptualisations  
 
It seems incubation researchers are quite concerned with ‘relevance to practice’ or in 
pursuing an instrumentalist research agenda. This becomes apparent from the some 
of the research questions that have been investigated in the past. The answer to why 
this is the case is open to speculation, however, what impact instrumentalism has 
had on the nature of our understanding of the incubator-incubation phenomena can 
be coherently discussed. The purpose here is not to present a wholesome critique of 
the instrumentalist position, rather, to extract (with some degree of precision) the 
inevitable knowledge gap(s) it has led to.  
 
Instrumentalists regard theories not as attempts to describe the world but as 
instruments for making predictions. For the instrumentalist then, questioning the truth 
of a theory is a conceptual mistake. The appropriate question to pose is whether a 
theory is empirically adequate. And a theory is empirically adequate if it makes 
accurate predictions or all of its observable consequences are true (Eldridge, 1998, 
pp. 67). Thus, the ‘black-box’ analogy is an appropriate one for instrumentalism. The 
researcher inserts (intrinsically value-free) information regarding observed 
background conditions into a model black-box and the box then generates 
predictions regarding what one will ultimately observe. The outputs, like the inputs, 
are value-free, only acquiring a moral significance at the point at which they are 
employed by human agents for particular uses (Newberry, 2007). To the 
instrumentalist, the most important expectation from such a black box is that when 
accurate information is inputted, then the yielded predictions must be accurate too. 
Of no concern, therefore, is the mechanism inside the box – it can be anything ‘as 
long as it works’. There is no particular requirement that the black-box and its 
mechanism depict the way the world really is. Indeed, the mechanism is only an 
instrument, depicting the world is not its purpose (Bird, 1998, pp. 125) 
 
The instrumentalist’s focus on inputs-outputs without any real concern for 
mechanisms is precisely what Hackett & Dilts (2008) lament in their article ‘Inside the 
black box of business incubation: Study B—scale assessment, model refinement, 
and incubation outcomes’. They conclude that in order to truly understand incubation 
we must move away from ‘black-box’ approaches designed to simply predict 
incubation outcomes to understanding how incubation works in practice. No doubt, 
the prediction of incubation outcomes is an important aspect of interest to both 
researchers and practitioners / policy-makers, however, the paucity of grounded 
models that can make accurate predictions is clear testimony that value- and context-
free black-box approaches are simply not enough.  
 
The intention and mind-set of past researchers, as it has been shown, is grounded in 
a pragmatist philosophy. This meta-methodological underpinning, it is believed, is 
truly noble and valid – a worldview arising out of practical action, situations and 
consequences, where there is a concern with real-world application – what works - 
and solutions to problems (Creswell, 2009).  However, a new moderating approach is 
needed that simultaneously embraces the spirit of previous incubator-incubation 
researchers and impedes the consequences arising out an extreme variety of 
pragmatism – i.e. instrumentalism. Our focus must be on internal incubation 
mechanisms that turn inputs (nascent entrepreneurs and new businesses) into 
outputs (‘successful’ new firms).  
 
 































   
 307 
Incubators-Incubation in Ireland 
 
Latest published statistics on the incubator-incubation phenomenon in Ireland are not 
readily available. A number of qualitative case studies by McAdam and colleagues 
though provide interesting insights for understanding the internal dynamic of hi-tech 
Irish incubators. These studies have been reviewed in Chapter – 3: Literature Review. 
A number of Irish government documents were offer background information or 
policy underpinnings. The Irish Government’s Dept. of Trade, Industry & Employment 
and Enterprise Ireland suggests a very high level of focus on “accelerating the 
development of world-class Irish companies”. Enterprise Ireland’s Strategy 2008-
2010 lays down the Govt’s plan for creating 200 new HPSUs (High Potential Start-
ups) through their envisaged work with and funding to city and county enterprise 
boards, business innovation centres (another term for business incubators) and third-
level institutions. The same focus is pronounced in the Policy for Science, 
Technology & Innovation 2006-2013.  
 
A useful report was a comprehensive survey on enterprise space in the Dublin City 
area produced by the Dublin City Enterprise Board (Dublin City Enterprise Board, 
2008). This report clearly establishes the link between curbing early stage 
entrepreneurial risk and the provision of business incubation and other state-
sponsored support services. The report also stresses the need for increasing the 
total available enterprise space due to excessive demand reported by existing 
incubation centres. Perhaps the most important aspect of the report is the broad-
based survey of existing incubation centres in the Dublin City area and a resulting 
typology of incubators in Ireland. Thus, in Ireland today three different types of 
incubator models exist: 
 
1. College Enterprise Centres – these are linked to and supported by third level 
institutions, and generally support businesses emanating from college research 
or from 3rd level graduates. Businesses tend to be knowledge based and there 
tends to be cross-fertilisation between the incubation businesses and college 
research activities.  
 
2. Community Enterprise Centres – these are rooted in the local community, and 
their objective is generally to provide local employment through the generation 
and support of local enterprise. They are generally very broad in the types of 
business supported, and the centre will often perform a dual role, offering a range 
of services and training to the local community.  
 
3. Cluster Enterprise Centres - This type of centre tends to specialise in developing 
synergies between businesses of a similar type such as IT, Software and 
Multimedia.  
 
Enterprise-Ireland reports a total of 23 campus incubation centres in the country50. 
These are incubators linked to either 3rd level institutes of higher education or the 
various institutes of technologies (ITs) in Ireland. The idea behind the establishment 
of these entities is to support academic researchers to take the outputs of research 
with commercial potential and bring it to a point where it can be transferred into 
industry or be commercialised. The client-mix at these facilities is, therefore, inclined 
towards the sciences or engineering. The incubators are usually set up as 
                                                 
50 From the website of Enterprise-Ireland: http://www.enterprise-
ireland.com/ResearchInnovate/Research+Commercialisation/Campus+Business+Incubation.htm (accessed July 
2009). 
   
 308 
independent entities with a % of shareholding (in terms of equity input) of both 
university-IT (where equity contributed is usually land/space) and EI. Campus 
incubation forms an important overall component of EI’s strategy of “Realising the 
Commercial Potential of Ireland's Research Community”. The last investment made 
in campus incubation was during 2007 amounting to (approximately) € 1.4 million51. 
The funds have been mostly utilised for the construction of incubation infrastructure.  
 
Community Enterprise Centres (CECs) are also seen as “a tangible and visible 
contribution to regional development” by Enterprise-Ireland52. CECs have in most 
part been established by local communities on a mostly self-help basis with support, 
at times, from local County Enterprise Boards. These facilities are mixed-use 
incubators catering to wide array of small business sectors and are not usually 
purpose built. They provide office space, commercial kitchen space, work shop 
space alongside advice, training, mentoring and other support services such as 
reception desk, conferencing, mail handling, shared internet, cafeteria and so on. 
Since 1989, EI and its predecessors have administered five schemes supporting 
CECs. A total of €51m has been approved for 169 CEC projects throughout the 
country. EI reports that to date 105 CECs have been built and 19 are under 
construction. In the year 2008, CECs received (approximately) € 1.2 million funding 
for infrastructural development12. CECs are financially sustainable on the basis of the 
incomes they generate through client rentals and other commercial / community-
based activities and as such receive no ongoing state subsidy for operations.  
 
There are five Business Innovation Centres (BICs) reported by EI on their website, 
however, DCEB reports a further three (Dublin City Enterprise Board, 2008). This 
disparity may again be due to the problem of “definitional ambiguity” (Hackett & Dilts, 
2004a) or overlapping roles between state agencies involved in the construction and 
support of incubators. BICs are involved in the provision of business information, 
advice, counselling and mentoring. They are also involved in the development and 
management of enterprise space and the promotion of an enterprise culture. Of all 
incubation programmes, the highest amount of funding in 2008 went to BICs, 
amounting to (approximately) € 2.7 million12. These facilities are usually large and 
purpose built and focus on the hi-tech / designated innovation-based sectors. 
Financial sustainability, due to lower rentals, comes once again from state subsidy 
and contributions from the industry.  
 
In 2007, EI conducted a survey of 105 CECs. EI reports that the top line results show 
a very positive use of the investment it has made in CECs in terms of occupancy 
rates, numbers employed and the number of manufacturing and traded service 
enterprises.  The survey revealed that the centres have been successful in achieving 
an average occupancy rate of 87% with almost 1,000 businesses employing 4,850 
people. As a follow-up to this exercise, according to our sources, EI is presently 
conducting a new survey of all incubators in Ireland. This survey, according to 
insiders, is essentially an attempt to compile base statistics about available 
infrastructure and incubators’ impact on economic development indicators such as 
number of new jobs created, number of new companies graduated and so on in a 
particular period of time. The primary data sources for this survey are incubator 
managers themselves who are relaying base data through questionnaires. In such a 
scenario, the reliability of the compiled statistics may be slightly questionable. This is 
due to two reasons: (a) since incubator managers in Ireland, especially community-
                                                 
51 Notes to the Enterprise-Ireland Annual Accounts 2008: http://www.enterprise-
ireland.com/annualreport2008/note4.html (accessed July 2009). 
52 Downloaded policy document from the website of Enterprise-Ireland: http://www.enterprise-
ireland.com/Grow/Finance/Community+Enterprise+Centre+Scheme.htm (accessed July 2009). 
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based (since they receive little or no form of state subsidy), do not maintain detailed 
records of incubation practice they maybe tempted to rely on rough guesstimates; 
and (b) in order to present a more positive picture for obvious reasons, incubator 
managers may resort to glossing-over finer details.  
 
In terms of incubator impact assessment, the latest publicly available document is the 
Dept. of Trade, Industry & Employment’s first-off Annual Output Statement 2009 
whose purpose is to “match key physical outputs and strategic impacts to financial 
and staffing resources for the financial year” (Department of Enterprise, Trade & 
Employment, 2009). This report evaluates, amongst other programmes, the Govt’s 
Enterprise Development scheme. This scheme funds activity carried out by Forfas, 
IDA Ireland, Enterprise Ireland, Shannon Development, the City and County 
Enterprise Boards, the National Standards Authority of Ireland and InterTradeIreland. 
Hence, the Annual Output Statement is essentially reporting the progress of all the 
above entities on their major overall objective: “to improve competitiveness and 
growth by promoting entrepreneurship, working with companies to develop new 
products and processes, growing exports”.  
 
This important scheme suggests 18 strategies to achieve the above goal of which 
promoting an entrepreneurial culture, training and mentoring to new entrepreneurs, 
direct assistance to hi-growth firms feature prominently. These strategies come 
together very neatly in package within an incubator setting. However, what we don’t 
understand is the particular impact of incubators to the achievement of the scheme’s 
overall goal. The role of incubators is presumably combined with a number of other 
programmes for supporting early stage entrepreneurs such as the Enterprise-Ireland 
Growth Fund, Enterprise Platform Programme and Enterprise Stabilisation Fund. 
Due to the Statement’s construction methodology and the system of compiling data 
at the concerned Govt. departments, it is nearly impossible to gauge incubator 
impact on economic development indicators. This essentially makes a majority of the 
indicators used in the Statement meaningless: for instance, when the reader comes 
across an indicator ‘% of Greenfield jobs approved or created’ or ‘X new HPSUs 
supported’, questions beg to be asked: what is the quality of those jobs?; what % of 
those jobs are ‘blue collar’?; ‘what sort of commitments do we have from the 
supported HPSUs that they in what ways will benefit the Irish economy’? 
 
At the overall expenditure of €536 million (approximately), 71 new High Potential 
Start-Up (HPSU) enterprises and 959 other enterprises were supported by the 
County Enterprise Boards. With further enquiries and more desk research, arguably, 
it may be possible to draw a straight line between expenditure on incubators and a 
number of economic development indicators, however, the ‘real’ and ‘true’ impact of 
incubators as it has been suggested by past researchers, can not be gauged in such 
a simplistic manner (Tamásy, 2007; Sofouli & Vonortas, 2007; Tamásy, 2001; Roper, 
1999; Sherman, 1999; Rudy, 2004). Incubators are very useful ‘packaged 
programmes’ for the curbing of entrepreneurial risk and the promotion of new 
ventures (Hughes et al, 2007; Ndabeni, 2008; Benson, 2008; Cooper & Park, 2008; 
Hongyi et al, 2007), however, they are also highly sophisticated when it comes to 
management, service delivery and evaluation (Sherman & Chappell, 1998).  
 
There is currently a national association for Irish CECs in existence with regional 
chapters, however, sources have informed that this body is not well coordinated, 
lacks capacity, resources and most of all ownership. The ITs also have their own 
association but allegedly suffers from similar coordination and control problems.  
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An Example of How an Interview Transcript was Coded 
 
Date:  ________________ 
Start time:  ________________  Client Name: __________________ 
End time:  ________________  Interview No: __________________ 
 
Researcher: XXXXXX, thank you again for taking out time to 
see me. As you know this is our third meeting and at this stage 
in my research I am finding a number of interesting patterns 
which I would like to discuss with you today. Is this okay? 
 
Client: Sure, happy to be of any help. 
 
Researcher: Before we begin, is it okay if I record this, it is 
customary to ask? 
 
Client: No problem there, I say everything on record. 
 
Researcher: The thing that is coming across quite prominently 
I suppose is that perspective matters. If you look at incubation 
from the perspective of XXXXXX, XXXXXX and their office it is 
totally different to when it is viewed from the tenants 
perspective. As many tenants as I have spoken to I am getting 
different views on how they see this facility, its goals, their own 
role, what incubation is about and how that has changed since 
the time they moved in to the time that they have spent now. 
Their ideas are not fixed, they seem to have changed over 
time. And this is very interesting. 
 
Last time, we sort of, spoke about your personal background 
and your approach to setting up and running your business. 
We also spoke about your dealings with XXXXX and her staff. 
Today, I want to us to go back in time a little and talk about 
your experiences of how you got here and your views on what 
business incubation is and how it works. 
 
From the time you came in, you probably had some ideas 
about enterprise centres, what came to your mind then, what 
could this place offer to you? 
 
Client: For me it was cost effective rent. In this part of Dublin, I 
was looking for a business unit and I had a budget and what I 
was offered here was quite reasonable considering what the 
market generally was offering. 
 
Researcher: So it was mostly about subsidised rent and there 
was no notion in there about the support services offered, 
shared facilities etc.? 
 
Client: No, I had no idea. 
 





Researcher: I see. 
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Client: I only came because of the rent, and I only knew 
because they advertised on Daft, if it were not for this, I would 
never have known that this place existed. And the fact that 
they have these other supports and services, when I enquired I 
have absolutely no idea that they were offered.  
 
Researcher: Now that you have been here for sometime; if 
you were going to tell a friend about this place and what was 
offered here, what would you say? 
 
Client: I would say that it is a Centre where you can get cheap 
rent in if you were to start your business. They are quite 
flexible in their relationships with tenants, especially with 
rental, if you can’t pay for a month you can go and have a chat 
about it. They collect your post and other simple things that I 
wouldn’t have thought of when I first came in here, do you 
know what I mean? There is no post office in XXXXXX, they 
put all the stamps on. For me that would have been a huge 
headache. I suppose, another thing is that you can talk to 
people here in the Centre and they are all in the same boat as 
you, so you can bounce off ideas, see how they are doing, 
discuss your own problems and you get ideas from that as 
well. 
 
Researcher: This is very interesting? Have you had any 
engagements with other tenants here, you did mention that 
you spoke with XXXXXX at XXXXXX and XXXXXX.  
 
Client: Also XXXXXX. 
 
Researcher: So its three tenants, very good, so how did you 
come to know them? 
 
Client: Well XXXXXX I used them to get uniforms made for my 
staff, XXXXXX I think XXXXXX told him to come see me and 
XXXXXX the receptionist told me about them.  
 
Researcher: I see, do you go to the Monday coffee mornings? 
 
Client: Some of them, not all, sometimes I am just too busy. 
Even the courses, the classes you know, they are on in the 
evening or at night, sometimes I don’t leave till 10 so the last 
thing I want to do is to attend a course at that stage, I just want 
to go home. I think the courses should be during the lunch 
time.  
 
Researcher: So as I am understanding it, convenience and 
timing would be your two key issues? 
 
Client: Yes, I think the tenants would be better attended to if 
these courses were made more accessible time-wise. 
 
Researcher: So, besides the benefits of client networking and 
the shared support facilities like post and the subsidised rental, 
do you have any views on some of the other support services 
here like coaching and targeted business advice? 
 
Client: See, I never use that. 
 
Researcher: How come? 
Motivation to pursue (8.3) 
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Client: I know my own…I know I have a lot to achieve…I did 
notice these, but lets say Dublin City Enterprise Board 
assigned a…what is it…a mentor…? 
 
Researcher: Yes, a mentor. 
 
Client: I felt I knew twice as much.  
 
Researcher: I see, so you thought the mentor was not upto 
speed with things? 
 
Client: No he wasn’t. 
 
Researcher: I just thought that it was a waste of my time. 
 
Client: I am a qualified accountant with good business 
experience, I thought he was going to add something to my 
knowledge, but it was generally a chat, if I wanted a chat I 
could just pop-in and chat with my friends in the exact same 
way, you know what I mean (laughs). 
 
Researcher: So you are saying that it was purely therapeutic? 
 
Client: Yes, more so than mentoring. I don’t know, I asked him 
if I could apply for a bank loan for my business and he told me 
that it wouldn’t work, but he was wrong. 
 
Researcher: What about with XXXXXX, XXXXXX and other 
people downstairs, do you talk with them sometimes, I know 
you mentioned that you ran into them in the hall way and the 
reception area, but do you speak to them specifically about 
whats going on in your business? 
 
Client:  If I went to talk to them that I would think that would be 
when I knew that she knows something that I didn’t. XXXXXX 
sends emails about awards and different competitions and 
says that maybe you should enter this one and infact I did. I 
probably wouldn’t have if she hadn’t brought it to my attention. 
She told me about micro finance for start-ups, never heard of 
them, but she told me…and that was just a meeting in the 
corridor.  
 
Researcher: And did you apply? 
 
Client: Yes, I did for 25K. But in saying that, she just told me 
about it, I wrote my own business plan, I did my own 
projections…I just latched onto her idea, she just told me oh 
look at this…and I went online and read up on it on the website 
all by myself, you know what I mean? But, I have an extra 
advantage that I am an accountant, that I can go and say oh 
yeah this is a good thing, I can make my own business plan 
and do my own projections, I don’t need…such advice. 
 
Researcher: What if you had a problem which was out of your 
own skill set, lets say a legal problem or marketing problem, 
not that you have one… 
 
Client: We already have a solicitor in town. 
 
Researcher: I see, so you are inclined to use your own 
Prior experience tainting 
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resources and your own networks. What if I were to say to you, 
do you feel you could ever have a problem that you may not 
be able to handle? 
 
Client: I am sure there is, but I don’t think you could get the 
answer in here, you know what I mean. 
 
Researcher: And why do you say that? 
 
Client: Well the girls at the front desk are good at general sort 
of business advice, I don’t want to be harping on about this but 
if I went to XXXXXX and said I have this legal problem, she 
would tell me to go ask a solicitor. What help can they be to 
me. They have offered this service for free. 
 
Researcher: So what you are saying is that any specific legal 
advice or advice on your books cannot be free? 
 
Client: Yes, it is to be paid for. 
 
Researcher: If it was free you wouldn’t value it? 
 
Client: No (laughs), I would think to myself, how much does 
this person know about what I am saying. 
 
Researcher: Very interesting insight because the way 
incubators are setup, they are supposed to be offering free 
advice or they have panels of experts setup to help tenants, 
because it is difficult for an incubator manager to be an expert 
in all aspects of the business cycle. So if I were to say to you 
that there is such a panel of experts and that they could help 
you, what would you say? 
 
Client: The problem is that it goes back to the same old 
saying, if people are not getting paid then how much interested 
are they going to take in your project. Any legal issues I would 
have would be of a high level nature, I am dealing with 
people’s eyes, I am dealing with the HSE and a lot of people 
would just veer away from the type of questions I would have. 
 
Researcher: How would you describe your relationship with 
XXXXXX and her team, it strictly professional or… 
 
Client: It is both professional and personal, she is the 
manager, you can push boundaries to a point you know, but 
you have to know where to stop… 
 
Researcher: What do you think is her role, what is she 
supposed to be doing? 
 
Client: Make sure the rentals are paid on time, follow up on 
rentals, make sure the corridors and other health hazards are 
looked after and are tidy, any lights that break or need fixing… 
 
Researcher: So is it mostly house keeping? 
 
Client: Yes, house keeping. 
 
Researcher: Other than house keeping, do you think the 
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Client: Ah maybe advising new start-ups, some of those 
people who have no business experience at all, like an artist 
starting up a business, somebody who doesn’t know anything 
at all. 
 
Researcher: Am I then understanding this correctly; you would 
only approach the manager if there was a problem related to 
the facility or your unit but not if you had a business specific 
problem? 
 
Client: Not with the current business, no, but I am setting up 
another online business so I asked her about setting up an 
online web shop. I asked her about that because she owned 
one in the past and understood the pit falls of it. 
 
Researcher: Are you then saying that for any incubator 
manager to be credible enough to be able to advise they 
personally ought to have gone through the trials and 
tribulations of entrepreneurship? 
 
Client: They have to understand that in the first six months 
you don’t make any money, so there will be a cash flow 
problem and it would be difficult to pay rentals. I understand 
that they have to run this facility and pay their staff salaries 
and all this to be done…but its upto the manager to be aware 
of. I will give you an example, we were here two months and 
we had a problem, not with XXXXXX but with the previous 
manager, in order for us to set up a business in the Republic 
we needed an address and to qualify for contract we had 
signed. I took up this unit in October of 2006 and did not move 
in until December, so I wasn’t in two months, I had paid the 
rent and the manager kept on ringing me every two minutes 
‘when are you coming in, when are you moving in’, I couldn’t 
move in because I didn’t know whether I was going to get the 
contract. She said ‘why did you take up an office when you 
didn’t have a contract’, but I needed an address to get the 
contract. And then when I did get the contract I had to do 
advertising material so I was only here only part time because 
there were other things to be done. She asks ‘where are you’, 
but I am doing advertising material. Do you know what I 
mean? So I moved in properly in the middle of January. They 
don’t realise that there is a time lag, the foot woman… 
 
Researcher: You mean the Chiropractor? 
 
Client: Yeah, she took up the unit even before her equipment 
was ordered…there should be some understanding… 
 
Researcher: Do you see a different between how XXXXXX 
managed this place and how XXXXXX is doing it now? 
 
Client: I didn’t really get to know XXXXXX that much. My 
experience with XXXXXX was that she wanted me to move in 
straight away and kept on ringing me constantly about when I 
was moving in. Like, I am paying the rent, I have moved in my 
things, 3 desks, chairs, filing cabinets. I could see her concern 
if I wasn’t paying the rent, but when you are paying the rent 
every month and she knows that you have business idea and 
even gave her an explanation as to why we hadn’t moved 
 
Role of the IM: Advise 
people who are new start-
ups with lack of experience. 
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Client: Back to my point, that if she had started up a business 
herself…theory is one thing and practice is another… 
 
Researcher: I see where you are coming from. Okay, let me 
put this to you, if you were in XXXXX’s chair, how would you 
run this place? 
  
Client: How would I run this place…eerrmmm….first I will give 
the new tenants freedom to do what they want with the office, 
so if they want to put one chair in, one desk and a computer. I 
wouldn’t interfere initially with them because they are obviously 
laying the foundations down the business hasn’t taken off yet, 
what they are doing is putting the building blocks down for a 
new business. I would ofcourse expect them to pay the rent 
but I would ask them from time to time what is your cashflow 
like blah de blah. Then lets say three months have passed, I 
would ask them how they are getting on, how they are settling 
in, you know, if the office is okay, if the facility is okay, and just 
general chat to them. And if they were to say to me that their 
plan wasn’t taking off or their business wasn’t taking off, I 
would tell them that there are support groups. I would actually 
ask them, in what area of your business are you having 
problems…like another issue I had was finding staff…basic 
administration staff, I didn’t want anybody highly 
accomplished, it was a problem… 
 
Researcher: How did you manage to resolve this recruitment 
issue? 
 
Client: Jobs.ie – I paid Euro 40 for it but FAS had a free 
service but I didn’t know about it. 
 
Researcher: After lets say one year has gone by, the tenant is 
paying their rental predictably, what kind of an approach would 
you adopt then, a more proactive interventionist type of an 
approach where you would see if they were meeting certain 
set targets and meeting their objectives…or… 
 
Client: It all depends on the individual totally, some people 
with no business background, would want that, others 
wouldn’t, so you have to judge each business person 
separately, each entrepreneur is different, you could get a very 
structured person who will take on this type of advice, and 
might take it literally, Another instance is that there is a 
business which is struggling, then the input would be very 
much welcome. I think you have to judge the business by 
judging the person in it.  
 
Researcher: So if you were to look at a pool of entrepreneurs 
out there, experienced ones, technology ones, so on, on what 
basis would you select individuals for incubation? 
 
Client: If you had an enterprise centre where you selected 
people based on what you want, lets say for example you 
selected only creative people, they would have little business 
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time, there will be no structure there. But if there is a good 
mixture, some technology, some health care, some 
creative…you know what I mean…then you will have people in 
the canteen talking about different things. A serious thing is 
also competition, if I setup a business that is similar to another 
business here then there might be a problem but if there is a 
good environment where people feel comfortable in talking to 
each other then it maybe a good thing. 
 
Researcher: Last question; can you describe, if you don’t 
mind me asking, what happened a few weeks ago in the 
canteen, there was some discussion about you firing someone 
and XXXXXX intervening… 
 
Client: (private and confidential) 
 
Researcher: Thank you for that XXXXXX. Is it okay if we talk 
again? 
 
Client: Yeah that’s okay, just email me. 
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 Client Respondent Quotes & Critical Incident Summaries 
 
Clients Industry Nature No. of Quotes and 





Client 1 Energy / Power Design 2 (pp. 153, 215)  
Client 2 Energy / Power Equip. Manufacture 2 (pp. 164, 189)  
Client 3 Energy / Petroleum Project Management 2 (pp. 153, 229)  
Client 4 General Social Entrepreneur  3 (pp. 146, 188, 240)  
Client 5 General Medical Diagnostics 2 (pp. 164, 229)  
Client 6 General Bespoke Stitching  1 (pp. 164) 2 
Client 7 General Health / Therapy   2 (pp. 147, 153)  
Client 8 General Consulting & Training 2 (pp. 169, 215)  
Client 9 Food Web Portal  2 (pp. 165, 239)  
Client 10 Food Processing & Sales 2 (pp. 159, 189) 1 
Client 11 Food Processing & Sales 2 (pp. 164, 190) 1 
Client 12  Food Processing & Sales 2 (pp. 152, 189) 1 
Client 13  Construction Recruitment 2 (pp. 153, 169)  
Client 14  Insurance / Energy Consulting 2 (pp. 169, 241)  
Client 15 Software Sales 3 (pp. 164, 190, 202)  
Client 16 Hi-Tech / Knowledge
 
Consulting 3 (pp. 147, 184, 240) 1 
Client 17 Publishing Design / Printing 4 (pp. 153, 159, 169, 218)  
Client 18 Property Management 2 (pp. 165, 215)  
Client 19 Optical Web sales 2 (pp. 159, 241)  
Client 20 Optical  Testing / Sales 3 (pp. 157, 191, 243)  
Ex-Client ICT Internet & Web Dev.  1 
IncuWorks 
Client 21 ICT Consulting, design 2 (pp. 160, 228)  
Client 22 ICT Product design 1 (pp. 152)  
Client 23 ICT R&D 1 (pp. 147) 1 
Client 24 ICT Internet technologies  2 (pp. 156, 218)  
Client 25 ICT Internet technologies 2 (pp. 153, 191)  
Client 26 ICT Internet technologies 3 (pp. 154, 189, 244)  
Client 27 ICT Misc. 2 (pp. 147, 160)  
Client 28 ICT Software Development 3 (pp. 147, 156, 240) 1 
Client 29  ICT Internet technologies 1 (pp. 189) 1 
Client 30  ICT Internet technologies 1 (pp. 187) 1 
Client 31  Telecom IP Commercialisation 2 (pp. 153, 187, 240)  
Client 32 General / Hi-tech Consulting 2 (pp. 152, 190)  
Client 33 General / Hi-tech Consulting  1 (pp. 216)  
Client 34 Bio-Tech Fuel 3 (pp. 187, 191, 243)  
Client 35  Bio-Tech Engineering R&D 2 (pp. 196, 228)  
Client 36 Bio-Tech Clinical trials, testing 2 (pp. 160, 216)  
Client 37  Bio-Tech Drug Testing / Dev. 1 (pp. 152)  
Client 38  Bio-Tech R&D 2 (pp. 160, 217)  
Client 39  Bio-Tech Clinical R&D 2 (pp. 157, 240)  
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An Example of the role of Unpredictable, Chance or Random 
Variables on the Life-world of Clients 
 
Two clients at IncuWorks recalled that they could never envision long term 
venture capital support which came as a result of them participating in an 
international competition of innovative business ideas and coming across an 
investor who was interested in precisely the sort of areas that their companies 
were working on. Similarly, a fiercely independent client at DubInc who was 
against any sort of state subsidy but on the insistence of the IM very casually 
applied to Enterprise Ireland for a grant, not expecting (or indeed requiring) an 
award, however, against all expectations was committed a substantial award 
without much scrutiny and hassle – as a result the client made substantial 
new investment in expansion. Chance meetings and introductions to other 
clients in the cafeteria led to a number of in-formal alliances; one client 
randomly ended up with a like minded neighbour which led to them joining 
forces to jointly bid for a large government contract.  
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End of document. 
 
